

H. S. Harris

Hegel's Development

* *

NIGHT THOUGHTS
(JENA 1801-1806)

HEGEL'S DEVELOPMENT



Night Thoughts
(Jena 1801–1806)

BY

H. S. HARRIS

CLARENDON PRESS · OXFORD
1983

*Oxford University Press, Walton Street, Oxford OX2 6DP
London Glasgow New York Toronto
Delhi Bombay Calcutta Madras Karachi
Kuala Lumpur Singapore Hong Kong Tokyo
Nairobi Dar es Salaam Cape Town
Melbourne Auckland
and associate companies in
Beirut Berlin Ibadan Mexico City*

*Oxford is a trade mark of Oxford
University Press*

*Published in the United States by
Oxford University Press, New York*

© H. S. Harris 1983

*All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without
the prior permission of Oxford University Press*

*British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Harris, H. S.*

*Hegel's development: night thoughts (Jena
1801–1806)*

1. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich

1. Title

193 B2948

ISBN 0–19–824654–4

*Printed in Great Britain by
Thomson Litho Ltd, East Kilbride, Scotland*

To
MY MOTHER
and to
the memory of
MY FATHER

O THOU, whose word from solid darkness struck
That spark, the sun, strike wisdom from my soul . . .
Through this opaque of nature and of soul,
This double night, transmit one pitying ray,
To lighten and to cheer. O lead my mind,
(A mind that fain would wander from its woe)
Lead it thro' various scenes of life and death,
And from each scene the noblest truths inspire.
Nor less inspire my conduct than my song . . .

(EDWARD YOUNG, *The Complaint*, Night I)

. . . das Absolute ist die Nacht, und das Licht jün-
ger als sie, und der Unterschied beyder, so wie das
Heraustreten des Lichts aus der Nacht, eine abso-
lute Differenz . . .

(*Differenzschrift*, 1801)

Diss Eine Wissen, dass im Absoluten Alles gleich
ist, der unterscheidenden und erfüllten oder Erfül-
lung suchenden und fodernden Erkenntniss ent-
gegenzusetzen, —oder sein *Absolutes* für die Nacht
auszugeben, worin, wie man zu sagen pflegt, alle
Kuhe schwarz sind, ist die Naivität der Leere an
Erkenntniss.

(*Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Vorrede, 1807)

Four Mighty Ones are in every Man a Perfect Unity
Cannot Exist, but from the Universal Brotherhood of Eden
The Universal Man. To Whom be Glory Evermore Amen.

(WILLIAM BLAKE, *The Four Zoas*, Night the First)

PREFACE

I dated my preface to *Hegel's Development I: Toward the Sunlight* for Hegel's two hundredth birthday. These 'Night Thoughts' following just ten years later, are signed and sealed as the year in which we shall observe the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of his death begins. The decade of gestation has involved much hard study, and continual revision of positions previously adopted. The writing has stretched out over two sabbatical years with a seven-year interval between them. I have tried hard to maintain both the consistency and the clarity of my presentation, but I can scarcely dare to hope that I have succeeded perfectly.

When I began this book almost none of the (quite voluminous) surviving essays and manuscripts from Hegel's Jena years had been translated into English; and there has been almost no serious critical discussion of any of this material in English, since the days of Stirling and Baillie (who did not have most of the documents). Even Charles Taylor leaps straight from the Frankfurt years to the *Phenomenology*. Only T. M. Knox, Z. A. Pelczynski, Shlomo Avineri, R. Plant, and, most recently, Bernard Cullen, have shown any consciousness that something important happened in the interim. (Also we do now have in translation, the major works of two French and one German pioneer in the field, Kojève, Hyppolite, and Lukács.)

The inaccessibility of Hegel's texts is a serious handicap, which I have myself struggled to remove, or at least to alleviate, during the decade; and my first words of gratitude must go to the collaborators who laboured with me—to Walter Cerf and to T. M. Knox, doyen of our Hegel translators, now, alas, gone from among us. This labour of translation goes on, with yet other collaborators, and I have good hope that even the 'Logic

and *Metaphysics*' of 1804/5 may yet see the light of day in an English dress.

The fact that this same '*Logic and Metaphysics*' was for so long, and until so recently, assigned to 1801/2, is one of the principal reasons why the scarcity of previous critical studies in English (or of works translated into English) need not be lamented. The new chronology of the Jena manuscripts, based on the research of Heinz Kimmerle, published only in 1967, has put all students of this period into the situation of pioneers; and the discovery less than four years ago, of some manuscript fragments that really do come from 1801/2, has sent us all back to the starting-line with respect to those crucial years of Hegel's collaboration with Schelling. In this perspective it is almost an advantage to have so little prior discussion to take account of; for it means that one has no established prejudices to fight against, or deep-rooted mistakes to eradicate.

The necessity of a new beginning is the reason why the reader will find few references in this volume to authors like Haering and Lukàcs whose names recurred so often in *Toward the Sunlight*. I have done my best to keep up with the stream of work that has appeared (mainly in German) since 1967. Certainly I am more indebted than appears on the surface to the earlier scholars—probably more indebted to them than I myself realize or could ever adequately acknowledge. But it is the volumes of the *Hegel-Studien* that have never been out of my hands—except when the needed volume was lost in the heaps around my chair. And it is to the writers of those volumes, and especially to the editors of the Critical Edition (a subset of the same group) to whom I owe the greatest conscious debt. My footnotes are an eloquent, if not adequate, testimony of what I owe them.

Several institutions and many people have aided me in various ways. York University and the Canada Council (now the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council) have financed the two sabbatical leaves which made most of the work possible. Colleagues and friends all over the world have put me on the track of books and information on specific points. But the book owes most to my wife, Ruth Koski Harris (PhD., Biochemistry) who typed every page of it, with all the corrected versions, drew all the diagrams, and in the process saved me

from many errors—often giving me good ideas in their place. In particular, if I have managed to avoid scientific blunders in my discussions of the philosophy of nature, the credit is all hers. For although I have nourished an amateur interest in the history and philosophy of science for many years, and although I believe that Hegel's conception of the philosophy of nature is one of his most vital legacies for the present day, I am myself a model instance of the alienation in English culture against which C. P. Snow so justly complained. I never had a formal science lesson after my fourteenth birthday.

H.S.H.

Glendon College, York University
Toronto
The Vigil of Albert the Great, 1980

During the final stages of the book's production—and consequently in the interval since the above was written—I have had further help from two people whom I wish to thank here: Mrs. Helen Patey did valuable work in the early stages of preparing the Analytical Index; and my daughter Anne has helped me enormously with all of the proofreading, and in the later stages of index making. (Once more it was my wife who did the typing.) Last, but by no means least, I want to thank my Departmental Secretary, Mrs I. Sabag, who has helped in many ways, and at all stages; and the staff of the Clarendon Press—of whom the same can be said.

H.S.H.

CONTENTS

NOTE ON REFERENCES AND ABBREVIATIONS	xvi
--------------------------------------	-----

PROCESSIONAL PRELUDE: Nocturne for the 'Son of the Gods'	xix
1 'Schelling's stout Warrior'	xix
2 The Doctor of Philosophy	xxv
3 The Critical Journalist	xxxiii
4 The Extraordinary Professor	xlvi
5 The Private Man	lxiii

BOOK I: MOONLIGHT

I: THE NEW LOGIC AND THE OLD METAPHYSICS	3
1 The Ideal in reflective form	3
2 Absolute reflection and speculation	14
3 Intellectual intuition	22
4 'Logic and Metaphysics'	26
5 The categories	35
6 Concept, Judgement, and Syllogism	43
7 Metaphysics	52
II: HEGEL'S FIRST PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE	74
1 The 'true Physics'	74
2 The Solar System in the <i>Dissertation</i>	82
3 Mechanism, Chemism, and Organism	97
III: THE NATURE OF FINITE SPIRIT	102
1 The <i>System of Ethical Life</i>	102
2 The intuition of life	108
3 The institution of property	117
4 The experience of liberty	124
5 The Idea of the Community	131

IV: THE 'RESUMPTION OF THE WHOLE INTO ONE'	144
1 The life story of God	144
2 The triangulation of the Trinity	157
3 The motion of the triangles	166
4 The half triangles of Cognition	172
5 The 'Resting Square'	179
APPENDIX: The full report of Rosenkranz concerning the 'Triangle of Triangles'	184

BOOK II: HESPERUS AND PHOSPHORUS

V: 'THROUGH PHILOSOPHY TO LEARN TO LIVE'	191
1 Night and day	191
2 The 'Outline of Universal Philosophy'	200
3 'Consciousness' and 'Spirit'	207
4 Absolute Spirit in the 'Outline'	213
5 Philosophy as Absolute Cognition	226
VI: THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE IN 1803/4	238
1 Hegel's materialism	238
2 Matter as motion	244
3 The fluidity of matter	252
4 Terrestrial 'physics'	261
5 The theory of organism	279
VII: THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPIRIT IN 1804	299
1 The concept of Consciousness	299
2 The evolution of consciousness	308
3 Language, tool, and patrimony	319
4 The struggle for recognition, and life in the <i>Volk</i>	329
5 The Absolute Spirit	334
VIII: THE LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS OF 1804/5	340
1 The approach to Hegel's logic	340
2 The logic of understanding (or 'simple connection')	345
3 The Infinite	362
4 Substance, Cause, and Reciprocity	366
5 Concept, Judgement, and Syllogism	375
6 Logical and metaphysical cognition	381
7 Self, World, and Supreme Being	386

BOOK III: THE DAYLIGHT OF THE PRESENT

IX: 'TO TEACH PHILOSOPHY TO SPEAK GERMAN'	397
1 The polemic against mysticism and formalism	397
2 The polemic against romanticism	402
3 The revolution in Hegel's logic	410
X: THE NATURAL PHILOSOPHY OF 1805/6	419
1 Mechanics or the Theory of Matter	419
2 Shape and Chemism	425
3 Physics	434
4 The Organism	441
5 Plants and Animals	451
XI: THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPIRIT OF 1805/6	467
1 The Concept of Spirit	467
2 The Concept of Volition	479
3 Legal Status	487
4 Law	492
5 The Constitution	499
6 The Social Classes and the Government	507
7 Absolute Spirit	512
APPENDIX: Hegel's diagram of Spirit as Organism	523
RECESSIONAL VOLUNTARY: Fugue of the 'Olympian in Shepherd Guise'	545
1 Theme: the muse of meaning	545
2 Fauxbourdon: the ground-bass of Nature	551
3 <i>Ricercare a tre voci</i> : the ideal of Society	559
4 The fugue of thought and life	565
INDEXES	
a. Chronological Index	574
b. Bibliographical Index	582
c. Analytical Index	595

NOTE ON REFERENCES AND ABBREVIATIONS

In referring to the more fragmentary texts among Hegel's posthumously published manuscripts, I have followed the convention set by Gisela Schöler and Heinz Kimmerle of identifying each fragment by its opening phrase or *incipit*. This practice avoids all the ambiguities of titles supplied by editors, and it also enables us to distinguish at need between the different drafts or stages in the composition of any single essay. The source references indicate clearly where the most accurate published texts are to be found; and wherever an English translation is known to me I have referred to it. The chronological index provides a full conspectus of all the texts referred to. Together with the similar index in my *Toward the Sunlight* it provides a complete list of Hegel's writings down to 1807 (so far as these are known to us).

Almost all references to sources, whether primary or secondary, have been abbreviated in the footnotes. For books I generally give the author's (editor's, translator's) name with the page number of the work referred to. The remaining details can be found quickly and easily in the Bibliographical Index which is arranged alphabetically by author (including all necessary cross references). It seems to me that this is preferable to hunting for the first occurrence of a work which recurs perpetually as 'op. cit.'. Books and articles which are cited incidentally (and usually only once) are given their full description in the footnote (but they are also included in the Bibliography).

The following abbreviations are employed regularly:

Akad. *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, herausgegeben von der
Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften,
Reimer, Berlin, 1902-38.

- Briefe* *Briefe von und an Hegel*, herausgegeben von Johannes Hoffmeister und Rolf Flechsig, F. Meiner, Hamburg, 1961.
- D.K. *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, herausgegeben von H. Diels und W. Kranz, 7th edn. 3 vols., Berlin, 1954.
- Dok.* *Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung*, herausgegeben von Johannes Hoffmeister, Fromann, Stuttgart, 1936.
- GSA* Hölderlin, *Sämtliche Werke* (Grosse Stuttgarter Ausgabe), herausgegeben von Friedrich Beißner und Adolf Beck, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1946 ff.
- IJP* *Independent Journal of Philosophy*.
- NKA* Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke*, herausgegeben von der Rheinisch-Westfaelischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Hamburg, F. Meiner, 1968 ff. (new critical edn.).
- TW-A* Hegel, *Werke*, herausgegeben von E. Moldenhauer und K. M. Michel, 20 vols., Frankfurt, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970-1 (Theorie Werkausgabe).
- Toward the Sunlight* H. S. Harris, *Hegel's Development: Toward the Sunlight 1770-1801*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971.

PROCESSIONAL PRELUDE:

Nocturne for the 'Son of the Gods'

I. 'Schelling's Stout Warrior'

At midnight on 31 December 1800 the eighteenth century of the Christian era ended and the nineteenth dawned. For Hegel, who had just entered a new decade in his own life, the epoch was not simply political and cultural, it was personal as well. He was about to embark on a new career of his own choice. His financial resources were slender and his prospects doubtful at best, but his hopes and his ambitions were high. He greeted the new century with a poetic 'Resolution' which expressed them forcefully:

Break then, peace with thyself, break with the work of the world!
Strive, seek something more than today or yesterday! So wilt thou
Better not be than the time, but still be the time at its best!¹

The new century found him resolved to go to the University of Jena and carve a place for himself, if he could, as a philosopher. The possibility of doing something of the sort had opened for him with his father's death, nearly two years earlier, in the middle of January 1799.² At the very end of Hegel's career as a student, Schnurrer, the Ephor of the *Stift* at Tübingen hazarded the guess in a letter of September 1793 that Hegel's will counted for more than his father's at home.³ But it would seem that basically he was wrong. For the obstinate resistance of Georg Ludwig Hegel to his son's

¹ The little poem 'Entschluss' is known to us only through a report in the *Vossische Zeitung* of Nov. 1841, where it is assigned simply to the year 1801. But if we assume that the year was given on the MS (as it must have been) while day and month were not (which is probable but not certain) the occasion for the poem seems obvious. The original will be most readily found in *Dok.*, p. 388.

² See Letter 28 (from Christiane, 15 Jan. 1799), *Briefe*, i. 58.

³ See the letter to J. E. H. Scholl, in Hölderlin, *GSA*, vii. 1, 462.

wishes in the matter of a career was well known to that son's close friends in the *Stift*, and long and firmly remembered by at least one of them.¹ Hegel himself (in a *curriculum vitae* of September 1804) specifically mentions that 'after my father's death I resolved to devote myself entirely to philosophic science'.² Every reader will instantly perceive, as his biographer Rosenkranz did, that he was alluding to the opportunity for a fresh start which his modest inheritance represented. But if, as Rosenkranz says, Hegel 'thought eagerly' of an academic career at this point, we can be sure that it was not now entering his mind for the first time.³

All the same—and Rosenkranz notes this too—Hegel took his time about his entry upon a new life, and set about preparing for it in a very deliberate fashion. He spent at least eighteen months more in 'unhappy Frankfurt' than he needed to if he was actually unhappy there. The truth seems rather to be that in this period he was quite happy, and very busy over the completion of his 'System'.⁴ His inheritance was settled by April 1799 (3154 Gulden, 24 Kreuzer, 4 Pfennige); and, had he been as eager to start a new career then as he certainly was in Switzerland in 1796,⁵ he would have moved very much faster than he did.

Instead he went on studying and writing until November 1800 before he approached Schelling for help in settling into a new place. Even then he was not quite ready in his own mind for a university post, though he did say that he was looking for a way to make an impact on public life. He told Schelling that he wanted a place where living was cheap, the beer good, and the religion preferably Catholic; a place where he could finish the studies that he already had in hand, *before* he ventured into the 'literary storm' of Jena.⁶

At this point he had just completed a fairly solid manuscript on the philosophy of religion; and he had begun trying to

¹ See Leutwein's reminiscences, *Hegel-Studien*, iii. 55, lines 97–102.

² *Briefe*, iv. 92.

³ Rosenkranz, p. 142. Rosenkranz will have seen the *curriculum vitae* no doubt. But he also had access to family letters and papers that have not all survived.

⁴ For the context of the phrase 'unhappy Frankfurt' see Letter 167 (Hegel to Sinclair, mid-Oct. 1810), *Briefe*, i. 333. For a discussion of its real significance see *Toward the Sunlight*, pp. 260–1.

⁵ See *Toward the Sunlight*, pp. 258–70.

⁶ Letter 29 (to Schelling, 2 Nov. 1800) *Briefe*, i. 58–60.

apply the doctrines and ideals contained in it to the actual situation of Germany. It was this that was in his mind when he spoke of looking for a 'way back to influence on the life of men'; and it was this that he wanted to finish before he entered the 'literary storm' of Jena. But in writing to Schelling at this point, he clearly hoped to enlist his support for an entry there; and he cannot have been altogether surprised at, or averse to, the urgent invitation which he presumably received, to come straight to Jena. For it was to Jena, and not as he had suggested, to Bamberg, that he moved as the new century dawned. To Bamberg he was to go, eventually; but only after six years of struggle and disappointment, driven from his chosen career into a newspaper office, by the twin forces of private indigence and public catastrophe.

There were few clouds on the horizon, when Hegel came to live in the Klipsteinischen Garten on 21 January 1801. But Jena was no longer the city of hope to which Hölderlin had come with Charlotte von Kalb seven years before. When Hölderlin arrived there Fichte was delivering the first version of the *Wissenschaftslehre* from the lectern. Now Fichte was already branded as an atheist, and had been forced to leave in spite of his always vigorous efforts in his own defence. His departure marked the beginning of the end for the brief but brilliant cultural renaissance that Goethe managed to generate in the small principedom of Sachsen-Weimar. The *Atheismusstreit* reflected the changing climate in the wider world, the gathering strength of reaction against the ideals and tendencies of 1789. But the Weimar sunset was also, in large part, a function of the maturing of the cultural renaissance itself. Schelling was already preoccupied with the philosophy of Nature when he came to Jena in 1798, and this would have made his breach with Fichte inevitable even if they had remained in daily converse with each other. On the other side, the romantic ideals of the Schlegels could no longer be conciliated with the intellectual enlightenment of C. G. Schütz (editor of the *Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung* at Jena) once they had achieved independent existence in a journal of their own (the *Athenaeum*). Goethe could embrace all the cultural tendencies, and an awe-inspiring array of further activities, within his truly Olympian purview. But the ener-

gies of growth were themselves the forces of disruption, the seeds of destruction. Within a few years the creative forces were all divided and scattered. By the time that Schiller died in 1805, the great moment was over. The material setbacks of the University in the campaign of 1806, though they were serious enough, did not affect the vital issue. Nor was it a matter of personalities. It Goethe was the integrative focus, we might perhaps find the disruptive tendencies personified in Caroline Schlegel Schelling. But just as Goethe could not prevent the alienation of the different tendencies, so Caroline did not, in any important sense, cause it. She did indeed cause Schelling to become alienated from many who had been his friends, but this was because of the jealousy and antipathy that she aroused among the womenfolk who were their wives, not because of any overflow of emotional tension between the men themselves into their professional lives.¹

In all this cultural turmoil—the ‘literary storm’ of Jena—Hegel’s fate was hardly more than an incidental detail. To himself he was a ‘Son of the Gods’; and there is evidence that, among his friends, Goethe and Schiller appreciated something of his quality. But to all who disliked the new philosophy he was nothing but a disciple of Schelling’s.² It was an extremely hostile, and not very noteworthy, critic who regaled the readers of the *Allgemeine Zeitung* in Hegel’s home town of Stuttgart with the news that ‘Schelling has now fetched a stout warrior to Jena from his fatherland Württemberg, through whom he gives notice to the astonished public, that even Fichte stands far below his own viewpoint’.³ But even outside observers who were less biased, accepted this view—not just of the *Difference* essay, but of Hegel’s activity

¹ The breach between Schelling and Paulus seems to be an exception here—see the documents in Fuhrmans, i, 259 ff. (esp. 260 n. 70).

² It is worthy of note that a gregarious and observant foreigner, with a good memory, had no distinct recollection of Hegel years later (when his fame and eminence made the failure a matter of regret). Henry Crabb Robinson, who retained a vivid image of Schelling, found references to Hegel in his own papers and letters (cf. Ch. III, pp. 102–3, below) when composing his reminiscences. But he could only conclude lamely, that this man by whom Schelling was later ‘dethroned from his metaphysical rank . . . must have been his pupil’. (*Diary, Reminiscences and Correspondence*, ed. T. Sadler, i, 70).

³ The anonymous reviewer of the Michaelmas publication list was actually Karl

generally. Schleiermacher, for instance, privately compared Hegel's client relationship to Schelling with the dependence of Köppen upon Jacobi (about which Hegel himself commented very scathingly in public).¹

Schelling himself gave credit to this rather derogatory conception of Hegel's position, and seems even to have shared it. A certain responsibility for Hegel was forced upon him by the general weight of opinion (as well as by the anonymity of everything published in the *Critical Journal*); and since Hegel was, as we shall soon see, a very forthright critic, this responsibility was at times slightly embarrassing for Schelling who would probably have preferred to see rather more diplomacy exercised in some directions at least. But he was quite ready to agree with the strictures of A. W. Schlegel upon Hegel's 'Faith and Knowledge';² and he was not above blaming Hegel for weaknesses in one of his own essays which he had left the latter to revise for publication in his absence.³

Two closely related circumstances combined to create this general impression. In the first place, Hegel appeared on the scene as an acknowledged protégé of Schelling's. His only significant publication in his own name was an essay on the difference between Fichte's system and Schelling's, which was plainly written from the point of view of one who was totally committed to Schelling's position as there interpreted. Secondly, in his subsequent essays published anonymously in

August Böttiger. The only signed statement in the *Critical Journal* was Hegel's denunciation of this report as a lie (*NKA*, iv. 190 n.).

¹ For Schleiermacher's letter to K. G. von Brinkmann (26 Nov. 1803) see Nicolin, p. 52 (report 77). The context for the comparison is provided by an earlier letter (Nicolin, report 74) about Köppen's pamphlet on *Schelling's Doctrine, or the Entire Philosophy of the Absolute Nothing* (Hamburg, 1803). We should remember that Schleiermacher there expresses surprise that Köppen did not object to the way that Hegel treated his own *Discourses on Religion* as a development of Jacobi's philosophy (see *Faith and Knowledge*, *NKA*, iv. 385, 18–386, 36; Cerf and Harris, pp. 150–2). A certain element of pique may have influenced Schleiermacher himself. (Hegel's opinion of Köppen is expressed plainly enough in *Faith and Knowledge*—see *NKA*, iv. 370, 30–371, 35; Cerf and Harris, pp. 130–1).

² Nicolin, report 66. Schlegel's own letter has not survived.

³ Nicolin, report 68. Schelling's view of Hegel at this time as a sort of Grub Street drudge—which is clearly evident in this letter—is something that we ought to keep in mind when we come to consider his testimony many years later about the authorship of various disputed pieces in the *Critical Journal*. (And perhaps Hegel's indignant awareness of Schelling's attitude, lies behind some of the apparently mischievous claims to authorship that he made too.)

the *Critical Journal*, whatever did not plainly derive from Schelling's inspiration was, generally speaking, not intelligible at all. Complaints of Hegel's unintelligibility begin to be heard as soon as the first acknowledged or plainly identifiable products of his pen came off the press. The difficulty of reading what he wrote became a mark by which his anonymous contributions were identified. The very objects of his attack, who were naturally curious about the identity of their attacker, used this criterion in assigning responsibility for different parts of what they all tended to call 'Schelling's Journal'. 'If only the wretched Hegel could write better,' says Jacobi in a letter to Reinhold, 'I often have trouble in understanding him. It is the bad style that makes me certain it is he, and not Schelling who was guiding the pen in this essay (i.e. *Faith and Knowledge*).' Friedrich Schlegel wrote to his brother from Paris (in March 1804) that 'Hegelisms' make him sick, and that his time is too valuable to waste it reading any more of 'this fellow'.²

It is not too surprising that no one could understand the published essays, for the critical—indeed polemical—form in which they were couched was not appropriate for the constructive expression of positive views in anything more than a programmatic or outline statement; and the only detailed filling available for any such programme was Schelling's. But even Hegel's lecturing style—his *Vortrag*—was bad. Schiller and Goethe, whose opinion of Hegel was founded on personal contact and discussion rather than on reading what he wrote, consulted anxiously with one another about how they could best help him to improve it.³ But the

¹ Nicolin, report 65. Jacobi is remarkable, among the targets attacked in the *Critical Journal*, in that his private comments are more temperate than his public ones. He is one of the few who seems to recognize that there is something in Hegel's essays that *deserves* to be understood. It is not surprising that when he and Hegel became better acquainted, they were soon friends.

² Nicolin, report 83a.

³ Nicolin, reports 75, 78–80. One student thought—quite rightly—that Hegel's lecturing style had improved in 1805 (*ibid.*, report 90), but Goethe's opinion was unchanged in 1807 (report 126). Hegel himself thought that his 8 years in the Gymnasium had given him clarity and freedom. Certainly the lectures of his Berlin years make easier reading than the Jena drafts. If it is true, as Hegel himself wrote in 1816, that as a beginner he was 'bound to the letter of his copy' then the lot of his Jena classes was indeed a hard one (*Briefe*, ii. 73). All the evidence is briefly cited and surveyed by H. Kimmeler in *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 84–5.

trouble went deeper than they knew. One might say that this problem never was solved—though Hegel himself may have been, in the end, better satisfied than most of his hearers and readers. After 1800 he always remained a 'Son of the Gods' indeed—one who did not speak easily in the tongues of men. But we shall see that the tension between his formal commitment as a supporter of Schelling's system and the natural evolution of his own concerns and problems—expressed in what he was already calling his 'System' before he went to Jena—was the source of no little difficulty and uncertainty for Hegel himself in these years. If no one understood him at this stage, it was at least partly because he did not yet fully understand himself.

2. *The Doctor of Philosophy*

When he arrived in Jena Hegel must surely have intended to qualify as a lecturer as soon as he could. But he could hardly do so before the autumn, so there seemed to be plenty of time; and he wanted to finish the project he was working on—the political essay which he had thought to finish in peaceful retirement at Bamberg. So for about four months he worked busily at that.¹ The winter term ended and the summer term began—and it became evident that he must now do something more philosophical to make his mark before it was too late. No doubt Schelling, who had just published his *System of Transcendental Idealism* at Easter, was very urgent upon this score. So between the middle of May (probably) and some time in July (certainly) Hegel wrote an essay on the *Difference between Fichte's System of Philosophy and Schelling's*.²

This essay was a contribution to the new 'Philosophy of Identity' on its transcendental side, just as the Dissertation *On the Orbits of the Planets* which followed was a contribution to Identity Philosophy on its objective side—the philosophy of nature. But in both cases Hegel's position was more independent of Schelling's than it appeared. The 'general reflections' in the *Difference* essay probably stem largely from

¹ All this work is discussed in *Toward the Sunlight*, Ch. V.

² The Preface is dated July 1801; *NKA*, iv. 8 (Harris and Cerf, p. 83).

his meditations in Frankfurt; and the first (vernacular) draft of the dissertation was probably written there.¹

As soon as the *Differenzschrift* was ready for the printer it was submitted to J. A. Ulrich, the ordinary Professor of Moral and Political Philosophy for approval.² And as soon as the approval was given (probably) Hegel applied to the Philosophy Faculty for 'nostrification' and permission to lecture (*venia legendi*).³

'Nostrification' was the formal validation of a degree obtained elsewhere as equivalent to a certain rank or degree in 'our' institution. Hegel had to have his *Magisterdiplom*, his licence to teach from Tübingen, recognized at Jena. Until about one generation earlier the teachers at Jena had been called *magistri*—they were still so referred to in the existing regulations which dated from 1759, and frequently in ordinary academic parlance as well—but now they were officially *doctores*. At Tübingen those who cared about such things—a party among whom Hegel had not hitherto been numbered—insisted that a *Magister* of the University was as good as a *Doctor* from anywhere else. So on the title-page of the *Differenzschrift* Hegel 'nostrificates' himself and comes forth as *Doktor der Weltweisheit*.⁴ He uses the vernacular, I think, because the only Latin title that he could properly lay claim to was *Magister*. His formal application, which had to be submitted in Latin, says *Quum olim ad philosophiae magistri gradum promotus sim, nunc, quae vocari solet nostrificationem impetrem*. But he signs himself *Philosophiae Doctor*, and the Dean always accords him the title.⁵

¹ The dissertation had to be submitted in Latin. But Rosenkranz mentioned some 'calculations' and a 'German version' of three-quarters of the dissertation in a letter to Karl Hegel of May 1840. It emerges from Hegel's negotiations with the Faculty that he almost certainly had a German version of his dissertation written in August. But it seems hardly likely that he had just then written it (see Kimmerle, *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 148–9). The fragment *absolute Entgegensetzung gilt* bears witness to Hegel's current interest in Nature-Philosophy in 1800 (TW-A, i. 420–1; Knox, pp. 310–11).

² An official authorization had to be obtained before the MS could be printed. Presumably the authorities normally accepted the verdict of an appropriate referee—see Ulrich's *Votum*, *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 30 with n. 11 on p. 31.

³ His letter of application to Dean Voigt was written on 8 Aug. and presented to the Faculty by the Dean on 13 Aug. (*Hegel-Studien*, iv. 28).

⁴ NKA, iv. 3. For Hegel's earlier attitude to his Magisterial dignity see *Toward the Sunlight*, pp. 262–4.

⁵ Not everyone follows his example in their votes; and it is clearly a matter of

In his request for nostrification Hegel stated that he wished to give lectures on 'theoretical and practical philosophy'. It seems incredible that he should not have known that in order to obtain the *venia legendi* he must submit a dissertation and hold a public disputation on it. He may have thought that the *Difference* essay could be informally treated as a substitute for the dissertation.¹ Probably the Dean had told him that the fulfilment of the formal requirement could be delayed for a term as long as he gave the stipulated 'test-lecture' before classes began. At any rate that is what Dean Voigt recommended to the Faculty. But the rule that a dissertation must be submitted, and a disputation held, before permission to lecture could be granted had only recently been agreed on (or, more probably, clarified and reaffirmed); and some members of the Faculty disliked the aliens from Swabia, and were certainly not prepared to see exceptions made in their favour. Few were prepared to be as explicit about their xenophobia as the senior professor, J. L. Suckow (Physics) whose written opinion was that 'the gentlemen of Swabia appear to me to be emigrating, and seeking to refound this Academy in the third century of its existence.'² But they were quite prepared to

punctilio rather than carelessness with some of them. Thus the reverend Senior Professor Suckow, who makes no secret of his hostility to all the young foreigners from Swabia, calls Hegel at first 'this Gentleman' (*diesen Ehren-Mann*); when his *Diploma* is submitted for inspection he becomes '*der Tübingsche Herr Magister*' (whereas the local candidates are '*Herr D. Pansner*' and '*Herr D. Schwabe*'). I suspect that Heinrich's use of *Magister* is also deliberate—but he sometimes applies it to all candidates equally.

¹ The way he speaks of the *Difference* essay in the *curriculum vitae* of 1804 might be evidence in favour of this hypothesis—see Nohl, p. ix.

² For Suckow's opinion see the *Votum* of 13 Aug. 1801, *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 29. The 'Herren Schwaben' at this time included Niethammer (who had only recently transferred to the Theology Faculty), Schelling (in Philosophy), Breyer (in History). All had been at the *Tübingerstift* in Hegel's time. There was also H. E. G. Paulus (*Stiftler* 1779–84, one year behind C. F. Reinhardt), now Professor of Theology. (An interesting sidelight on Hegel's *Habilitation* and on contemporary feeling about Swabians is offered by the following anecdote from Heinrich Laube's *Moderne Charakteristiken* (Mannheim, 1835): 'Did your girl-friend know Hegel, too?' 'Oh yes, he was a *Docent* in Jena then, and his Swabian was as good as the others! I always liked him, he was a dear kind-hearted man, simple and natural, and full of fun. He paid for his *Habilitation* comically enough with a bad *Louis d'or* that Fichte had given him [i.e. with the *Differenzschrift*]; his philosophy was always counterfeit coin, but he was bold as brass to defy the Faculty with a leg pull. Hegel was a real good fellow, full of good humour.' (Nicolin, report 116.) The literary and philosophical criticism may be Laube's own; but it probably reflects the sort of joke that was made at the Jena

exhibit the normal concern of academics about the preservation of good order and the avoidance of bad precedents.¹

There were not many students enrolled in the Faculty. Suckow complained that there would soon be as many *Docenten* as students, and this was less of an exaggeration than it sounds.² It was, indeed, a slightly legalistic point since the majority of students enrolled in most classes were from the Faculty of Theology. But it is important for us to realize that there was quite bitter competition for students and that many more classes were announced than were actually given. The students of the *Docenten* paid fees to their instructors (the Faculty had decreed that only professors could lecture gratis) but the fees were not high and no *Docent* could hope to live on what he earned by teaching. For this reason the Faculty was obliged to inquire into the financial circumstances and career prospects of all who applied for the *venia legendi*.³

From the academic point of view what mattered most was, of course, the attitude of the responsible ordinary professor. Since Hegel wished to give lectures in theoretical and practical philosophy he needed the support of both J. C. Hennings, the Professor of Logic (and next in seniority after Suckow) and J. A. H. Ulrich, the Professor of Moral Philosophy. Hennings was willing enough, and simply supported the Dean's proposal (as did C. G. Schütz). Ulrich was, surprisingly, more stringent—at least to outward appearance—for he insisted that a public disputation must take place before the *venia legendi*. It is apparent that he wanted, if possible, to propitiate C. G. Heinrich, the Professor of History, who, like K. D.

tea-tables where the other *Docenten* forgathered—compare Troxler's comment that Laube 'sketched the Jena period well', Nicolin, report 50.)

¹ Some were sincere enough in their pedantry about the regulations to favour the foreigner's case (once the exception had been made). See for instance the position taken by Ilgen on the question of Hegel's seniority once it was decided that he could dispute 'upon theses' (*Hegel-Studien*, iv. 41; see p. xxx, below).

² In Oct. 1801 there were 8 *Docenten* (including Hegel) and the number of students was certainly not above 30, perhaps not above 20. There were about 800 students altogether at the University at this time.

³ No one raised this question in writing (though they all harped on the statutory fees, which would be shared among the seven of them when paid). But someone certainly raised it orally, since the Dean asked Hegel for assurances about it. Probably it was Suckow; since his written opinion alludes to the point indirectly, and even after Hegel's assurances were received he insisted that a binding promise not to make any claim upon the University for financial assistance must be obtained.

Ilgen (Oriental Languages), was adamant about the dissertation. These three, with Suckow, constituted a majority vote against the Dean's proposed exception.

Informed of the Faculty's decision, and of its concern about his economic situation, Hegel responded immediately that he at present possessed resources of several thousand Gulden, and could count upon obtaining a post in Württemberg eventually. But with respect to the disputation he could only plead the obvious impossibility of completing anything before the lecture-list appeared. He offered to produce 'the greater part or the whole' of the dissertation by that deadline, and suggested that if he had not completed, published, and defended it, within the following month, the faculty could suspend his permission to lecture.

The Dean now put this proposal to the Faculty. He also pushed the test-lecture into prominence as a requirement. Hennings considered it an unnecessary formality, but Schütz waxed very eloquent about it. Heinrich was quite willing to add on this requirement too, but remained unmoved on the need for the public disputation. The aged Suckow gave as yet, no opinion about formal requirements, being still exercised about the risk that an alien might become a charge upon the financial resources of the University. But Ulrich now offered a compromise proposal which formally satisfied the regulations. He suggested that Hegel might be allowed to dispute publicly 'upon theses', as Friedrich Schlegel had done in the previous term (when Ulrich himself was Dean). This was expressly allowed by the regulations, but it was a legal loophole, and the defenders of the Faculty's declared policy all began to say at once that it was a very bad precedent. Ulrich and Schütz agreed that it was most regrettable and should not be allowed to happen again, but the majority was now clearly on Hegel's side (including both of the professors with direct responsibility). So the matter was decided (17 August). On 20 August Hegel was 'nostrified'. On 21 August the Dean informed the Faculty that Hegel would defend his *Theses* on the 27th.

At this point Hegel himself was guilty of a quite astounding blunder. He must surely have known that there was strong feeling in the Faculty against him as a foreigner, but he now claimed that in the lecture-list he should come before the two

Jena candidates because his disputation was to take place a day earlier! Suckow was already on his deathbed, but the new *Senior*, Hennings, who had always supported the most generous proposals in Hegel's case, was as incensed as Suckow would have been. Both of the Jena candidates, Schwabe and Pannsner, had completed their dissertations and were defending them in the regular way; one of them, Schwabe, had already given his test-lecture and received his doctoral licence under the earlier regulations. Hennings proposed that, if necessary, the order of the public disputations should be changed. But, to the relief of Dean Voigt this did not have to be done. Everyone except Ilgen agreed that Schwabe and Pannsner should have seniority over Hegel. (Ilgen, who had been the most outspoken opponent of an irregular disputation in Hegel's case, now argued that Hegel must rank *between* Schwabe and Pannsner because the former was already a doctor of the University and the latter was not.) From this curious little incident we can see how much importance was attached to seniority.¹

On his thirty-first birthday Hegel defended twelve theses in a public disputation. The Swabian invaders displayed their solidarity on this occasion, for Hegel was supported by Schelling's brother Karl who was a third-year student at Jena, and opposed by Niethammer and Schelling himself. The third opponent, Thomas Schwarzott, was a student from Bamberg.² The Theses, being deliberately formulated as paradoxically as possible, are in general quite cryptic, but the theoretical ones obviously depend on the Identity Philosophy for their general context, while the ethical ones depend on the theory of fate, which Hegel had developed at Frankfurt.³

The lecture-list, Hegel's status being thus validated, now announced that he would lecture on 'Logic and Metaphysics' and would join with Professor Schelling in offering an introduction to philosophy and a *disputatorium philosophi-*

¹ All the documents of the *Habilitation* (including Hegel's letters to the Dean) are in *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 28-41.

² See the Protocol of the Faculty for 27 Aug. 1801 (in *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 43). Hegel's notes for his ceremonial opening and closing speeches (in Latin) on this occasion can be found in *Dok.*, pp. 312-14.

³ The theses can be found in *Erste Druckschriften*, pp. 404-5.

cum.¹ But he had still to complete and submit the dissertation before he would be authorized to give a class. So he must have worked hard in the next six weeks, preparing his lectures on a subject which was new to him and for the traditional form of which he had no taste; and at the same time turning the first chapter of what was to become a thirty-year polemic against Newton into Latin. He got his dissertation in on 18 October and gave his test-lecture on 19 October. The six surviving members of the Faculty were all present, but we do not know what they heard or what they thought about it.

The *Collegium* on *Logic* which Hegel had fought so hard to be allowed to give² had eleven registered students including Schelling's brother Karl and two kinsmen of Goethe's named Schlosser from Frankfurt.³ According to the recollection of another student, B. R. Abeken, Hegel made a considerable impact—at least upon the conventionally pious. He began by quoting the inscription over the gate of Dante's *Hell*: 'Abandon hope all ye that enter here!' and proceeded (as we might expect) to attack all the 'postulates of practical reason' in Kant and Fichte. For Abeken writes: 'God, faith, redemption, immortality, as they were formerly established in my mind, could not be combined with the new doctrine, but rather seemed to contradict it . . . I wept most bitter tears.'⁴ But I. P. V. Troxler, one of Schelling's most gifted, and best-loved

¹ The lecture-lists for 1801-7 are printed in *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 53-7. The 'Introduction to Philosophy' was apparently distinct from the *disputatorium philosophicum*. It was free and no hour was announced. Had it not been for Schelling's participation, Hegel would have come into conflict with the regulation against gratis lecturing by the *Dozenten* immediately. Some fragments of early lectures in both the 'Introduction to Philosophy' and the 'Logic and Metaphysics' have recently been discovered, and are to be published in *NKA*, v. Interesting testimonies about the *disputatorium* have been discovered and published by F. Nicolin (in *Hegel-Studien*, ix, 1974, 43-8).

² After he had signed the consent form for this class, Hennings was told by someone that the dissertation was not in. He wrote to the Dean in great agitation asking that the consent-slip be withdrawn. But Hegel delivered the dissertation on the same day (*Hegel-Studien*, iv. 41-2, 44).

³ The registration sheet for this course is preserved—see *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 59.

⁴ Nicolin, report 49. Abeken was in his 3rd year at Jena when Hegel arrived, and these are memories recorded many years later. The Dante quotation is specifically ascribed to Hegel 'beim Beginn seiner Vorträge'—though there is no sign of it in the newly discovered fragments. The rest of Abeken's report is a general memory of his first impression of the Identity Philosophy. (See further, pp. 51-52, 72-73, below.)

students, who was also in the class, remembered over fifty years later, that the class soon broke up.¹

The *Disputatorium*, on the other hand, seems to have been quite a success. They met every day with an appointed speaker to defend a stated thesis and another to attack it. Troxler, who played a leading part in it, says he learned a lot and gained valuable practice. Abeken kept his notes, and from his account we can see how students of no more than average ability would take over the theses propounded by their teachers—so that their opponents were confounded and could find nothing to say. Abeken's friend (doubtless one of two other students from Osnabruck whom we find on Hegel's class-list) withdrew from the group in shame because he could find nothing to reply to such propositions as: 'Epic and Tragedy are related as Identity and Totality; lyric poetry stands as the middle term and sets forth duplicity.'²

This combination of happy and unhappy experience may lie behind Hegel's proposal to give in the next term a free *Collegium* on Fichte's *Naturrecht*. He announced his course on 'Logic and Metaphysics' once more (with the promise that a textbook would be forthcoming for it); and another course on the 'law of nature and of peoples'. The 'critique of Fichte' which he wanted to do gratis may well have been conceived as an occasion for discussion.³ In any case the proposal required the unanimous consent of the Faculty, for the rule was that only the *professores publici* could give free lectures of any kind.⁴ Ulrich was therefore obliged to refer the question to the Faculty. Heinrich there interposed a temporary veto until the

¹ Nicolin, report 50. (This memory was recorded in a letter to Varnhagen von Ense in 1853.)

² Nicolin, report 48.

³ There is a fairly lengthy 'critique of Fichte' in the *Naturrecht* essay that he published in the last two issues of the *Critical Journal*; and it is quite probable that he already had much of the material for this in draft form. For there is evidence to suggest that his critical concern with Fichte's *Grundlage des Naturrechts* began as soon as the first part of that work appeared (at Easter 1796). See *Toward the Sunlight*, pp. 251–2.

⁴ The rule is so categorically stated (see *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 57 n. 5) that one wonders how the formula 'gratis introductionem in Philosophiam tractabit' got past the professor's eye without amendment in the previous term. But the professor in that case was (presumably) Hennings and he was not paying any particular attention. The proposal was accepted because it was under the aegis of Professor Schelling (cf. p. xxx n. 1, above).

recommendations of a commission for the reorganization of the Faculty were known. The recommendations when they came said nothing about gratis lectures. But Hegel had to give up the plan at least for the moment; and he was soon obliged to forego all such luxuries for lack of time.¹

3. *The Critical Journalist*

While he was teaching his first logic class—or as soon as it broke up—Hegel probably began to think seriously about writing his own textbook for the future. All the evidence seems to suggest that he was only half prepared to do what he wanted to do when the class began. Writing the *Differenzschrift* (behind which lie all his studies of Kant, Fichte, and the early essays of Schelling at Berne and Frankfurt) had put him in a good position to attack critically what his predecessors had done. Beyond that he could only redefine the problem, and state programmatically what needed to be done. He had formed the project of a logic which would provide an adequate 'deduction of the categories', in place of what he could only regard as the quite ungrounded efforts of Kant, and the half-grounded efforts of Fichte; and the Identity Philosophy with its Spinozist parallelism of Subject and Object, and its method of reconciling opposites in 'totality' supplied the tools and the canons for his task. But he had not yet begun to carry it out.²

¹ Kimmerle thinks the question whether Hegel gave the course after a belated announcement on the blackboard must remain open (*Hegel-Studien*, iv. 58 n. 8). But if he is right about the dating and occasion of Letter 659 (*Briefe*, iii. 359) I think the question can be regarded as settled (*Hegel-Studien*, iv. p. 149). Kimmerle can scarcely be right in taking the promise of C. G. Schütz that he would 'bring the whole matter up' to refer to what he did at the session of 5 May. For there was hardly any time before the session when he could *already* have given Hegel the opinion that there was nothing to be done. The letter and the consultation with C. G. Schütz to which it refers came shortly *after* 5 May. (This letter to F. K. J. Schütz, *Docent* in History and son of Prof. C. G. Schütz, also seems to me to indicate that it was something like another *Disputatorium* that Hegel had in mind.)

² It seems best to suspend judgement about Kimmerle's conjecture that Hegel brought the 'materials' for his 'system' as 'Logic and Metaphysics' from Frankfurt (*Hegel-Studien*, iv. 85). His efforts to express the Frankfurt 'system' in 'reflective form' probably involved a 'metaphysical treatise on the relation of the finite to the infinite' (see *Toward the Sunlight*, pp. 405–6). But what remains of the MS that hypothetically contained that 'treatise' seems clearly to deny the possibility of a *logical* transition from finite to infinite; and the report that Hegel's first 'Logic and

He must have believed, however, that the task would prove much easier than he found it to be in fact. For he began negotiating with Cotta almost at once for the publication of his manual. They entered it into their printing register for publication at Michaelmas 1802. In view of this commitment we can be sure that he made every effort to give the course in Summer as announced, just as his disappointment over Fichte's *Naturrecht* would have made him doubly eager to give his own course on natural law. Rosenkranz says that Hegel 'seems' not to have lectured in Summer 1802 because 'in that period his literary labours occupied him completely'. We shall soon see how true this last assertion was, but it is probable that Rosenkranz came to his conclusion upon mistaken grounds. We cannot absolutely prove that Hegel actually gave the classes he announced for this summer but it is most likely that he did.¹

The book, however, did not appear. The publishers patiently changed their printing schedule from Michaelmas 1802 to Easter 1803. They could hardly complain, for they were receiving reams of manuscript from Hegel for the new *Critical Journal* which they had agreed to publish for Professor Schelling (with Hegel as joint editor).² The first issue appeared in December 1801 and the fair copy for it must have been at the printer's by early November.³ Thus we must

Metaphysics' course broke up quite soon is an indication that Hegel had some difficulty in putting the old wine into his new bottles.

¹ Rosenkranz, p. 161. The full context of this comment shows, I think, that he drew a conclusion from the absence of any lecture notes for these courses (as he thought). He is considering the announcements in relation to the remains (in his ordering of them: 'Gratis introductionem in philosophiam tractabit et disputatorium philosophicum communiter cum excell. Schellingio diriget. Aus diesem Unternehmen scheint jedoch so wenig *etwas geworden zu sein*, als aus den Sommervorlesungen 1802, in welcher Zeit ihn seine literarischen Arbeiten gänzlich in Anspruch nahmen.'

The fact that we know he was mistaken about the winter *Disputatorium* should teach us to distrust the *argumentum e silentio* that Rosenkranz depends on here. In any case his arrangement of the MSS was wrong and some of the MSS on political theory that he quotes on pp. 132–41 may have belonged to Summer 1802 (see pp. 102, 214 n. 1, below). They certainly belonged to the Jena period, and not as he supposes, to Frankfurt.

² The publishers dealt with Schelling—and paid the editorial honorarium to him—Buchner in *Hegel-Studien*, iii. 112. But Hegel became a close friend of the printer, Frommann, and his family. (We have here another indication of who did all the donkey work.)

³ Buchner, *ibid.*, p. 124.

suppose that as soon as the *Differenzschrift* was finished in July, all through the anxious months of August and September, concurrently with the writing (or at best translating) of his dissertation and with preparations for the Logic course, Hegel had begun to work, at least sporadically, on the copy for the *Journal*. We must now sketch briefly the story behind this.

Cotta had long had the idea of starting a liberal review which would embrace the whole range of culture and learning. He discussed it with Schelling at the Leipzig book fair of Easter 1798, before the latter ever came to Jena.¹ After Fichte left Jena in 1799 he and Schelling discussed the idea frequently in letters. But the more ambitious the plan grew, the more reasons there were for delay in its execution; and there were certainly too many cooks for this broth to be wholesome. Almost everyone involved in the communal planning had his own eye on the editor's chair, and every conceivable editor was totally unacceptable to somebody. Fichte tried to draw Reinhold into the plan in February 1800²—which is ironic when one considers how Reinhold was to fare at the hands of the *Critical Journal*. Fichte still spoke of the new 'critical institute' as a 'pragmatic history of literature and art for the time', but the part that the Schlegels were scheduled to play in it was repugnant to him, and he was determined that it should be as small as possible. Reinhold, however, was already planning his own journal (the *Beyträge* which was Hegel's principal critical butt in the *Differenzschrift*). He hoped for his part to make a convert out of Fichte for the new gospel according to Bardili, whose prophet he had himself become.³

The Schlegels and Schleiermacher had started the *Athenaeum* in 1798. They were not interested in Fichte's 'monarchic' plans for they were 'republicans'.⁴ But in 1800 the *Athenaeum* was at death's door, so the Schlegels began

¹ Schelling to Fichte, 18 Aug. 1800 (Schulz, ii, 254); Cotta to Fichte, 13 Nov. 1800 (ibid., p. 288).

² Fichte to Reinhold, 28 Feb. 1800 (ibid., p. 213).

³ Hegel quotes the relevant passage from the first issue of the *Beyträge* in the *Differenzschrift* (NKA, iv, 91). Of all the circle-squaring ambitions nourished by the journal planners of this period this dream of Reinhold's is the most astounding.

⁴ A. W. Schlegel to Schleiermacher, 21 Apr. 1800 and 9 June 1800 (quoted by Buchner in *Hegel-Studien*, iii, 101-2 and 103).

negotiations with Cotta about a critical journal that would be literary-philosophical in a way quite different from Fichte's. They wanted Schelling to join them in this venture (and they thought that they could bring Fichte in with just the sort of subordinate role that he designed for them).

In June 1800 Schelling proposed to Cotta that he should edit a philosophical journal. It is right, I think, to regard this proposal as the moment when the *Critical Journal* was conceived.¹ Schelling told Fichte that the first volume would contain a 'general review of the present state of philosophy' and Bardili and Reinhold—'perhaps also Jacobi' were to be taken to pieces in a tailpiece to it.² But Cotta was still preoccupied with his idea for a literary journal (which would certainly interest a wider public). He discussed it with Goethe as well as with A. W. Schlegel.³ Schelling was only willing to join in with the Schlegels if Fichte would join in too—and Fichte would not.

In November 1800, when Hegel came into this 'literary storm' with his letter to Schelling, Fichte and Schelling had agreed with Cotta to edit a philosophical-scientific journal. Fichte was hanging back, but Schelling declared himself ready to fill the first issue on his own for publication at Easter 1801, leaving Fichte to fill the second one.⁴ Fichte accepted this suggestion but would not bind himself to publication at regular intervals. He had now read the *System of Transcendental Idealism*; and at this point he initiated discussion of the principal philosophical bone of contention between them: the relation of transcendental philosophy to the philosophy of nature. It fell to Hegel to bring this issue into the public domain for the first time.⁵ But we cannot doubt that Schelling

¹ This is the view of Buchner, *ibid.*, p. 104. See Schelling to A. W. Schlegel, 6 July 1800 (Fuhrmans, i, 197) and Schelling to Fichte, 18 Aug. 1800 (Schulz, ii, 254–5).

² Schelling says the 'general review' is partly written already. Hegel took on the task of cutting up Reinhold and Bardili in the *Difference* essay—and eventually he did the same for Jacobi in 'Faith and Knowledge'.

³ Cotta to Fichte, 13 Nov. 1800 (Schulz, ii, 288).

⁴ Schelling to Fichte, 31 Oct. 1800 and Fichte to Schelling, 15 Nov. 1800 (Schulz, ii, 284, 291–2). Schelling says he has 'enough interesting material' for this. But one wonders where it all went. It did not go into the *Critical Journal*. (Most of Schelling's literary energy seems to have been devoted to the *Zeitschrift für spekulative Physik* at this time.)

⁵ He remarks on this himself in the 'Vorerinnerung' of the *Difference* essay (NKA, iv, 5; Harris and Cerf, p. 79).

was glad to have it in the open (and doubly glad to have it brought out by someone else). At any rate he told Fichte how anxious he was that they should get clear on the question between themselves before they embarked on a common undertaking; and he wrote at length on the point in a very prompt reply.¹

Fichte was now trying to engage Schiller and Goethe as collaborators. In a letter to Schiller he described the aims of the new journal in a way that anticipates the programme of the *Critical Journal* a year later:

Science must be subjected to a vigorous examination as soon as possible, if the few good seeds that have been sown are not shortly to be brought to nothing by the abundantly flourishing weeds. In the realm of the first science, philosophy, which must help all the others out of confusion, folk are prosing on in the same old way as if no objections had ever been made to it . . . I consider it to be quite possible to reduce the philosophical chatterers to silence by a rigorous critique maintained over two or three years, and so make room for something better.²

Hegel subjected Fichte himself to rigorous examination in the name of science; and while he found more than a few good seeds, he rooted out a mass of weeds. But Fichte came to his own reckoning with Schelling before the first chapter of that stern critique saw the light. On 31 May he began his most extended critique of the Identity Philosophy. The final postscript was added on 7 August but it looks as if the rest of the letter was written in early June and lay on Fichte's desk for two months. By the time Schelling answered it the *Difference* essay was out, and the first issue of the *Critical Journal* was in preparation.³

We do not know when Schelling decided to give up the idea of collaborating with Fichte and edit his own journal with Hegel's help. He was still hoping to collaborate with Fichte—though Easter had come and gone—when he wrote on 24 May. Perhaps Buchner is right in thinking that he went on hoping till he got the reply to that letter in August.⁴ But in the

¹ Schelling to Fichte, 19 Nov. 1800 (Schulz, ii, 194-9).

² 2 Dec. 1800 (Schulz, ii, 302).

³ Fichte to Schelling, 31 May-7 Aug. 1801 (Schulz, ii, 322-9); Schelling to Fichte, 3 Oct. 1801 (ibid., 332-41).

⁴ *Hegel-Studien*, iii. 108.

interim he must have discussed his plans with Hegel at some length, with the explicit understanding that Hegel would be an important collaborator. There is an explicit promise at the end of the 'Foreword' of the *Differenzschrift* that some of the questions raised in the introductory discussion will be more fully discussed elsewhere.¹ Hegel's part in the first issue was smaller than his part in subsequent issues. But it was still fairly solid, and his draft of the *Einleitung* at least must have been written before he delivered his dissertation to the Faculty on 18 October. Once that is admitted we can go further and infer that it was written no later than mid-August; for although Hegel was quite capable of working on more than one project at a time, the need to strain every nerve to obtain the *venia legendi* would have made it hard for him to concentrate on anything else between 15 August and 18 October.²

In 1838 Schelling claimed that the *Hauptgedanken* of this Introduction were his.³ But Hegel had listed it as his own work in 1804. Doubtless the main argument was so much discussed between the two of them that it makes no sense to ask whose it was originally.⁴ Criticism, say the editors, requires a standard derived from the nature of the thing that is evaluated. So the enterprise of philosophical criticism presupposes that we know what philosophy is. *Vernunft* is singular, so philosophy must be singular likewise. But there can be an

¹ *NKA*, iv, 8; Harris and Cerf, p. 83.

² Between 15 Aug. and 26 Aug. he managed to write a quite lengthy review of Bouterwek (see p. xli, n. 1, below). He probably wrote the Krug essay in Oct. (see p. xxxix, n. 2, below).

³ In his draft *curriculum vitae* of 1804 (*Briefe*, iv, 92) Hegel notes that the *Einleitung* to the *Journal* is his. By Nov. 1838 Schelling was convinced that 'many passages which at this moment I could not precisely identify, along with the main arguments, are mine; there is probably no passage that I did not at least revise.' (Plitt, iii, 143; cited by Buchner, *Hegel-Studien*, iii, 134.) If we assume that a draft by Hegel lay on Schelling's desk for 2 months, and was often looked at and altered in that period, Schelling's view is easier to reconcile with Hegel's quite indubitable testimony. It is rather harder to accept if the essay was written in the last week or two before the copy went to the printer. The essay is in *NKA*, iv, 117-28; and there is a translation (by the present writer) in *IJP*, iii, 1979, 37-45.

⁴ Schelling's claim (see preceding note) only reveals that in his memory of the period Hegel figured simply as a 'disciple'. But anyone who reads straight through the first issue of the *Critical Journal* will agree that the author of the Krug essay had little to learn from the author of the dialogue on the Absolute Identity-System about the essence of philosophical criticism.

indefinite series of distinct reflections of the one absolute Idea. A good critic must discover the angle of reflection, so to speak, and criticize from the point of objectivity within the philosophical work that he has before him. Without this reference to the Idea there is no relation of mutual recognition between author and critic. There are simply two conflicting subjectivities each with equal right. This is the situation of 'unphilosophy' as opposed to philosophy.¹ But philosophy cannot be tolerant of, or indifferent to this opposition. Philosophical criticism must show up the 'nothingness of unphilosophy' (its *lack* of objectivity) as well as the presence of the Idea where it is present.

This is Fichte's critical programme restated; and the war on 'unphilosophy' promised in the 'announcement' that came out near the beginning of December² does in fact fill a large number of pages in the *Critical Journal*. There are barbs of wit in these pages—some of Hegel's most famous sallies are to be found in them—but essentially they are dreary because the material in them has no life. What makes the essays in the *Critical Journal* still readable, as many of them are, is the positive use of the criterion, the identification of genuine reflections of the Idea. The introduction distinguishes two possible cases here. First there is the situation where consciousness has not transcended subjectivity, has not risen to the free intuition of objectivity. Criticism must appreciate the striving here and distinguish even its most imperfect forms—this Hegel sought to do in *Faith and Knowledge* which claims to survey the philosophy of subjectivity 'in the whole range of its forms'. Or secondly, there can be a genuine intuition of objectivity, but the subjective consciousness seeks to defend itself against it. Here it is the forms of the defensive error that need to be shown up.

¹ Reinhold is for Hegel the paradigm case of the 'unphilosopher' because his conception of the history of philosophy and its disputes reduces it to a series of subjective views.

² This announcement is reprinted in *Hegel-Studien*, iii. 95–6; and in *NKA*, iv. 503–4. The variation in the title of the Krug essay in the 2nd part of this announcement shows that it was based on copy provided before the essay received its final revision. But since this 2nd part was probably written up in the publisher's office, we cannot infer from it anything about the date when the copy for the 1st part was submitted. (It does suggest, however, that Hegel was still working on the Krug essay at the last minute.)

Criticism must also show up the emptiness of much received criticism of earlier philosophy¹—with this reflection the essay turns back to the problem of 'unphilosophy'. The Kantian revolution is credited with two results here. First, by rupturing the tradition it has created a situation where all that matters is originality. But instead of the free expression of a manifold cultural life, such as we see in 'the philosophical gardens of Greece' what we have here is rather a 'play of the tortures of the damned'.² Secondly, by exposing the dialectic of pure reason, Kant gave philosophy up to crass empiricism. Thus 'unphilosophy' was able to achieve a philosophical form, and even to transcend philosophy altogether, in the form of 'common sense' which satisfies all our deepest moral needs without the effort of speculation.

'Common sense' provides a starting-point that has the certainty of immediate awareness. But according to our young apostles, when this certainty is developed, it splits into the consciousness of the finite being that actually is, and the infinite that is required. Thus the highest philosophical achievement of the most recent era is still within the bounds of the philosophy of subjectivity. The opposition of knowledge and faith has been rendered as extreme as possible. But this makes the transition to genuine philosophy easier.³

All real philosophy is esoteric, not popular. As compared with the world of common sense the world of the philosopher is an 'inverted world'.⁴ In these times of 'liberty and equality' there is a larger audience of cultured people to whom 'popular'

¹ The most important example of this type in the *Critical Journal* is Hegel's account of the ancient Sceptics.

² *NKA*, iv. 121, 25–31. We may have a co-operative metaphor here. For the reference to the Greek schools probably stems from Hegel, while the reference to Dante is more likely to have come from Schelling.

³ Hegel criticizes 'common sense philosophy' along these same lines in the *Difference* essay (see *NKA*, iv. 20–3; Harris and Cerf, pp. 98–103); and his settlement of accounts with W. T. Krug is the best example of the critique in action (*NKA*, iv. 174–87). The 'philosophy of subjectivity' is the connecting theme of *Faith and Knowledge*.

⁴ The aristocratic, esoteric, character of philosophy is a theme of Schelling's rather than of Hegel's (originally). Hegel repeated the point about the philosopher's world—which Engels later turned against him—in the *Phenomenology* (*NKA*, ix. 22, 27–23, 23; Miller, sect. 26). But there is not much point in arguing about where the first germ came from since 'the world turned upside down' is a theme of the time as a whole—and not just of Europe!

philosophy can appeal. Every genuine achievement has suffered the fate of popularization as a result. Leibniz began it in philosophy with the publication of the *Theodicy*. Hegel and Schelling believed in the possibility of educating the public up to the philosophical level, but they did not want to see philosophy itself lowered to the level of common sense as the champions of enlightenment did.

In the new, more revolutionary unrest of their time, they claimed to detect the presence of a more serious spirit of quest. This religious spirit of the Protestant Reformation involved the rejection of the dualism that was given its philosophical formulation by Descartes. But the religious and political revolutions were only the outward expression of a change in the inner life of the time. Philosophy must change too. The spirit of dualism on which all science was at present founded was the spirit of death; it must give way to a philosophy rooted in the living intuition of unity. This transformation should be set up as the goal of genuinely philosophical criticism.

The essay ends, as it began, by affirming the need for a basis of mutual recognition in criticism. The critic must not fall into one-sided polemic, for by so doing he would fall into 'unphilosophy' himself. But there is, in fact, quite a lot of polemic in the *Critical Journal*—some of it is quite open and self-confessed. The *Notizenblätter* at the end of the first three issues and the *Anhang* at the end of the last consist of nothing else. The problem is that when the 'unphilosopher' refuses to accept the critic's demonstration of his 'nothingness' there is nothing left to do but to engage in polemic with him, to make him into a figure of fun.¹

In this general 'Introduction' we have before us a clear case of Hegel's producing a first draft which Schelling then revised (probably quite extensively). My guess would be that the

¹ Hegel's particular butt in the *Critical Journal* is Friedrich Bouterwek (Professor of Philosophy at Göttingen). At least I think he is Hegel's butt—all ascriptions of material in the *Notizenblätter* are purely conjectural. There is perhaps a glancing reference to Bouterwek in the *Einleitung* of the *Critical Journal* (NKA, iv. 123, line 7) when Hegel discusses the philosopher whose beginning is 'nur provisorisch, problematisch und hypothetisch usw.'. Bouterwek was very insistent on the 'provisory character of his thought'. See further *Notizenblatt*, B, II, NKA, iv.

explanatory foreword for the *Notizenblätter* was written in a rather more syncretistic way. The opening reference to the general introduction proves nothing as far as authorship is concerned, but the following survey of hopeful speculative developments in the natural sciences must surely have come from Schelling's pen, in view of Hegel's known preoccupations at this time. And the pun about Krug's being a pitcher that has gone too often to the water, like the comment on the review of the *Difference* essay in the *Allgemeine Zeitung* of Stuttgart must have been contributed by Hegel. (The footnote in which he flatly stated that the reviewer's claim that he was simply the mouthpiece that Schelling employed in order to let the world know how far he considered himself to have risen above Fichte, was a lie, is the only thing in the *Journal* that is signed.)¹

No doubt both Schelling and Hegel habitually read all the copy for the *Critical Journal* and made comments or suggested revisions. But I suspect that except in the case of the general introduction, Schelling's revision of Hegel's contributions was far more cursory than Hegel's revision of Schelling's. We know that in mid-1802 Schelling left an essay that was to appear in the *Neue Zeitschrift für spekulative Physik* for Hegel to edit; and he affected to be dissatisfied with the result.² It is more than likely, I think, that he did the same

310-11; and the final *Anhang* to the *Critical Journal*, *NKA*, iv. 497-8 (discussed on pp. xlv-xlv, below).

¹ *NKA*, iv. 190 n. See the editors' note on p. 595 for the offending passage. The author was Karl August Böttiger, the *Böttcher* who is attacked in the text to which this footnote was added. According to Caroline (Nicolin, report 54) he gave up his position (and stipend) with the Jena *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung* as a result of this attack. But he did not give up feuding with the *Critical Journal*, and they replied in kind—see below, p. xlv. (It would appear that Fichte was rather upset by this report. He was glad to see the clarification in the *Journal*—or so he wrote to Schelling, 15 Jan. 1802, Schulz, ii, 345.)

² Schelling to A. W. Schlegel, 3 Sept. 1802 (Nicolin, report 68). The 1st issue of this new journal came out in August (Fuhrmans, i, 236). The 1st issue of the 2nd volume of the *Critical Journal*—which consists entirely of 'Glauben und Wissen' and is the largest single issue of the journal—was announced at the end of July; and again (this time with a short notice by Hegel himself—*NKA*, iv. 505 or *Hegel-Studien*, iii. 125-6) at the end of August. The editing of the 3rd issue of the 1st volume had to wait until Hegel had finished this mammoth undertaking—the text of which bears many signs of haste. My hypothesis is that Hegel knew Schelling had been dissatisfied with his editing of the essay for the *Neue Zeitschrift*—we can readily imagine the sort of pressure the job was done under, and how Hegel felt about having to do it at all—so

with the article 'On the relation of Nature Philosophy to Philosophy in general'. Hegel's verbal assertion to Michelet that 'that too was mine' cannot be taken at face value, for he did not list the essay as his in the *curriculum vitae* of 1804. But Michelet's account of the conversation is too unambiguous and too circumstantial to be set aside as a simple misunderstanding or false recollection. If we suppose that Schelling left a rather rough draft for Hegel to polish, and that Hegel was anxious to do the job properly this time—for he really did have an editorial responsibility for *this* journal—I think we can understand why he might, with some measure of conscious irony, assert twenty years later that the essay was his.¹ He would remember with some bitterness the editorial burdens that he shouldered in that summer and autumn when he had so much else to do—and the ideas in the essay were at least as much his as those in the introductory essay were Schelling's.

It was in the *Notizenblätter*, I fancy, that collaboration went furthest. No secure attributions of these polemical pieces can be made in most cases, but more than one of them show signs of being made up of paragraphs or sections by different hands. It is not safe to assume that polemical pieces which are thematically linked to critical essays whose authorship is known, came from the same pen. For in some cases it is at least equally probable that the other collaborator wanted to

he tried, once the pressure was off, to do a more thorough job on the essay for their own—we might almost say 'his own'—*Journal*. The 3rd issue of the 1st volume was probably ready for distribution in October. But we first hear of it as definitely published in December (at the same time as the 2nd issue of Vol. ii). See *Hegel-Studien*, iii. 125–8.

¹ Michelet's account is now reprinted in Nicolin, report 367. It is noteworthy that Hegel's assertion was provoked by Michelet's claim that he could identify the essay as Schelling's on *stylistic* grounds. (Thus Hegel's claim can likewise be taken as a *stylistic* one.) Schelling's assertion in Nov. 1838 that there is 'not a syllable of Hegel's in the essay' is an exaggeration, but we must assume that, by that time, he sincerely believed it was true. That his memory was betraying him we might have guessed even without the report of Hegel's conversation with Michelet. For Schelling's further claim that Hegel 'did not even see the essay until it was in proof' quite simply cannot be true. It conflicts with everything we know about the part that Hegel played in the editing of the *Journal*. In Schelling's perfectly sincere statement we have another reflex of what the years have made of his conviction at the time that all the ideas were his, and that Hegel was only what the Stuttgart reviewer said he was—a mouthpiece (Plitt, iii, 142–3; cited in *Hegel-Studien*, iii. 138—cf. also the letter to Henning of 1844, *ibid.*, p. 141).

fire a shot in the common cause. For instance, the fact that the little letter from 'Bottom the Weaver' (i.e. Reinhold) to 'Snug the Joiner' (i.e. Bardili) is plainly a supplement to Schelling's 'Dialogue on the absolute Identity-System' inclines me to believe that the author was Hegel. One cannot place much weight on the argument that having written a lengthy satirical dialogue, Schelling would hardly be moved at once to write a parody on the same theme. For it is a plain fact that neither of the two critics got tired of repeating themselves; and Schelling, in particular, did not know when to stop—his dialogue is already too much of a not very good thing. But the fact that Bottom's letter is much concerned with the *Difference* essay (whereas the dialogue is, of course, more about Schelling's latest publications) and the further fact that some of the parodic devices used here had already been the target of Hegel's wit there, suggest that he is the author.¹

As an example of collaboration, the *Dante-Anhang* at the end of the last issue, deserves a moment's notice because it may well be the only place in the *Journal* where a third pen was involved. The essay for which this is an 'Appendix' comes directly from Schelling's lectures on aesthetics.² But the Appendix is printed at the end of the issue as if it were a *Notizenblatt*—and that is in fact what it is. In the first section, the reader who cannot understand Schelling's view of Dante is offered a summary of the section on Dante in Professor Bouterwek's *History of Poetry*. We should notice that the contrast between the two justifies the inclusion of Schelling's essay in the *Critical Journal* as a piece of historical rehabilitation of the sort that the general introduction sets out to justify. The need for some intelligent criticism of Dante is most strikingly illustrated by a bald summary of Bouterwek. About the question of authorship we can only say that while Schelling was more likely to be reading the available literature on Dante, it was Hegel who had reason to keep up with the works of Bouterwek. At the very least I should think it was he who suggested the piece. He was certainly reading Dante with

¹ NKA, iv. 190–4. (However, if someone could show that Schelling had recently been studying *A Midsummer Night's Dream* the question would be settled the other way—Hegel had not much time for that at this moment.)

² This is testified by Schelling's son who simply omitted the section of the lectures when he edited them, directing all readers to the essay.

real interest in this period; and he did not need any Dante literature apart from Bouterwek and Schelling's essay in order to write this squib himself.¹

Just as the decision to print an extract from Schelling's lectures is justified by one part of the *Anhang*, so it is explained by the other. The second section deals with a libel published in the *Neue Deutsche Merkur* to the effect that Schelling (he is not mentioned, but the reference cannot be to anyone else) was pouring scorn on all the eminent Protestant divines of recent times and exalting Dante's *Hell* and *Purgatory* as the true Christian Gospel. In reply the *Journal* quotes a communication from someone else who identifies the author of the libel (Karl August Böttiger) not by name but by a sarcastic description of his education and activities. Since he wrote not only for the *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung* of Jena, but for journals of commerce and fashion, he was an easy mark.

According to an anonymous pamphlet of 1805, which probably stems from the very circle which gave currency to Böttiger's libel, the author of the communication quoted here was Caroline Schelling. This information could only have come to such ears as a rumour. But we are bound to wonder how such a rumour arose. The more natural assumption of his opponents would be that Schelling had answered for himself; and while there were plenty of her former friends who were ready to tell ill-natured tales about Caroline by 1805, they would hardly tell an unlikely lie which could be easily contradicted—but they might well know the slightly surprising truth.²

There may have been collaboration of this same sort—rather than mutual revision—in some of the major articles of the *Journal*. Thus we know that Hegel was interested in reviewing Rückert's *Realismus*, because he offered to do it for Mehmel's literary review in Erlangen.³ He also mentioned

¹ Hegel's running fight with Bouterwek started when he was asked by G. E. A. Mehmel (at Schelling's suggestion) to review the *Anfangsgründe der spekulative Philosophie*, for the *Literatur-Zeitung* of Erlangen (see Schelling to Mehmel, 4 July 1801, Fuhrmans, i, 149; Hegel to Mehmel, late July 1801 (*Briefe*, iv, 3). The review was completed and sent off on the eve of Hegel's disputation (Hegel to Mehmel, 20 Aug. *Briefe*, i, 63–4); and it duly appeared in mid-Sept. (*NKA*, iv, 525). It is reprinted, *ibid.*, 95–104.

² See the note in *NKA*, iv, 619 (or *Hegel-Studien*, iii, 98 n.).

³ Letter 30a (to Mehmel < late July? > 1801), *Briefe*, iv, 3.

Schulze's monstrous *Kritik*. Mehmel did not send him either of these for review, but he did write a lengthy critique of Schulze for the *Critical Journal*. It is virtually certain therefore that he took a very active interest in the critique of Rückert and Weiss that appeared in the *Journal* though his silence about it in the *curriculum vitae* of 1804 establishes beyond question that Schelling and not he was primarily responsible for it.¹

When the account is tallied in full, not much is left for which Schelling was solely responsible in the way that Hegel was solely responsible for *Faith and Knowledge* and the *Natural Law* essay. Schelling's longest piece, the dialogue 'On the absolute Identity-System' has more bulk than substance, and goes some way to justify the doubts expressed by Schleiermacher when the air was so full of plans, about his capacities as a critic. The critical essay on the Swedish Kantian, Benjamin Hoyer, is rather better; the lecture on Dante shows Schelling at his best, but it is not very long. We can almost agree with Rosenkranz, that the *Critical Journal*, which was Schelling's so far as the public and the publisher were concerned, was really Hegel's.²

The *Journal* was short-lived. It died suddenly and unexpectedly; and it was probably Schelling's failure to support it that brought about its early demise.³ The last issue (Volume ii, No. 3), containing the concluding section of the *Natural Law* essay and Schelling's Dante essay, came out in May 1803 just about eighteen months after the first announcement. As

¹ We should notice the references to Schulze, both covert (*NKA*, iv. 240, 10-13) and overt (*ibid.*, p. 248); and to Bouterwek (*ibid.*, p. 248). Not too much can be made of the neutral way in which Schelling refers to this piece in his letter of 11 July 1803 (*Briefe*, i. 71); it is likely that he already regretted the extreme tone of the attack, so he would not feel much like claiming credit for it; but the way he speaks certainly increases the probability that he was not *solely* responsible for it.

² Rosenkranz, p. 162: 'jenes Journal fast allein als Hegel's Werk erscheint.' (The decision to reprint the *Journal* as a whole in *NKA*, iv. was a very wise one.)

³ Schelling was thinking of answering Jacobi's published letters about *Faith and Knowledge* in July 1803, but when Hegel inquired about this in August, he confessed that nothing had come of it. As it turned out, he received and accepted the call to Würzburg and never returned to Jena at all. Hegel himself was beginning actively to seek for a position somewhere else at this time. He did not find one; but he seems to have resolved to concentrate his efforts on the preparation of a systematic statement of his own philosophy for publication as soon as possible. Cotta would almost certainly

compared with previous issues it was rather slim—but this was to compensate for the thickness of the first issue of the volume; and only five hundred copies were printed. It may well be—though we cannot be certain of this—that the initial print-order for the *Journal* was for a thousand copies; but the print-order for the third volume—which was never destined to appear—was for five hundred; so it was not a success from the publisher's point of view.¹ Nor can it be said that either of the author–editors gained much by it. Whatever public kudos it achieved went to Schelling. But the high scornful tone which characterized the attack on 'unphilosophy' that Fichte had recommended—a tone which was not absent even from the *Journal's* more positive criticism—was not calculated to make many friends at the time, however clearly it may appear justified in the light of history. The spirit that made Hegel's students feel and say, a bit later on, that 'Death himself has come among us' is very evident in the *Critical Journal*. There are some signs that Schelling himself quickly repented of their joint intransigence.²

Not just his anonymity, but the very character of the Identity Philosophy, prevented Hegel from earning any general notice or reputation. There was speculation among the *cognoscenti* about who had written this or that piece in the *Journal*. But the general attitude was expressed by Friedrich Köppen—himself the paradigm of philosophical discipleship

not have wanted to continue to publish the *Journal* with just his name on the title-page in any case (see *Briefe*, i. 70–1, 74, 76).

¹ I have here followed the Editorial Report, *NKA*, iv. 537—instead of Buchner's hypothesis (*Hegel-Studien*, iii. 111–12) that the initial print-order was for 500 with an agreement that it would be increased if the market for the 1st issue made it advisable (which did not turn out to be the case). The *Journal* was sold by the volume (3 issues).

² In the earliest days Jacobi wrote to Bouterwek (22 Mar. 1802): 'Köppen informs me of the appearance of the first issue of a new critical journal, edited by Schelling and a certain Herr Hegel, who is quite unknown to me, in which a most violent scorn is prevalent, it seems' (Nicolin, report 58). Schelling may well have felt uncomfortable in July 1803 when he encountered Rückert (*Briefe*, i. 71); for he was already looking for a post elsewhere, and this would make him sensible that a polemical stance has a high cost in terms of human relations. Certainly he had learned this lesson when he specifically denied all polemical intents in the preface to the *Jahrbücher der Medizin als Wissenschaft* in 1805 (*Werke*, vii. 260–8; cited by Buchner, *Hegel-Studien*, iii. 114–15). For the student comment on Hegel, see Gabler's reminiscences of the lectures on the history of philosophy in the winter of 1805/6 (*Hegel-Studien*, iv. 70; or Nicolin, report 92, p. 65).

in most men's eyes—when he offered a 'deduction of the essay on *Faith and Knowledge*' in his pamphlet on *Schelling's Doctrine, or the Entire Philosophy of the Absolute Nothing*:

In principle it makes no difference at all who the author of this essay in the *Critical Journal* is . . . the important thing is to show: that the author of this essay, whether he be Herr Hegel or some other individual, had to write as he did, according to the principles of Schelling's system; that no other offspring could be born to a Schellingian philosopher than the one that has been born.

'The reader is therefore requested to take the name *Hegel* as used in the following discussion, to refer simply to an individuality belonging to the system of Schelling', he added in a footnote.¹ In this way Hegel became the victim of the very tendency in philosophical criticism that he was most concerned to combat—the view that a philosophy is a set of concepts belonging to an individual thinker (in this case to *Schelling*) as if it were a kind of private property; and Köppen gained a revenge, in which there certainly was a sort of wild justice, for the sarcastic quips about Jacobi's 'continuer' in *Faith and Knowledge* itself.

4. *The Extraordinary Professor*

It is important to remember that while Hegel and Schelling were editing the *Critical Journal* together, they were bound to regard systematic philosophy as a shared enterprise. This did not prevent them from formulating the 'system' in quite different ways. Schelling experimented continually, and it is not surprising to find that Hegel, in his more ponderous plodding way, was developing the theory of the Absolute Identity according to a method that was very much his own. But the goal was fixed for both of them; and this had the effect of pushing some concerns that had hitherto been central for Hegel to the fringes of the common undertaking. This explains why he could throw himself so whole-heartedly into work which was defined by the common standpoint as 'critical' rather than 'speculative'; and yet strive to fulfil an essentially *constructive* purpose. For instance, he wanted to make his logic (the essentially 'critical' character of which is beautifully

¹ I quote from Buchner, *Hegel-Studien*, iii. 130–1.

illustrated in *Faith and Knowledge*) into the constructive preamble for the 'metaphysics' of the Absolute Identity; and he had the same concern in 'Natural Law' which was his other major interest—though there the relation of criticism and speculation was harder for Hegel himself to define.

He announced these two courses again for the Winter semester of 1802/3—just as he had done in the summer. The textbook for 'Logic and Metaphysics' was again promised, indeed its publication was now declared to be imminent (*nundinis instantibus proditum*).¹ He must therefore have had a manuscript almost ready for the printers. But he never sent it to them; instead he dismissed his classes and went back to his study to complete it by adding an outline of his 'real philosophy', so that the whole 'system' could appear in one volume.²

The reconstruction—so far as it is feasible—of this first, four-part, 'Encyclopaedia' is our project in Book I. The manuscript of the 1802 'Logic and Metaphysics' is lost; and the very existence of the second part ('Philosophy of Nature') is somewhat hypothetical. But the project for it, at least, can be clearly demonstrated from the manuscript of the third part, which remains to us. This is the so-called 'System of Ethical Life', which contains the speculative foundations of Hegel's theory of *Natural Law*. This third part of the 'system' was abandoned incomplete. The raw material both for its completion, and for the unwritten fourth part (the theory of the 'Absolute Idea' set forth in art, religion, and philosophy) clearly existed in Hegel's lecture notes. But when he reached the problem of public morale, and the 'classification of constitutions'—i.e. the point where the evolution of 'Absolute

¹ *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 53. With 'Glauben und Wissen' in print, and the copy for the 3rd issue of the *Journal* about ready for the printer, Hegel probably had some faith in his own ability to work miracles when he submitted this statement for the *Catalogus* in August. (He had promised to have the copy ready for the printer at Michaelmas; Cotta announced it in June—*Hegel-Studien*, iv. 85.)

² The early breaking up of Hegel's classes was reported in a letter of Henry Crabb Robinson's (see H. Marquardt, *Crabb Robinson und seine deutschen Freunde*, i, 84). What Hegel did with the leisure that he thus procured can be inferred from the MSS of the *System of Ethical Life* (*Schriften* (1913), pp. 419–503; Harris and Knox, pp. 99–177) and the *Verfassungsschrift* (*TW-A*, i, 461–5, 472–85, 487–512; Knox and Pelczynski, pp. 143–6, 153–64, 166–86). What his main goal was at this time emerges

Spirit' had to be considered—Hegel gave up working on his systematic manuscript, and turned back to the political project that he had brought with him to Jena, but which he had laid aside in the spring of 1801.¹ He now began to revise this manuscript (the *Verfassungsschrift*); and he got about half-way through it before putting it aside again—this time for ever. From the practical point of view, it looks as if he decided that the project was of no use in the form in which he had hitherto envisaged it. But if I am right in thinking that he had turned back to it at this point, because to complete it was the best way of getting his ideas clear for the writing of the remainder of his 'system', then the radical transformation of the form and structure of his system that begins to be evident from the summer of 1803 onwards was the immediate cause of its being set aside.

It is clear enough that the project of a single textbook embracing the whole system of philosophy is logically connected with the announcement for Summer 1803 of an 'Outline of Universal Philosophy from a compendium to appear during the current summer'. This is the first appearance of the 'Encyclopaedia of Philosophy' (as the course was called in the vernacular announcement).² But by the time he began to give the course, Hegel's conception of the right approach, organization, and method for it had undergone a fairly drastic change. He *must* have used his manuscript as a foundation for the lectures, but he had to transpose his discourse as best he could into the conceptual frame of a transcendental logic of 'cognition' instead of the frame of 'Nature' provided by the Identity Philosophy. (Either his turning from the *System of Ethical Life* to the *German Constitution* already signalizes the dawning of the new standpoint in his mind, or—more probably—his attempt to get clear about the ideal of a 'free

clearly from the promise of an encyclopaedic 'compendium' in the *Catalogus* announcement for Summer 1803 (*Hegel-Studien*, iv. 54).

¹ It is not quite true that he had done *nothing* relevant in the interim. He certainly kept up with the political news, and when something that he read interested him he excerpted it—to the end of his life, as Erdmann tells us, he read, pen in hand (*ADB*, xi. 255; cf. Kaufmann, Anchor edn., p. 369). Some political excerpts that he made between Sept. and Dec. 1802 have come down to us.

² *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 54. Some fragments of the lecture MSS of this summer have now been rediscovered and will be printed in *NKA*, Vol. v.

constitution' by going back to his project for the constitutional reform of Germany, following as it did upon his prolonged wrestling with the legal theory of Kant and Fichte in the critical essay on *Natural Law*, resulted in the discovery that the whole problem must be approached afresh from a 'transcendental' rather than a 'natural' point of view.)

This by no means meant a return to the standpoint of Kant or Fichte, for 'transcendental philosophy' was one side of the Absolute Identity, and Hegel had already subjected the 'transcendental philosophy' of Kant and Fichte to a radical critique in *Faith and Knowledge*. So it would not appear to Hegel as an apostasy from 'Schelling's System' as he had defended it in the *Difference* essay. Nevertheless, Schelling's departure from Jena, made it psychologically much easier for him to think along the 'transcendental' lines that his initial concern with critical logic both suggested and required. After the appearance of the last issue of the *Critical Journal* we hear no more of *Naturrecht* in Hegel's discourse, but only of *Recht* pure and simple.¹

When that last issue appeared, in May 1803, Schelling had already travelled into Württemberg with Caroline Schlegel. Her separation from A. W. Schlegel was now final, and she and Schelling were shortly to be married—Schelling's father performed the ceremony at the end of June. In the circumstances it must have been clear when they left that they would not return if Schelling could find another place. With Schelling gone it was obviously incumbent upon Hegel to defend the Identity Philosophy as a whole, just as Schelling had done regularly before Hegel had arrived;² and apart from being a duty it was an economic opportunity, since Schelling had created quite a following for the 'philosophy of nature'. So, at the very moment when Hegel felt the need to recast the

¹ He announced a *course* on 'Naturrecht' twice more (Winter 1803/4, and Summer 1805—*Hegel-Studien*, iv. 54). But the 1805 course, at least, was to be based on a textbook in which the 'state of nature' was rigorously excluded from the proper scientific study of man 'according to his concept', *NKA*, viii. 214, 26–7. (I shall argue in Ch. XI below that the marginal notes in the 1805 lecture MS largely represent the first stage in the transformation of that MS into a textbook. This comment occurs in a note of this type.)

² See Fuhrmans, i, 235. Before Hegel's arrival he had lectured on different parts of his philosophy: Philosophy of Nature, Transcendental Philosophy (which he often calls 'introduction to philosophy'), and Philosophy of Art (*ibid.*, pp. 163, 169, 170).

structure and method of his whole presentation, he was also impelled to develop his essentially skeletal treatment of natural philosophy proper into something much more detailed, which could serve as the basis for an independent course of lectures. It is not surprising, therefore, that his lecture notes on *Naturphilosophie* for the winter of 1803/4 are a rather disorderly mass.¹ Nor can we wonder that with such an urgent and demanding double task Hegel set the *Verfassungsschrift* aside unfinished.

He must have hoped that many of the students who had formerly gone to Schelling's classes would now come to him. We do not know how many of them came immediately in the summer of 1803. The fact that Hegel now began looking for another position *may* be a reflection of disappointment, but more probably it reflects only the fact that he was beginning to feel the economic pinch. That he had, indeed, begun looking for a properly salaried position is obvious from the fragment of a letter from his friend Hufnagel in Frankfurt expressing doubt that he would be interested in giving up his academic career for that of a Gymnasium teacher, and informing him that the post of Prorector of the Gymnasium had been offered to a teacher in Gotha (whose decision had not yet been received).²

Five more years were to pass before Hegel finally became Rector of the Gymnasium at Nüremberg. But Hufnagel may well have been wrong in thinking that he would not consider such a move. For in August Schiller recommended him to Wilhelm von Humboldt as a possible tutor for his children.³

¹ The *Differenzschrift* gives an outline of 'Schelling's System' (NKA, iv. 67, 1-75, 25; Harris and Cerf, pp. 160-71) which must have been worked out rather more fully in Hegel's notes for his 'Introduction to Philosophy'. Celestial mechanics is treated more fully in the Dissertation *On the Orbits of the Planets*. I believe the speculations on the 'Divine Triangle' (*Hegel-Studien*, x. 1975, 133-5; translated in the Appendix to Ch. IV, pp. 184-8, below), also belong to the year 1801/2 but this is a rather conjectural matter (see Ch. IV). The 'System of Ethical Life' refers back to an account of natural philosophy as if it already exists. But detailed development in a more or less continuous series of fragmentary drafts (with later revisions and still later replacements and supplements) begins this summer and continues through the following winter—see Kimmerle, *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 156-9.

² Letter 37, 4 May 1803 (*Briefe*, i. 68-9).

³ Von Humboldt specified that he wanted someone well qualified either in the classical languages and literature, or in physics and natural science: 'Don't send me a mere metaphysician or *Naturphilosoph*.' Hegel was well qualified in classics, and by

By that time Hegel was committed to lecture for another semester, so I do not suppose he was ever seriously considered for the post. But Schiller must have known that he was willing to be.

That Schiller should have concerned himself directly about Hegel's future is significant. In the next term when it was publicly known that Schelling had gone to Würzburg, the students came to Hegel's classes in satisfying numbers. The list of registrants for the Winter course on the 'system of speculative philosophy, including a) Logic and Metaphysics or Transcendental Idealism, b) Philosophy of Nature and c) of Spirit (*mentis*)' contains thirty names.¹ Wilhelm von Humboldt might not want a 'mere metaphysician or *Naturphilosoph*', but there were plenty of students who did. Schiller wrote to Goethe in November: 'Philosophy is not quite dumb [with the departure of Schelling presumably?], and our Dr. Hegel has got a lot of listeners who are not dissatisfied with his performance at the lectern.'² But Hegel said nothing in the announcement for this term about the appearance of a manual; and the reason is clear enough—his change of perspective required him to write a new textbook.

Goethe and Schiller both seem to have been concerned that the philosophy of nature should not disappear from the scene. It seems not unreasonable to suppose that the departure of Schelling was one factor that caused them to pay more attention to Hegel. Once they began to do so they soon learned to value him highly for himself—and both were ready to do what they could for him in a quite disinterested way (as witness Schiller's letter to von Humboldt). But it is noteworthy that it is now, when he has for the first time a sizeable class, that they are taken with the project of improving his *Vortrag*.³

now hardly less so in science. But he was a prime example of the two things that von Humboldt stipulated against; also, as Schiller wryly admitted, he was 'a bit sickly and morose' (Nicolin, report 73 with the editor's notes).

¹ *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 54 (for the title); *ibid.*, p. 60 (for the list).

² Nicolin, report 75.

³ Nicolin, reports 77–83. There was plenty in Hegel's background and interests to impress Goethe. He had been deeply interested in physics and astronomy since his schooldays in Stuttgart. He was already an eager student of botany at Tübingen, and he followed a course in anatomy there. Rosenkranz (p. 220) says that at Jena he attended Ackermann's course on physiology (cf. Nicolin, report 92, p. 60), botanized

For the Summer of 1804 Hegel announced simply that he would deal with his system as a whole. But it is fairly certain that he did not give any lectures in this term after all.¹ Instead, he began to write his new textbook. He did not complete it, but taken together with the lecture fragments of Winter 1803/4, it gives us a clear view of the new transcendently conceived and triadically articulated system (this is the topic of our Book II).

He also spent several months of this summer on a geological field trip. We know that in January he had become an 'assessor' of the Mineralogical Society of Jena; and on 30 May a pass was issued to him by the University for a journey to Göttingen and the Harz.² Rosenkranz tells us that his journey was for purposes of geological study.³ He journeyed into Westphalia where he was elected to membership in the *Naturforschenden Gesellschaft* (Brockhausen) on 1 August.⁴

On his return Hegel found that proposals were being put forward that his colleague J. F. Fries should be given an extraordinary professorship. Fries had begun his career as *Docent* at the same time; but Hegel had matriculated—or, more exactly, he had been 'nostrified' first, and he was three years older. Thus, as he pointed out in his letter to Goethe on 29 September, he was 'senior among the *Privatdozenten* in philosophy at present'. He was very modest about his publications, knowing—probably—that they would not interest Goethe very much. But he was more forthcoming about the 'purely scientific treatment of philosophy' which was

with Schelver, did chemical experiments with Seebeck, and studied medicine with Kastner. Much of this activity must be after mid-1803. Ackermann was only at Jena for the one year (1804/5). Schelver came in 1803—and we soon find him together with Hegel in the Goethe circle (see Nicolin, reports 76, 78, 81). Seebeck (a fellow Swabian) is there too. Kastner was a student at Jena (matriculated Apr. 1804) and took Hegel's 'systematic' course in winter 1804/5. He became a *Docent* in 1805 at the age of 22, and very soon passed on to be Professor of Chemistry at Heidelberg. But he kept up a correspondence with Hegel (and Schelling)—see Nicolin, report 97 and *Briefe*, i. 102–4, 127–8.

¹ When he wrote to Goethe in the autumn about his nomination as extraordinary professor he mentioned both the success of his lectures in the previous winter, and the planned completion of his book for the coming winter; but he says nothing of classes in the intervening summer.

² See *Briefe*, iv. 90 for the official records.

³ *Hegels Leben*, p. 220.

⁴ *Briefe*, iv. 91.

'the aim of a work which I hope to complete this winter for my lectures'.¹

Goethe went to work quite promptly on his behalf and in due course both Fries and Hegel were nominated as Professors of Philosophy.² There was some resistance within the Faculty, but the general view was that the two must be promoted together.³ Duke Carl August made the official proposal at the end of November and the appointments were confirmed and registered by the University at the beginning of March 1805. Gabler says that the salary was fifty thalers, but it seems that he was wrong. There was *no* salary attached to the new post. Hegel apparently got no money from the University until Goethe finally managed with great difficulty to get him a salary of a hundred thalers in 1806.⁴ To begin with, the professorship was only an honour, against which he had to set the loss of the small stipend that he had received from the Stuttgart Consistory ever since he entered the seminary at Tübingen in 1788. For he was now 'placed'; and since the 'place' was in the service of a foreign prince, he had to have permission from his own prince, and from the Consistory, to take it, or he would lose his rights as a citizen and all prospects of a place at home. He rightly judged that the post was by no means good enough to justify that. So having got his place in March he wrote in June for permission to take it. His stipend was reallocated and the official consent followed three weeks later.⁵

While all this was going on Hegel was presenting his system to another class of thirty students. He gave only this one class,⁶ and said nothing in his announcement about a text-

¹ Letter 49, *Briefe*, i. 84-5. The lecture-lists confirm Hegel's claim to seniority by according him first place among the *Dozenten* in Philosophy (see Kimmerle's note, *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 45).

² The official documents of the whole proceeding—letters exchanged between the Sustaining Princes, formal records of the University, receipts for the appropriate fees (of course!), are all printed in *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 46-9 and *Briefe*, iv. 93.

³ See Gabler's account, Nicolin, report 92, p. 59 (or *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 65).

⁴ *Briefe*, iv. 94. The implication of Hegel's letter to Niethammer (17 May 1806) is that he was paid nothing at all before this. He was paid for three-quarters at this rate (to the end of Apr. 1807). Carl August tried to persuade the other Sustaining Princes to make additional grants (*Hegel-Studien*, iv. 49-51). But apparently nothing came of this (probably because Hegel had already ceased to lecture).

⁵ See *Briefe*, iv. 85 (Consistory records) and 73-4 (Court decree).

⁶ The *Jenaische Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung* listed him under 'Logic and

book. But we know from his letter to Goethe that he was working on one; and in fact we have the manuscript, so we know how far he got. He seems to have abandoned it about half-way through his account of the philosophy of nature. The beginning is fragmentary; but this textbook is the only record of 'Logic and Metaphysics' as Hegel taught it in the Jena period that has come down to us more or less complete.

Hegel set the manuscript aside because his ideas about the right approach to philosophy, and the method of developing and presenting a philosophical system changed radically once more. He had always been concerned about the critical approach to speculative philosophy. This concern had already caused him to jettison one systematic textbook just when it was more or less done. Now another swing caused him to lay the second text aside half-finished.¹ What Rosenkranz calls 'the phenomenological crisis of the System' had now begun. (This is the theme of Book III.)

In spite of his continual changes of mind, early publication continued to be Hegel's conscious goal. For Summer 1805 he announced a 'systematic' course in the identical terms used for the previous term. This time he again promised a book that would come out during the term. But in the event his course was confined to Logic only. The class was small (twelve students) but here for the first time we find the names of C. G. Zellmann, (for whom Hoffmeister claims the distinction of being Hegel's best student at Jena) and Hermann Suthmeyer (to whom Gabler accorded the palm).²

Metaphysics' as well as announcing that he would treat 'the whole science of philosophy'. But this seems to be a mistake arising from a misreading of the Latin announcement in which the parts of the 'whole science' are specified (*Hegel-Studien*, iv. 54).

¹ The MS *seyende sind. Das eine* is a fair copy begun (probably) in Summer 1804 and abandoned half-way through the *Naturphilosophie*. We do not know when Hegel stopped writing, but because of the identical announcement for Summer 1805, I do not think we can say it was 'abandoned' before Apr. 1805. It is noteworthy, however, that the first fragment of a 'phenomenological' approach to Logic is written on a sheet subsequently used for part of one draft of the letter to Voss. On another sheet of the Voss draft we find a notice to his students that his lectures would be delayed for a week. Thus the *Phenomenology* fragment was written before the beginning of May and the Voss letter after it; and the 'dringende Arbeit' that forced Hegel to delay his lectures may well be connected with the 'phenomenological crisis of the System' (Hoffmeister, *Briefe*, i. 457).

² *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 62 (the relevant passage from Hoffmeister's introduction to the

The book promised in the announcement was again transformed like Proteus into a new shape. But now at last it was destined to get into print. Nothing was said of it in the announcement for Winter 1805 but in Summer 1806 it appears as the *System der Wissenschaft*—a title which it never lost.¹

From Summer 1805 onwards it is evident that Hegel is dividing his system into two parts ('speculative' and 'real' philosophy). Thus the 'phenomenological crisis' resulted in a move back towards the standpoint of the Identity Philosophy. But the earlier advance remains incorporated in the new position. The approach is through the 'concept' not through the 'Idea'. The 'Logic' which Hegel lectured on—in lieu of 'the whole science of philosophy'—embraced the whole theoretical (or 'speculative') half of the system. He also announced 'Natural Law' for the last time (but perhaps he did not give it). That winter he gave the 'real' half of his system (the philosophy of nature and of spirit). But he added two new offerings: pure mathematics (arithmetic and geometry) and the history of philosophy. Gabler attended both, and they made a great impression on him. The mathematics class was small, but over thirty, including all of Hegel's most prominent students attended the history of philosophy course, and we have spoken already of the 'dance of death' impression that Hegel made upon those who were not as committed to him as Suthmeyer.² At the semi-annual celebration with which the students marked the installation of a new Prorector he was chosen for special honour (February 1806).³

lectures on the History of Philosophy is quoted on the same page). For Gabler's account of both of them see *ibid.*, pp. 66–8 (or Nicolin, report 92, pp. 60–3). Zellmann died in 1808 when he was still only about 23. We have a letter from Hegel to him from Jan. 1807 (*Briefe*, i. 137–9).

¹ It is not called 'First Part' till the next semester. But the *System of Science* though it was called a 'book' was clearly understood to be more than one volume. Kastner had heard that Hegel planned to publish 4 volumes at once at Easter 1806 (Nicolin, report 93).

² Gabler's attendance in this semester and the next is certified by Hegel's testimonial (cited by Kimmerle, *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 65 n. 2); his memories are *ibid.*, pp. 69–72 (or Nicolin, report 92, pp. 64–7). cf. pp. xxxi, xlvii, above.

³ *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 73 (or Nicolin, pp. 69–70). This honour took Hegel by surprise and we may judge of its effect on him by the fact that it is one of the few details which Christiane recalled (though inaccurately) from the Jena period (see *Dok.*, pp. 393–4). By agreement between the student 'parties' they feted Krause as

For Summer 1806 Hegel announced the pure mathematics course again together with both 'speculative' and 'real' philosophy. Gabler completed his Hegelian *cursus* by taking both of the latter. But there were not many other students—only 'a moderate number'—and Hegel thought of cancelling the courses.¹ Rosenkranz asserts categorically that the mathematics course was not repeated—and this time I think we must believe him, since he had a reliable source of information about Hegel's activities for this year in Gabler. For the course on *philosophiam speculativam sive logicam* Hegel used parts of the manuscript of the *Phenomenology*; and this was in effect his farewell lecture at Jena. For the winter he announced it again (and here the name 'Phenomenology of Mind' was given to the introductory part). But he did not lecture in this term.² He had finally begun to receive a salary at midsummer, but his economic situation was by now very difficult; and it was rendered desperate by the invading army of Napoleon.

According to a famous story, Hegel finished the *Phenomenology* with the cannon-roar of the battle of Jena in his ears.³ Actually the Emperor Napoleon entered Jena on 13 October—the day that lectures were supposed to start; and at the moment when Hegel saw 'this world-soul' ride through the town he was very anxious about the safety of the manuscript which he had already dispatched to Bamberg. He had strained every nerve to finish it, in conformity with the terms of his contract with the publisher Goebhardt, for which Niethammer stood surety.⁴ But he was even more immediately anxious about the safety of the manuscripts that he had *not* sent away, and about food and a roof for himself and his maidservant. In

well. (Hegel, though senior, was a 'foreigner'; Krause was senior among the regular matriculands of Jena—see *Hegel-Studien*, iv, 35.)

¹ Letter 61, to Niethammer, 17 May 1806 (*Briefe*, i, 108–9).

² Rosenkranz is again quite categorical about this (p. 124); and while one might conceivably hold that he was guessing about the mathematics course (though the form of the assertion shows, to my mind, that he was not) it is unthinkable that he would make a definite statement about the end of Hegel's teaching career at Jena without Gabler's confirmation. (Kimmerle argues that Gabler's testimonial provides further indirect evidence—but this is of little weight since Gabler had already taken all the courses that Hegel was prepared to offer.)

³ The story—embroidered thus by Gans in his obituary (Nicolin, report 738, p. 492)—originates in Hegel's letter of 1 May 1807 to Schelling (*Briefe*, i, 161–2).

⁴ Letter 71, from Niethammer, 3 Oct. 1806 (and Hoffmeister's note); Letters 72, 73, 74, to Niethammer, 6–13 Oct. 1806 (*Briefe*, i, 117–21, 462).

the next few days, they sought refuge first with the Gablers. Gabler's father was Prorector of the University for this semester; but his house was a sort of sanctuary, not because ordinary illiterate French soldiers would have respected this dignity, but because the young Gabler had found a French artillery officer who was willing to keep his quarters in the house. Hegel went there only after he had had one brush with marauders—who went away peaceably after he had given them what food and drink he had. From the Gablers, he moved almost at once to the Frommanns, where he remained some weeks.¹ But he was absolutely penniless. Goethe told von Knebel to give him ten thalers to help him through the immediate emergency.²

From the time of Schelling's departure Goethe had continually exerted himself to help Hegel in any way that he could. He had come to have a very high opinion of him, particularly as a natural philosopher. Paulus—who is a slightly tainted witness because of the animosity between him and Schelling—claims that more than once Goethe remarked in conversation that in mathematics and physics, at least, he prized Hegel above Schelling.³ No doubt Hegel's espousal of Goethe's theory of colours (an extension of his war against Newton's mechanics into the field of optics) had much to do with Goethe's feelings about him. Another who shared this commitment was Seebeck, whose own educational background was medical and scientific. In August 1806, Goethe notes that the three of them conducted experiments on coloured light with the camera obscura.⁴ But the whole field of natural philosophy was common ground for Hegel and Goethe. They came together several times in the last days of

¹ This account is mainly from Gabler (*Hegel-Studien*, iv, 72–3 or Nicolin, report 92, pp. 67–9), supplemented by K. F. E. Frommann's letter to Goethe (Nicolin, report 108). The editors of the *Logic* of 1804 have suggested the possibility that the plundering soldiers may have damaged Hegel's MSS. This seems to me rather unlikely. Hegel complains that they stirred his papers up 'like lottery tickets'; but he means the MS on his desk from which the fair copy of the *Phenomenology* was made. He was worried about the difficulty of replacing part of the fair copy in case one of the packets sent off earlier had been lost in the post, Letter 75, to Niethammer, 28 Oct. 1806 (*Briefe*, i, 124).

² Nicolin, reports 110–11.

³ Nicolin, report 117.

⁴ Nicolin, report 98.

August (when Goethe was apparently visiting Jena). As we might expect, they discussed geology and mineralogy; and one evening at the Frommanns' they talked for a long time about Steffen's latest work (i.e. his *Basic Features of the Philosophical Science of Nature*, 1806) with Frau Frommann sitting in the shadows, an interested but rather bewildered listener. At the beginning of October, with the war clouds gathering, Goethe records that they ranged over a variety of philosophical topics. But at least once Seebeck was there too, so the philosophy was probably more natural than transcendental.¹

When the worst emergency of the battle period was over, an appearance of normality returned; but the life of the University was at a standstill. Hegel, who still had the last sheets of his manuscript because he had not dared to send them off, wrote to Niethammer in Bamberg that he would come there; for as far as the University was concerned there was no point in his remaining in Jena, while in Bamberg he could at least correct his proofs, be with his friends, and make his honorarium from the publishers go a little further. But he had to ask his friend to send the money for his travelling expenses. He and Seebeck were still at the Frommanns'.²

The letter apparently crossed with one from Niethammer containing the good news that the manuscript had arrived safely, and a promise that money would follow within a few days.³ The University Senate had decided that lectures would begin on 3 November, but Hegel felt it was a sham. He was still in Jena on 3 November, and he wrote again that day, mainly about how quiet things were (by contrast with some of the rumours that were current). But he said nothing of the University; and about ten days later he travelled to Bamberg.⁴

He remained for a little over a month, returning to Jena in mid-December. For a long time he had been hoping to get a

¹ Nicolin, reports 99–105; cf. also report 111 which gives some idea of Hegel's philosophical impact on Goethe.

² Letter 76, 18 Oct. 1806, *Briefe*, i, 123–4. He wrote again on 20 Oct.—but the letter is lost. The letters to Niethammer in this critical period are lost or mutilated. We have only fragments or the abridged versions printed by Karl Hegel. (For a conjecture as to the reason for this see p. lxviii, n. 1, below.)

³ See Hegel's reply, Letter 77, 22 Oct. 1806, *ibid.*, p. 125 (with Hoffmeister's note, p. 464).

⁴ Letter 79 to Niethammer, 3 Nov. 1806; and Letter 81 to Frommann, 17 Nov. 1806 (*Briefe*, i. 126–7, 128–30).

post at Heidelberg. Several of his friends had gone there and were bestirring themselves in his interest.¹ But he now wrote to Schelling (in Munich) ostensibly about his latest published essay and his invitation (given to Hegel some time before) to collaborate in the newest journal plan—the *Jahrbucher für Medizin als Wissenschaft*—but actually to see what the academic prospects were like in that quarter. Schelling answered at once, and he took the point, for he discussed the not very hopeful prospects and gave advice on where copies of the forthcoming book should be sent, etc., before he turned to scientific subjects.²

At this point Hegel was writing the *Vorrede* for his book; he informed Niethammer on 16 January 1807 that it had finally been sent off. The body of the work was now in press (the letter deals in part with problems of proof-reading and an errata sheet).³ A few days later the news came from Schelver, the Jena Professor of Botany, that he too had received a call to Heidelberg.⁴ As soon as his resignation was official, Hegel wrote to Goethe, emphasizing the inadequacy of his own salary, and offering to supervise the botanical garden (and even give lectures in botany) if he were allowed simply to live in Schelver's house. For, as he pointed out, most students regarded philosophy as a luxury which in time of emergency they could easily do without. He asked Goethe for an interview—and Goethe's diary records lunch with Frommann, Hegel, and Seebeck on the last day of the month.⁵ But nothing came of this initiative either. The vacant professorship was filled by a *Docent*, F. S. Voigt (son of the Professor of Mathematics).⁶

Niethammer's letter of 16 February offered Hegel at least a way out of his economic difficulties. The editorship of the

¹ See *Briefe*, i. 95–105, 127–8, 139–49.

² Letters 82 and 83, 3 and 11 Jan. 1807, *Briefe*, i. 130–6. Hegel also wrote to Sinclair, but the latter could not help him, being still insecure about his own future (see his answer, Letter 91, 6 Mar. 1807, *ibid.*, p. 155).

³ Letter 84, 16 Jan. 1807, *Briefe*, i. 136–7.

⁴ Letter 86, end Jan. 1807, *Briefe*, i. 139–40.

⁵ Letter 87, <end Jan. 1807>, *Briefe*, i. 141–2. Hegel notes that he used to be an enthusiastic practical botanist. While he was living in Berne, he had made a herbarium (which in parts he still had). For Goethe's diary entry see Nicolin, report 115.

⁶ See Hegel's next letter to Niethammer, *Briefe*, i. 146.

Bamberg paper was vacant, because the previous editor, a French *émigré*, had attached himself to the staff of Marshal Davoust and was not intending to return. Niethammer had already proposed Hegel for the post, and was empowered to offer it to him upon the condition that he would take up his duties on 1 March. The salary was not princely, but as Niethammer said, it was more than Hegel could earn in Jena, and there were prospects of improving it. Hegel was not pleased with the salary at all, but the idea of producing a paper more like the French journals than German papers usually were, attracted him. He did not see how he could be ready to start on 1 March, but he said he would do his best. Since he was still hoping for a call to Heidelberg, he would not irrevocably commit himself to stay in Bamberg.¹ He announced his lectures for the Jena Summer term just as if he was going to be there to give them; and even for Winter 1807 he made the formal announcement of a professor away on a journey: that he would announce his classes when he returned.²

He wrote once more to Schelling before he moved. This time he concentrated on the project of a 'Critical Journal of German Literature'. This plan was originally associated with his desire, somehow, to get a place at Heidelberg;³ but he had already tried it out on Niethammer (as a possible collaborator);⁴ and now he is obviously fishing for suggestions from Schelling as to where it might be started in Bavaria. He turns finally to discuss Schelling's latest scientific enthusiasm—wishing he had the experimental data and experience that he could so easily get in Schelling's company.⁵

The postscript to this letter reveals that he wrote again to Heidelberg too. For he apologizes for addressing a letter meant for Schelver to Schelling by mistake. But none of his efforts were destined to bear fruit. To Bamberg he was to

¹ Letters 88–9, 16–20 Feb. 1807 (*Briefe*, i. 143–7).

² *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 56.

³ The project was first mooted, apparently, in Hegel's letter to Voss (Letter 55) though our draft breaks off at the critical moment (see Voss's reply (Letter 56) and Kastner's report and suggestions (Letter 55), *Briefe*, i. 101–3). See further Letter 80 (Kastner to Hegel, 15 Nov. 1806), *Briefe*, i. 127–8.

⁴ Letter 70, 17 Sept. 1806, *Briefe*, i. 116–17.

⁵ Letter 90, 23 Feb. 1807, *Briefe*, i. 147–52. The 'Maxims' that he wrote for the *Journal* at this time still survive. They are printed in *NKA*, iv.

go—he got there on 12 March according to Niethammer's report to Schelling¹—and there he was to remain for eighteen months a journalist before he passed to Nüremberg for eight years as Rector of the Gymnasium. Then at last, in 1816—not as he had hoped, in 1806—he would become Professor at Heidelberg.

5. *The Private Man*

When we consider the extraordinary volume and variety of work that Hegel produced in these years we may well wonder how he could have had any personal private life at all. His indefatigable industry was a byword. When Kastner heard that Hegel's 'system' was to be published in four volumes at once at Easter 1806, he was quite prepared to believe it, merely remarking that it was 'only possible for the perseverance of a Hegel'.² But Hegel was, in fact, always a very social creature. His energy needed to be sustained by a friendly, even a convivial, atmosphere.³

In the first years of the Jena period this atmosphere is very much in evidence. The Swabian invaders were a jovial lot, and Hegel kept his end up very well.⁴

In these years, before Schelling left Jena in the company of Caroline Schlegel, they were all friends. If Rosine Niethammer and Elisabeth Caroline Paulus disliked Caroline, at least there was no open resentment between them.⁵ (Rosine's father was the Schlegels' landlord.) Schelling and Hegel were near neighbours in the Klipstein Gardens—'I live with him' as Hegel put it.⁶ Goethe came on visits (especially to Major von

¹ Nicolin, report 125.

² Nicolin, report 93.

³ We may remember how he suffered from loneliness in Switzerland; and the 'hypocondria' which he mentioned to Gabler, or the 'moroseness' which Schiller felt obliged to mention to Von Humboldt, no doubt arose partly from this source—though he had enough other, more concrete, worries. He could write with high seriousness about the 'loneliness' of the philosopher's quest—as he did in his letter to Zellner—but we should also remember his sense of being 'condemned' to be a philosopher.

⁴ See Troxler's comment on Laube's *Moderne Charakteristiken* (Nicolin, report 50; what Laube says about Hegel is in report 116).

⁵ Frau Paulus (Elisabeth Friederike Caroline) was and is usually called Caroline. But I prefer to have only one Caroline in my story because her *surname* is so ambiguous.

⁶ *Briefe*, i. 65.

Knebel), and there was the '*Bund of Free Men*' which now revolved around the figure of J. D. Gries (translator of Tasso, Ariosto, Calderon, etc.), another near neighbour to whom Schelling introduced him.¹ Then there was the Frommann family of which he was soon almost a member—playing cards with his printer (ombre), and drinking tea with the printer's wife. The little son Friedrich Johannes (b. 1797) later joked that Hegel was his first teacher since he took him on his knee and made him decline *mensa*.² After Schelling and Niethammer the Frommanns must rank as Hegel's closest friends in this period.

Johanna Frommann's tea-table was not the only one that he frequented. The look of an 'Old Man' which earned him his Tübingen nickname was accentuated ever more as the years progressed; but in spite of his distinctly unprepossessing appearance, Hegel was always something of a ladies' man. We can tell that he made rather a hit with Caroline's young friend and protégé, Julie Gotter, for several of Caroline's letters to her give details of his social activities. 'Hegel plays the gallant, and is the general Cicisbeo' she wrote in February 1803.³

He continued to be something of a connoisseur of the theatre too. We find him advising Caroline (rather negatively) about the acting capacities of Sophie Bulla (whom he had probably seen in Frankfurt).⁴ The whole group (Gries, Schelling, Hegel, the Frommanns, A. W. Schlegel, and no doubt Caroline also) made a journey to Lauchstädt for the opening of the theatre there with Goethe's *Was wir bringen* and Mozart's *Titus* at the end of June 1802. It was a pleasant little midsummer holiday.⁵

They all used the same wine merchants—Ramann Bros. of Erfurt—and Hegel, who was always rather concerned about what he drank, discovered that some of his friends were being sent better wine than he received at the same price. He

¹ Hegel's first definitely documented meeting with Goethe was in Nov. 1801; he became acquainted with Gries during that same winter (see Nicolin, reports 43, 44, and 47).

² Nicolin, report 119 (Gries was a family friend here too).

³ Nicolin, report 71 (see also reports 57, 69).

⁴ Nicolin, report 56. She was still not 20 at this time (b. 1783) and was being talked of for a part in A. W. Schlegel's play *Jon*.

⁵ Nicolin, report 61.

protested to the merchants that he paid his bills as regularly as anyone. The suspicion that he was discriminated against continued to dog him, and since he was certainly not a major customer it may not always have been his mildly paranoid imagination. Sometimes it was probably just his typical bad luck—for instance when he received a leaking cask.¹ But it all contributed to the 'morose' character that Schiller attributed to him. Occasionally Caroline included the wine for Schelling and Hegel in her family order for the Schlegels.² But wine was expensive, and I do not think it is entirely an accident that we know of only one order (January 1806) after the end of 1803. Hegel did not stop drinking wine, but I expect his orders were rarer. There were objective economic grounds for his depression.

In 1803 the group began to break up. Schelling and Caroline had, of course, strong personal reasons for their going. But the Niethammers and the Paulus family went to Würzburg too, for simple economic and academic reasons; and there the womenfolk quarrelled (and in the case of Schelling and Paulus the menfolk too).³ Hegel remained friends with all parties,⁴ and Niethammer would have liked to do the same, but found Schelling unwilling.⁵ Gottlieb Hufeland, the Professor of Law with whom they were all friendly, also transferred to Würzburg.⁶ Gries was sometimes in Jena

¹ 5 letters to Ramann Bros. have survived and we know of 6 more that are lost. (See *Briefe*, i. 63, 67, 68; iv. 4, 5; *Hegel-Studien*, iii. 80.) The complaint is in Letter 36 (2 July 1801, *Briefe*, i. 68). That the suspicion lingered is evident from Hegel's specific instructions about the wine which he wants to return to Seebeck (Letter 43a, 8 Nov. 1803, *Briefe*, iv. 5).

² See Nicolin, reports 63 and 64.

³ They conducted a rather petty squabble by letter, about a book which Schelling borrowed while still in Jena. He could not find it when Paulus asked for it back. His hope that his father would have a copy proved vain. The book was a Spinozist *Ars ratiocinandi* by A. J. Kuffelaer (Hamburg, 1684). (See Fuhrmans, i, 328, 342-3, 347.)

⁴ Fuhrmans (*ibid.*, pp. 347, 532-5) thinks Paulus poisoned his relations with Schelling, but I cannot see any real sign of bad feeling before the publication of the *Phenomenology* (which was enough for a breach in itself as far as Schelling was concerned). The story Gabler tells about the serious emphasis with which Hegel spoke of having a *friend* (i.e. Schelling) in Würzburg, seems to me to show that there was no cloud over their relations in 1805 (*Hegel-Studien*, iv. 69; or Nicolin, report 63).

⁵ Cf. *Briefe*, i. 92.

⁶ See Letters 39-41 (*Briefe*, i. 72-6) for the discussion in Aug. 1803 of Hufeland's

still, but often away.¹ Only the Frommanns, and Seebeck were left of the earlier circle (though probably Anton Thibaut (Professor of Law) and Schelver the botanist, who both came to Jena in 1802, should be counted as belonging to it).²

Students, of course, came and went. But we hear of none in these first years with whom Hegel established lasting ties. Goethe and Schiller went out of their way to bring Hegel and the new Professor of Philosophy K. L. Fernow together; but since *they* agreed with Hegel's view that he was superficial, while Hegel must have coveted his job, and envied his great popular following among the students, we can hardly be surprised that Schiller's hope that the two would find common ground and begin to mend each other's weaknesses came to nothing.³ In 1804 Ackermann arrived, and presumably he became more than a mere acquaintance, since Hegel followed his course, and they had common scientific interests. In the same year Kastner, a brilliant young chemist, took Hegel's 'encyclopaedic' course. But he passed on to Heidelberg as chemistry professor immediately.⁴ Hegel's close circle in these later years seems to have shrunk to the Frommanns, Schelver, and Seebeck.

We have already spoken of Hegel's efforts—beginning in 1803—to obtain a position elsewhere. His financial situation, which had seemed satisfactory to the faculty in 1801, gradually became very bad. His promotion to an extraordinary

probable departure. He came originally from Danzig. See Nicolin, report 71, for his connection with the group. His daughter later married Niethammer's stepson.

¹ See Letter 48, 7 Sept. 1804, *Briefe*, i. 82–3.

² The first definite link between Hegel and Seebeck that we know of is when Hegel borrows some wine from him late in 1803. But he belonged to the Gries circle, and was a familiar of the Frommanns. Thibaut had offers to go elsewhere in 1803, but chose to stay in Jena (*Briefe*, i. 73). Like Schelver, he eventually went to Heidelberg (in 1806). Both are with the surviving group at one of Goethe's Jena evening parties (Nicolin, report 81). (Niethammer was there too—he was not called to Würzburg till spring 1804—cf. *Briefe*, i. 82). Schelling sends greetings to Schelver in his letter of 11 July 1803 (*Briefe*, i. 72).

³ See Hegel to Schelling, Letter 42, *Briefe*, i. 77; and Nicolin, reports 76, 78–83. Since Hegel's French was probably good enough, we may assume that he and Fernow spent an hour or two discussing philosophy with Mme de Stael at the end of 1803 (*ibid.*, report 82).

⁴ He remained in correspondence with Hegel from there; and enrolled him as a member of the *Physikalischen Gesellschaft* that he founded. The tone of his letter of Nov. 1806, when Hegel's financial troubles were at their worst is intimate (*Briefe*, i. 127–8; Nicolin, report 97; *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 92).

professorship brought in no money, and the University of Jena itself was plainly in decline. By the spring of 1806 his chronic difficulty was becoming acute. Gries told Caroline in May that everything was dead and mournful in Jena. 'Schelver lived with his wife in one room . . . and no one could tell how Hegel managed to get along.'¹ The printing of the *Phenomenology* began in February of this year, and the publishers had promised to pay the honorarium when they had printed half of the manuscript. But Hegel was still writing, and as Kuno Fischer remarks, it is not easy to say *when* a book is half-written.² The publisher naturally wanted to see the whole of the manuscript; and Niethammer was only able to get the payment that Hegel desperately needed by promising to pay a heavy indemnity for the printing already done if the whole manuscript was not in the hands of the publisher by 18 October.³ The emergency of the battle prevented Hegel from sending the last part by this date (and made him very anxious for some days about what he *had* sent).

The final grant of a salary (one hundred thalers) in June 1806 did not alleviate Hegel's situation much. For, as he might have put it himself, he was at last entangled with fate. Aphrodite took a revenge that was to have bitter consequences to the end of his life, upon the 'general Cicisbeo'. Johanna Burkhardt (née Fischer), abandoned by her husband, had already had two children by other men (although only one of them lived). It appears that in 1806 she was employed as a chambermaid in the house where Hegel lodged. She it was, who became the mother of his first child, Ludwig, born on 5 February 1807 and baptized on 7 February with Hegel's brother Ludwig and his friend Frommann as godparents.⁴ We can well understand why Hegel could not be in Bamberg by 1 March as the newspaper proprietor wished. We have here also, I think, the reason why he did not feel comfortable at the

¹ Nicolin, report 94.

² K. Fischer, i, 69. For the printing of *Phenomenology* see Letter 67 (to Niethammer, 6 Aug. 1806) *Briefe*, i, 113.

³ *Briefe*, i, 462 (notes to Letter 68 and 71).

⁴ The baptismal certificate is in *Briefe*, iv, 121. Frau Burkhardt's birth and baptism dates are also given there. For her death in 1817 see Letter 317, *Briefe*, ii, 154-5. Ludwig's brief career—he enlisted in the Dutch East Indies military service and died

Gablers' house during the hectic time of the battle. For the *Wärterin* with a bundle on her back, whom Gabler mentions, must have been Johanna—and since she was by then more than five months pregnant I suppose her situation could not easily be hidden.¹ It never was hidden from the Frommanns, to whom the couple very soon went. Not only did Frommann stand godfather, but Johanna Frommann's sister, Sophie Bohn, took charge of the child when he was four years old.

Johanna Burkhardt was born in 1778 and died in 1817. That his relation with her lay heavy upon Hegel's conscience is evident from what he wrote to Frommann in July 1808: 'I must always be bitterly sorry that I have not so far been able to wrench her, who is the mother of my child, and who therefore can require every kind of duty from me, entirely out of her situation.'² It looks rather as if he would have emulated Goethe and married her, had she been free and he been settled. When he did marry in 1811 he did not attempt to keep the earlier liaison a secret from the bride's family (but he did try to keep his engagement from Frau Burkhardt's ears).³

We must certainly agree with Kaufmann therefore, that Glockner's comment on Hegel's relationships with women: 'Nothing suggests that any of these relationships gave rise to a moral problem about which Hegel ever thought seriously' is rather disgracefully disingenuous.⁴ But it is foolish to rush to

of a fever in Djarkarta in Aug. 1831—can be followed fairly easily in the documents printed in *Briefe*, iv. 121–36.

¹ I suspect that we have here also the reason why Karl Hegel did not print Hegel's letters to Niethammer in full. He made some parts of the originals that survive illegible, and it seems probable that he destroyed others altogether. Since he was clearly conscious of their intrinsic interest as documents of the most dramatic moments of Hegel's life (both world-historically and academically) he must have had some pressing reason for this.

² Letter 125, *Briefe*, i. 236.

³ Letter 184 to Johanna Frommann, *Briefe*, i. 362. The secret could not be kept when he was married; and Johanna Burkhardt certainly poisoned the child Ludwig's mind against his stepmother (see *Briefe*, ii. 154–5). Probably the news got to her ears quite soon and she reacted just as Hegel expected. For the story told by Heinrich Leo (see *Briefe*, iii. 434–5) inaccurate as it is in matters about which an outsider would be ignorant, can scarcely be a mere invention as far as the sudden appearance of Frau Burkhardt in Nuremberg is concerned. It is quite likely too, that she spoke of a promise to marry her, but even if we were sure of this, it would not establish that Hegel ever made such a promise. (As far as the published records go we do not know when, or even whether, she actually became a widow.)

⁴ Glockner, i, 283 n.—cf. Kaufmann (Anchor edn.), pp. 91–2. Glockner is

the opposite extreme, as Kaufmann does, and find in the Burkhardt affair a clue to the character of the *Phenomenology*.¹ Economic necessity was one factor that drove Hegel to publish at last. But he began sending the manuscript to press for the use of his students before the pregnancy began. Hegel's thought was still in the process of evolution; but he cannot (as Kaufmann supposes) have been in any doubt about his ability to write a book. Kastner did not doubt his ability to produce the whole system in four volumes at one time, and Hegel himself had written enough fair copies of different parts of it to give good grounds for that sort of confidence. Actually he published only the 'introduction and first part', and he wrote it in a free-flowing way that often reminds us more of the Frankfurt manuscripts than of his Jena 'textbook' drafts. He wrote the second half of the *Phenomenology* in a hurry certainly. But the argument of this 'introduction' to his system had been long pondered. There is no need to marvel, as Mueller does,² at its rapid emergence when Hegel came under real pressure to produce it.

The only question that it makes sense to ask about the effect of the Burkhardt affair on Hegel's career is whether his responsibility for mother and child forced Hegel to to to Bamberg when he might otherwise have hung on, 'managing no one knows how' for six months or a year longer to see whether something turned up at Heidelberg, or at Berlin, or at Tübingen (for he inquired about that possibility too)³ or in Bavaria. Since he was writing up his scheme for the hypothetical 'Journal of German Literature' when the baby was born

explicitly discussing Hegel's *letters* (but even at that he may be wrong about the letters to Nannette Endel—see *Toward the Sunlight*, pp. 263–4.

¹ Kaufmann (Anchor edn.), pp. 92–3. What Kaufmann wants us to infer from the fact that the *Vorrede* was written and dispatched a week or two before Ludwig was born I cannot imagine. The only conceivable connection is an economic one. But I do not suppose the publisher welcomed this rather lengthy addition to a bulky MS about which he had already developed very cold feet (quite rightly as the sales were to show); and it would require clear documentary proof to convince me that he paid Hegel anything for it. (Even if Hegel expected Goebhardt to behave like Santa Claus, I feel reasonably certain that he did not write the *Vorrede* for money.)

² Mueller, *Denkgeschichte*, p. 163.

³ See Letter 62 from Niethammer (26 May 1806, *Briefe*, i. 109). (There can be no doubt that it was always the chance of obtaining an academic—not a pastoral—position that Hegel had in mind when he took steps to safeguard his rights in his homeland.)

(or even later); and since he went to Bamberg only after writing to everyone who might conceivably have news of a post, and with the explicit stipulation that he would not consider himself bound to the newspaper office if something that he regarded as a better position were offered him, I think the suspicion that the necessary maintenance of mother and child was what drove him to give up his first University career, when he would have preferred for himself to go on starving on the professorial pittance that he had finally achieved, is justified.

BOOK I

MOONLIGHT

CHAPTER I

The New Logic and the Old Metaphysics

1. *The Ideal in reflective form*

In his letter to Schelling of November 1800 Hegel summed up his educational career thus:

In my scientific development, which began from the subordinate needs of man, I was bound to be driven on to science, and the Ideal of my youthful period was likewise bound to transform itself into the form of reflection, into a system. I ask myself now, while I am still occupied with this, what way back to intervention in the life of men is to be found. Of all men whom I see around me, it is only in you that I see the one whom I might find my friend even with respect to the publication [of the systematically expressed Ideal] and its effectiveness in the world; for I see that you have grasped man purely, i.e. with whole soul [*Gemut*] and without vanity.¹

Hegel obviously thought that Schelling knew enough about the progress of his reflections and the nature of the 'Ideal' that he was formulating in them, to appreciate fully the significance of this short statement. His letter is a carefully pondered statement, which shows clearly both his desire to be invited to collaborate with Schelling in the academic world of Jena, and his acceptance of the fact that in Schelling's eyes, his own aims and efforts were sub-philosophical, so that the partnership could scarcely be an equal one. This did not matter to him because his own view of what was important was different; what *did* matter, was that in the attempt to formulate his 'Ideal' as a system, he had come to his point of contact with Schelling. For Schelling philosophical insight was an end in itself, while for Hegel, at this stage, it was primarily an

¹ Letter 29, *Briefe*, i. 59-60. I have followed the form of Hegel's German as closely as I can.

instrument for social regeneration. But the question of which was really the end, and which the means, could be left in abeyance as long as they were agreed about the insight itself; and within the ivory tower of the academies Schelling's view of what came first must inevitably prevail *de jure*, even if Schelling were not already the senior partner *de facto*. Hegel's confidence that Schelling must understand and sympathize with his efforts, even though he was bound to evaluate them differently, was almost certainly well founded.

But for us the situation is different. For us, the terms in which Hegel wrote to Schelling require lengthy gloss if we are to understand properly what he meant.¹ It is unfortunate for us that we have only two fairly short fragments of the largest, and most 'philosophical' manuscript in which Hegel sought to give his Ideal the 'reflective' form of a 'system'. But we have enough evidence in the fragments of his preparatory studies for that manuscript to get a fairly clear idea of what he meant.²

Since it is the 'Ideal' of what this thirty-year-old student already calls his 'youth' that he was occupied in expressing 'scientifically', let us begin with the word 'Ideal'. According to Kant's usage—from which Hegel's is derivative—an Ideal is an adequate or perfect instantiation of an Idea in (or for) the imagination.³ Transcendental theology is concerned with God as 'the Ideal of pure Reason'.⁴ Thus when Hegel speaks of 'the

¹ Only a minimal bird's eye view will be given here. A much fuller commentary will be found in Ch. IV of *Toward the Sunlight*. The present survey is designed only to complement that discussion.

² Otto Pöggeler has also shown that the 'Fragments of historical studies', given by Rosenkranz, fit very plausibly into the context of Hegel's essentially practical philosophy during the Frankfurt period. The possibility that some of them were written even earlier cannot be excluded (see *Toward the Sunlight*, p. 158 n. 1). But I am now convinced that none of them belong to the Jena period. All the inherent probabilities are against this. (For Pöggeler's reading of the evidence see *Hegel-Studien*, ix, 1974, 73–107; Clark Butler's translation of the fragments themselves is in *Clio*, vii, 1977, 113–34).

³ Properly speaking, an *Idea* signifies a concept of reason, and an *Ideal* the representation of an individual existence as adequate to an Idea—*Critique of Judgement*, sect. 17, *Akad.* v, 232; Meredith, *Aesthetic Judgement*, 76.

⁴ The 'Ideal of Pure Reason'—which is particularly important for the understanding of the word 'Sein' in Hegel's Frankfurt MSS, is characterized in several different ways at different stages of Kant's argument in the *Critique of Pure Reason*: as the *ens entium* (A340, B348—cf. A408, B434–5); as the 'sum-total of all possibility' (A573, B601); as the 'necessary and supremely real being' (A640–41; B668–9). What Kant says in this last connection is especially relevant: 'While for the merely speculative

Ideal of my youthful period' he means primarily the idea of God as *έν και παν* which he and others formulated together at Tübingen in opposition to the way in which the deity was presented in the orthodox Lutheran theology of G. C. Storr. He began to use the word 'Ideal' for this 'totality' quite early in the Frankfurt period—and his intentional reference to the Kantian 'Ideal of pure reason' is very obvious:

Where subject and object—or freedom and nature are thought as united, so that nature is freedom, subject and object are not to be separated, there is the divine—such an Ideal is the object of every religion. Divinity is at once subject and object, one [can] not say of it that it is subject in opposition to object or that it has an object.¹

Hegel's name for the religious Ideal that was to be expressed in his own 'mythology of Reason' was *Life*. The task of philosophical reflection as he posed it in this period was 'to think pure life' since 'pure life is being'.² This problem is proposed and resolved in the 'Spirit of Christianity' in the context of Hegel's critique of the Ideal that Jesus proclaimed and personified. Jesus did not solve the problem correctly. In trying to achieve *purity* of life he was driven to reject all life's empirical conditions. Thus his pure union with all life in his God of Love required a flight from all the concrete relationships in which human nature is actively realized. Nevertheless 'pure life is being', and so 'to think pure life' is indeed the general problem. The solution offered by Jesus illustrates one pole of the antinomy that arises here—the gospel of 'love' expresses the side of pure subjectivity or pure self-consciousness. The other pole—pure objectivity or simple Other-consciousness—is represented by the 'Lord God Almighty' of positive religion from Abraham to G. C. Storr. The 'transcendental theology' of the new mythology of Reason must think

employment of reason the supreme being remains a mere *ideal*, it is yet *an ideal without a flaw*, a concept which completes and crowns the whole of human knowledge. Its objective reality cannot indeed be proved, but also cannot be disproved, by merely speculative reason.'

¹ *Positiv wird ein Glauben genannt*, (before July 1797), TW-A, i. 242. This fragment is translated (by C. Hamlin) in *Clio*, viii, 1979, 258–61.

² *Reines Leben zu denken*, TW-A, i. 370–1 (Knox, 254). The 'mythology of Reason' is set up as the goal of philosophical endeavour in the 'Earliest System-programme' (*eine Ethik, Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 9, 1973, 265; *Toward the Sunlight*, p. 511).

subject and object, freedom and positive necessity, together in an antinomic unity.

This was the task to which Hegel addressed himself in the major manuscript of 1800. The first surviving fragment defines 'pure life', or human nature conceived in abstraction from all particular circumstances, without any resulting falsification of the conditions of finite existence. The *abstract* Idea of 'pure life' which Jesus managed to incarnate through his 'opposition to opposition' is here replaced by the *concrete* Idea of an 'infinite life' which takes finite life up into itself in all its empirical variety and particularity. The 'infinity' of life is the stably cycling and self-sustaining system of natural and human activities within which every finite life is nourished, and all the differing possibilities of human excellence are realized and harmonized; this must be envisaged as a single spirit, a living bond which unites the whole mass of multifarious doings and strivings of the members of the community. The members feel that they are 'organs' of this whole. But they are also bound to feel, through the stresses of natural need, that they are private individuals who must care for their own affairs. Both of these antithetic feelings are inescapable aspects of life. The first is the sense of the *Volk*, through which I come to be aware of my human freedom; the second is the sense of the family which is the organization of nature itself for the maintenance of life. Thus the being of a free moral consciousness must be a 'union of union and non-union'.¹

¹ *absolute Entgegensetzung gilt*, TW-A, i. 422 (Knox and Kroner, p. 312). It is essential to keep in mind the problem propounded in the 'Earliest system-programme': 'How must a world be constituted for a moral *Wesen*?' (*eine Ethik, Hegel-Studien, Beiheft* 9, p. 263; *Toward the Sunlight*, p. 510). For then we can readily see that Hegel is here expounding his own general answer to that question in critical contrast to Fichte's. In *eine Ethik* the explicit contrast is with Kant (esp. *Perpetual Peace*). Hegel's doctrine itself is an aesthetically *harmonized* or fate-reconciled version of the 'unsocial-sociability' of Kant's 'reflective' concept of humanity in the 'Idea for a Universal History'. It is plain upon its face that the fragment *absolute Entgegensetzung gilt* is meant to be interpreted in a speculative-religious sense. I tried to show in *Toward the Sunlight* (see pp. 383-8) that this sense rests on a *natural* one suggested by its biological language. But I did not attend to the intermediate *social* interpretation which becomes apparent when the fragment is considered in relation to the *Natural Law* essay and the *System of Ethical Life*. Yet the application of the speculative concept of 'living nature' at the social level is evident enough in the Frankfurt period. See esp. *Der immer sich vergrößernde Widerspruch* (1800, TW-A, i. 457-61 and *Ich (a) Menschenliebe Freundschaft* (late 1800 or early 1801?, *Dok.*, p. 467 or TW-A, i. 444-5 n. 6) both translated in *Clio*, x, 1980/81, no. 4; the Kant

This union of public commitments and private needs cannot be adequately expressed in any reflective system of natural rights and social obligations. Any attempt to express it in this way can be overthrown by the first critic to approach it with a different order of priorities; and the course of life itself necessitates that we must for ever estimate our needs and determine our duties from conflicting points of view. There is always a formal opposition between the standpoint of the agent(s) and that of the patient(s), or between that of 'ruler' and 'subject' in any social interaction. But it is the pressure of life itself that makes this formal opposition *real*, as soon as we go from home to market-place. There is no hope that this real opposition can ever be obviated—as it is obviated by the loving acceptance of parental authority in an ideal family—because not even a regulative ideal for social harmony can be adequately formulated as a 'principle of pure reason'. Specifically, Kant's ideal of 'perpetual peace' is mistaken. Social conflict involving a conscious and deliberate risk of life, is essential to life itself, because it is through the laying down of life on behalf of the community that the *living* bond of the organs finally verifies its existence. Without the experienced demonstration of voluntary self-sacrifice, the religious forms in which this bond is expressed for conscious contemplation would be a sham.

This social bond, the 'union of synthesis and antithesis' that is 'a reality beyond all reflection'¹ is presented in a non-propositional form in the religious experience and practice of the

commentary of 1798 (Rosenkranz, pp. 87–8 or *TW-A*, i. 443–4); and finally the 'Earliest System-programme' (1796, *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 9, 263–5; *Toward the Sunlight*, 510–12) which supplies us with the 3 levels, nature, human affairs, religion.

¹ *absolute Entgegensetzung gilt*, *TW-A*, i. 422 (Knox and Kroner, p. 312). When Hegel called love a 'miracle that we cannot grasp'—*so wie sie mehrere Gattungen*, *TW-A*, i. 244 (*Clio*, viii, 1979, 262)—he was reclaiming the concept of 'miracle' for its proper (aesthetic) use at the higher level of consciousness which he called, at that stage, 'religion'. This reclamation did not conflict with—rather it presupposed—his critical rejection of 'miracles' in the sphere of the understanding. The fact that Hölderlin owned an early German translation of Hume's *Enquiry concerning the Human Understanding* (Jena, 1793—see *GSA*, vii. 3, 390) tends to support the hypothesis that the fragment *Der Streit über die Möglichkeit* belongs among the drafts for the 'Spirit of Christianity' (which is where Rosenkranz, pp. 510–12, found it, or at least put it). The nameless 'Bestreiter der Wunder' is Hume (not just by reputation or report, but pleading his own cause at the 'Richterstuhl des Verstandes').

community. Language plays an important role in this presentation; but any seeming propositions that are uttered will only be distorted and misunderstood if we treat them as the raw material for a 'dogmatic theology' or even for a critically rational 'religion of Reason'. The only regulative standard for the use of Reason here is the aesthetic sense. Art and artists come into existence because the community needs to represent to itself its own free union with nature, or the integration of its natural environment with its own cultural self-assertion. The embodied standards of beauty which they simultaneously both create and aspire to, represent the harmony of necessity and aspiration that is the Ideal of 'life'. A philosopher who has understood the folly of attempting to reduce this Ideal to a reflective 'system' of rights and duties, can finally discover his proper role in relation to it, by developing his aesthetic sense through meditation on what the poets have achieved, and offering reflective analyses (of problems) and syntheses (solutions) which are both the spur and the raw material for further poetic endeavour. The word 'poetic' is here intended to embrace all forms of social creation: in art itself, in politics, and in religion. Essentially the philosopher is *dependent* on the artist proper. He can offer stimulus and raw material to art, only because any actual artist is not simply a creative genius, but is himself a 'sundered' or reflective being, who must think, plan, devise, choose, and accept raw material for his own creative endeavour. And in the sundered realm of 'antithesis', the realm of active political life, the philosopher comes into his own properly. In this sphere, the philosopher is, ideally, the qualified interpreter of what artistic genius simply presents; he interprets the work of genius for those who must realize social life in all the positive (or 'opposed') structures sustained by communal respect, and enforced or reinstated where necessary by social authority. This is the conceptual context in which Hegel's labours on the *Constitution of Germany* must be understood. The philosopher cannot create the mythic raw material for the rational ideology of the new age. He can only find it, and draw attention to its significance.¹ But the theoretical

For the proper context of the fragment cf. *TW-A*, i. 408–18 (Knox and Kroner, pp. 292–301).

¹ The collaborative relation of philosopher and poet in political creation is made fairly explicit in another fragment of 1800, *Der immer sich vergrößernde Wider-*

rationalization of political life *is* precisely the translation of the Ideal into 'reflective form'.

Finally in the 'mythology of Reason', the artist and the philosopher join hands for the 'elevation of the finite to the infinite'. For it is the philosopher now, who defines the significance of the artist in the rationalized political whole. There can be 'naïve' artists, and they even enjoy a certain advantage, in principle, over their more reflective brethren. A naïve artist does not recognize any intellectual authority over what he produces; and in any case that authority is not properly exercised by expelling him from the City when he transgresses against it, but rather by incorporating what he naïvely produces into a comprehensive 'synthesis' of reflection (within which it may well gain a significance quite different from that which it had for *his* reflection). In this philosophical interpretation the *intellectual*, or a *priori* character of the artist's intuition, its absolute or free significance is revealed. Neither the naïve genius, nor the reflective interpreter is now the protagonist. In their collaborative endeavour it is the God of the *Volk* who appears and speaks. Thus art and speculation are complementary 'moments' of 'divine service', the way in which men express the sense that all of their differing goals and conflicting activities are the organs of one 'spirit'.¹ This definition of Religion transcends the sphere of

spruch—see p. 6, n. 1 above. It is important to remember the influence, or more probably the complex interaction, of Hölderlin upon Hegel here. While Hegel's attention was focused upon Abraham, Moses, and Jesus, Hölderlin's mind was moving from the philosophically-poetic figure of Hyperion (the Titan who accepts political failure) to the poetically-philosophic figure of Empedocles (who accepts Titanic martyrdom as an earnest of the people's political rebirth). Hegel later recalled that Hölderlin had discussed the Empedocles project with him 'for several years and frequently' (GSA, vii. 2, 544—cf. Pöggeler's account in *Man and World*, vii. 1974, 175). The difference in their preoccupations is almost as important as the affinity (Hölderlin came to Jesus a bit later, so to speak).

¹ The definition of art and speculation as complementary moments of 'divine service' is only found in the *Difference* essay (NKA, iv. 75, 26–76, 26; Harris and Cerf, pp. 171–2). But I have interpreted this in terms of the 'Earliest System-programme' and the Frankfurt System-fragment. The way everything fits demonstrates, in my view, the essential continuity between the Frankfurt Ideal of 'life' and the first form of Hegel's Jena 'philosophy of Identity'. It may be slightly proleptic, however, to speak of the philosopher's *authority* over the poet in the Frankfurt period. The 'Idea' of philosophy is first clearly established as the standard of *all* true criticism—literary and aesthetic, as well as intellectual—in the introductory essay for the *Critical Journal* (NKA, iv. 117, 5–30). And it is only when Hegel begins to develop a theory of

the Church as traditionally understood, in the same way that Hegel's doctrine of 'life' transcends the Christian gospel of 'love'. For the Church is the community as conscious of its own pure union in (and with) God. But 'life is the union of union and non-union', so true Religion must overcome opposition between the sacred and the secular, between the Sabbath and the working-week. Hence the relation of Church and State was a central focus of all of Hegel's early political theorizing;¹ and hence, too, a sort of thinker's blueprint for the religious life of society was the appropriate climax of his attempt to express the 'Ideal of his youth in reflective form'.² He was striving to meet the philosophical need of his time³ in its most absolute form; and if he could do this successfully, then poets, educators, all bearers of political responsibility not only ought to heed him, but would surely be obliged to do so.

This brings us to our final point about the Frankfurt Ideal. A Hegelian Ideal, unlike its Kantian prototype, must necessarily exist. 'We cannot posit the Ideal outside of ourselves, for then it would be an object—nor only within ourselves, for then it would be no Ideal'.⁴ What this means can best be

the *grounds* of this authority—the speculative comprehension of the *complete Lebenslauf Gottes*—that his mature conception of the order of the absolute triad of art, religion, and philosophy begins to emerge.

¹ See *Toward the Sunlight*, Ch. V, sects. 1 and 2. (It should be noted that this continues to be the *ultimate* problem of Hegel's social theory right to the end of the Jena period—cf. *NKA*, viii. 281, 2–286, 5.)

² *ein objektives Mittelpunkt*, *TW-A*, i. 423–5 (Knox and Kroner, pp. 313–16).

³ Again the 'need of philosophy' is first mentioned in the *Difference* essay (*NKA*, iv. 12, 21–16, 14; Harris and Cerf, pp. 89–94). But there is a clear continuity between Hegel's doctrine of the need, and the task, of philosophy there, and his doctrine of the 'stages of opposition and unification' in *ein objektives Mittelpunkt TW-A*, i. 425–7; Knox and Kroner, pp. 317–19. However, once the problem is characterized as 'the need of philosophy' the importance of a certain *historical sequence* of stages becomes apparent. For the self-critical 'Idea' of speculative philosophy is just what this latest age (and no earlier one) has produced in response to its 'need'. In the Frankfurt sketches and systematic MSS we find only a contrast of 'happy' and 'unhappy' peoples, and different modes of 'unhappiness' (cf. *so wie sie mehrere Gattungen* (*TW-A*, i. 243–4; *Clio*, viii. 1979, 261–3) and *ein objektives Mittelpunkt*, (loc. cit.; Knox and Kroner, p. 317) for example). In some cases, a historical sequence is fairly clearly necessary—it is hard to see how an introreflected or rationally positive religion like the Kantian 'religion within the bounds of Reason' could arise without a preceding naïve or Mosaic phase, for example. But in the context of the Frankfurt Ideal, all such historical necessities are accidental and unimportant, since the true standard of the happy *Volk* is not historically conditioned. The same cannot be said for the 'Idea' of philosophy as critically self-conscious speculation.

⁴ *so wie sie mehrere Gattungen*, *TW-A*, i. 244 (*Clio*, viii. 1979, 261–3).

illustrated by referring to our own present discussion of the complementary roles of poet and philosopher. Truth is claimed *ideally* for everything that we have said about the social task and achievement of poets and philosophers, and about their reciprocal relations. But it is not claimed that all who are poets and philosophers know that they are doing what we have described them as doing, or even that they would accept it, after reflection, if it were put to them as a description of their activity. Nor is it asserted that all who claim to be poets and philosophers really are doing (or trying to do) what we have said. Rather, what we have said is to be interpreted on the theoretical side (the side of necessity) as a statement about the *logic* of artistic and philosophical endeavour, about what is necessarily involved, whether one knows it or not, in all successful efforts in these fields; and on the practical side (the side of existence) it involves the presupposition that there are, indeed, successful artists and philosophers. For they must have existed, and must have been generally recognized as successful in the roles we have described, in order for our reflective logical analysis to have been possible at all. Their existence in turn presupposes the real existence of the Ideal, to whose reality their activity contributes the final consummatory touch by which its existence is made manifest.

Thus, we find that with respect to the necessary being of the Ideal the following paradoxical situation exists. First, since all consciousness is reflective, ultimate reality (or being) 'can only be believed in'.¹ Second, since ultimate reality, as the precondition or ground of the rational consciousness which immediately knows itself to exist, is an infinite *spirit* (the 'living bond' of a community of finite moral beings) 'Union and [ultimate] being are synonymous.'² What the finite spirit

¹ *Glauben ist die Art*, TW-A, i. 251 (*Toward the Sunlight*, p. 513).

² Loc. cit. Hegel very explicitly does *not* restrict this assertion to the case of absolute or ultimate being. I think that it is clear that he has Jacobi's attempt to stand Hume's scepticism on its head and use it to justify religious fideism in mind. (As I pointed out in *Toward the Sunlight*, p. 312 n. 2, the originator of this adaptation of Hume's theory of belief was actually Hamann. But I did not mean to suggest that Hamann was Hegel's source.) Yet Hegel too, is only really interested in religious faith at this stage, even though he is putting forward a thesis about belief in general; and since we know, beyond question, that the main stimulus behind his theory of an ultimate 'being' as the necessary presupposition of all consciousness is Hölderlin's

has to presuppose, *must* believe in, is an ultimate being whose essential structure is the realization of rational consciousness, through the 'elevation of finite life to infinite life'. Hence the *attitude of belief itself* is an essential moment in the structure of ultimate reality, not the contingent condition of separation from independent, self-subsistent, true being that it appears to itself to be in immediate reflection. 'That which is, does not have to be believed' because what is believed is the free product of thought in reflection, so that the reflection of being may be distorted. Yet 'what is believed does have to be',¹ and that in two senses. First it is as a *Sollen*. It must *be* because the religious conception of their life and destiny that a community universally accepts is the 'necessary being' (i.e. the *a priori* categorical structure) that conditions all of their free activities, it provides the shared context of interpretation through which they give meaning to their life together. Secondly it is necessarily *real*, even in so far as it is an inadequate Ideal (like the Promised Land of milk and honey, or Dante's Hell and Paradise, or the Purgatorial remnant from Dante's *Comedy* that we are offered in the 'postulate of immortality' as conceived in the 'practical faith' of Kant and Fichte). Its reality (as a postulate) is absolutely or ontologically necessary (but not the reality of what it pictures) because it is the necessary completion, the *plerosis* of life, to reflect itself freely in thought; and its actual distortedness—the *unreality* of what it pictures—is empirically (or contingently) necessary in

move toward a 'philosophy of Identity' from *Fichtean* assumptions, we must ask *why* Hegel chose to argue from the subject/predicate structure of a typical existential belief (that 'S is P') rather than from the subject/object structure of consciousness as Hölderlin argues from 'I am I' in 'Urteil und Seyn', *Toward the Sunlight*, p. 514. That this was a deliberate decision, made after some reflection, is shown by the fact that Hegel at first wrote 'Selbstbewusstseyn' (for 'Leben') in 2 places at the beginning of *Reines Leben zu denken* (Nohl, 302; Knox, 254); both the influence of Hölderlin, and the deliberate rejection of his line of approach could hardly be clearer than they are here. From this time forward Hegel consistently develops his *logical* positions from non-subjective foundations (cf. his treatment of the principle 'A = A' in the *Difference* essay, *NKA*, iv. 24, 25–27, 18 Harris and Cerf, pp. 106–9). The answer is, I think, that from the first Hegel believed that systematic philosophy must not have a one-sided starting-point. One could no more begin from the 'self' of Fichte, than one could from the 'matter' of Newton. Hegel's own principle of 'finite life' is not the single individual but the immortal lifeline sustained by the family. This is a *union* of soul and body, and of life and death. How this commitment is related to his concern for a non-subjective account of logical thought we must leave for discussion later.

¹ Loc. cit.

the sense that the free activity of thought can identify the 'need', the empirical condition in its own life situation, that made the distortion inevitable when it actually arose. Thus, for instance, the situation typified by Abraham is different from that typified by Job; and that again is different from the situation of Moses (though one could not explain the distortion present in the Mosaic Ideal without referring to Abraham). But, of course, one could not have the problem of explaining the distortion at all, until the true reflection of life in its Ideal had been formulated *and recognized*. The modes of 'necessity' which Hegel has certainly begun to distinguish in the Frankfurt period, but which he has not yet begun to arrange in their systematic relations, are many and various. But the tragic fate that produces all these distortions of life arises from the ambiguities implicit in the combination of the two propositions 'Being and union are synonymous' and 'That which is does not have to be believed.' We do not have to believe the simple truth. But it is an important part of the simple truth that we do have to have *some* ultimate belief in order to exist at all.

According to this 'philosophy of life' all *thought* is 'reflective'. But reflection itself is free, or it could not go wrong in the various ways that it does. Abraham, Moses, and Jesus were not artists but thinkers who created an ideal concept of true being. They lacked the 'intuition' of the naturally adequate life which the Greek poets projected for that 'happy' people. Indeed they had consciously renounced it as impossible. But then the life that they knew and reflected upon was objectively inadequate; and the thought-Ideals that they produced were not an arbitrary play of rational constructs uncontrolled by experience. These ideals corresponded to reality, they answered to its 'need', in a freely creative way.

What is even more important to notice is that already in the Frankfurt period, Hegel expects philosophy—in spite of its inevitably reflective character—to play a crucial role in undoing its own wrong-doing. Artistic genius may be what created the Ideal to begin with; but it is the philosopher with a critically developed sense of aesthetic appreciation who must initiate its restoration when 'the might of union' has departed

from life.¹ The reflective response to need, must always be a thoughtful projection of what is lacking. But it can be true to life. Instead of being the postulation of what must be real elsewhere, it can be the speculative recognition of what is coming into being here. But this is still a practical perspective, sharply distinguished from the theoretical contemplation of that which 'was, is and ever shall be'.

2. *Absolute reflection and speculation*

There are, I think, three principal novelties in the 'philosophy of philosophy' that Hegel propounds at the beginning of the *Difference* essay. Two of them are direct developments of his Frankfurt position; the third is the consequence of those developments. There is no doubt that Hegel's coming into Schelling's orbit was the crucial stimulus for the two new developments. But neither of them was at all like anything in Schelling's own philosophical development; and the consequence was a new conception of philosophy as 'speculative' which influenced Schelling's own thought rather more directly than he influenced it.

What Schelling contributed to Hegel's development was a new perspective on his problem. Schelling's emphasis on philosophy as 'absolute' science caused Hegel to reassess his own position, and to recognize the difference between the philosophy of reflection by means of which he had constructed his Ideal, and the reflective philosophy which was the object of his criticism while he was constructing it. Nothing essential in his position changed except the direction of his attention. Instead of concentrating on the end, he began to attend to the means; and instead of thinking of the need of his time as a new religion, he began to think of the philosophical insight through which the religion was to be interpreted as being itself what was needed. This was (logically) the first new development.

The second was closely allied with it. Schelling's insistence

¹ The assertion is based on *eine Ethik* (Berne, 1796, or Frankfurt, early 1797). But the echo of the Frankfurt Ideal of 'aesthetic perfection' is from the *Difference* essay (see *NKA*, iv. 144; Cerf and Harris, p. 91) in the very context where Hegel develops the view that philosophy itself is a 'need' of the time and that its task is to overcome and to heal the disruption of the aesthetic ideal of human nature.

on philosophy as absolute science obliged him to focus attention on the 'intellectual intuition' which distinguished the true philosophy from all non-absolute standpoints. So Hegel, too, was led to concentrate attention on the *intuitive* character of the true philosophy as what distinguished it from false philosophies. Schelling gave him a new viewpoint and a problem to go with it. But he did not take over Schelling's solution. Rather Schelling (partially and rather erratically) took over his.

This statement of the case requires careful development. For in a sense both the viewpoint and the solution to the problem had been common ground between them for years. Ever since Tübingen days they had shared the conviction that the 'completion' of the Kantian philosophy would make a revolution in the world.¹ This was a bond of alliance that set them apart from all who thought of Kant's philosophy as essentially complete already, still further apart from those who refused to accept the new Kantian foundation, and furthest of all from those who—like G. C. Storr—sought to adapt it for the support of an older dogmatic position.

Also they had agreed for years that intuitive access to the Ideas of pure Reason was the key to the proper 'completion' of Kant's work. For a long time it was believed by scholars that Schelling was the decisive force here, and that Hegel became his pupil in this matter during the Jena years. For this reason the 'Earliest System Programme', which plainly invalidates that view, was taken to be part of an essay of Schelling's which Hegel had 'excerpted'—as he excerpted so much else that he read. As soon as the fragment is studied carefully in relation to Hegel's Frankfurt 'system', this uncomfortably *ad hoc* hypothesis can be seen to rest on nothing but a prejudice. From the end of 1796 onwards Hegel held the view for which the proverbial expression is Schelling's dictum (five years later) that 'Art is the organon of Philosophy.'² This is not to say that it was really Schelling who was the pupil. We cannot say categorically who it was, among the Tübingen circle, who first uttered something approximating to that dictum—though a very plausible case can be made on behalf of

¹ See Letters 11 and 13 (*Briefe*, i. 23, 28).

² *System of Transcendental Idealism, Werke*, iii. 627.

Hölderlin.¹ What seems clear, in any case, is that they were not pupils of one another at all in this regard, but pupils of Schiller—though they all took his lesson over into their post-Fichtean context of thought.

So when we find Hegel claiming in the *Difference* essay that 'transcendental intuition' can legitimately be 'postulated' by philosophical reflection (and that all that *can* legitimately be postulated is this intuition, not an Idea),² this only counts as a new development when we discover that the whole standpoint of postulation can be transcended, because self-intuition is an autonomous act of reflective thought in which it makes itself its own object. When he comes to this point³ Hegel speaks of 'intellectual' intuition. What is postulated is the 'transcendental intuition' that has to be ascribed to the artist in order to account for his achievement. But Hegel warns us from the first that the postulational standpoint is erroneous. This activity of philosophical postulation is that same union of reflection with being in 'belief' which can only happen rightly when it is guided by aesthetic insight. Where art is not the organon of reflection, it is not the case that an intuition (an Ideal) is postulated; rather the antinomic side of the Idea—the one which life does not satisfy—is thoughtfully projected into a supersensible realm; and this world is believed and asserted to be real, but it is 'not yet'.⁴ This is the religious faith which Hegel will now begin to call *Sehnsucht* because it yearns for a reality that is beyond its cognitive compass.

In properly intellectual intuition reflective thought secures itself against this shipwreck by turning upon itself as an object. Thinking is itself a real existence that can be reflected upon. The first (negative) benefit of this absolute reflection is to teach us the vanity of our belief in the 'beyond'. Positively,

¹ Cf. *Toward the Sunlight*, p. 253 n. 1.

² NKA, iv. 29, 4-13; Harris and Cerf, p. 111.

³ NKA, iv. 76, 38-77, 26; Harris and Cerf, p. 173-4. He does refer earlier to 'intellectual intuition' in Fichte. But in Fichte it is only postulated, not achieved. The postulated *transcendental* intuition 'fails to produce philosophical knowledge' because 'reflection gets control of it, opposes it to other intuitings, and holds fast to this opposition. This absolute act of free self-activity [the *intellectual* intuition that is *transcendentally* postulated] is the condition of philosophical knowledge, but it is not yet philosophy itself' (NKA, iv. 36, 5-10; Harris and Cerf, p. 121).

⁴ Cf. *Glauben ist die Art*, para. 2 (TW-A, i. 252) and para. 7 (*ibid.*, p. 254); *Toward the Sunlight*, 513, 515.

however, it gives us the *objective* starting-point for speculation. Speculation, or absolute reflection, is the mirroring, not of the immediate being which simple reflective thought must presuppose, but of the union which is synonymous with it, i.e. it is contemplation of fulfilled being, the observation of 'life' as it comes to consciousness of itself as a whole, or as infinite. Speculation is the self-consciousness of this 'living whole'.

Hegel insists that in order to achieve intellectual intuition we must reflect on the process of life as a whole, we must have 'transcendental intuition' as our object. Kant abstracted the process of reflecting and made it an object for reflective thought. But in doing so he froze it into a non-living object, a structure with which we are not and cannot be 'united'. Fichte's achievement was to reflect intuitively upon that structure, to observe it alive and in motion. But he still saw it only as a *subjective* activity, an epiphenomenon upon the dark ground of being—the 'thing-in-itself' which must still be presupposed. Speculative philosophy proper must go another step and reflect on the whole process as the movement of living being.¹ The 'difference' between Fichte and Schelling is that Schelling takes this further step.

The 'transcendental intuition' that becomes the object of reflection when reflection itself becomes 'intellectual intuition' is just the 'Ideal' of the Frankfurt period. It is the contemplative awareness of the infinite life that takes finite life up into itself. But by *intellectualizing* it, philosophical reflection gives it a very abstract appearance:

Philosophical reflection is conditioned, [it presupposes a whole world of being within which the philosopher has himself come to be as the awareness of a 'need'] or the transcendental intuition enters consciousness through free abstraction from the whole manifold of empirical consciousness, and in this respect it is something subjective. When philosophical reflection becomes its own object, it is taking something conditioned [the awareness of the need] as the principle of its philosophy. In order to grasp transcendental

¹ This is my interpretation of the difficult concluding paragraph of the section comparing Schelling's principle with Fichte's. (*NKA*, iv. 76–7; Harris and Cerf, pp. 173–4). If, as I believe, this account is faithful to the text there, it is certainly more perspicuous than the 'nothingness' which was all that I could find here in my introduction to the *Difference* essay (Harris and Cerf, p. 61). But what I said there is not invalidated by this second attempt.

intuition in its purity, philosophical reflection must further abstract from this subjective aspect [answering the need of the time] so that transcendental intuition, as the foundation of philosophy may be neither subjective nor objective for it, neither self-consciousness as opposed to matter, nor matter as opposed to self-consciousness, but pure transcendental intuition, *absolute identity*, that is neither subjective nor objective.¹

The principle of identity which is neither time-bound ('subjective') nor outside time ('objective') is a logical principle. We have here both the first germ of Hegel's speculative Logic, and the reason why Reinhold is the particular historical butt of the *Difference* essay. Hegel was most anxious to set the 'speculative' interpretation of the principle of Identity into the sharpest possible contrast with the 'reflective' interpretation that it received in the 'reduction of philosophy to logic' proclaimed by Reinhold and Bardili; and in so doing he wanted to provide a basic model of an 'objective'—or more accurately a *neutral*—conception of thought.² When Hegel told his students in his 'Introduction to Philosophy' that 'the extended science of the Idea as such is Idealism or Logic'³ he meant that philosophy proper must begin from the speculative theory of the syllogism (or from 'A = A'), not from 'God', (or from 'I am I').⁴

¹ NKA, iv. 77, 5-14; Harris and Cerf, pp. 173-4 (my italics).

² Cf. the following passages in the *Difference* essay: NKA, iv. 5 (the opening para.); 7, 19, 23-30, 79, 80, 81-8, 91-2; Harris and Cerf, pp. 79, 82, 97, 103-13, 176, 177-8, 179-88, 192-5). On the contrast between Hegel's initial announcement and his procedure at the conclusion of the essay see further my introduction (Cerf and Harris, pp. 62-6). I believe, however, that this present discussion does more justice to the view that Reinhold was a significant stimulus for the development of Hegel's *Logic*. Reinhold's proclamation of the need for an 'objective' conception of thinking struck a nerve even more vital than that which Krug struck with his challenge about the 'deduction' of his pen.

³ *Die Idee des absoluten Wesens*, 1b (in NKA, v); see M. Baum and K. Meist, 'Durch Philosophie leben lernen', *Hegel-Studien*, xii, 1977, 47. (The italics are mine.)

⁴ The proposition 'A = A' is the *Grundsatz* of the *Difference* essay. But the *Difference* essay offers trenchant criticism of the reflective procedure of beginning from a *Grundsatz*; and in Hegel's Habilitation Theses we find 'Syllogismus est principium Idealismi.' This is confirmed by the programme of the first Logic course where the transition from critical logic to speculative philosophy proper (Metaphysics) is made through the 'speculative theory of the syllogism' (Rosenkranz, pp. 191-2; Cerf and Harris, p. 10. The actual text *Dass die Philosophie*, 19b-20b, will be printed in NKA, v). Perhaps we can infer, however, that the proper starting-point for critical logic was the exposure of the hollowness of 'the reduction of philosophy to

Not very much is certain about the earliest form of Hegel's Logic.¹ But from what he said about 'the Idea as such' in his initial 'Introduction to Philosophy' we can see that his account was brief and very abstract. He was very much afraid that his students would take it lightly, or that it would seem empty and formal to them (like Reinhold's philosophical logic). If the extraordinary difficulty of the speculative concept of 'Identity' as expounded in the *Difference* essay is anything to go by, he ought to have been afraid that they would fail to understand it altogether. Yet there is nothing mystical in his doctrine of how simple reflection becomes *absolute* reflection, and so transforms itself into 'speculation' by way of 'intellectual intuition'.

The appalling opacity of the three preceding pages can best be illuminated by reflecting upon this process briefly without concerning ourselves about the *ontological* interpretation that Hegel wanted to put upon it. I hope that the following statement is couched in terms that are traditional and familiar enough to be easily intelligible. My object is not to make Hegel's position appear uncontroversial—which would be treachery if it were possible, because he insisted that real philosophizing must always scandalize common sense—but to locate it properly in the familiar context of a number of traditional controversies (e.g. the correspondence theory of truth and the controversy about universals) which Hegel refers to in puzzling ways and often under guises that are much less familiar.

Let us stipulate, then, to begin with, that knowledge is the possession by the mind of the truth about something that exists as an object in the world. To say that a proposition is 'true' is to say that it corresponds with the way things *are* in

logic' on the basis of the reflective principle of identity. But see further the discussion below, pp. 31–35, 50–52.

¹ The reader should take note that I use 'Logic' to refer to 'the extended theory of the Idea as such' or to Hegel's later speculative Logic; and 'logic' to refer to *his* critical logic. 'Reflective' logic (traditional theory of knowledge), 'ordinary' logic (Aristotelian logic in its 'traditional' form), modern 'formal' logic, etc. are always adjectivally distinguished. I shall generally avoid the ambiguous term 'transcendental logic'—referring where necessary to 'Kant's (Fichte's, etc.) critical logic'. Hegel's *early* speculative Logic (in the narrower sense) is what he (and I) call 'Metaphysics'; 'metaphysics' is used (with appropriate adjectival qualifications) to refer to what earlier thinkers called by that name.

the world. In this correspondence of thought and thing, it is the thought that must follow the thing. Truth is the accurate reflection of the thing in our thought (whether the 'thing' be a simple element or a complex state of affairs). This subjection and obedience of our thinking to the way things are is what leads us to speak of cognition as essentially 'reflective'. Use of the word is suggested by the physical analogy with the way that a mirror reflects the image of what comes before it; and to say of any kind of knowledge that it is 'reflective' is to say that it is dependent on its object in the way that a mirror image is.

But, of course, a 'true' reflection of a real state of affairs in the mind is a very different matter from the mechanical reflection of a room in a mirror. In the first place, the knowledge of something is a true reflection of its *universal* nature; it is knowledge that is valid for everything else of the same kind. And we could not even formulate this difference between physical and mental 'reflection' if there were not another more elementary way in which they differed. For although 'truth' is a certain kind of dependent correspondence of our mental awareness upon the things which are known, its existence is not dependent on the physical presence of the object in the way in which a physical reflection or mirror image is. Knowledge can be retained when the object has passed away; and it can even be acquired for the first time (from others who already have it) after the real object has passed away, or when it has become otherwise inaccessible.

These obvious differences between physical and mental reflection of the most ordinary empirical kind, lead us on to the discovery of *philosophical* reflection. For these differences show us that, whereas a 'true' physical mirror is said to be true precisely because it receives the image passively, and does not do anything to it which 'falsifies' it, the mind cannot be passive in that sense. True consciousness grasps the nature of the singular object and actively transforms it from the form of *being* (as a singular thing) into the form of *thought* (as a universal concept). We have discovered this—though of course we have not yet unpacked its meaning thoughtfully—by the most immediate and elementary reflection upon the differences between the way that a thing is on its own account, and the way that it is known in our conscious-

ness. And the differences that we have noted hold good, whether our consciousness of the object is 'true' (correct) or 'false' (distorted). Thus we have discovered some *necessary* truths, and in doing so we have entered the realm of *philosophical* reflection.

Philosophical reflection is distinct from ordinary mental reflection, because it takes as its object the very characteristic that distinguishes mental reflection from physical reflection: the fact that it is active and constructive rather than passive or receptive. Philosophical reflection is reflection upon the mind's *activity* in reflecting. Thus the process of philosophical reflection creates a very peculiar situation, and reveals to us a very startling power of reflective consciousness. First of all, like all other reflection, it is possible because its object is there to be reflected. Thinking, conscious awareness, is something that actually happens; it is there in the world as a thing to be observed, even though in its uniquely occurrent aspect as a singular thing to be observed, and so to have its nature reflected in our minds as a universal concept, it is peculiarly transient and evanescent because everything stable and permanent in it is already universal, or because it is already the result of simple reflection. Still, there is a singular, uniquely identifiable *sequence* of these thought contents, existing in the objective world—the sequence which I call 'my' thinking or 'my' consciousness, or 'my' mind. Whatever name I give it, I am reflecting empirically upon an object that is there to be reflected. Whether it is more accurately characterized as a unity, e.g. as 'my mind', or as a plurality, e.g. as 'a heap or collection of impressions', is a matter of philosophical dispute. But the dispute can only arise between parties who grant without question that there is something there which can be accurately characterized (or 'reflected') in conceptual terms.

The fact that disagreement about its accurate characterization is as spontaneous as agreement about its objective presence brings out the difference between the objects of ordinary reflection and the object of philosophical *reflecting*. This object is an activity that is only there to be reflected itself in universal concepts because it is first generated or produced as an active interpretation or conceptualization of the world of non-conceptual singular existent things, and then regarded

objectively as something that is, after all (as it comes into being, like light or darkness), really there whether I think about it or not.

But now when I think about it in this ordinary empirical mode, I am thinking about the nature that that empirical object has in common with all other thinking. So whatever truth I discover about it must validate itself as true by applying just as much to my own present activity of thinking as it does to the objective activity that I am remembering or observing (or in any case thinking about). It is precisely this formal identity between my present thinking activity and its object that is the ground of the necessity that characterizes any truth claim that I make in philosophical reflection. My psychological observation may be faulty (and is subject to correction in the light of further experience) but my reflection upon the form or structure of my conscious activity is self-validating.

3. *Intellectual intuition*

Can this structure be seen as a self-validating whole? Obviously, in one direction, at least, it is not that. The empirical content from which the process of reflection starts is always a fragment in a larger field, and the interpretation of the data given to reflective consciousness in experience is an endless process. The more difficult question is whether the activity of the reflectively conscious self can be objectified and grasped as a whole. Can I completely comprehend my own activity of interpreting the world? Kant had claimed that because of the obvious empirical fragmentariness, this perfection of speculative insight, the limit at which the reflective intellect is a perfect mirror (*speculum*) for itself was impossible. We do not know our real selves, and our world does not make a whole in this purely intellectual intuitive way. The Ideas of Reason (notably the Idea of the *Whole*) are only regulative ideals. All of our actual cognition is fragmentary and finite; it becomes self-corrective and progressive so far as it is guided and organized by the critical use of these regulative concepts.

But Kant held, nevertheless, that the operation of the mind can be reflectively known and set forth as a systematic structure; and further that we are—we practically 'know' (or

we must believe) ourselves to be—free rational causes. On the basis of this practical certainty Fichte strove to erect a postulational theory of the rational individual's place in the total scheme of things. Hegel himself began with the Fichtean question 'how must a world be constituted for a moral entity?' and projected 'nothing less than a complete system of all Ideas or of all practical postulates'.¹ But it is plain enough from the Berne years onwards that he wanted to be faithful in his own way, to the critical limits established by Kant for 'Pure Reason'. He aimed to restrict the range of the postulates to the world of phenomenal experience. So he had to find a way of conceiving *that* world as a whole. Instead of trying to cope with the 'bad infinite' by postulating a bad infinity of the rational agent's acts (as Kant and Fichte did in their 'postulate of immortality') he postulated a foundation of transcendental necessity for the poetic intuition of the wholeness of the human cultural world. It is the *world of human experience* that must have an *a priori* unity if the 'dialectic of pure Reason' in Kant is to be overcome, and speculative metaphysics is to be possible once more.

Kant's view that the world of theoretical understanding is a 'bad infinite' of space and time, Hegel accepted. Certainly, he held that the Kantian deduction of the categories of the understanding was susceptible of improvement. Its organic character, its self-enclosed, systematic completeness needed to be better displayed. But in principle it was correct; and for that reason Hegel called the principle of it 'authentic idealism', or 'the authentic principle of speculation'.² But this categorical system has to be thought of as the structure of a world that does not pass away, rather than as the legislative activity of an individual consciousness which certainly does pass away in this world. In the human world of culture and communication we have a substance which (unlike the rational soul) does not have to be postulated. Its immortality may indeed be problematic—as the Ideas of Reason always remain when they are applied in the sphere of understanding. But what properly pertains to Reason is not immortality but *eternity*. This eternity is exactly what typifies logical truth and logical

¹ *eine Ethik, Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 9, p. 263; *Toward the Sunlight*, p. 510.

² *Difference*, NKA, iv. 5, 18; 6, 27; Harris and Cerf, pp. 79, 81.

necessity. Logic is, therefore, the substantial structure of the human world. In that aspect it is 'objective'. But this human world is itself a human creation. Thus applied logic is subjective rather than objective. Logic as such, however, is neither subjective nor objective but neutral.

Thus far, however, I have deliberately leapt over an awkward ditch. Why should the poet's experience be regarded as privileged? Why should 'poetic genius' be thought of as an 'intuiting' of this wholeness of the human world in any *transcendental* sense? Obviously the major poets do help us to synthesize our experience in important ways. But all kinds of human agents do this in as much as they are leaders of thought, and innovators in practical life. Why should the poet's intuition of the human world be dignified with a transcendental status (like the 'pure intuitions' of mathematics) any more than that of the farmer, the soldier, the statesman, or the scientist? If anything is clear about art and poetry generally, it would seem to be its essential subjectivity in the 'bad infinite' sense of absolute contingency and unique particularity; and this is just as evident with respect to the world-intuitions of the more philosophical poets, as it is with respect to the personal feelings of the great lyrists.

The answer seems to be partly that art and aesthetic experience are the *primitive* mode in which the human world of experience organizes itself. It is for this same reason, I take it, that the first part of Kant's *Critique of Judgement* is devoted to aesthetic judgement. The artist is the specialist in imaginative intuition. To this end it may well be crucial that he should strive to express what is uniquely personal to himself. But if he is successful, if we recognize him as a genius, it is because what is uniquely personal to him, is revealed to us, in his work, as universally and essentially human.

In this coincidence of the singular and the universal aspect of experience we have the other part of the explanation. The poet labours at the foundation of the human world.¹ The

¹ In his 1803 lectures Hegel compared the poet's contribution to the keystone of the arch of human communal effort (*seiner Form*, 4a-4b in *NKA*, v; Rosenkranz, pp. 180-1; Harris and Knox, pp. 254-5). But there he is speaking of the arch of *natural* consciousness. The keystone of that arch is the foundation of the spiritual arch, the

philosopher completes the great process of the self-conceptualizing of humanity which the poet begins; and Hegel's doctrine of transcendental intuition requires that the philosopher's work should be as uniquely personal as that of the artist. In the perspective here offered we may well wonder why this is necessary. The *objectivity* of logic, as the structure of our thought-world is probably more immediately acceptable, more intuitive in the common sense of the word, than Hegel's thesis that we must come to the recognition of it via the 'intellectual intuition' of our own reflective activity in reasoning. A clear understanding of what the philosophic enterprise has in common with the activity of the poet will save us from the error of believing that intellectual intuition is only an 'empirical necessity' of Hegel's thought, only a response to the 'need of the time'.

As we can see at once by referring back to its Kantian origins, intellectual intuition is the direct awareness of an activity of free creation. This sort of creativity is what we ascribe to an artist who is recognized as having 'genius'. What he creates, on the view here put forward, is a new way of 'seeing things'—and we have suggested that all genuine leaders and innovators have a share in this sort of poetic activity. The philosopher is required to achieve intellectual intuition as the starting-point for his speculative organization of the human world into a logical system, because any logically based system of experience that does not *start* from here will find moral freedom to be an ultimate surd. The theme of Logic as a systematic science is the organization of the forms of the *a priori*, i.e. of the different forms of *necessity*. The absolutely first step in Logic, the primal necessity, is the recognition of this logical activity itself, the organization of necessities, as a *free* activity. We must begin by intuiting thinking as a spontaneous activity of creative self-expression, even as we recognize that what this self-expression produces is the necessary structure of the world into which we have come, the world that will abide when we depart, and without which we could never come to the recognition of ourselves as free rational agents. Hegel's original question was 'how must a

arch of scientific cognition for which the philosopher in his turn, provides the keystone.

world be constituted for a *moral* entity?' This question is in no sense peculiar to Hegel's time; apart from it we cannot understand how the Idea of 'wholeness' can be applied to the human world any more legitimately than it can to the natural order in space and time. This was Fichte's advance over Kant, that he grasped the principle from which the 'deduction of the categories' must start.¹ The principle is a moral one, but there is also a neutral logical necessity that underlies it. A systematic whole can only be constructed out of the bad infinity of empirical life, by showing that there is a standing pattern or cycle in it. The cycle must have an identifiable point of return upon itself, and the circular pattern itself must have a centre. The immediacy of subjective consciousness ('empirical intuition') is Hegel's identifiable starting-point to which the cycle must return. But the unmoving centre from which every point on the circle is defined is the 'intellectual intuition' of rational freedom. We may think what we will of Hegel's project and of his performance. There are many places where one may want to quarrel with what he assumes. But only a clear understanding of what he was *trying* to do can put us in a sound position to criticize what he did. And if we do not understand what he meant by 'transcendental intuition' we shall be likely to get an inverted view of the whole enterprise from the start.. The poet is accorded 'transcendental' status along with the philosopher because the Concept that is going to set itself forth in Hegel's incipient system of philosophy is that of *rational freedom*— the 'Ideal of his youth' is the Ideal of 1789.²

4. 'Logic and Metaphysics'

We have a reliable report that in one of his lectures in 1830 Schelling declared that Hegel first concerned himself with Logic only when his friends at the University advised him that it was a good topic for lectures, because it was being neglected.³ Since this declaration was part of a valet's-eye view

¹ See esp. *Difference*, etc., *NKA*, iv. 6, 23–7; Harris and Cerf, pp. 80–1.

² For the watchword 'Reason and Freedom' see *Toward the Sunlight*, Ch. III. (Of course, I am not claiming here that Hegel always managed to incarnate 'the time at its best'—as he resolved to do when the century dawned. Opinions about that must inevitably vary with our historical estimates of what 'the need of the time' was. My concern is only with accurate understanding of an 'Ideal' that is not 'time-bound').

³ See *Der Briefwechsel K. Chr. F. Krauses*, ed. P. Hohlfeld and A. Wünsche, Leipzig, 1907, ii. 157; and cf. Kuno Fischer, ii. 1201–2.

of the great man, which Schelling's jealousy led him to promulgate when Hegel had become more influential and authoritative than he, we must naturally regard it with suspicion. However, an intelligent person desirous of maintaining his own credit, would hardly have said something that was as easy to controvert as this claim would have been if it were entirely false. Schelling did not assert that *he* gave Hegel this advice, but that several people did. If Hegel remembered things differently, he had only to ask Schelling to name some of them, so that their memories might be canvassed further. It is worth while, therefore, to consider what Schelling's assertion can plausibly mean in the context of all our untainted evidence about the situation at Jena in 1801.

First, it is not literally correct that 'Logic and Metaphysics' were neglected at Jena then. Several people lectured on it regularly.¹ But if 'Hegel's friends' said that logic was 'neglected' they would, of course, mean that the true logic of speculative philosophy was not being taught. Fichte had lectured on 'Logic and Metaphysics' while he was at Jena, but Schelling did not.² Fichte's doctrine was still purveyed by his pupil Schad; but in the *Difference* essay, Hegel had already attacked the way in which Fichte sought to ground logic itself in the transcendental theory of the Ego. And in his parallel attack upon Reinhold and Bardili, he claimed to have a *neutral* theory of logic, such as was obviously appropriate for the new philosophy that began from the 'absolute Identity' of

¹ For instance two senior professors (Hennings and Ulrich) were lecturing on it when Hegel began. The following semester no less than 5 courses were announced (though perhaps not all of the 'private' lectures were actually given). See *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 53.

² Cf. Düsing's note (*Problem der Subjektivität*, p. 79 n. 10) and Fuhrmans, i. 163, 235-6. W. Hartkopf's monograph *Kontinuität und Diskontinuität in Hegels Jenaer Anfängen* (Königstein, 1979) came into my hands too late to take proper account of his thesis that Hegel's first 'logic' was directly inspired by, and developed from, the 'mechanism of intelligence' in Schelling's *System of Transcendental Idealism*. In principle, my conception of Hegel's role in the 'Schelling School' makes me sympathetic to this view. But in his righteous wrath against some of Düsing's overweening claims for Hegel as the true begetter of the Identity theory (see esp. 'Spekulation und Reflexion', *Hegel-Studien*, v. 117) Hartkopf goes too far in the opposite direction. Whatever the truth may be about the genesis and development of their shared concept of 'speculation', there can be no doubt that Hegel influenced Schelling's concept of 'logic'. Düsing's later researches have definitely established this at least. (See further my review of Hartkopf in the *Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain*, no. 4, autumn-winter, 1981.)

Subject and Object. This claim would naturally sound interesting and exciting to Schelling's students. Surely *they* are the friends whose counsel Schelling recalled years later? Certainly, several of them duly appeared, and paid their fees, when Hegel gave the class; and we can fairly surmise that their advice took the form of a request and a promise: 'Please explain what you have written. If you will agree to do that, I will certainly come to the class.'¹

On this view, the fact that Hegel was already known to be concerned about Logic—as a critic of Fichte on one side, and of Reinhold and Bardili on the other—was the determining condition of the advice that he received from his friends. In defence of Schelling's memory, however, it can further be suggested that he may quite reasonably have believed that *he* personally was the friend who got Hegel interested both in the 'difference' between Fichte's position and that of the Identity Philosophy, and in the 'reduction of philosophy to logic' proclaimed by Reinhold and Bardili.

If Schelling did indeed believe that, however, he was probably mistaken. The hypothesis that Hegel's initial interest in logic as such arose from a convenient division of labour between himself and Schelling as defenders of a common philosophical position, must be rejected. It was not just the 'difference between Fichte and Schelling' but the difference between both of them and Hegel, that forced Hegel to clarify his own logical position when he moved from Frankfurt to Jena, and came forward as the deuteragonist of the Identity Philosophy. Rosenkranz has preserved for us a passage from one of Hegel's introductory lectures, which shows how clearly he was aware of this himself:

Least changed was the basic pattern of the *Logic* and *Metaphysics*. We can, however, see the greatest efforts in his introductions to justify the undertaking [of philosophical logic] in general. It is quite remarkable, thinks Hegel, that modern philosophy *despises* logic and yet all the same logic is *required* by it generally, while of course, those who still pay homage to the *old forms* of logic, are *just as*

¹ One such friend was certainly Schelling's brother Karl. Another was I.P.V. Troxler. The class-list is preserved (*Hegel-Studien*, iv. 59) but the information supplied in Kimmerle's *Personenverzeichnis* about most of the students enrolled is

discontented, yet neither party has generated any new logic. Fichte's *Science of Knowledge* like the *Transcendental Idealism* of Schelling are both of them nothing else but attempts to expound Logic or speculative philosophy purely on its own account. Fichte, admittedly, took the great, but *one sided* standpoint of consciousness, of the Ego, of the subject, as his starting-point and this has made a free and complete detailed treatment [of Logic] impossible for him. Schelling starts from there too, certainly, but he suspends this [subjective] standpoint in the sequel. But as far as speculative philosophy itself is concerned, it appears that the very *consciousness* was *not present* in these essays that precisely this and nothing else was at issue. In his later views of philosophy Schelling sets up the speculative Idea quite generally, *without development* in itself [as Logic], and passes on straight away to the shape that it has *qua* Philosophy of Nature.¹

I think that this passage could be a summary and quotation from the 'Introduction to Philosophy' of Winter 1801 to 1802.² But this cannot be decisively established, and there are some solid grounds for Düsing's view that it is later.³ What matters

very scanty. The fact that Hegel announced the course regularly, however, is a fairly reliable index that he was regarded as the 'logic teacher' of the 'Schelling school'.

¹ Rosenkranz, pp. 188–9 (Harris and Knox, p. 262); cf. *Faith and Knowledge*, NKA, iv. 400, 4–14, where Fichte's 'Wissenschaftslehre' is called 'logical idealism'. The passage does *not* come from the 'Logic and Metaphysics' of 1801/2 since Rosenkranz goes on immediately to *distinguish* that MS as an 'introduction to what [Hegel] called speculative philosophy in the stricter sense'. The further probability is, therefore, that it does not come from *any* lecture course that was strictly confined to 'Logic and Metaphysics'.

² The main grounds for this attribution are the way that the introductory summary chimes in with the *Difference* essay, and the way Fichte is treated as a 'speculative' thinker in the quotation itself. In *Faith and Knowledge* Hegel treats Fichte's Ego-theory as the logical completion of the 'reflective philosophy of subjectivity'. This view of Fichte is maintained in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (see my discussion in the Introduction to *Faith and Knowledge*, Cerf and Harris, pp. 4–6). I cannot prove that the Fichte discussion in the *Lectures* goes right back to the Jena course of 1805/6, but I think it is significant that 'Ego = Ego' is the principle of finite 'Self-Consciousness' in the *Phenomenology*, while the principle of 'Reason' (the self-conscious infinite) is 'the Category' (NKA, ix. pp. 133–7; Miller, sects. 233–9). From this I infer that Hegel maintained the 'reflective' view of Fichte's Ego theory that he developed from his reading of *Die Bestimmung des Menschen* (1800). However, this is not inconsistent with his *also* continuing to maintain the 'speculative' view of the first *Wissenschaftslehre* (1794) that he had already advanced in the *Difference* essay—the distinction between Fichte's 'speculative' philosophical principle and his 'reflective' system is clearly stated in that essay itself. (The evolution of Hegel's own conception of 'absolute Wissen' would make it natural for him to maintain this two-sided attitude.)

³ *Das Problem der Subjektivität*, p. 125 n. 154—my claim (in Harris and Knox,

here, however, is not the date—even if it be October 1804—but the fact—which I believe the following discussion will demonstrate—that the passage is in perfect accord with the positions that Hegel adopts regarding philosophical logic in the *Difference* essay, in the undisputed remains from the lectures of 1801/2, and in *Faith and Knowledge*. These are the primary sources for the reconstruction that I shall now attempt.¹

pp. 262–3 n. 9) that the fragment ‘can be *securely* assigned to 1801’ is an overstatement. The best argument for a later date is the way Hegel speaks of ‘Schelling’s *later* views’. In Oct. 1801 the views referred to would have to be his *latest* ones, and one might expect Hegel to speak of them in a more immediate way, and not as if either the views or Schelling himself were already at some distance (by 1804 he was at Würzburg). This is a fragile inference, but it rests on a firmer base than that provided by the language of the lecture-announcement for Winter 1803/4 (on which Düsing would like to rely). Hegel there refers to ‘Logic and Metaphysics’ *together* as ‘Transcendental Idealism’ which constitutes the first part of ‘the system of speculative philosophy’. Neither here, nor in the backward reference to ‘the first part of the system’ in the fragments of the ‘philosophy of Spirit’ which we still have (NKA, vi. 268; Harris and Knox, p. 205) can I see any evidence that Hegel has departed from the critical-introductory conception of Logic which he had in 1801. To my mind, it is more significant that he already spoke of ‘the extended science of the Idea’ as ‘Idealism or Logic’ in Oct. 1801 (see p. 18, above). This alone shows that the critical-introductory conception of logic, does not conflict with the demand for an exposition of ‘Logic or speculative philosophy on its own account’; or if it does, it conflicts equally with *any* of the expositions that Hegel offered in which Logic was distinguished from Metaphysics. This putative conflict can be avoided by the assumption that whenever Hegel identifies Logic with ‘the science of the Idea’, ‘Idealism’, or ‘speculative philosophy’, he always means ‘Logic and Metaphysics’ together. And the way he speaks of ‘Logic’ both generally and specifically even in 1801, shows that there is from the first, a peculiarly rigorous relation of *interdependence* between Hegel’s *critical* logic and his *speculative* Metaphysics. Furthermore, because of his quarrel with Fichte’s grounding of logic in transcendental psychology, and his determination to show Reinhold and Bardili how thought *should* be conceived ‘objectively’ he could not fail to be aware of this. The eventual dissolution of the distinction between logic and Metaphysics was the overcoming of this awkward reciprocity—which then emerged elsewhere in the more general (and more adequately comprehended) form of the dialectic of finite cognition and infinite truth in the *Phenomenology*.

¹ I agree with Horstmann, Trede, and Düsing that Kimmerle’s attempt to reconstruct the earlier logic by comparing the ‘Logic and Metaphysics’ of 1804/5 with the ‘programme’ of 1801 was not a reliable approach. Trede’s appeal to the structure of the *System der Sittlichkeit* for support is less hazardous, and I shall recur to it in due course. But my reconstruction owes most to Düsing. As the reader of the two preceding notes will perceive, however, we are not in perfect agreement about the *significance* of the logic we are reconstructing. See H. Kimmerle, *Das Problem der Abgeschlossenheit des Denkens* (Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 8), Bonn, Bouvier, 1970 (esp. p. 52); R. P. Horstmann, ‘Probleme der Wandlung in Hegels Jenaer Systemkonzeption’, *Philosophischer Rundschau*, xix. 1972, 87–118; J. H. Trede, ‘Hegels frühe Logik’, *Hegel-Studien*, vii. 1972, 123–68 (esp. p. 152 and n. 19); L. Lugarini, *Hegel*

Logic, in these sources, is 'the extended Science of the Idea as such'. In the *ideal* realm of pure theory, the Idea is intuited in a dispersed or spread-out way. It needs to be collected and articulated so that it can be cognized as an organic whole. This living integrity of the Idea is what appears in the *Difference* essay as the 'philosophy' (absolute idealism) which Fichte and Schelling have in common, but which they have 'systematized' in different ways.

This concept of 'speculation' or of the 'Idea as such' is discussed at some length in the introductory section of the *Difference* essay. But in the Preface Hegel apologizes for all these 'preliminary' considerations, and speaks of them as if they form no part of speculative philosophy in its properly systematic form. He seems to imply that 'general reflections about the need, presuppositions, basic principles, etc. of philosophy' will not be needed once 'the day comes when from beginning to end it is philosophy itself whose voice will be heard'.¹ A careful reader might perhaps be able to infer from the text of the essay alone that 'philosophy itself', when it speaks, must begin with a statement of its own principle or of the 'Idea as such', before proceeding to the 'systematic' exposition of the Absolute in its twin sciences of Nature and Mind.² He might infer this because the two sciences are not

dal mondo storico alla filosofia, Rome, 1973, pp. 89ff.; K. Düsing, *Das Problem der Subjektivität (Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 15)* Bonn, Bouvier, 1976 (esp. pp. 33, 77-8); M. Baum, 'Zur Methode der Logik und Metaphysik', *Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 20*, 1980, 119-38. Other relevant literature is cited in p. 61, n. 2, below.

¹ *NKA*, iv. 8, 14-20; Harris and Cerf, p. 83.

² The two philosophical sciences are called 'philosophy of nature' and 'transcendental philosophy' in the *Difference* essay. But this terminology has a dangerously misleading tendency (it certainly misled *me*, until the discovery of the 1801 lecture MSS drove me to re-examine the place of 'Logic and Metaphysics' in the 'system' sketched in the essay). All properly philosophical inquiry is 'transcendental' and the distinctive character of the 'transcendental philosophy' of the *Difference* essay is that it is 'subjective'. Logic, on the other hand, is *neutral* (according to the essay itself). My own choice of 'philosophy of mind' as the name for the transcendental science of the subject, also has its implicit dangers, because the real topic of the science is the structure of social life (theoretical Reason and *Sittlichkeit*) not the finite self. In other words, it is really what Hegel already calls in the 1801 lectures 'philosophy of spirit'. But I do not want to speak of it in that way before he does. In calling it 'mind' I am trading on the fact that Wallace and the English Hegelians who translated *Geist* as 'mind' conceived of *Geist* in very much the way that the 'transcendental subject' is conceived of in 'Schelling's System'. (The quotation marks are meant to indicate that this expression refers *only* to the system sketched in the *Difference* essay, not to the writings of Schelling himself.)

only *parallel* (hence separate and distinct) but also in a logical *sequence* (hence continuous and connected). Some preliminary statement of the articulation of the Idea is thus structurally essential in order that the project of philosophy itself may be understood, and this paradox justified and explained. Much of the indirect exposition of Schelling's principle in the 'comparison of principles' section of the *Difference* essay, belongs to a necessary preamble on 'philosophy as such', and cannot itself be fitted into any of the divisions that it enumerates. Even some part of the 'general reflections' spoken of so dismissively in the Preface is in fact essential to this speculative preamble, if speculative systems require criticism—and it is apparent from the very existence of the 'difference' between Fichte and Schelling that they do. Finally, it is obvious that a critical discussion of the 'relation of speculation to healthy human understanding' is a permanent necessity if the voice of philosophy is to be intelligible to the uninitiated. It is true that Hegel's discussion of the 'various forms occurring in contemporary philosophy' will cease to be necessary when the 'various forms' vanish because the business of philosophy has been rightly understood. But in spite of that, most of the topics that Hegel discusses under this heading must in a more general way continue to be essential heads in the necessary preamble to the great speculative debate, precisely because they arise in the normal, non-philosophical evolution of human thought. The disappearance of Reinhold, with his 'basic principles', his 'presuppositions', and his explanations of the 'need' of philosophy, will not betoken the disappearance of 'principles', 'assumptions', and 'conflicts' (or 'problems') either from ordinary life or from empirical science. Hence both a critical preamble and a speculative exposition of the Idea are a necessary part of speculative philosophy at all times.

There is a further complication implicit here. Much of the critical preamble to philosophy will need to be treated again (in quite a different way) in the speculative science of mind—since that science must inevitably deal largely with non-philosophical awareness, and with the stages through which it becomes philosophical. But the practical preparation of a philosophic mind, is quite distinct from the same mind's theoretical understanding of the process through which it was

formed. Critical logic is thus quite distinct from the science of mind. Both of them are 'transcendental philosophy' but one is practical, the other theoretical (in the Aristotelian, not the Kantian sense of the distinction).

The speculative theory of the Idea on the other hand, is distinct from philosophy of mind, because it is logically prior to the subjective/objective distinction upon which the definition of 'philosophy of mind' depends. It does not have the same subject-matter at all, except accidentally, since it deals with the articulation of the whole within which 'philosophy of mind' is an articulated part. What it really needs to be distinguished from is the final 'resumption of the whole into one'.¹ This is the *practical integration* of the Absolute Idea through the consummatory effort by which speculative theory returns to the concreteness of self-conscious individual insight, whereas 'the extended science of the Idea as such' is the *theoretical differentiation* of the Absolute Idea through the abstract 'extending' of pure insight into the 'universe' of systematic thought. As the beginning of science, the Logical Idea is prior to the subject/object distinction, and as such it is *neither* subjective nor objective (which is what I mean by 'neutral'). As the end of Science, the Religious Ideal is the totality of subject and object, and as such it is *both* subjective and objective (which is what Hegel means by 'Identity').

We know that Hegel worked hard to develop and clarify both the critical and the speculative preamble to systematic philosophy in his first years at Jena. We know that he produced a systematic manuscript, which he subjected to several revisions. But we do not have any version of this manuscript. All that remains to us from these systematic labours are some programmatic outlines given in lectures before even the first version of the manuscript intended for publication was completed, perhaps before it was well begun. The outline of logic is specific and carefully structured; that of Metaphysics is less clearly structured but, as I shall show, it is equally definite. And we have a mass of indirect evidence from

¹ For the articulated structure of the Idea in 1801-2 see below, pp. 62-9. The 'resumption of the whole into one' is identical with the theory of 'the absolute indifference point' or 'absolute totality' in the *Difference* essay (NKA, iv, 74, 10-76, 37; Harris and Cerf, pp. 169-73).

which the outlines can be filled out in the shape of Hegel's critical essays on the positions that the true logic must critically overcome.

Critical logic is itself the backlash of speculative Metaphysics upon all non-speculative systems of thought. It must, therefore, be historically conditioned, and its systematic form must reflect and respond to the 'need' of the time.¹ Like Aristotelian ethics it is a practical science in that it forms the mind of the learner. It can only be taught by one who is himself a speculative metaphysician. Such a one must have theoretical awareness and the practically formed conviction that at all times there has been only one and the same philosophy.² One who has really arrived at this standpoint properly will not blaspheme against his predecessors as Fichte did when he claimed that Spinoza could not possibly have believed in his philosophy, and that the Greeks did not even understand what philosophy was about.³ A true metaphysician will know how to recognize the speculative principle even in undeveloped or imperfect forms that are widely different from his own, because they express the integration of a different culture and a different need. Hegel's test case for this is his own idealistic appreciation of the materialistic *Système de la nature* of Baron D'Holbach.⁴

In view of this historical conditioning of logic, it is not surprising that Hegel does not yet conceive of any absolute transhistorical programme for the logician's collecting of his 'extended' realm. Such a programme can only be conceived when one has recognized that the *historically comprehensive standpoint* in metaphysics is itself the product, not of a particular time and its 'need', but of a logical sequence of

¹ In his definition of logic in the 'Introduction to Philosophy' Hegel makes clear that it is the *critical arm* of Metaphysics (*Die Idee des absoluten Wesens*, 1b in *NKA*, v. 263; see Baum and Meist, *Hegel-Studien*, xii. 1977, 47); and in his introduction to 'Logic and Metaphysics' he dwells on its practical relation to the 'need of the time' (*Dass die Philosophie*, 15a-16b, in *NKA*, v. 269-70; see Baum and Meist, *Hegel-Studien*, xii. 1977, 52-3).

² Rosenkranz, p. 192; Cerf and Harris, p. 10; cf. *Difference*, *NKA*, iv. 11, 3-12, 14; 31, 30-6; (Harris and Cerf, pp. 88-9, 114).

³ *Difference*, *NKA*, iv. 11, 13-18; Harris and Cerf, pp. 87-8.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 79, 35-80, 15; Harris and Cerf, p. 177. The metaphysician's task of historical appreciation is described more fully in the 'Einleitung' for the *Critical Journal* (*NKA*, iv. 117-28; *IJP*, iii. 1979, 37-45).

'needs' in time, a necessary progress in time toward the goal of comprehending time itself. That insight was not one that could be formulated in the context of the Identity Philosophy as Hegel held it in 1801/2. By the time he had fully grasped this point, Hegel had already resolved the dualism of logic and Metaphysics and could give the task of critical introduction to a different philosophical discipline altogether: the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

All the suggestions of an absolute programme, with a logically necessary starting-point, that can be found in the early Jena documents refer to the structure of the speculative Idea. These hints are (perhaps intentionally) pluralistic.¹ It is quite probable that Hegel envisaged the possibility of several different, and of course mutually equivalent, speculative expositions of the Idea—all 'imperfect' in different ways—and sometimes in different degrees.² In any case, the programme of his logic in 1801 is demonstrably related to his analysis of the particular form of dichotomy that Reason has to overcome in his time.³ It begins where the historic rediscovery of speculation in his time began: with the Kantian 'deduction of the categories'.⁴

5. *The Categories*

Logic, Hegel told his students, leads us from the 'finite cognition' of our world in time and space, to the 'infinite cognition' of the Absolute in true Metaphysics. The destiny of

¹ See, for instance, *Difference*, NKA, iv. 16, 4-14; 30, 31-31, 19; Harris and Cerf, pp. 93-4, 113-14. Cf. also my discussion of this passage in the Introduction (*ibid.*, pp. 22, 32-4).

² The programme of the *Critical Journal* seems to aim at bringing all truly speculative efforts to the perfect fruition of mutual recognition. (NKA, iv. 119, 17-120, 18). Implicit in this programme, is the view that the 'Idea' of philosophy through which this is achieved, is more adequate than the 'Ideas' that it reconciles. This is nowhere dwelt upon, but I have expounded Hegel's 'Idea of Philosophy' below on the assumption that he could not help being vividly conscious of it.

³ Every time establishes different antitheses as absolute. The ones that Hegel enumerates as fundamental for his own time (NKA, iv. 13, 26-32; Harris and Cerf, p. 90) are the focal problems of Kant ('Reason and sensibility') and of Fichte and Schelling ('intelligence and nature' in the real order, and 'absolute subjectivity and absolute objectivity' in the ideal order).

⁴ The passage referred to in n. 3 marks the *goal* of logic. The Preface to the *Difference* essay provides the proper clue to its beginning (NKA, iv. 5, 16-6, 4; Harris and Cerf, pp. 79-80).

our finite cognition is to be absorbed into this infinite context. Hence the task of logic is to identify the forms of our cognition which are genuinely basic structures of our thought-world, and then 'nullify' the finiteness of these forms by relating them to the Absolute.¹ In this relation to the Absolute their mutual opposition is overcome and they are constructively related to one another: 'their finitude is nullified in virtue of the way they are connected with one another in speculation'.²

What they are [in their finitude], <they> are only through their opposition; hence, as soon as their opposition is sublated, as soon as they are posited identically, their finitude is sublated also at the same time. Mere reflection, however, cognizes them only in opposition, and so has them only in their finitude.

It is as such forms of finitude, that the forms of speculative thought are presently taken up in logic. As logicians are ordinarily accustomed to say, all thought content is abstracted from in logic, and only the subjective [form] of thought is considered.

At the same time, [however], the understanding, or reflection, the capacity of finite thought, is covertly driven by Reason to arrive at an Identity; the understanding within its finite realm imitates Reason in that it strives to bring its forms to a unity; but the unity that it can bring forth is only a formal [*formell*] one—that is it is only a finite unity itself, since it rests on absolute opposition, on finitude.³

Here Hegel is contrasting the procedure of ordinary or reflective logic with his own. The 'opposition' that has to be overcome is the opposition between form and content; which is exactly what is made absolute by the abstractive procedure of ordinary reflective logic. How this is achieved by the rational connecting of the categories into an organic system is not yet at all obvious. But it is clear that we must distinguish

¹ Rosenkranz, p. 190 (trans., in Cerf and Harris, p. 9); and *Difference*, pp. 94–6 (NKA, iv, 16, 19–18, 22).

² Rosenkranz, whose text was the only one available when I translated the passage in my introduction to *Faith and Knowledge*, omitted this crucial acknowledgement that the *constructive* activity of logic is a *speculative* one.

³ Rosenkranz omitted this passage—see Baum and Meist, *Hegel-Studien*, xii, 1977, 55–6 (*Dass die Philosophie*, 17b–18a in NKA, v, 271–2; cf. also *Difference*, NKA, iv, 12, 22–13, 32; 15, 5–19, 2 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 89–90, 92–7), where Hegel describes the activity of reflection in much the same terms. The 'covert drive' of Reason (in Kant) must however be distinguished from the 'seduction' of understanding by Reason (in Fichte). This point is discussed below (see pp. 41, n. 44).

their real connection with the Absolute from the 'imitation' which the 'covert' influence of Reason drives the understanding to produce. The theories of human nature produced by the great empiricists are reflective imitations by *Verstand* of the bolder procedure of speculative rationalism, which starts from God, and from a conception of *ratio* or *Vernunft* which is common to God and man alike. And the three Critiques of Kant taken together, are the great model of 'Reason operating as understanding', or of understanding 'driven' by reason into an imitation of genuinely speculative unity. Kant is the great master of reflective logic.¹

Properly critical logic will overcome the reflective standpoint in three stages. First it will set out the *categories* of finite reasoning in their logical order 'just as they come forth from Reason'. This can be done because the working structure of the finite individual mind is an 'image of God'—to use the Judaeo-Christian metaphor that is harmoniously present along with the Platonic one in Hegel's use of *Urbild* and *Abbild*. Thus the copying instinct that drives the reflective understanding toward a systematic conception of the workings of the individual mind in cognition is regarded by Hegel as sound. But only the secure knowledge of the *Urbild* can make the copy right.

Reference to the *Urbild* is required because the categories of 'universal logic' (as Hegel called this first phase in a marginal note)² are the 'forms or laws' of finite being gen-

¹ It is not just Kant (as suggested in my introduction to *Faith and Knowledge*, p. 11) who is guilty of 'bundling the categories together empirically', but Bouterwek and still more Reinhold and Bardili with their boasted 'reduction of philosophy to logic' (cf. Düsing, *Das Problem der Subjektivität*, pp. 82–3). The fact that Reinhold does not recognize his own earlier theory in Bardili's new one is the apt Nemesis of this confusion (see *Difference*, NKA, iv. 88, 20–91, 18; Harris and Cerf, pp. 188–92). Jacobi's attempt to improve the 'Transcendental Deduction' (*Faith and Knowledge*, NKA, iv. 349, 1–350, 18; Cerf and Harris, pp. 99–101) is another good example of what Hegel means. By contrast Hegel's exposition of the Kantian system as an *imitation* of Reason by the understanding (*Faith and Knowledge*, pp. 67–96) preserves the order of Kant's treatment fairly faithfully, though it is inevitably selective and abbreviated.

² Baum and Meist, *Hegel-Studien*, xii. 1977, 56. It should be noted that the word *Kategorien* is in the margin here. It was imported into the text itself by Rosenkranz. Hegel clearly regards it as a 'reflective' term, which can be used as a pointer to help his students to orient the new logic of the speculative infinite in relation to the transcendental logic of the finite subject which they were familiar with.

erally. They are not just the structure of the finite subject, conditioning the *appearance* of an ultimate Being which, problematically at least, can be thought of as existing unconditioned. The mistake involved in postulating that sort of unconditioned reality is that the finite subject whose structure establishes the conditions of all phenomenal manifestation is thereby assumed, quite dogmatically and without any consciousness of a problem, to exist independently as *another* unconditioned being. The only unconditioned reality that can be postulated consistently is a 'totality' that includes the process of phenomenal appearance to a finite consciousness as an essential or necessary phase of its own rational structure. And this implies that at least some part of an adequate philosophical logic must state the structure of being prior to its manifestation, and that the *structure of appearance* can only be analysed in a logically justifiable way within the context provided by these more general logical laws. Or, to put the point another way, a theory of the structure of the mind is only possible in the context of a theory of the reality that the mind seeks to know (of which the mind itself is one element). The *Urbild* for the mind's image of itself is its conception of its place in Nature.

The 'intellectual intuition' from which Hegel's theory of the 'absolute Identity' (in Spinozist terms 'the union of the mind with the whole of nature') is developed is the intuited unity of necessity and creative spontaneity in logical thinking. The one ultimate postulate that is contained in his insistence on the ontological primacy of logic, is the postulate that what is *can* be truly known. Knowing the *truth* logically involves recognizing necessity. But *knowing* the truth logically involves the possibility of not knowing it, and hence of passing from ignorance to knowledge by the free or spontaneous actualization of the power of cognition.

I believe that it is this analysis of 'knowing' that lies behind Hegel's insistence on the ontological primacy of logic; and it is that insistence, in turn, that necessitates the cognitive primacy of 'intellectual intuition'. Intuition, as such, is a psychological fact, a subjective state which *cannot* consistently be given any ontological primacy. This is graphically exhibited by the logical impasse that Fichte got into. He sought to ground the

laws of logic in the free activity of the transcendental subject; but when he claimed to have done so he was faced with the question: How do we know that the 'Science of Knowledge' is *true*? For if the laws of logic are abstractions from this absolute activity they cannot legitimately be used to assure us of its existence. Ultimately it is the intuitive moral certainty of our membership in the Kingdom of Ends that guarantees the status of the 'Science of Knowledge' as knowledge for Fichte. But one cannot help remembering Descartes's demon when one is asked to affirm that one has an intuitive awareness of one's own immortal moral agency.

Instead of denying the death of the singular rational subject, Hegel affirms the immortal life of the ultimate reality within which the struggle of the mortal mind for true cognition of its place in the whole occurs. Any whole within which that struggle has its rationally necessary place must be conceived of organically. That is to say that Nature must not be conceived as a mechanism (as it is by Newton and Descartes) and that mind must not be conceived as an arbitrary activity (as it is in Fichte's theory of the Ego). Rather the unity (identity) of self and world must be comprehended as an *a priori* synthesis of necessity and freedom.

When we speak of 'nature' as an 'organism', we should clearly understand that, regarded simply as a necessary being, a life that does not pass away, this 'Universe' is something much poorer than the finite life that dies, yet maintains its place in the scheme of things by starting a new cycle of mortal generation before it does so. At the basic level of what is ordinarily called 'inorganic' being, the component of spontaneity in the conceptual synthesis may well be minimal. At bottom it need be no more than that character of brute arbitrariness, that logical surdity, which reflective empiricists or speculative materialists have always insisted on as a necessary aspect of all actual existence. According to Hegel's 'Introduction to Philosophy', the 'body' of the Idea is the 'System des Himmels', i.e. the Solar System. This is the image of the 'true Infinite' at the level of simple being. But it has as its context (its 'inorganic nature' as Hegel likes to say) the boundless infinity of space and time. Hegel seems to have been as radical as Hume in regarding bare factual existence in

space and time as a logical surd. His word 'infinite' is always a synonym for Reason. But what he already calls the 'negative infinite' (might we perhaps say 'the irrational'?) he will soon be calling 'bad'. The logical demonstration of the surdity of factual existence is what, in his perspective, is to be seen in the Kantian doctrine of the antinomies. The real world, at this most basic level of conceptual abstraction, simply does *not* make a comprehensible whole. We cannot set limits to it, and we cannot conceive its unlimitedness. This is where all of the '*universal* forms of finitude' (the categories that apply indifferently to the 'objectivity' of space and the 'subjectivity' of time) are connected with the Infinite and so nullified.

In Hegel's *critical* logic, it is only this 'negative' Absolute that appears—the infinity of Newtonian space and time, or of the infinite progress, the infinity for which the simplest model is the series of the integers. This model is particularly helpful because the positive element in its construction is the unit; and this will become in the speculative theory of nature, the focal point, or gravitational centre of the opposite forces of attraction and repulsion that are united in the concept of matter. In critical logic, however, it is the *endlessness* of the number series that is important. It is easy to think of objective exemplifications of the dialectic by which our concepts are 'connected' with the negative Absolute in this way. But we need to remember that Hegel is *not* just thinking about the conceptual structure of matter, but at the same time about the structure of the self. Kant's antinomies are supposed by Kant to demonstrate not something about the nature of things, but rather something about the limits of our cognitive capacities. But Zeno's paradoxes illustrated the shipwreck of reflection with respect to the simple intuition of being in space; and Fichte's recourse to the 'infinite progress' in his construction of the self as an identity, illustrates the same shipwreck with respect to the bare concept of rationality in time. None of these cases belongs to logic as such. What belongs to logic as such is the conceptual (non-temporal, non-spatial) truth that 'there is no highest number' *and* the intuitive knowledge that that truth has both 'objective' and 'subjective' applications.

What is really difficult is to see how these finite categories can be 'connected with one another' in the process of being

brought to nothing in the negative Absolute. There is a large, and quite indefinite number—perhaps, in principle, a denumerably infinite set—of conceptual antitheses which could be subjected to the treatment described in the *Difference* essay:

Every being, because it is posited, is an opposite, it is conditioned and conditioning. The understanding completes these its limitations by positing the opposite limitations as conditions. These need to be completed in the same way, so the task of understanding expands *ad infinitum*. In all this, reflection appears to be merely understanding, but this guidance toward the totality of necessity is the contribution and secret efficacy of Reason. Reason makes the understanding boundless, and in this infinite wealth the understanding and its objective world meet their downfall. For every being that the understanding produces is something determinate, and the determinate has an indeterminate before it and after it. The manifoldness of being lies between two nights, without support. It rests on nothing—for the indeterminate is nothing to the understanding—and it ends in nothing. The obstinacy of the understanding can let the determinate and the indeterminate, finitude and the infinite that is to be set as task, subsist beside one another ununified; and it can hold fast to being as against the non-being that is just as much necessary to it.¹

How the categories are shipwrecked is clear enough. Kant wrote his 'Dialectic of Pure Reason' about that. But how one

¹ *NKA*, iv. 17, 9–23; Harris and Cerf, p. 95. We have been guilty of a mistranslation here. The two sentences before this present quotation should read: 'Reason raises the intellect above itself, driving it toward a whole of Reason's own kind [*seiner* refers to *sie*, i.e. to *Vernunft*]. It seduces the intellect into producing an objective totality.'

The totality that is naturally sought after by *Verstand* is 'subjective' because 'reflective' logic abstracts from all content and concerns itself only with the activity of the thinking subject. When Hegel claims that 'Reason seduces *Verstand*' into seeking a totality of the rational or objective kind, he must (so far as the seduction of rational 'system' is concerned) be thinking of Fichte's 'objective' or 'constitutive' use of the *postulates* of practical reason—which is still, in his view, 'Reason operating as understanding'. The shipwreck of that effort is the 'infinite progress' in Fichte's moral system. Hence I have here chosen the alternative translation 'set as task' for *aufgegeben*. On this interpretation, the 'seduction' and the 'infinite expansion of the task' are logical red herrings produced by Fichte's fall from speculation to dogmatic reflection. If on the other hand the reference is to Kant's being led on to complete his theory of judgement in the critique of that name—and specifically in the theory of the *organism*—then the seductive activity of Reason is not a logical red herring, but looks forward to the next phase of Hegel's integrated logic. My reasons for preferring to distinguish the 'covert drive' in Kant, from the 'seduction' in Fichte are given below (see p. 44 and n. 3).

stage of reflective completion leads to another is not. We need a guideline for the choice of a finite set of categories, and a method for threading them together into system, even if the system does finally come to grief in the void.

The guideline can be found by comparing this stage of Hegel's logic with the next. In the second phase of logic we shall deal with the 'subjective' forms of finitude. These are no longer forms of being but forms of judgement, i.e. forms of thinking only. We can infer with fair plausibility, that the categories of 'universal logic' are those necessary for the constitution of 'intuition'. Intuition is the form (both subjective and objective) which provides the objective content for the 'forms of judgement'. The triads of Quantity, Quality, and Relation in Kant's table are therefore the essential elements that we are seeking.¹

There is no way of deciding how Hegel treated the Kantian triads of Quantity and Quality in his first logic. My hypothesis is that he argued that in the *Urbild* of Reason the development of the 'true infinite' moves from Quality to Quantity (as in the logic of 1804) but that the Kantian order is the inverted order that is natural to reflection, and that the critical logic must take up the categories in this inverse order, on the way to their eventual supersession in the 'negative Absolute' (or 'bad infinite'). This hypothesis is strengthened by the fairly clear indication in our documents of how Hegel employed the categories of 'Relation' to bring about this final supersession. 'The true relation of speculation', he tells us in the *Difference* essay, is 'the relation of substance [and accident]'.² But the 'true relation of speculation' like the 'true infinite' belongs to metaphysics not logic. The *reflective* relation, the mode in

¹ That only these 9 of Kant's categories belong to 'universal' logic is certified by the Preface to *Difference* (NKA, iv. 6, 9-11; Harris and Cerf, p. 80—quoted below in p. 45, n. 3. But the discussion in the context there makes it fairly clear that these 9 are not the only universal categories, and that they cannot constitute even a finite subject/object by themselves. What other thought-determinations Hegel considered it essential to treat we cannot be sure. It seems probable however that the relation of 'whole and parts' was dealt with under Totality of Quantity (cf. Düsing, *Das Problem der Subjektivität*, p. 85); and virtually certain that the *Satz des Grundes* was dealt with in the context of Reciprocity (cf. *Difference*, NKA, iv. 25, 24-26, 17; Harris and Cerf, pp. 107-8; and *Faith and Knowledge*, NKA, iv. 348, 1-26; Cerf and Harris, 98-9).

² NKA, iv. 33, 3-4; Harris and Cerf, p. 116.

which the 'negative infinite' manifests itself is the causality-relation, and especially its 'total' category of reciprocity.¹ The final stages of 'universal' logic will therefore be the setting up of the concept of a substance in 'transcendental intuition' only to see the reciprocity involved in the cognitive relation destroy the stability of the substance as defined.

The opposition of force and manifestation works itself out equally disastrously in the Newtonian concept of gravity or in Fichte's self-positing Ego. But it is the latter that must assume the mantle of the Absolute if we are to pass here from the forms of finite being to the forms of finite thought. It is Fichte's Ego that remains above the ruins of 'this body and the shining suns'—a passage from the *Appeal to the Public* which drew Hegel's sarcasm at Frankfurt because of the 'bad infinite' conception of Nature that it expresses.²

6. Concept, Judgement, and Syllogism

The second phase of logic deals with the activity of the finite understanding in judgement and inference. This activity of the finite subject presupposes the constitution of both subject and world in the minimal cognitive relation (of intuition) established by the universal categories. Hegel promises that 'we shall briefly construct the organization of the human spirit, and consider it under these same aspects [the subjective forms of finitude], and in its advance by stages through concepts, judgements, and syllogisms.'³ A fairly clear idea of the 'organization of the finite subject' from the logical point of view can be gained from his systematic summary of 'Kantian philosophy' in *Faith and Knowledge*.⁴ This is where the

¹ Cf. for instance the criticism of Fichte (*NKA*, iv. 49, 38–50, 34; and 52, 28–53, 2; Harris and Cerf, pp. 138–9, 142). In the latter passage we read 'reflection . . . puts subject and object into the relation of dependence . . . the relation of causality' and it may be inferred from the context that this is a quite *general* proposition. Cf. also the context of the quotation on p. 41 above, and the discussion of Reinhold's treatment of the *Satz des Grundes* (*NKA*, iv. 25, 24–26, 18; Harris and Cerf, pp. 107–8).

² *TW-A*, i. 426–7 (Knox and Kroner, p. 318). Cf. Fichte, *Werke*, v. 236–8.

³ Baum and Meist *Hegel-Studien*, xii. 1977, 56 give this text, but note that it is 'hard to reconstruct'. Hence Rosenkranz (p. 191) did not quote most of this passage—cf. Cerf and Harris, p. 10.

⁴ *NKA*, iv. 326–44 (Cerf and Harris, pp. 68–94). (It should be apparent to the reader by now that I agree with Zimmerli's contention that 'Herr Hegel worked

understanding 'copies' Reason, and produces a subjective totality of its own. The exposition of this totality is the 'construction' of the human cognitive organization that Hegel speaks of. Kant did it perfectly in the three Critiques. That this was Hegel's view is shown by the way he repeatedly praises Kant's 'speculative' instinct. One can soon see in *Faith and Knowledge*, that it was not just the 'deduction of the categories' but Kant's whole theory of the human understanding that was 'held over the font by Reason'.¹ Kant remains consistently a reflective philosopher (or 'the Kantian philosophy remains *entirely* within the antithesis').² It is only in Fichte that the understanding is 'seduced' by Reason into positing an 'objective' totality (the 'moral world-order'). For this reason, and to preserve this distinction, Hegel does not deal with Kantian ethics under 'Kantian Philosophy' in *Faith and Knowledge*. He leaves that whole topic for the Fichte section.³ But in spite of Kant's heroic resistance to dogmatic temptation, he was everywhere 'secretly driven by Reason to arrive at an Identity'.⁴ His philosophy 'expresses the authentic Idea of Reason in the formula, "How are synthetic judgements *a priori* possible?"'⁵ This is the focus of the second phase of critical logic. Düsing has rightly argued that in giving his 'speculative' answer Hegel changes the meaning of 'synthetic' in Kant's question.⁶ But for the right understanding of the critical logic of 1801/2 we can ignore Hegel's speculative reintegration, and follow the exposition and criticism in a

"economically": he published what he taught, taught what he published'—'Inwiefern wirkt Kritik systemkonstituierend', *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 20, 1980, 82. Zimmerli's attempt to find a prototype of the *Phenomenology* in the *Difference* essay is an oversimplification, however. It would be forgivable—because of the insight it contains—if it were not so dangerous. The danger becomes evident, in my view, when Zimmerli speaks of the long path through the intervening system-sketches as 'ein langer (Irr)weg' (ibid., p. 102).

¹ *Difference*, NKA, iv. 6, 3–4 (Harris and Cerf, p. 80).

² *Faith and Knowledge*, NKA, iv. 325, 21; Cerf and Harris, p. 67. The italics are mine.

³ NKA, iv. 338, 26–34 (Cerf and Harris, p. 85). For the explanation of the decision as given here, see the end of the Kant section (NKA, iv. 344, 30–346, 4; Cerf and Harris, pp. 94–6) esp. the comment 'Kant remains within the right and proper bounds of his postulates, which Fichte does not respect.' The 'seduction' passage is in *Difference* and is cited above in full.

⁴ See the quotation on p. 36, above.

⁵ NKA, iv. 326, 32–3; Cerf and Harris, p. 69.

⁶ *Das Problem der Subjektivität*, p. 111.

sense that is, at least, plausibly close to Kant's. Hegel himself warns us to distinguish between his own speculative interpretation of the 'transcendental unity of apperception' and Kant's merely reflective principle of the 'Ich denke'.¹ It is Hegel's criticism of the way 'productive imagination has been allowed to get by easily in the Kantian philosophy' that shows us how it appeared in his critical logic.² This whole phase of logic is marked by its two-sidedness. There is the formulation of the judgement in the mind, and the state of things in the world. Yet the judgement itself is supposed to link the concept in the mind with the real state of affairs, and to do so 'identically' if it is true. This is the 'formal' identity that Kant's theory arrives at. And at the level of simple judgement the identity is still unconscious. When we formulate a judgement, what we are directly conscious of is the *difference* between the concepts in our mind and the things in the world. Even the formal identity asserted in the copula, only comes to conscious attention in syllogistic inference. Yet this integrative function is the corner-stone of all truth, for at the foundation of the whole process of experience there is only the manifold of sensibility, which is precisely the 'negative Absolute' that we reached in the first phase of logic: 'the world is in itself falling to pieces, and only gets objective coherence and support, substantiality, multiplicity, even actuality and possibility, through the good offices of human self-consciousness and understanding.'³

¹ NKA, iv. 329, 13–22; Cerf and Harris, pp. 72–3. In the same way, we must ignore the speculative healing of *UrTeilung* that Hegel performs for the exemplary concepts of Gravity and Imagination (NKA, iv. 331, 22–5; Cerf and Harris, p. 75). (These recommendations that some points in *Faith and Knowledge* should be ignored, are strictly provisional. Eventually we shall see reason for supposing that speculative healing—or conceptual *reconstruction*—was in large part the aim of Hegel's self-styled 'critical' logic.)

² NKA, iv. 329, 37–330, 7; Cerf and Harris, p. 73.

³ NKA, iv. 330, 24–7 Cerf and Harris, p. 74. The reference to 'actuality and possibility' here, prompts the comment that the categories of modality form part of Hegel's 'critique of judgment'. It is through the modal concepts that we make the transition from the 'negative Absolute' of the sensory manifold to the legislative right of the Ego. The failure of intuition to fix the manifold as an *actual* substantial being raises the problem 'how are synthetic *necessary* judgements possible?' This view of the categories of modality is confirmed by the comment in the *Difference* essay that in Kant's theory 'the identity of subject and object is limited to twelve acts of pure thought—or rather to nine only, for modality really determines nothing objectively;

Kant based his table of categories on the table of the forms of judgement; we can be sure that Hegel dealt with Kant's table, but there is no telling how. In *Faith and Knowledge* he is only interested in contrasting Kant's reflective treatment of the forms of judgement with their properly speculative use. So we cannot securely infer much about his own systematic treatment of them. I suspect that he could afford to go quickly here because he only had to repeat Kant until he reached the conclusion: 'The things as they are cognized by the understanding, are only appearances. They are nothing in themselves, which is a perfectly truthful result. The obvious conclusion, however, is that an understanding which has cognizance only of appearances and of nothing in itself, is itself only appearance, and is nothing in itself.'¹

The 'negative Absolute' that engulfs the logician's efforts here is not the intuitive infinite of space and time, but the conceptual infinity of Reason. If we continue to ignore Hegel's speculative commentary, we shall find in *Faith and Knowledge* a safe though very sketchy guide, to the critical argument of his own logic:

Kant always and everywhere recognizes that Reason, as the *dimensionless activity* [note the contrast to the extensive infinity of space and time], as pure *concept* of infinitude is held fast in its opposition to the finite . . . But there is an immediate contradiction in this: this infinitude, strictly conditioned as it is by its abstraction from its opposite, and being strictly nothing outside of this antithesis, is yet at the same time held to be absolute spontaneity and autonomy. As freedom, Reason is supposed to be absolute, yet the essence of this freedom consists in being solely through an opposite. This contradiction . . . remains insuperable in the system and destroys it.²

Kant's own discussion of the 'Paralogisms' provides a model for this 'destruction'. I have insisted that in order to follow the thread of logic in *Faith and Knowledge* we must ignore Hegel's metaphysical interjections. But, of course, it was this

the non-identity of subject and object [i.e. the *Ur-Teilung* typical of 'judgement'] essentially pertains to it' (NKA, iv. 6, 8-11; Harris and Cerf, p. 80).

¹ NKA, iv. 332, 37-333, 2; Cerf and Harris, p. 77.

² NKA, iv. 336, 8-17; Cerf and Harris, p. 81. So far the argument is 'formal' and hence belongs to logic; the *reale Inkonsequenz* which Hegel here goes on to discuss, results from the 'seduction' of Reason; and it is the business of philosophy (not logic) to put right the erroneous postulate of an *objective* totality in the noumenal realm.

speculative perspective that made logic interesting and valuable in Hegel's eyes. So we must assume that, especially where he could lean directly on his great critical predecessor, as I believe he did in the doctrine of judgement, his logical discourse was steadily accompanied by a philosophical commentary like that which we find in *Faith and Knowledge*.¹

From judgement Hegel proceeded to syllogism. The appearance of the negative Absolute of Reason was his occasion for discoursing on the 'speculative meaning of the syllogism'. Not much can be gathered directly from our remaining documents about his doctrine of syllogism at this early stage. As we have already remarked, it is in formal syllogism rather than in simple judgement that the understanding operates consciously. Having frozen the living world of experience into its concepts it manipulates these concepts according to the 'laws of Reason'. From the attacks on Reinhold and Bardili, we can gain an indirect impression of what the critical aspect of this part of Hegel's logic was like. But none of his published comments on 'the reduction of philosophy to logic' deals explicitly with syllogistic theory.

The one explicit reference to syllogistic inference in *Faith and Knowledge* contains a vital clue, however. The crucial point is that just as Kant consciously derived the table of the categories from the table of judgements, so he less consciously related the operation of the human cognitive powers to the basic pattern of the syllogism. Kant himself remarks that:

Reason in the syllogism does not concern itself with intuitions, with a view to bringing them under rules (as the understanding does with its categories), but with concepts and judgments. Accordingly, even if pure Reason does concern itself with objects, it has no immediate relation to these and to the intuition of them, but only to the understanding and its judgments.²

¹ In my view the first draft of the great *Journal* article was effectively written as part of the lectures on *Logic and Metaphysics* (cf. *Dass die Philosophie*, 20b in *NKA*, v. 274-5. It is true that in the lecture MS, the essay could only have existed as *disjecta membra*. But for the Kant section, the scattered members would have been relatively few, intact, and easy to assemble. I assume, however, that the discussion of the *mathematical antinomies* had to be moved to its present position (*NKA*, iv. 337, 7-37; Cerf and Harris, pp. 83-4) from its Hegelian place in the 'universal logic'.

² *KRV*, A 306-7; B.364 (Kemp-Smith, pp. 305-6).

But Hegel pointed to the sceptical consequences implicit in this position, and insisted that in syllogism we become *conscious* of a procedure that we have already gone through in judgement, which is the 'mediating concept' a relation between intuition and understanding that is already syllogistic in form.¹ In arguing this way he was building on the syllogistic analogy that Kant himself employed. Judgement is said by Kant to be 'the mediate knowledge of an object, that is, the representation of a representation of it'.² And therefore, he goes on to say, 'the understanding may be represented as a faculty of judgement'. All this procedure of 'representation' is what is typical of the subjective 'copying' of Reason by the understanding. If we take it seriously, and if we distinguish the faculty of imagination from the faculty of judgement, and that in turn from the faculty of concepts, then we can say not just that judgement is 'mediate knowledge', but that the faculty of judgement is a middle term between imagination and understanding; even as Kant does say (twice) at the beginning of the *Critique of Judgement* that judgement is 'a middle term between understanding and Reason'.³ The philosophical doctrine of formal syllogism, consists quite simply in the demonstration that all reflective knowledge depends on a 'syllogistic' chain by which 'higher representations' are derived from 'lower' ones (the work of imagination) and applied to 'lower' ones (the work of judgement). In this process Reason appears as the 'rule' (both for construction and for application). Only through the strictly syllogistic conception of this process (i.e. by insisting that the chain of higher and lower 'representations' preserves the character of formal logical identity that is essential for validity of inference) can the Critical Philosophy maintain itself as a theory of *knowledge*. If the chain of 'representation' (which is what makes the knowledge merely 'formal', since what is known is always an *image*, a presentation of the 'form' of reality to the intuiting subject)

¹ *NKA*, iv. 328, 34–6 (Cerf and Harris, p. 72. Our footnote at that point is of no help for understanding Hegel's assertion here. But the references we give there will throw light on his contention in the Habilitation Theses that 'the Critical Philosophy is an imperfect form of scepticism' (*Erste Druckschriften*, p. 404).

² *KRV*, A 68–69/B 93–94.

³ *Akad.*, v. 168, 177 (Meredith, *Aesthetic Judgement*, pp. 4, 15).

is not logically secured, then the Critical Philosophy becomes a radical scepticism.

In his 'Habilitation Theses' Hegel did, in fact, call it 'an imperfect form of scepticism'. Kant holds that we do have knowledge, but only knowledge of the finite and phenomenal kind that this cycle of representations makes possible. The finite subject's world of representations hangs in a Void of Reason, because—as Hegel puts it—'The Idea is the synthesis of finite and infinite and all philosophy is in Ideas' but 'the Critical Philosophy lacks Ideas'.¹ The rules of Reason by which the understanding organizes our subjective systems of representation into a world of knowledge are not all of them categories capable of being schematized. Some of them are what Kant himself calls 'Ideas'. But these 'regulative' principles are just the ones which (in Hegel's terminology) are not 'syntheses' of 'finite' (intuition or thing) and 'infinite' (concept or rule). They cannot be adequately exemplified or realized by the imagination. So Kant is a philosophical sceptic because he lacks *viable* 'Ideas'.

Yet the Critical Philosophy is not *perfect* scepticism because Kant thinks that we can and do *imagine* what we lack. In our aesthetic sense he finds a form of intuition which cannot become properly cognitive because the 'higher' representation of it by the intellect can never be adequate to it but only violates it. We have aesthetic intuition and hence we can make aesthetic judgements; but we cannot conceptualize the process.²

This view that what we can sense exceeds our rational capacity to know, while what we know exceeds our intuitive capacity to express sensibly, was the foundation of Hegel's Frankfurt position. He brought the two 'excesses' together into the synthesis of an intuitive knowledge facilitated by the artist's genius (his 'faculty of aesthetic Ideas' as Kant calls it). But although (unlike Kant) he claimed that this aesthetic intuition was cognitive, Hegel at that stage accepted Kant's view that

¹ *Erste Druckschriften*, p. 404.

² *NKA*, iv. 339, 4–340, 25; Cerf and Harris, pp. 86–8. We give there *all* the identifiable Kant references that seem to be intended. The crucial text, however, is *Critique of Judgement*, sect. 57, Remark I (*Akad.*, v. 341–4; Meredith, *Aesthetic Judgement*, pp. 209–13).

this knowledge could not be conceptualized. Now he thinks differently. The admission of an intuitive knowledge of the Ideas of Reason now opens up the possibility of a conceptual exposition of the noumenal realm, the realm which Kant merely posited negatively as the unknown or supersensible world.

The key to the actualization of this possibility, the key to philosophy proper, is the 'speculative meaning of the syllogism'. As a speculative reintegration of the 'formal' theory of cognitive experience as syllogistic, this can be summed up in two propositions. First, the original unconscious synthesis of the manifold of sense in the 'productive imagination' is not merely a 'formal' (or representative) process.¹ I do not 'represent' *the* world to *myself*. Intuitive consciousness does not involve two separate beings that enter into a relation. Rather the being of the world *presents itself* (in the mode of my 'intuitive' consciousness) *to* Reason as the absolute mode of cognition. Just as 'my body' is only a 'moment' in the life of the species, so 'I' am not a substance, but a moment in this process of rational cognition. My infinite significance as an individual springs from the fact that I am both a necessary moment in the cognitive process, and a moment of free spontaneity (or individuality) in the life-process. My world of consciousness *is* me; and it is unique to me. But it is also *the* world which all rational beings do (or can) share. I should not count as a rational being at all if I did not already share the universal realm of the understanding with everyone else; and I should not count as a free rational being if I could not communicate the subjective side that is unique to me so that the others can share it.

Secondly the whole chain of conscious syntheses in the logical analysis of the levels of 'representation' is only a formal process. There are really no distinct faculties of imagination, judgement, understanding, and Reason. There is only the unified development of the originally syllogistic structure of the 'transcendental unity of apperception'. Hence we find

¹ 'We must not take the faculty of imagination as the middle term that gets inserted between an existing absolute subject and an absolute existing world.' (*NKA*, iv. 329, 17-19; Cerf and Harris, p. 73).

Hegel insisting that 'productive imagination is a truly speculative Idea, both in the form of sensuous intuition and in that of experience which is the comprehending of the intuition [i.e. the whole sequence of representative syntheses]'.¹ The whole world of experience is simply the developed 'Concept' which existed initially as the intellectual 'intuition' of the self as a 'productive imagination', or an 'original synthetic unity of apperception'. The same self/world synthesis is conceptually set forth in 'experience' that existed as a simple object of intuition in 'the Ego'.²

The 'speculative theory of the syllogism' has a long history of development in Hegel's thought. But this speculative interpretation of the transcendental unity of apperception as a *really* 'productive imagination' is its point of origin; and without continually returning to this we cannot rightly understand the doctrine in any of its forms. This possibility of thinking not just for oneself but for the world (with a clear consciousness of the subjective moment in one's thought) is the foundation of what Hegel calls Reason (as distinct from understanding). One can do this when one recognizes the absolute primacy of Logic as a system of concepts which are all equally essential and equally constitutive of the *world* of experience that rational knowers share. This is the 'intuitive intellect' which Kant found it necessary to postulate as a 'regulative Ideal' but which he could only think of negatively as beyond our cognitive comprehension.³

Hegel claims that the 'intuitive intellect', the mind that posits the whole world of experience is *real*, that conscious access to it is possible *in* experience. But he does not want us to suppose that this access is quite as direct as Fichte, for example, would have us think. Hegel calls this third part of Logic where the forms of finite understanding are sublated

¹ *NKA*, iv. 328 (Cerf and Harris, p. 71).

² Cf. 'imagination is the subjective [i.e. it belongs to the 'ideal order' or to philosophy of mind] which qua subjective or particular is Ego [the *Ich denke* or transcendental unity] and qua objective or universal is experience [my interpretation of the world]', *NKA*, iv. 331, 23-5; Cerf and Harris, p. 75.

³ *Faith and Knowledge*, *NKA*, iv. 335, 8-13; 340, 26-343, 17; (Cerf and Harris, pp. 80, 88-92); cf. *Difference*, *NKA*, iv. 69, 10-70, 13 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 163-4). The crucial text in Kant is *Critique of Judgement*, sects. 76-7 (*Akad.* v. 401-10; Meredith, *Teleological Judgment*, pp. 55-67).

and the foundations of scientific cognition are laid 'the negative or nullifying side of Reason'. In his view we have to annihilate our own selfhood in order to enter the sphere where Philosophy herself speaks. Faced with Reinhold's conception of the history of philosophy as a series of uniquely personal attempts to interpret life in the world, he commented acidly: 'The essence of philosophy, on the contrary, is a bottomless abyss for personal idiosyncrasy.'¹ That is why I expressed his doctrine of the speculative syllogism by saying that *the world* presents itself to *Reason* through the singular consciousness. The singular consciousness is *mortal*. The 'self' is not a substance, but an impersonal category. 'Experience' necessarily belongs to someone, but only contingently to *me* personally. The effect of this doctrine on an intelligent mind formed by Fichte and the Romantics can be judged from B. R. Abeken's report:

God, faith, salvation, immortality, as they were formerly established firmly in my mind, would not coalesce with the new doctrine, nay they seemed to contradict it; and Hegel, whom Schelling soon brought in after him, had recalled to us, at the beginning of his lectures, the words of Dante: *Lasciate ogni speranza voi ch' entrate*. I wept the bitterest tears.²

Most of us probably do not have this existential crisis of faith to go through any longer. But we must still find the impersonal voice of Reason strange, because none of the processes of ordinary thought are self-generating or self-sufficient as metaphysical thought must be.

7. *Metaphysics*

The speculative interpretation of the law of Identity which Hegel gives in the *Difference* essay, was probably part of the third phase of logic, rather of Metaphysics proper.³ But it is a good illustration to make us see why Hegel gave warning that

¹ *Difference*, NKA, iv. 11, 30 (Harris and Cerf, p. 88).

² Nicolin, report 48. Abeken took the 'Logic and Metaphysics' course. The Dante quotation (*Inferno* III. 9) 'Abandon hope all ye that enter here' is the last line of the inscription on the gate of Hell. ('Beim Beginn seiner Vorträge' must mean 'early in his lectures' since the sense of *despair* that Abeken speaks of could hardly arise at the first day.)

³ NKA, iv. 24, 7-27, 18 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 105-9).

the Idea of the Absolute—the theme of his Metaphysics at this period—would ‘seem to have no significance’ although ‘its complete significance is the whole of philosophy and of life itself’.¹

Reflection needs to distinguish two ‘laws of logic’: the Law of Identity and the Law of Contradiction: ‘ $A = A$ ’ and ‘ $A \neq B$ ’. Reason nullifies even this absolute foundation of reflective logic by insisting that the two laws are really one. Every true ‘identity’ (i.e. synthetic judgement) is true *because* it is a contradiction. This seemingly horrendous assertion is, for Hegel, primarily though not exclusively,² a way of formulating ‘the semantic theory of truth’. For what it means is that any synthetic judgement (e.g. ‘snow is white’) is true because its (universal) meaning is identical with a real (singular) state of affairs (or class of singular states of affairs). This identity is thus also a contradiction (between concept and thing).

Here, too, once it is reflectively unmasked, we seem to have a ‘truth of no significance’. Yet its full significance is only given by the doctrine of the productive imagination as the concrete unity of self and world. The ‘identity of thought and thing’ has to be taken in a much stronger sense than we reflectively attach to it, when the thought (the concept, experience) is recognized as the developed form of the thing (intuition, Ego) itself. When we read it this way, we can see why Hegel insisted that the complete significance of the

¹ *Die Idee des absoluten Wesens*, 2b (in *NKA*, v. 264; cf. Baum and Meist, *Hegel-Studien*, xii. 1977, 51–2).

² I think it is clear that ‘ $A = A$ ’ *primarily* states the identity of concept and being, or thought and thing, or truth and the real state of affairs. While ‘ $A \neq B$ ’ *primarily* states the *difference* between the concept and its content, between the universal thought and the singular thing, between knowledge and what is known. But Hegel *also* illustrates his doctrine in a way that foreshadows the dialectic of F. H. Bradley. No ordinary finite proposition states the *whole* truth about its (logical) subject. Thus when any true judgement is reduced to the form ‘ $A = A$ ’ it is also true that the subject contains *more* than the predicate. So that ‘ $A = A$ ’ is true; but also ‘ $A = B$ ’ (*NKA*, iv. 26, 18–27, 4; Harris and Cerf, p. 108). This, however, is only a dialectical criticism of the use of the formal principle of Identity by Reinhold and Bardili—and possibly, as in Bradley, an attempt to elicit the ‘spectre of Scepticism’ that is implicit in the assumptions of empiricism. All such dialectical uses of ‘the negative side of Reason’ to confound the reflective understanding, must be sharply distinguished from speculative thought proper, which seeks to lay the sceptical ghost once and for all—cf. the last paragraph of *Dass die Philosophie*, 20b (in *NKA*, v. 274–5—and to save *all* ‘appearances’, each in its rationally justified place.

Absolute Identity was 'the whole of philosophy and of life itself'. More immediately, however, the speculative interpretation of the law of identity leads us to the doctrine of the 'speculative proposition' which is the reflective beginning of metaphysics proper. The speculative principle of Reason is the indissoluble *unity* of identity and contradiction. All significant 'identities' exist in a context of contradiction, and likewise all significant 'contradictions' exist in a context of identity.¹ A system of speculative thought must therefore be formulated in terms of antinomies. And *if it is to be formulated in reflective form*, it must begin from a basic proposition that contains an explicit antinomy. Such, for example, is Spinoza's definition of 'substance' as 'cause of itself'. Hegel explicitly says that 'Spinoza's artlessness makes philosophy begin with philosophy itself';² and since the philosophy of Identity, as expounded in Hegel's *Difference* essay or in Schelling's *Exposition of My System* is clearly modelled on Spinoza's One Substance with the two attributes of extension and thought, some interpreters, notably Düsing, have argued that the topic of Hegel's Metaphysics was the speculative concept of 'substance'.³

This is not incorrect, but I think it is rather misleading. The speculative concept of 'substance', if my analysis is right, will be the integration of the 'negative Absolute' of infinite space and time that 'universal logic' is finally engulfed in. In the philosophy of nature this concept is exemplified by the Solar System (Plato's City in the Heavens) and in the philosophy of mind by the *Volk* (Plato's polity). The logical Idea of it is the True Infinite; and if Metaphysics simply *was* the speculative integration of logic (with the necessary reversal through which 'absolute reflection' undoes the original inversion produced by reflection in the first place) then it could

¹ Thus we can sensibly say 'snow is not black' because 'snow is coloured' and 'black is a colour'. But, as A. C. Ewing pointed out years ago, we cannot sensibly ask 'Do quadratic equations go to race-meetings?' (Mathematicians do, and they may solve quadratic equations, instead of watching the races. This kind of conceptual mapping, rather than Bradley's pursuit of Reinhold and Bardili in the native forms of Hume and Mill, seems to me to be the useful application of Hegel's critique of reflection.)

² NKA, iv. 24, 25-6 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 105-6).

³ See esp. *Das Problem der Subjektivität*, pp. 135-6.

very well begin from the true Infinite as the Idea of Substance.¹

But in fact there is nothing to suggest that Hegel's first Metaphysics did mirror his logic in this way. If Hegel *had* so conceived of Metaphysics, he could very easily have indicated the schema of it at the very beginning. All the evidence points rather to the view that the speculative reintegration of finite logic was done where it was needed—in the course of the logical discussion itself. The task of Metaphysics was rather different. Its topic was certainly the 'true Infinite'. But, in accordance with the general definition of Logic as 'Idealism', the true Infinite was approached as a *form of thought which involves being*, not as a form of being which involves thought. Not the Idea of substance, but the Idea of absolute Knowledge, the Idea of Philosophy was the theme of Metaphysics.

This has the interesting consequence that just as critical logic was obliged to lay its own speculative foundations—to keep the *Urbild* of the Absolute Idea before our eyes—so speculative Metaphysics was obliged to establish a continuum of criticism. The Idea of Philosophy is the Idea of Absolute Thought *in human experience*, the Idea of God's Intellect or of the Logos. Metaphysics is, as Aristotle said, theology.² Hegel knew perfectly well that many philosophies have been developed at different times. He knew also that the philosophies that Kant condemned as 'dogmatic' included many different attempts at rational theology. What he calls 'speculation' was something that had just been rediscovered in his own time, but it was also a perennial aspect of civilized culture. The Identity Philosophy was the latest form of speculation; and it was also the most adequate, because it was the overcoming of the Critical Philosophy which had developed the

¹ The definition of the 'true infinite' is given in *Faith and Knowledge*, (NKA, iv. 358, 34–359, 9; Cerf and Harris, p. 113). It is not very clearly stated but I think that by the end of the paragraph the distinction between the 'true' and the 'pure' infinite is clear. The 'true infinite' is the identity of the 'pure infinite' of thought (the negative infinite with which logic ends) with the finite particularity of being (which is the direct antithesis of the 'pure infinite').

² I am not asserting, or assuming, that Hegel had already studied Aristotle long and hard at this stage, as he certainly did later. I am only taking it for granted that he knew what Aristotle's conception of Metaphysics was, just as he surely knew what Aristotle's view of the relation of logic to philosophy was.

principles of the reflective understanding, and had exposed clearly the essentially finite character of all reflective reasoning.

Hence the Identity Philosophy was superior to the philosophy of Spinoza, for example, because it did not commit the error of supposing that philosophy ought to begin from a 'basic proposition'. Given that assumption, Spinoza made the best beginning possible. He began from God and he defined God antinomically. With the restoration of the lost concept of speculation, Spinoza would be restored to honour.¹ But the assumption that philosophy must begin from a 'speculative proposition' is itself a reflective illusion. If one makes that assumption, one has then got to find the *right* beginning; and then any philosopher who begins somewhere else must be mistaken. But in fact a speculative philosophy is a circle; and the propositions it consists of are all of them part of the circumference, whereas the beginning of the circle is its centre.²

Conscious possession of the 'Idea' of philosophy is what distinguishes the new speculation from the older tradition. The spur for this consciousness came precisely from Kant's critical attack on the older tradition as dogmatic. Because of this attack speculative philosophy was obliged to clarify its own goal and method, to distinguish its thought and procedure sharply from the reflective assumptions and methods of the critic. Hegel holds that speculative minds have always been able to recognize one another intuitively as great artists do. But the possibility of bias or critical blindness in this intuitive recognition is evident enough.³ Now the conceptual

¹ In addition to the comments in *Difference* (see p. 54 above) the discussion in the Jacobi section of *Faith and Knowledge* deserves careful study (NKA, iv. 352, 11-360, 1; Cerf and Harris, pp. 104-14).

² This assertion is supported by the following pointers: 1. The analogy of the circle in *Difference* (NKA, iv. 71, 1-9; Harris and Cerf, p. 165). 2. The circular structure of the Identity Philosophy moving from the Idea through finite embodiment in Nature and Spirit back to the resumption of the whole into one. 3. This structure is the only one by which the 'true' infinite as distinct from the 'pure' infinite—see p. 55 n. 1—can be achieved.

³ See esp. *Difference*, NKA, iv. 11, 19-12, 20; Harris and Cerf, pp. 88-9. (The case of Fichte's *blindness*, which is attributed to his exaggerated vigour, should be compared with Virgil's *error* which arose from the decadence of his culture. The 'Idea' is a canon for judgements of this sort because it provides the standard against which the character and needs of *any* time can be assessed.)

canon for it is known; and in future, one of the defining characters of a speculative philosophy will be its capacity to recognize itself in its predecessors,¹ even where it appears to be in radical opposition to them. The *positive* project of the *Critical Journal* was to demonstrate the truth and the significance of this conceptual advance. Hegel's contributions to the *Critical Journal* should therefore be seen as the application of his Metaphysics in this period. His aim in the Metaphysics lectures was to provide the theoretical canon for philosophical criticism and construction.

Obviously this canon was, finally, the thought structure and method of the Identity Philosophy itself. So the Metaphysics must begin with the bare Idea of the 'true Infinite' that has to be recognized equally in all speculative theories, and culminate with an exposition of the pattern and method of this latest, most adequate articulation of this Idea as a 'system'. But how were 'the possible systems of philosophy' arrayed between these termini? Hegel promised 'to restore the oldest of old things'.² This certainly points to early Greek origins. From the *Scepticism* essay we might judge that he had Parmenides in mind (mainly as revealed in Plato's dialogue).³ But as Zeno demonstrated so graphically, the Identity of Being and Thought in Parmenides was the 'pure infinite'. The 'true infinite' of the Logos that expresses itself in finite being and returns to itself in absolute cognition is more clearly found in Heraclitus. The *ἐν και παν* probably derives from Heraclitus originally; and the absolute Identity that differs from itself certainly comes from the same source (via Plato's *Symposium*).⁴

¹ In *Dass die Philosophie*, 20b (see *NKA*, v. 274-5) Hegel says 'recognize itself in the true philosophy'. But that is also 'the oldest of old things' (20a). The rest of the sentence is confirmed by *Difference*, *NKA*, iv. 12, 10-13; 31, 24-36 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 88, 114) and more explicitly by the 'Einleitung' for the *Critical Journal* (*NKA*, iv. 119, 13-120, 18; 127, 22-128, 4-*IJP*, iii. 1979, 39-40, 45).

² Cf. Rosenkranz, p. 192 (trans. Cerf and Harris, p. 11).

³ See esp. *NKA*, iv. 208, 7-14.

⁴ The formula *ἐν και παν* came from Jacobi's report of Lessing's Spinozism (see *Toward the Sunlight*, pp. 97-9). Lessing may have known the Heraclitus fragment: 'Listening not to me but to the Logos it is wise to agree that all things are one (*ἐν πάντα εἶναι*)' (D K, B. 50). But I doubt if his Tübingen followers did, since it occurs only in Hippolytus. They would, however, have known the fragment quoted by Diogenes Laertius: 'For what is wise is one, to understand the judgement by which all things are steered through all things' (D K, B. 41). The 'one which differing with

But in any case, this appeal to antiquity was only part of Hegel's case for the 'perennial' character of speculation. Possession of the 'Idea' of philosophy enables us to see that 'there has been one and the same philosophy at all times'. There is not the slightest sign in anything that Hegel says about the Idea that he presently regarded the *history* of its evolution as important. Historical conditions are important to applied metaphysics because the 'need of the time' gives speculation a definite shape (and hence a limited aspect even at its best). But pure metaphysics is precisely the overcoming of this historic limitation.

It is most likely, therefore, that Hegel intended to take his own version of the Ontological Argument as the 'pure concept' of the Logical Idea.¹ He would have done this, naturally enough, because Kant had focused attention on it; and the documents support the hypothesis that Hegel wanted to claim that it was precisely in this form that the 'concept of philosophy was rediscovered'.² But all that we know about his own attitude to the argument at this date is that he was extremely dissatisfied with the form in which Kant received it from Moses Mendelssohn. The identity of infinite thought with finite existence cannot be conceived on the analytical model of a subject containing a predicate, or of one concept being

itself agrees with itself' (D K, B. 51) they will have found, not in the Heraclitean form in which Hippolytus gives it, but in the Attic of Plato's *Symposium* (187a). But, to express the *absoluteness* of the 'differing', Hölderlin (at least) deliberately changed the middle form (διαθερόμενον ἑαυτῷ) to the active (διάθερον ἑαυτῷ). I suspect that he meant 'makes [itself] different in relation to itself' (probably in the sense of 'surpasses itself'). If so, then the maintenance of the dative was a solecism. But the change to the active form can hardly be an accidental error since he cites it twice in *Hyperion* in this form; and in view of the pains that he took in composing that novel I cannot believe that he did not look at the *Symposium* passage at some point before his MS went to the printer.

¹ I say that he *intended* to do this, because I do not think that any of the Metaphysics projected for 1801/2 was actually written out. We know that the course was not completed (Nicolin, report 50); and we do not know how the *systema rationis* of the next course (Summer 1802) was structured—there are some reasons for thinking that it may have been quite differently organized. (The report of Rosenkranz—pp. 192, line 12 to 193, line 18—is not evidence for the early Jena period at all; *pace* Kimmerle—in *Hegel-Studien*, v. 1969, 88—there is no reason to doubt that Rosenkranz is citing a MS of Summer 1806 there.)

² Cf. esp. *Faith and Knowledge*, NKA, iv. 325, 14–20 (Cerf and Harris, p. 67) where the Idea of God is what philosophy '*ganz allein* begins from, and its one and only content'.

added to another.¹ (How it should rather be conceived Hegel showed in his treatment of the laws of identity and contradiction.)

It would appear from the discussion of the 'various forms in contemporary philosophy' at the beginning of the *Difference* essay that the main logical divisions recognized by Hegel among the 'possible systems of philosophy' were the distinctions between realism and idealism and between dogmatic and transcendental philosophy.² A dogmatic philosophy is one that employs reflective categories quite naïvely for its own speculative formulation. It takes up one side of a reflective antithesis, and gives to it the infinite authority of the 'pure' concept.³ Thus its relation with its dogmatic opposite is a 'struggle for recognition'.⁴ Hegel admitted that the speculative impulse is harder to recognize in dogmatic realism than in dogmatic idealism. But it can be recognized, and he thinks we ought to recognize it in D'Holbach's *Système de la nature*.⁵ He does not name the model of dogmatic idealism. But he knew that every reader of the *Critique of Pure Reason* would automatically refer what he says to Berkeley.

The resolution of this simple conflict of opposites within the limits of the dogmatic standpoint is 'pure dogmatism' which exalts *both* of the opposites to absolute status and produces a metaphysical dualism like that which we find in Descartes.⁶

Between pure dogmatism and transcendental philosophy stands the 'spectre' of scepticism. The reflective philosophy which sets its face against the very possibility of

¹ *Faith and Knowledge*, NKA, iv. 338, 14-25 (Cerf and Harris, p. 85); cf. 'Scepticism', NKA, iv. 224, 30-225, 2.

² Cf. the fourfold division in Schelling's *Bruno* (1802, *Werke*, iv. 307-29) for a variation on the same themes.

³ *Difference*, NKA, iv. 31, 25-8; 40, 32-41, 8 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 114, 126-7).

⁴ The first appearance of the 'struggle for recognition' in Hegel's writings is in this philosophical context. See the 'Einleitung' for the *Critical Journal*, NKA, iv. 127, 30-128, 4 (*IJP*, iii. 1979, 45).

⁵ See NKA, iv. 32, 19-22 (Harris and Cerf, p. 115) for the admission of difficulty; and NKA, 79, 36-80, 15 (Harris and Cerf, p. 177) for the plea on behalf of D'Holbach.

⁶ *Difference*, NKA, iv. 32, 23-7; Harris and Cerf, pp. 115-16. For the identification of Descartes here, cf. *Difference*, NKA, iv. 14, 15-21 (Harris and Cerf, p. 91) and the 'Einleitung' to the *Critical Journal*, NKA, iv. 126, 15-127, 3 (which is cited in Harris and Cerf, p. 91 n. 10; or see *IJP*, iii. 1979, 44).

speculation—represented in modern times by the reaction against Descartes that began with Locke—is produced by this ‘spectre’. In 1801 Hegel called Kant’s philosophy an ‘imperfect form of scepticism’. Presumably a ‘perfect’ scepticism would annihilate the possibility of genuinely philosophical knowledge altogether. Kant did not do that; but according to *Faith and Knowledge*, Jacobi and Fichte finished the task of reinstating Faith upon the throne of Reason.¹

Hegel’s attitude to Kant is ambivalent, because even in his surrender to scepticism Kant discovered the principle of true speculation; and as we have seen, he also identified all the elements of the Absolute Concept of Reason. But he could do so only sceptically, in a thoughtful analysis of what reflective consciousness lacks. Philosophical Moses as he was, Kant could not set foot in the Promised Land.

Spinoza, however, had already reached it; and Spinoza was not a dogmatic philosopher, as Kant and Fichte believed. In Hegel’s view he was already a properly transcendental thinker, for he drew a clear and sharp distinction between the finite cognition based upon imagination, and the infinite cognition of Reason. As the speculative philosopher of substance and rational necessity he is the model of transcendental realism.²

The proper model both of transcendental realism and of transcendental idealism is the Identity Philosophy. But Fichte’s transcendental theory of the absolute subject provides the perfect example of ‘pure’ or ‘logical’ idealism.³ In the *Science of Knowledge* Fichte is a worthy counterpart to Spinoza. But in his practical philosophy he declines into a ‘reflective’ version of pure dogmatism. Here the positing of two absolute substances, involves the simultaneous postula-

¹ As far as Hegel’s view of Fichte is concerned this is a somewhat impressionist oversimplification. It states Hegel’s view of the *Vocation of Man* and of Fichte’s practical philosophy. But he probably continued to regard the *Science of Knowledge* as a work of authentic speculation.

² That he is a ‘transcendental’ thinker in Hegel’s view is shown copiously in the commentary on Jacobi’s reflective interpretation (*Faith and Knowledge*, NKA, iv. 352–60; Cerf and Harris, pp. 104–11). That he is the model of transcendental realism expresses a Fichtean view of him. But for Hegel he was the realistic counterpart of the full-blown transcendental idealism of the Identity Philosophy, rather than of the half-transcendental, half-reflective idealism of Fichte.

³ Cf. *Faith and Knowledge*, NKA, iv. 387, 31–388, 8, and 400, 3–22 where Hegel uses and explains these two adjectives with reference to Fichte’s idealism.

tion of another world of experience. Because of this postulation of a 'beyond', reflective dogmatism involves a surrender to scepticism; hence, unlike naïve dogmatism, it is no longer a form of genuine speculation.

The Identity Philosophy, which expresses the *Urbild* of the Idea adequately, and banishes the 'spectre' of scepticism—expressed 'imperfectly' by Kant and raised to scientific status, or given its perfectly systematic form, by Hegel's critical logic¹—unites *logical* idealism with *speculative* realism in the 'absolute identity'.² The methodic principle of dichotomy,

¹ The overcoming of the 'spectre' of Scepticism is a *distinctive* note in Hegel's metaphysical programme (*Dass die Philosophie*, 20b, in *NKA*, v. 275. Cf. also the essay of M. Baum cited in the following note.) But Schelling adopted it (see *Method of University Studies*, lecture VI, *Werke*, v. 267–70; Morgan and Guterman, pp. 61–5). I agree with Düsing ('Idealistische Substanzmetaphysik', *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 20, 1980, 32–3; *Subjektivität*, pp. 101–2) that the logic, which Schelling says still does not exist, but which would be 'dialectic' or 'scientific scepticism' if it did, is exactly Hegel's critical logic. Thus the overcoming of the 'spectre' is the *whole* project of Hegel's first metaphysics. This does not invalidate my placement of 'Scepticism' in the fourfold scheme (since 'the serene, more ungrounded, and more singular [aspect] of the dogmatic philosophies as also of the nature-religions, must disappear', *Faith and Knowledge*, *NKA*, iv. 414, 10–11, Cerf and Harris, p. 191; cf. also 'Scepticism, etc.', *NKA*, iv. 419, 33–7).

² Until the rediscovery of the MS from which Rosenkranz cited the fourfold division of Hegel's system that he noted as an interesting 'didactic modification' (*Hegels Leben*, p. 179; cf. Harris and Knox, p. 6), we had no clear schematic statement of the structure of Hegel's system in 1801–2 anywhere in our datable sources. The discursive *descriptions* of the system of Absolute Identity in the *Difference* essay and the *Natural Law* essay are not easy to interpret harmoniously without further evidence. Hence Kimmerle is to be congratulated (in my view) for recognizing the connection between 'Schelling's System' (in the *Difference* essay) and the Rosenkranz-schema (all the more because he did *not* see that the latter could have come from the 'Introduction' course of 1801). But the reader should take note that the relation between Hegel's early system-sketches is hotly disputed, and the dispute shows no sign of abating even after the discovery of the new MSS (which appear to *me* to settle the question decisively). I have noted the following contributions to the discussion: H. Kimmerle, *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 1967, 78–81 and *Das Problem der Abgeschlossenheit des Denkens* (*Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 8) Bonn, Bouvier, 1970; R.-P. Horstmann, 'Probleme der Wandlung in Hegels Jenaer Systemkonzeption', *Philosophische Rundschau*, xix. 1972, 87–118; J.-H. Trede, 'Hegels frühe Logik', *Hegel-Studien*, vii. 1972, 123–68 (esp. p. 152 and n. 19) and 'Mythologie und Idee', *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 9, 1973, 170–204; the response of Kimmerle in 'Ideologiekritik der systematischen Philosophie', *Hegel-Jahrbuch*, 1973 (Cologne, 1974), 85–101; the review by R.-P. Horstmann, 'Jenaer Systemkonzeptionen' in *Hegel*, ed. O. Pöggeler, Freiburg-Munich, 1977, pp. 43–58; K. Düsing, 'Idealistische Substanzmetaphysik', *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 20, 1980, 25–40; K. R. Meist, 'Hegels Systemkonzeption', *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 20, 1980, 59–79; and H. Kimmerle, 'Hegels Naturphilosophie in Jena', *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 20, 1980, 207–15.

clearly stated in the *Difference* essay, is basic to the articulation of the schema which Hegel gave in his 'Introduction to Philosophy'.¹ The 'Idea of the absolute essence' is to be set forth first as speculative Idea then as 'Universe'. Its *Darstellung* as 'Speculative Idea' is the special task of Metaphysics. But even in its ideal display we can observe the dichotomy between its negative engulfing in logic and its speculative exposition in Metaphysics. 'Idealism or Logic' as 'the extended science of the Idea as such' unites both aspects and resolves the antithesis. The critical application of his metaphysical standards to the work of Kant and Fichte, with which Hegel promised to conclude his first course in 'Logic and Metaphysics' brings the 'science of the Idea as such' round in a circle to the critical logic.² The logic itself was constructed systematically but is to be illustrated historically at the end of the Metaphysics in different phases and aspects of its evolution (as it is, in fact, in *Faith and Knowledge* and the *Scepticism* essay).

The exposition of the Idea as *Universe* is the 'Philosophy of Nature'. Later, when he distinguishes 'nature' from 'spirit' generally, Hegel will call the theory of the Universe, 'real philosophy'. But here the philosophy of finite spirit is treated as one part (or level) of 'Nature'. Only what is later called 'Absolute Spirit' is distinguished from 'Nature' altogether.³ Hegel initially gave 'earthly' and 'ethical' nature as the main dichotomy. This was unsatisfactory because the primary reality of the Idea is its existence in the heavens, not on earth.

¹ *Difference*, etc., *NKA*, iv. 64, 5-68, 13 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 156-61); *Die Idee des absoluten Wesens*, 1a-2b, (in *NKA*, v. 262-5); in the *Natural Law* essay the fundamental dialectical dichotomy is identified as one/many, *NKA*, iv. 432, 13-33, 37 (Knox and Acton, pp. 72-4).

² Cf. *Dass die Philosophie*, 20b with *Die Idee des absoluten Wesens*, 1b (both will be found in *NKA*, v. 263, 274-5); for the present see Baum and Meist, *Hegel-Studien*, xii. 1977, 47).

³ 'Nature' is Hölderlin's Hellenic ideal; and as 'Universe' it is Spinoza's 'God or Nature'. I use the capital letter where this total (or ideal, or 'infinite') sense is intended or stressed; and I use 'nature' where some finite aspect (or part) of the 'Universe' is meant. Similarly I use 'Spirit' as the name of God (or where the absolute 'infinite' sense of the concept is intended or stressed); and 'spirit' as the name of humanity (or where the immanent or 'finite' sense of the concept is intended or stressed). Thus 'God is spirit' expresses in my usage, the Hegelian doctrine of the Incarnation.

So he chose to rely rather on the distinction between *bodily* and *spiritual* 'reality'. This tends to obscure the distinction between Nature and Absolute Spirit, but, as we shall see, it has no implications that are actually false. The purely bodily reality of the Idea is its *extended* existence in cosmic space and time, and especially in the great clock constituted by the Solar System. This is the sphere of true or infinite mechanics. Against it Hegel sets the sublunar world of physical change in which 'finite mechanics' is only the basic level; through its own 'chemical process' the Earth becomes a self-maintaining 'mineralogical organism', the environment of mortal life in its two great realms, the vegetable and animal kingdoms. Now the dichotomy is between immortal and mortal life (or between the 'outer' and the 'inner' light as Hegel prefers in the critical essays)¹ at two levels. Cosmic mechanism and the chemism of the Earth-process (which come to their uniting resolution in the 'mineralogical organism') are contrasted with simple physical propagation and the 'chemism' of sex (articulated at the properly organic level, on the analogy of the outward mineralogical organism—which I can now call 'inorganic' according to our ordinary usage—through the concepts of 'animal magnetism' and chemical affinity).²

With the animal organism the Idea achieves its perfect bodily expression. The whole logical evolution of physical nature is here 'resumed into one'. At this turning-point the ensouling of body, or the embodiment of the Idea as 'real spirit' can begin. This is the boundary of the 'philosophy of nature' as Hegel later envisages it. But in the Identity Theory the evolution of human consciousness is part of the 'Universe', i.e. of the natural order. When Hegel speaks of the 'philosophy of nature passing over into the philosophy of spirit' at this point, he is thinking of absolute Spirit as the goal of this new development.³ The evolution of finite spirit is a mirror-rever-

¹ Cf. *Difference*, NKA, iv. 73, 10–74, 9 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 168–9) and *Natural Law*, NKA, iv. 464, 8–31 (Knox and Acton, pp. 111–12).

² See the same passage in the *Difference* essay.

³ This is evident from the whole doctrine of *Sittlichkeit* in the *Natural Law* essay and in the *System of Ethical Life*. *Universum* is the general name for the whole embodied order of finite nature; the reality of Spirit is 'ethical nature' as opposed to 'physical nature'. Cf. the cancelled version in *Die Idee des absoluten Wesens* 2a (printed in the critical apparatus of NKA, v. 263) with *Faith and Knowledge*, NKA,

sal of the evolution of physical body; but the 'heaven' of speculation to which spirit returns as absolute consciousness is not the physical heaven of the aether as self-positing. It is the metaphysical heaven of the aether as self-cognitive, and so finally self-intuitive.

Thus, the evolution of physical nature moves from the substantial unity of the gravitational system to the accidental multiplicity of the earth's chemical process; and from there to the essential multiplicity of sexual propagation, and the struggle for animal existence. The evolution of spirit by contrast begins from the essential *relatedness* of natural life, and moves towards the substantial unity of the *Volk*. The unrelated multiplicity of experience is what is present to spirit as *Vorstellung*. The necessity of relation is what we experience in *Begierde*. These moments are the spiritual correlates of terrestrial mechanism and chemism. Hegel's outline does not give the correlate of the 'mineralogical organism', but from the *System of Ethical Life* we can readily supply 'the family' as the missing term. What he calls the 'realms of need and right' correspond to the vegetable and animal kingdoms in the evolution of the physical organism. The *Volk* corresponds to the animal organism; but now the essential mortality in which physical nature culminates is taken up into the immortal living substance. Here too the necessity of natural relatedness is transcended, and we can speak of Spirit proper, or free spirit.

The *freedom* of Spirit is what is displayed and enjoyed in the realms of absolute culture. The dichotomous display of it is in the 'philosophies of Religion and Art'. Through the

iv. 407, 16-408, 35 (Cerf and Harris, pp. 180-2) and with the following passages in the *Natural Law* essay: *NKA*, iv. 427, 15-17; 432, 14-434, 30; 454, 1-3; 459, 1-15 and 28-32; 460, 35-462, 21; 462, 32-6; 463, 17-21; 467, 1; 468, 11-24; 469, 12-15; 479, 1-24 (Knox and Acton, pp. 66, 72-5, 98, 104-5, 107-9, 109, 110, 112, 113-14, 114-15, 126). The retention of the Frankfurt concept of 'ethical nature' in the *Natural Law* essay was no doubt encouraged by the traditional topic-title. In the *System of Ethical Life* Hegel no longer speaks of *absolute* ethical life in 'natural' terms, though he still employs the contrast of 'organic' and 'inorganic' nature in his analysis of bourgeois ethics even at that level. But if he had completed his account of 'Religion' as the highest *Potenz* of *Sittlichkeit* the perfect consistency of the two treatises would be more evident than it is; and even as things are, the doctrine of 'ethical nature' in *Natural Law* is the best key to the doctrine of 'relational' and 'absolute' *Sittlichkeit* in the 'System of Ethical Life' (whose very title was borrowed by editors from the *Natural Law* essay).

unification of these two the Idea 'returns to the pure Idea [of *Logic*] and organizes the intuition of [absolute] Spirit'.

There is a problem about the successive ordering of the moments here. But before we deal with that we should consider what the deliberate separation of this final 'resumption of the whole into one' as the 'fourth part of the system' signifies. It does not imply any transcending of the order of 'ethical nature' or 'the Universe' which has come to its final fruition as the living substance of the *Volk*. Rather it is the final *cognition of what is* (in the historic shape of the community's ethical life). The *Idea* now has cognizance of itself *as itself*; it can reach back over the whole display (*übergreifen*) or 'resume' it. The resumption is only perfect when cognition coincides with the being of the living substance as Universe. Thus cognition must resolve its own spiritual extension into absolute intuition here. Absolute *Sittlichkeit* can only be comprehended perfectly when speculation overcomes even the opposition of the levels as serially organized, and embraces (*übergreift*) physical and ethical nature as identical.¹

In the substantial life of the *Volk* this identity is experienced by all in their religious observance.² His religion is what reconciles the soldier to the sacrifice of his life. Thus we should not be surprised to find that the final resumptive phase of speculation begins with the 'philosophy of religion'. But the final triad of Religion, Art, and the Speculative Idea cannot be ordered into a series consistent with all of Hegel's statements about them in this period. Thus in the *Difference* essay he puts Art on the side of 'nature' and Speculation on that of 'intelligence'; but makes them both forms of 'divine service'

¹ Thus the lecture outline is in perfect accord with the climax of the *Natural Law* essay (which insists that 'Spirit . . . without returning into itself out of intuition, immediately [re]cognizes the intuition itself as its own self, and by that very recognition is absolute Spirit and perfect ethical life' (NKA, iv. 484, 36-9; Knox and Acton, p. 133); yet the *theory* of religion, art, and speculation needs to be distinguished from *Sittlichkeit* proper as the fourth part of *philosophy* because only at this level does spirit exist as *Spirit* ('simply' but not 'purely').

² This follows from the evident fact that 'Religion' is the implicit complement of 'Constitution' in the *System of Ethical Life*; and from Hegel's doctrine of the organic unity of Church and State (formulated already at Frankfurt); cf. also *Natural Law*, NKA, iv. 462, 13-21 (Knox and Acton, pp. 99-100).

(which seems to imply the order Art, Philosophy, Religion).¹ Here in the lecture-outline, he speaks rather of the '*philosophy of Religion and Art*' (which makes philosophy the final comprehensive moment, and seems to indicate that art is higher than religion because of its 'intuitive' character). The superiority of philosophy (which is, after all, entailed by the view that speculative philosophy is possible or by the claim that the 'absolute identity' can be 'intellectually' intuited)² is at once confirmed and qualified in Rosenkranz's report of the Natural Law lectures, where he prints the assertion: 'With respect to its *matter*, therefore, *das Wissen* has no distinctive advantage over Religion' in spread type (which suggests a direct quotation and possibly one underlined by Hegel himself). But here again, in the philosophy of Religion itself, Art is the *first* phase, upon which the 'form of thought' must supervene.

The right answer seems to be that 'religion' is the crown and fulfilment of *Sittlichkeit* proper, the moment where spirit recognizes itself and exists for the first time in perfect freedom. But that speculation or *Wissen* is the display of this freedom in consciousness, moving from *aesthetic* to *intellectual* intuition, and so finally uniting the two poles of subject and object as it overcomes the 'inessential preponderance that consciousness has in it' and returns to the 'divine service' in which *public* experience has already culminated. In that case the right thing to say is that there is *no* serial order here. We have a circle: Public Religion, (*Wissen*): Philosophy of Art, Speculation, Philosophy of Religion. But this way of stating the 'infinite intuition' shows that Religion is truly the highest mode of experience, because the culmination of *Wissen* is the intuition that its whole long process of self-begetting is at the same time 'the original absolute Being, which can only come to be, so far as it [already] is'. Finally, since the circle of

¹ *Difference*, NKA, iv. 75, 26–76, 8; Harris and Cerf, pp. 171–2.

² Kimmerle (*Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 20, 1980, 210 n. 9) is not *absolutely* correct in saying that Hegel *nowhere* uses the adjective *intellectual* to explicate the 'absolute intuition'—see *Natural Law*, NKA, iv. 472, 21–4 (Knox and Acton, p. 118). We can readily understand why he does not like to use the term (because of its associations in the *reflective* tradition, and particularly because of the opposition of 'nature' and 'intelligence' within the Identity Philosophy itself). He generally uses 'absolute' (e.g., *Natural Law*, NKA, iv. 464, 22 and 484, 34—Knox and Acton, pp. 111, 133); and once (at least) 'eternal' (*Faith and Knowledge*, NKA, iv. 318, 38–319, 3).

absolute *Anschauung* thus closes back upon the religious awareness of 'absolute life in the *Volk*' the proud claim for the utter self-sufficiency of embodied *Sittlichkeit* at the climax of the *Natural Law* essay is fully justified.¹

The influence of the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation is obvious. But the dogma is telescoped in the transition to *Wissen*, so that the moment of Ascension into Heaven is identified with the Second Coming (as the climax of a Resurrection which is itself a long historical process, not an event). By this means the Christian dogma is harmonized with Plato's conception of the embodiment of the world-soul—which Hegel explicitly appeals to as his model of absolute *Sittlichkeit*, just as he recalls the mystery of the Incarnation in his adumbrations of the absolute religion.²

Secondly, we should note that the Spinozist doctrine of a perfect parallel between the 'real and the ideal series' which is so prominent in the account of 'Schelling's system' has been preserved; but only as the context for a greater contrast which was implicit but left in the shadows in the *Difference* essay.³ The parallel is now speculatively interpreted by explicit combination with the principles of antithesis and of absolute reflection. We can still say if we like that 'the order of Ideas is the same as the order of things'; but this is obviously putting the cart before the horse. Now that we have passed through the logic and arrived at the Idea in *Metaphysics*, we are fully aware of that. For we can see plainly now that the twin

¹ The crucial passage is cited in p. 65, n. 1.

² Cf. *Natural Law*, *NKA*, iv. 462, 31–4 (Knox and Acton, p. 109) with *Difference*, *NKA*, iv. 75, 17–25 (Harris and Cerf, p. 171); *Faith and Knowledge*, *NKA*, iv. 413, 22–414, 13 (Cerf and Harris, pp. 190–1); and Rosenkranz, pp. 135–41 (Harris and Knox, pp. 181–6). At one point in *Faith and Knowledge*, Plato and the Incarnation doctrine are brought together (*NKA*, iv. 407, 5–408, 10; Cerf and Harris, 180–1). But there the reference is to the more easily assimilated *Timaeus* (30 B conflated with 34 B); in the *Natural Law* essay Hegel is recalling *Phaedrus* 246d where he clearly takes 'eternally born together' as showing us the right interpretation of the Creation myth in *Timaeus*.

³ A detailed analysis of 'Schelling's system' will be found in my introduction to the *Difference* essay (Harris and Cerf, pp. 40–61). As far as I can see the new evidence strengthens and in some places decisively confirms the hypothetical parts of my reconstruction (e.g. in the 'theoretical part' of the Science of Intelligence, p. 59). But I did not grasp the structural context of interpretation, so I could not see the full import of the antinomy of freedom and necessity for the parallel of 'nature' and 'mind' (for example). It is the right *perspective* that I am seeking to supply in this present chapter.

sciences of Nature and Mind in 'Schelling's system' were only the sciences of the finite. Now they are set firmly in the context of a genuine science of the 'Idea as such'. Hegel is certainly anxious that we should *see* the parallelism. In the case of mechanism and chemism, where it is least obvious, he underlines it; he expects us to see the other parallels for ourselves¹ (Solar System/Volk; Earth with mineral—or, meteorological—process/human organism with mind process; vegetable and animal kingdom/system of need and system of justice). But as soon as we see the total parallel we are aware of the mirroring or inversion; and from that *outward* form, our minds move at once to the inward inversion, the reversal of functions or of teleological relations in the two finite systems. The heavenly mechanism of the 'true Infinite' in Nature is instrumental for the 'immortal life' of the Earth (the universal individual); and that in turn is instrumental for the 'particular' kingdoms in their instrumental order. But the human organism (the individuated universal) is the hinge of a reversed order of teleology. The living man *realizes* his universality in the free *Volk*. It is this 'universality' that is now the *goal*. But when the goal is achieved, the fourth phase gives the whole process an absolutely reflected meaning. For the 'Philosophy of Religion and Art' returns us to the 'individuality' of Reason as an *intuitive* activity of self-consciousness. Thus it is finally individual genius which gives the significance of the whole process, though only at the level of intuition. God is *perfectly* incarnate in the individuated creative act of the artist. Speculation transmutes this intuition into an inner or *intellectual* one.² But we can now see clearly the enormous significance of

¹ Of course, I do not mean this quite literally, since Hegel probably drew attention to the parallels when he went on to expound the system in detail later. But the initial hint that he gives would be sufficient for anyone who had already been to Schelling's lectures.

² One surprising result of this is to democratize the 'absolute intuition'. The artist's intuition only counts as the *perfect* incarnation of God, because (or so far as) it is an individuation of the *community's* self-consciousness, not a personal intuition of his. Thus by insisting on the 'natural' character of art, Hegel resists the *aristocratic* cult of the genius. But he is not a social authoritarian either—he insists that in true religious consciousness 'the spirit is not ashamed of any of its individuals'. Cf. Rosenkranz, pp. 133, 180–1 (Harris and Knox, pp. 179, 254–6) with *Faith and Knowledge*, NKA, iv. 403, 29–404, 26, and 408, 11–25 (Cerf and Harris, pp. 175–6, 181–2). What *horrifics* Fichte is just what Hegel sees as a cause for jubilation.

the fact that logic is only a critical science. It leads us to the formal intuition of the Idea in Metaphysics; then the exposition of the Idea as reality is the world of finite experience: the external (*ideell*) realm of nature, and the internal (*ideal*) realm of history.¹ *Philosophy* as the metaphysical science for which logic is the 'introduction' only shows us how to draw the great circle of conceptual organization, from its true beginning at the centre provided by intellectual intuition. The *real* intuition (or 'resumption of the whole into one') is a religious experience. In the phenomenology of the absolute Religion, the aesthetic phase, precedes the speculative one. But the end of the process is a reconciliation with God in which aesthetic experience returns to correct any speculative excess. The *concept* of Religion must be seen as developing to a *totality* (Absolute or spiritual Religion) through the moments of Aesthetic Religion and Speculative Religion. Philosophy comprehends everything in its own way. It comprehends artistic genius, and is not, at least not necessarily, comprehended by it. But the last thing that Philosophy comprehends is that it is, and must be, itself comprehended by Religion. It seeks to comprehend even the universal religion of art, and the religion of pure thought in order to bring this *truly* comprehensive religion of absolute reconciliation to birth.²

The *method* of Hegel's Identity Philosophy was rather

¹ Hegel's use of *ideell* in reference to finite mechanism and chemism and *ideal* in reference to the economic and legal systems provides a bench-mark for the vexing problem of interpreting the whole triad of single and double 'I' forms (*reell*, *ideell*, *formell*/*real*, *ideal*, *formal*). In the present passage the standpoint is absolute or speculative. From this standpoint we can distinguish the *ideal* and the *real* order as 'inner' and 'outer' manifestations of the Idea. But the *real* world has its inner and outer side. It has both because it is a reflection of the Idea; so its inner side is a reflection into itself of the Idea which finite being itself mirrors. This inwardness of the outward being is what is properly *ideell*; in effect it includes all the distinctions in nature that must be made by the mind, and cannot be made with a cleaver. Distinctions that can be made with a cleaver are *reell*. In the inner world of Spirit the analogous distinction between what *organizes* itself in real independence and what remains spiritual is made by the use of *real* and *ideal*. *Formal* and *formell* distinguish the inner (speculative) and outer (reflective) 'form' of something without regard to whether it is in the 'ideal' or the 'real' order.

² See Rosenkranz, pp. 138-41; Harris and Knox, pp. 183-6. (Only 'absolute knowledge' can make the 'absolute Religion' real. But this is philosophy's service of God, not the perfection of knowledge itself.)

complex. In great part it was metaphysically 'constructive', in small part logically 'destructive' or 'dialectical'. In the first and fourth parts it was properly 'metaphysical', but in dealing with the 'Universe' of finite nature (both physical and ethical), where the Idea is 'coming to be' or 'in motion', conceptual 'construction' and destructive 'dialectic' alternate. Always, however, the dialectical aspect is subordinated to the formally constructive purpose, instead of being the ultimate fate of the completed 'construction' as it is in the critical logic. Thus in the *System of Ethical Life*, even the negative, destructive phase of 'Freedom or Transgression' is 'constructed' as a 'true infinite' *Potenz* (or 'totality'), with the result that we have some difficulty in seeing how it functions as the 'dialectical' negation of relational ethics, and even more difficulty in understanding how to make the transition to *Sittlichkeit* proper. At that level we have a different set of difficulties, because now the Idea is at rest, and the method seeks to display social life in perfect balance, so that the unresolved dialectical tensions in the bourgeois class, for example, are treated not quite as insignificant, but without regard for their obvious revolutionary potential.

The *System of Ethical Life*, being the only part of Hegel's Identity-System that has survived more or less complete provides the clearest model of the method that we have—and it is a model of the method in its most developed state.¹ But it

¹ Some of the students of Hegel's critical logic who have recognized that the 'relational ethics' of the *System of Ethical Life* (with its dissolution in 'freedom' as the 'negative absolute') is constructed on a pattern closely analogous to that of the Logic, seem to me to make two connected mistakes. First they identify logical method with 'dialectic', whereas in fact logic is actually a *constructive* effort that is engulfed in the dialectic of the negative absolute. Secondly, when they consider *Sittlichkeit* as a 'system' they are apt to assume that those parts of the treatise that mirror the logic must be regarded as 'logical' rather than properly 'metaphysical'. But, in fact, the whole treatise is 'metaphysical'. Every *Potenz* is 'constructed' *completely* as a *Bild* of the 'true Infinite'; Hegel's insistence that we must see each phase as a *whole*, and *sub specie aeternitatis* is just what makes the argument generally—and especially its transitions—so hard to grasp. It is true that only the *Volk* is a substance; only its life has metaphysical *being*. But the object of the 'system' is to exhibit the identity of being and knowing or of *Werden* and *Wesen*. We should beware of being mesmerized by the attempted revival of *Substanzmetaphysik* because Hegel was always more interested ultimately in the *free motion* of the Spirit. Cf. the articles cited in p. 30, n. 1, above (my position is close to that of M. Baum); and for the second error see J.-H. Trede, 'Mythologie und Idee', *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 9, 1973, p. 186 n. 16.

seems that Hegel had his own method of philosophical 'construction' in mind before he adopted Schelling's terminology for it. For in the *Difference* essay Hegel describes 'the self-production of Reason' as follows:

A whole of this sort appears as an organization of propositions and intuitions. Every synthesis of Reason is united in speculation with the intuition corresponding to it; as identity of the conscious and non-conscious it is for itself in the Absolute and infinite. But at the same time, the synthesis is finite and limited, insofar as it is posited within the objective totality and has other syntheses outside itself. The identity that is least dichotomous—at the objective pole, matter, at the subjective pole, feeling (self-consciousness)—is at the same time an infinitely opposed identity, a thoroughly relative identity. Reason, the faculty of totality (*qua* objective totality), complements this relative identity with its opposite, producing through their synthesis a new identity which is in turn a defective one in the face of Reason, and which completes itself anew in the same way. The method of the system should be called neither synthetic nor analytic. It shows itself at its purest, when it appears as a development of Reason itself. Reason does not recall its appearance, which emanates from it as a duplicate, back into itself—for then, it would only nullify it. Rather, Reason constructs itself in its emanation as an identity that is conditioned by this very duplicate; it opposes this relative identity to itself once more, and in this way the system advances until the objective totality is completed. Reason then unites this objective totality with the opposite subjective totality to form the infinite world-intuition, whose expansion has at the same time contracted into the richest and simplest identity.¹

In the *System of Ethical Life* each 'self-production of Reason' is a *Potenz*. The process of 'complementation' (*Vervollständigung*) emerges in the *System of Ethical Life* as a reciprocal *subsumption* of intuition by concept and concept by intuition. The relation of dominance is not mentioned in this present passage but the establishment of a 'totality' through reciprocity is clearly necessary if the dialectical fate of

¹ NKA, iv. 31, 1–19; Harris and Cerf, pp. 113–14. We should notice that Hegel carefully distinguishes metaphysical 'construction' from logical construction in terms of their respective destinies. Logical construction is *nullified* by its 'recall into Reason'. But the constructive procedure is similar (since the logical understanding *imitates* Reason (see *Difference*, NKA, iv. 17, 9–23; Harris and Cerf, p. 95—cited on p. 41 above.

disappearance into the negative Absolute is to be avoided; and Hegel was already saying in 1797 that *Begreifen ist beherrschen*.¹ Since *Begriff* is the obvious complement of *Anschauung*, and these terms stand for the formal and material elements in the Kantian 'synthesis', the hypothesis that Hegel was already developing and using something very like the method of the *System of Ethical Life* by the middle of 1801 seems fairly likely.

The crucial dominance-problem, to be resolved before 'the infinite world-intuition' can be enjoyed, is the traditional problem of the 'one and the many'. Concept (as one) and Being (as many) are abstract opposites. In the 'relative identity' of physical nature it is 'the many' that is 'primary and positive'. Physical nature is an *order* of many discrete and mutually indifferent elements. In the 'relative identity' of ethical nature, on the other hand, 'unity is primary even in its relation'. Here the singular consciousness can embody the whole system of relations; he can be its incarnate law, or rather—since this unified whole is *free*—its spirit. Thus the key to the dominance-problem is to be found in the fact that 'each of them, the unity and the multiplicity, whose identity is the Absolute, is itself a unity of one and many.'² For the *conscious* unit this is naturally verified in his sense of the family; but his human intelligence is the 'absolute concept' or the negative infinite in which all purely natural relations are engulfed. The positive salvation of the many in the one depends on his rational capacity to identify with a higher spiritual community. As intelligence he is 'the Ego which can directly somersault into the positivity of the absolute Idea'. The 'somersault' is a practical act of self-dedication which 'reestablishes for philosophy, the Idea of absolute Freedom, and along with it the absolute Passion, the speculative Good Friday'. This *philosophic* acceptance of being dead to the world is the highest form of 'life in the *Volk*'. Speculative self-transcendence enables the philosopher to see and say 'how the essence of nature, in the form of possibility, i.e., as spirit,

¹ *Positiv wird ein Glauben genannt*, TW-A, i. 242; *Clio*, viii, 1979, 260.

² *Natural Law*, NKA, iv. 432, 7-433, 37 (Knox and Acton, pp. 72-4) contains all these quotations in a context which should be carefully studied.

has enjoyment of itself as a living Ideal in visible (*anschaulich*) and active reality; and how it has its actuality as ethical nature, in which the ethical infinite (or the concept) and the ethical finite (or individuality) are one without qualification'. By comprehending and accepting the necessity of its own natural mortality as the condition of this spiritual resurrection, the conscious self can 'reconstruct' the identity which *must* appear in its experience as 'movement and shattering of the identity'.¹ So an important part (at least) of the 'overcoming' of the 'inessential preponderance' of consciousness, is the surrendering of the 'postulate of immortality'. Rudolf Abeken's tears were the beginning of wisdom.²

¹ *Faith and Knowledge*, NKA, iv. 413, 22-414, 13 and 408, 26-35 (Cerf and Harris, pp. 190-1 and 182). Until the 'Introduction' lecture appears (in NKA, v) this latter passage is the clearest statement of the relation of the Idea (as negative Concept and positive Universe) to phenomenal experience.

² Cf. Nicolin, report 49 (and pp. 51-2 above). The earliest surviving expression of this abiding heritage from the Hellenic ideal of Hegel's youth comes from 1795—see *Ein positiver Glaube* (TW-A, i. 195 or Nohl, p. 238—cf. *Toward the Sunlight*, p. 227).

CHAPTER II

Hegel's first Philosophy of Nature

1. *The 'true Physics'.*

The direct evidence about Hegel's philosophy of nature in 1801/2 is not quite so sparse and indirect as the evidence about his 'logic and Metaphysics'. But Hegel had no proper occasion to develop his theory of nature publicly, and we might easily be tempted to infer that he did not develop it systematically during this period, or at least that he did not do so in any detail. This hypothesis can be fairly conclusively refuted. The *System of Ethical Life* is visibly part of a continuous systematic account of the *real* Idea. It is an outline of 'real spirit'; and it does not merely logically presuppose an account of nature as the 'real body' of that spirit; it refers back to that account as something already completed.¹ We can be fairly certain therefore that Hegel used his 'Introduction to Philosophy' lectures (and whatever other notes he had accumulated) to write up a systematic account of nature as a series of *Potenzen* which evolve logically as totalities through the reciprocal subsumption of concept under intuition and intuition under concept. The *System of Ethical Life* gives us occasional glimpses of how this logical process operated in physical nature.² But it is not now possible to organize the scattered

¹ See *Schriften* (1913), p. 421; Harris and Knox, p. 102. *Absolute Ethics according to Relation* begins 'Ebenso wie im vorigen muss dies eingeteilt werden'—and the explanation that follows shows that the backward reference is *not* to the two-page prospectus that is the only preamble for *this* part of Hegel's undertaking. See further p. 110, n. 2, below.

² Hegel treats plant and animal *explicitly* in this way, in dealing with them as the natural raw material of human labour (*Schriften* (1913), pp. 426–7; Harris and Knox, p. 108); and it is quite easy to interpret his analogy from magnetism and electricity in terms of the *Potenz* logic (see p. 100). Beyond this, my occasional attempts to organize the fragmentary data into this formal schema must be regarded only as exemplary conjectures.

data that remain to us completely in this way. For this period only the philosophy of real spirit can be expounded systematically in the shape that Hegel himself gave it.

The fact that there is no sign of *Potenz* logic in the 'Introduction to Philosophy' fragments, is a fairly sure sign that Hegel did not take over and adapt this weapon from Schelling's conceptual armoury until 1802. The *Potenzen* do not occur in the *Difference* essay either—except in the illustration of 'Schelling's System'. Schelling explains *Potenz* logic in his 'dialogue with a friend [i.e. Hegel]', 'On the Absolute Identity-System' in the first issue of the *Critical Journal*.¹ It is tempting to see that dialogue as marking their agreement that both would present the finite side of the system, the theory of empirical cognition and human action, as a chain of *Potenzen* in future. It was fundamental to Schelling's view that 'in the Absolute itself there is *no* *Potenz*' because the Absolute itself exists only as the sum of all *Potenzen*. So the absence of *Potenz*-language in the fragments of Hegel's early logic is not significant, since 'Logic is the extended science of the Idea as such'; similarly the presence of pure logical categories, and the absence of *Potenz*-language in the 'Divine Triangle' fragment, is only what we should expect, if that fragment is (as I think) part of the 'resumption' of all finite science into the original unity of the pure logical Idea.² The *Potenzen* belong to the real order of things, both conscious and unconscious.

The fact that we do not find *Potenz*-language in Hegel's first 'system of the heavens'—the *Dissertation* of August 1801—is not reliable evidence of Hegel's being still unconverted at that time. Hegel presented his short Latin treatise 'On the Orbits of the Planets' to the Faculty at Jena in October 1801, after a breakneck rush to get it ready. So it is reasonable to suppose that the vernacular draft which we know to have existed, was

¹ See *NKA*, iv. 161, 16–162, 21; cf. *Difference*, *NKA*, iv. 73, 7–74, 9 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 168–9).

² On the Divine Triangle see Ch. IV, below, pp. 157–88. Since I hold that 1801 is the most probable date for it, I would like to take the absence of *Potenz*-language in Rosenkranz's report about the treatment of nature in this MS as a pointer in my favour. But it could equally well reflect Rosenkranz's own dislike for Schelling's terminology.

something which Hegel had ready to hand, and that he actually wrote it at Frankfurt.¹

In the *Difference* essay Hegel indicates that each finite science of the Absolute must begin with the 'intuition' or 'identity' that is 'least dichotomous'; and he says that 'at the objective pole' this is 'matter'.² The dialectical concept of matter as 'real gravity', an identity which is a unity of opposites, and hence 'an infinitely opposed identity, a thoroughly relative identity' is the main physical theme of the *Dissertation*. But, in fact, there is something even more basic which we need to take into account in order to understand Hegel's theory. Matter as gravity is the physical self-positing of the *aether* which is the indifferent identity of the divine life, the creative power that expresses itself in all forms of real existence, whether conscious or unconscious, extended or intelligent.³ In all forms of its manifestation it is 'infinitely

¹ In the biography (pp. 151–2) Rosenkranz says 'The theme . . . he had nursed for a long time. Excerpts from Kant's writings on mechanics and astronomy, from Kepler, Newton and others, are already to be found among his papers much earlier. He wrote the *Dissertation* first in German. Then he put it together more briefly in Latin. These manuscripts and a mess [*Wust*] of calculations belonging to them are still preserved.' In a letter to Karl Hegel of May 1840, he was more precise about the German MS. Apparently it contained only two-thirds of the Latin text (Kimmerle, *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 148) but I think we can assume that it was more discursive, as the statement in the biography implies.

Some of the excerpts that Rosenkranz mentions, may go right back to the Gymnasium years at Stuttgart (see p. 78, n. 1). I agree with Kimmerle that Hegel could hardly have written the *Dissertation* in German, and then turned it into Latin between the end of August and the beginning of October 1801. His willingness to submit a thesis at short notice, clearly indicates that translation was the only problem he faced. He *could* have written the German version during his first months at Jena (before he embarked on the *Difference* essay). But in view of his demonstrable preoccupation with the *Verfassungsschrift* in these months (see Kimmerle's catalogue) it is more probable that he brought it with him from Frankfurt. Evidence of Hegel's interest in the philosophy of nature during 1800 can be found in *absolute Entgegensetzung gilt* (TW-A, i. 419–23; Knox and Kroner, pp. 310–13). It is not clear that Hegel intends any direct reference to the theory of the heavens there, but the doctrine of spirit as an 'enlivening law' makes a bridge between the 'System-Programme' and the *Dissertation*. The expression 'belebendes Gesetz' which I found startling (see *Toward the Sunlight*, p. 387) in the context of the opposition between 'begreifen' and 'beleben' in the Frankfurt fragments (e.g. *Positiv wird ein Glauben genannt*, TW-A, i. 242; *Clio*, viii. 1979, 260–1) establishes a continuum between the law of gravity in the heavens and the law of the free community on earth.

² NKA, iv. 31; Harris and Cerf, p. 113. Schelling's term *Potenz* simply replaces the Kantian term 'synthesis', which Hegel is still employing here.

³ The plainest statement is in the *Natural Law* essay: 'the aether, which permeates

self-opposed'—that is to say it has both a subjective and an objective pole. Even as matter it 'intuits itself', though it is only when we reach the conscious or spiritual level that we can say it 'intuits itself as itself'.¹ This active self-intuition of matter is apparently, in Hegel's view, its self-positing as *light*. Thus light is a logically primitive aspect of physical reality, one of the elementary concepts in terms of which the theory is framed. It is not quite as primitive as gravity, because all bodies are indifferent foci of gravitational *force* (the self-positing of the aether everywhere in the 'ideality' of space, the otherwise empty extension in which these foci of gravity move). All the independent foci are self-lighting centres. But in the full displaying of matter, light and darkness are sundered as bodies. The self-lighting bodies cast light upon dark bodies, which must therefore be gravitationally dependent because they are only reflective.²

This is the thought-context in which the *Dissertation* must be studied. Like the *Dissertation* itself, its origins must be sought in the Frankfurt period not in the latest publications of Schelling. In view of Hölderlin's interest in the elliptical

nature is the inseparable essence of the *Gestalten* of nature' (NKA, iv. 467; Knox and Acton, pp. 112–13).

¹ *Natural Law*, NKA, iv. 463–4, (Knox and Acton, pp. 110–11). The *aether* is the 'simple substance in reality [the reality of the *Idea*]' which arrives at 'marriage with absolute Infinity' [the self-recovery of the *Idea*]. As the first (simple *nature*) it is 'absolute self-intuition'; as the second (absolute knowing) it is 'absolute intuition of itself as itself'. Thus the *aether* is an absolute presupposition, a logical concept rather than a physical one. Every occurrence of the noun 'aether' or the adjective 'ethereal' in Hegel's prose is a sign that we have come down to his speculative bedrock. One of the clearest illustrations of the fact that it is the same *real* bedrock everywhere (not a poetic metaphor for 'spiritual' things, as one might often be tempted to think) is in the *System of Ethical Life*, (*Schriften* (1913), pp. 474–5; Harris and Knox, p. 151). But even this passage is only fully transparent if one remembers that the aether is the *inseparable essence of all the Gestalten of nature*—see the preceding note.

² A fairly clear description of the self-positing of the aether as the 'creation of the world'—first the *fixed* stars as singular *intuitions* and then the conceptual displaying of light and gravity in a 'bloom' with 'petals' that move—is given in the *Natural Law* essay: 'In the indifferences of light, the aether has scattered its absolute indifference into a multiplicity; in the blooms of the solar system it has borne its inner Reason and totality out into expansion. But the individualizations of light are dispersed in multiplicity [i.e. the fixed stars], while those which form the orbiting petals of the solar system must behave towards them with rigid individuality [i.e. they have their fixed orbits]. And so the unity of the stars lacks the form of universality, while that of the solar system lacks pure unity, and neither carries in itself the absolute Concept as such' (NKA, iv. 464; Knox and Acton, p. 111).

orbits of the planets it is tempting to connect this first chapter of Hegel's long struggle against Newton's mechanical philosophy of the heavens, with his influence.

The *Dissertation* may even be the only surviving fruit of the 'First System-Programme'.¹ The 'System-Programme' shows that the original context of Hegel's speculation about natural philosophy was the Fichtean question: 'how must a world be constituted for a moral entity?' He wanted to build a moral theory of the world of human experience as a whole—'a complete system of all Ideas or of all practical postulates (which is the same thing)'. The Fichtean inspiration of this determination to reorganize the Critical Philosophy upon the foundation provided by the Idea of the Ego as a free being, is evident enough. But Hegel's conception of the result of this reorganization is so far removed from Fichte that even in the 'System-Programme' we can already detect the cutting edge of his attack on Fichte's concept of nature in the *Difference* essay. It is of the utmost significance that he says 'The first Idea is naturally the *Vorstellung of my self* as an absolutely free essence.' It seems to me probable that *natürlich* here means not just 'of course' but 'in the course of nature'. For Hegel goes on to speak of the simultaneous origin of self and world; and from there he 'steps down into the fields of physics'. But even if this interpretation of *natürlich* is dismissed as overstrained, the identification of *Idea* and *Vorstellung*, taken with the project of 'giving wings to our backward physics, that advances laboriously by experiments', indicates that Hegel's use of 'Ideas' here, though it is *practical* and hence only a postulation, involves an *a priori* synthesis of concept and intuition. We can fairly say that the unified *Vorstellung* of my freedom in my world is the intellectual intuition of the original *Idee*—since Hegel says that it is 'the only true and thinkable creation out of nothing'. What Hegel is prepared to postulate practically on the basis of this Fichtean intuition, is not an intellectual reality beyond the range of experience, but only a speculative interpretation of experience. This is the formal

¹ Hegel's interest in physics and astronomy goes right back to his Gymnasium years—see *Toward the Sunlight*, pp. 7, 9, 46, 50, 74, 103; but the story of his philosophy of nature properly begins with the 'First System-Programme' (discussed therein, pp. 249–55, and translated, pp. 510–12) in any case.

reason why he is obliged to develop an organic philosophy of Nature. But, of course, the sense of the *έν και παν* as a living whole, was always the real ground of his rejection of the moral opposition between soul and body, reason and sensibility—an antithesis which made the instrumental conception of nature as a pure mechanism appear sufficient to Fichte.

The philosophical physics that Hegel looked forward to in 1797 was a synthesis of 'Ideas' supplied by 'philosophy', with data supplied by 'experience'. *Creativity* is the hallmark that he emphasizes; and we can see when he advances to deal with human affairs that this is because 'only what is *Gegenstand* of freedom, is called *Idea*.' His violent attack on the 'clockwork theory' of the State (where he even asserts that 'there is no Idea of a machine') clearly indicates that he would not have been prepared in 1797 to speak of 'celestial *mechanics*' either. The physical world that is 'created out of nothing' is a city in the heavens in which the members 'proceed through the aether in the manner of Gods', as Hegel puts it at the beginning of his *Dissertation*.¹ The physics that rests on creation out of *nothing* will not resolve the orbits of the planets into a parallelogram of forces, but will rather interpret the whole system as self-positing, like the Ego. The *Idea* that replaces mechanical composition is that of 'living force'; and the reason for adopting this mental set, rather than a mechanical-compositive one, is quite simply that freedom (interpreted as creativity guided by the sense of beauty) is the moral ideal of our existence within the stable frame of nature. That stable frame is to be thought of as animate rather than as mechanical, because how we think of it is an image of the way in which we think of thinking. The romantic enthusiasm of the 'System-Programme' for a world in which there will be perfect freedom of expression is what determines the equally striking insistence in the *Dissertation* on maintaining classical modes of speech about the heaven of the newest astronomy.

In making this connection between the 'System-programme' and the *Dissertation* I have gone one tiny step beyond the explicit evidence of the text. The concept of 'living force'

¹ 'Deorum more per levem aera incedant', *Erste Druckschriften*, p. 348. Hegel is probably recalling Plato's *Phaedrus* 246c—247b.

is not actually mentioned in the 'Programme'. But since Hegel's 'winged physics' will not have Newtonian mechanical forces at its foundation, I do not think that this is a very risky projection of what he says. It certainly would be risky, however, to assume a connection between the 'System-Programme' and the *Dissertation* without considering the intervening 'System Fragment'.¹ For in the 'System fragment' of mid-1800 Hegel *seems* to say that 'Nature' is strictly a 'reflective' concept. 'Nature is a positing of life, since . . . reflection has made life into nature by positing [life under reflective categories] . . . Nature is not itself life, but a life fixated by reflection, even though it may be treated in the worthiest manner.'²

If we abstract this fragment from the continuum that can be shown to exist between the 'System-Programme' and the *Difference* essay, it seems almost as sceptical about the possibility of any speculative science as Jacobi ever was. Only 'Religion' gives us real positive contact with the Absolute, and for that we must put reflection, with its negative infinity of the causal regress and the moral progress, behind us altogether. 'Philosophy must cease with religion'; and it appears to 'cease' (as in so many critical religious minds) at the sceptical extreme.

But even within the bounds of the fragment we can see that this impression is false; a *practical* 'science of life' is possible. We can escape from reflection because experience supplies an intuitive religious bridge between the finite and the infinite *as life*: 'the living [self]'s being-only-a-part [in a system of 'dead' parts, i.e. a *mechanism*] is sublated in religion, the bounded life lifts itself up to the infinite [life].'³ And once this elevation has occurred, a 'science of life' can be constructed—indeed we can see that (quite unlike most mystics) Hegel was ready to

¹ Even if, as I think possible, the German draft of the *Dissertation* was written before the 'system' of 1800 we have to consider what place it could have had in that 'system' in the light of its instant validity for presentation in 1801. (Actually, in spite of my *jeu d'esprit* about its being part of the execution of the 'System-Programme', I think it was probably written late in 1800, because of its 'Pythagorean' affinities with the *Difference* essay and the Triangle-fragment—see Ch. IV. pp. 159–62, 178, below).

² *absolute Entgegensetzung gilt*, TW-A, i. 420 (Knox and Kroner, pp. 310–11).

³ *absolute Entgegensetzung gilt*, TW-A, i. 422 (Knox and Kroner, p. 313).

give a blueprint for our social existence. He positively wants to *unite* 'God' with 'Nature' (as fixated in the reflective ideal of it as 'one unique organized divided and united whole'). The incarnation of God in the whole of Nature, is Hegel's theme, and he dismisses the *noumenal* blessedness of Kant and Fichte's 'rational faith' as

a phenomenon of the time having basically the same significance as the blessedness of dependence upon an absolutely alien essence which cannot become man [i.e. the God of Abraham and Moses] or if it were to have become man (hence [to have been] in time) would remain an absolutely specific [being], only an absolute unit, even in this union [i.e. the God of positive Christian faith].¹

It is clear, therefore, that Hegel has not surrendered the possibility of a speculative physics in this fragment. It is a necessary part of his projected religion in which the Incarnation of God is universally realized and comprehended. His attack on the categories of reflection is only intended to drive home the lesson that *all genuine science is part of ethics*. The condemnation of 'Nature' as a reflective fixation is exactly parallel with the condemnation of 'State, Constitution, etc.' as mechanical concepts in the 'System-Programme'. Just as that attack did not mean that a true science of politics is impossible, so this one does not mean that a speculative science of nature is impossible. (It is Kant's 'Critique of Teleological Judgement' that is the 'worthiest' failure of reflective philosophy, not Schelling's *Von der Weltseele*.)² Nor need we doubt that Hegel was still prepared to call this organic science 'philosophy of nature' (just as he speaks of the State as an 'organism' both before and after 1796). It is *theoretically* reflective philosophy that 'ceases with religion'. Speculative philosophy (as conceived in 1800, and probably already in

¹ *ein objektives Mittelpunkt*, TW-A, i. 427 (Knox and Kroner, pp. 318-19).

² Richard Kroner must be applauded for recognizing the affinities between the 'System fragment' and the *Difference* essay. But it is only his peculiar view that Hegel really succeeds in being an impartial umpire in the *Difference* essay that makes it possible for him, on this basis, to identify Schelling's philosophy of nature as the target of Hegel's critique—see Knox and Kroner, pp. 22-5, 311, n. 3, 318-19. (Hegel does indeed criticize Schelling's *method* in the *Difference* essay; but neither Fichte, nor Schelling, nor anyone else was ever for one moment in doubt as to whose side he was on with respect to the substantial issues.)

1796) begins with it. From the reflective point of view this speculative philosophy is all practical 'postulation'. But that false appearance is finally dissipated when speculation comes round in a circle to religious experience as its climax. This is exactly the view that we shall find once more in the *Difference* essay, developed along lines for which the 'System-Programme' provided the first (very crude and primitive) sketch. Just as Hegel was already logically and psychologically prepared to adopt Hölderlin's 'Fichtean' philosophy of Identity before he ever went to Frankfurt, so he was ready to move from his subjective postulational standpoint to Schelling's doctrine of an intuited identity of subject and object by the time he went on to Jena. The continuity between the 'System-Programme', the 'System Fragment', the *Dissertation*, and the *Difference* essay shows that Hegel accepted the Fichtean doctrine of the primacy of the practical, but that from the first he rejected Fichte's instrumental view of nature. The 'System fragment' further demonstrates that this rejection is logically connected with his rejection of 'practical faith', i.e. of the postulates of the 'Author' of nature, and of the rational soul's immortal existence in the noumenal world. To prove the identity of God and Nature was always an essential goal for Hegel. This essentially ethical context of his philosophy of nature explains why he was always much more bitterly antipathetic to Newton than Schelling was, and why he found it harder to accommodate the concept of 'mechanism' than Schelling did.

2. *The Solar System in the 'Dissertation'*

Hegel promises to do three things in his *Dissertation*:

first, to discuss those primary concepts upon which the physical part of astronomy is ordinarily taken to depend (*vulgo pendere solet*); then to expound what true philosophy establishes about the structure of the solar system, especially with respect to the orbits of the planets; finally to demonstrate how valuable philosophy is, even for determining the mathematical ratios of quantities, by offering a famous example from ancient philosophy.¹

¹ *Erste Druckschriften*, p. 348.

We should notice the pattern here. First Hegel intends to argue that the proper use of mathematics in physical theory must be determined by theory, and should not determine it. Then he will expound the physical theory that accords with the true philosophy. Finally he will show that the true philosophical physics is itself mathematically fruitful.

The first part of the dissertation, therefore, is an attack on the vulgar view that physical theory depends on mathematical principles. This mistake results in the reduction of physics proper to mechanics. Kepler gave the laws of planetary motion their proper mathematical form. Newton's 'geometrical' analysis which decomposed the simple planetary ellipse, and exhibited it as the product of a parallelogram of forces is philosophically misleading. There are no *real* forces corresponding to the lines in his diagrams. The planets are not pulled different ways by *impulse*. 'We hold that *impulse* belongs to mechanics not to true physics.'¹ The fact that a certain pattern of motion *can* be produced experimentally through the composition of mechanical impulses does not at all prove that the unchanging courses of the planets *are* produced by that sort of composition. 'A principle is not to be accepted because of its utility and fertility, nor are lines . . . to be given a physical significance on grounds of mathematical convenience.'² Instead of constructing a mechanical model in which the centrifugal force is *added* to the pull of gravitational attraction, the whole motion must be seen as expressing the gravity of the bodies themselves, and the centripetal and centrifugal forces must be interpreted as opposite aspects of gravity:

true philosophy repudiates the principle of the experimental philosophy which is derived from mechanics, or the imitation of nature in dead matter, and the production of a synthesis of absolutely distinct forces in a certain body; for whatever pertains to the imitation of nature is to be entirely set aside in the cognition of nature itself, and no place must be given in physics to chance and caprice; but if the motions of the sun, the planets, and the comets are explained

¹ Ibid., p. 352.

² Ibid., pp. 356–8. On p. 356 Hegel remarks, in passing, that Newton has applied the same illegitimate approach to the simple phenomenon of *light*. This is his first public declaration on behalf of Goethe's theory of colours.

through the ratios of centripetal and centrifugal force, they must be said to have found their places, not by any necessity but simply by some chance.¹

The compositive method of Newtonian mechanics is not at all like the method of geometry itself, which does not construct a curve from straight lines. (This point was important to Hegel because the Identity Philosophy leaned heavily on mathematical analogies, and particularly on the 'geometric' method of Spinoza.) Geometry takes some whole as given and deduces unknown properties and relations from known ones. This should be the method of physics likewise.

Hegel seeks to show both from the procedure of mathematical calculation and through the examination of empirical cases 'that the distinction between centripetal and centrifugal force is quite empty'.² Kepler's account of planetary motion which does not depend on this distinction but only on ratios of space and time is thus preferable.³

Kepler's strength comes from having always considered the Solar System as a whole; Newton's weakness from his conviction that a whole can be built up out of finite bits. The story of the apple has become an appropriate mythic presentation of this, but Hegel suggests that we ought to realize that Newton's Apple was as baleful as the apples in those other older myths of the Fall of Man and the Fall of Troy. Newton's Apple belongs to the myth of the Fall of Reason into understanding.⁴

¹ Ibid., p. 362.

² Ibid., p. 376. The arguments about mathematical procedures entered into his 'dialectic of quantum' (which is discussed below, pp. 358–62). In most of the *applied* cases he objects to the appeal to centrifugal force, or to the supposed variation of one or the other force, as an *ad hoc* hypothesis. Several of the cases that he brings up for the first time in the *Dissertation*, he continued to use in his mature discussions of Newtonian mechanics. For instance *Erste Druckschriften*, pp. 370–2 (slowing of the pendulum at the equator) should be read in conjunction with *Encyclopaedia*, § 270, Anm. (Petry, *Nature*, i. 267, 31–6).

³ *Erste Druckschriften*, p. 376. Cf. *Encyclopaedia*, § 270, Anm. (Petry, op. cit., i, 264, 26–265, 6).

⁴ *Erste Druckschriften*, p. 378. The facts about Newton's apple are given in Petry's note, op. cit., i. 362–3. (The interested reader will even find there a description of how the apple looks and tastes!) Petry also supplies a translation of the passage here referred to.

We should notice that Hegel's theory of the 'pendulum of nature' shows no sign of being influenced by Boehme's doctrine of the 'two centres'. That model provides only

Hegel is anxious not to deny or belittle the magnitude of Newton's achievement as a mathematical construction. He was an enthusiastic student of mathematics himself, and there is no doubt that he studied Newton's theorems and proofs carefully. His quarrel is with the underlying assumptions of the experimental philosophy. Newton seeks to explain an organism with mechanical assumptions, and is therefore driven to ascribe the force of gravity and the origin of the mysterious centrifugal force to a God of whose creative activity he can give no account. The mechanical approach assumes that matter is an inert 'stuff' to which contrary impulses are somehow imparted. Instead, Hegel thinks, we must assume that the contrary impulses that God is said to have imparted to matter, really express the nature of matter. We must conceive matter itself as a unity of opposite forces. Only on *this* assumption can we construct a properly *physical* theory.

In the second part of the dissertation Hegel sketches the outline of a properly physical theory of the Solar System. Matter, he says, is 'objective gravity'.¹ Now as a physical phenomenon, gravity is already in itself objective, or in Schelling's terminology it is part of the 'real series'. But from the *Difference* essay we have learned to expect that the great conceptual oppositions between the sides of the Absolute Identity will be reflected on each side. Thus according to the *Difference* essay itself, philosophy of nature is 'theoretical', and philosophy of mind is 'practical'. But each of the absolute sciences has a theoretical and a practical part.² The subjective/objective distinction and the particular/universal distinctions similarly appear on both sides. Hegel's conception of a *compositional* account of the planetary ellipse. The high Platonic tone in which Hegel speaks of the planets is far removed from any talk of the 'fall of Lucifer' or the *Eitelkeit* of 'being-for-self'. The Hellenic influence of Kepler must be distinguished from the Protestant-Newtonian influence of Boehme; and for this reason we must be chary of accepting Marshall Brown's assumption that the 'elliptical' image of life is always to be traced to the latter (cf. *The Shape of German Romanticism*, pp. 129-79). I doubt if Boehme ever became important for Hölderlin, as he did for Hegel; and because I am inclined to believe in Boehme's influence upon Hegel from 1801 onwards, I take the characterization of the second pole of the ellipse as 'blind and merely mathematical' (*Erste Druckschriften*, p. 386) as another sign that the *Dissertation* was conceived and drafted at Frankfurt.

¹ *Erste Druckschriften*, p. 382.

² *Difference*, NKA, iv. 73; Harris and Cerf, p. 168.

philosophical method in this period derives from this principle of 'absolute reflection'. Whatever metaphysical problem he is dealing with has the two sides: real/ideal, particular/universal, subjective/objective, intuitive/conceptual, theoretical/practical. These two sides have to be brought into a perfect equilibrium which is the 'totality' of the *Idea*. We shall see how Hegel applied the method in detail to the practical sphere proper, when we come to the *System of Ethical Life*. For the moment we need only notice that the consistent application of all these antitheses to both the ideal and the real series is bound to produce some unexpected and even paradoxical interpretations for these familiar terms. Thus, in the present instance, *Faith and Knowledge* provides the essential clue that gravity '*qua* subjective or particular is body, but *qua* objective, or universal, it is motion'.¹ The physical body is the particular centre of gravitational force, and as exerting force it is a 'subject'; but the universal law of gravity, its objective reality, is revealed only in the motion of bodies—where the Moon appears as the satellite of the Earth, the Earth of the Sun, etc. Finally the 'totality' of subjective force and objective law, is revealed in the perfect equilibrium of the Solar System, in which motion is brought to rest without being brought to a stop (as it is when a projectile falls to earth).

Thus Hegel is asking us to conceive of matter in such a way that it contains motion within itself. 'Matter' here means not 'body' but extension.² The most primitive model for this is a line of bodies in space. But if the line is to be self-maintaining, then the bodies must neither fall together, nor fly apart. They must 'cohere' somehow across the interval between them.

¹ *NKA*, iv. 331, 22–3; Cerf and Harris, p. 75.

² In his discussion of the human intelligence as the 'negative infinite' or 'absolute Concept' Hegel appeals to the analogous doctrine of the Greek Atomists: 'For the absolute Concept is the absolutely immediate contrary of itself, and as an ancient [thinker] said "Nothing is no less than something"' (*NKA*, iv. 463, 26–8; the translation in Knox and Acton, p. 110 is slightly faulty). Since atoms and void survive into the second phase of his natural philosophy I think it is not very risky to assume that this analogy indicates that in his first natural philosophy atoms and void were taken as the contrary moments of the absolute Concept (in its self-external form as 'matter'). Real motion expresses the *essentially gravitational (or aetheric) nature of extension generally* (cf. *Erste Druckschriften*, p. 394).

Applying this conceptual requirement to our line of bodies we can deduce that they must have different gravities. But difference of gravity is what is revealed as motion. Motion involves a third real spatial dimension, and the ideal dimension of temporal sequence. Thus we have *four dimensions*, three of space and one of time required for the 'realization' of the force of gravity, or its complete display as the law of motion.

All that Hegel has done here is to analyse what is involved in the 'Idea' of the Solar System. Or, in terms of the Kantian theory of space and time, as the 'forms of intuition', and of mathematics as the constructive science of pure intuition, we can equally well say that Hegel has 'constructed' the Idea out of the pure intuition of gravitational force. He prefers to put it in this latter way. But either way will only work if there is a whole (the Idea) which can be comprehended intuitively. Newton's compositive approach presupposes that rest in space is more intuitive than motion. Hegel's construction substitutes the resting whole of motion as what is intuited.

The four dimensions of the absolutely resting motion are the 'squareness' of Nature. According to Hegel's third thesis: 'The square is the law of nature, the triangle of spirit.' Whereas the essence of nature is a motion that is perfectly at rest, spirit is a motion that is absolutely restless. The dimensions of nature are four, three spatial and one temporal; the dimensions of Spirit are but three, the three inner dimensions of time, past, present, and future.¹ The philosophical intuition of the Absolute is the moment when past and future are comprehended in an eternal present, but this perfectly one-dimensional 'resumption of the whole' is radically different from the four-dimensional *cyclic* oneness, or eternity of nature.

¹ *Erste Druckschriften*, p. 404. My claim is only a hypothesis (see p. 94, n. 1 *ad fin* for its principal grounds). Kimmerle has an interesting interpretation of the 'squareness' of nature and the 'triangularity' of the real spirit, which he detects in Hegel's lecture-outline of Oct. 1801—see *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 20, 1980, pp. 209–15. He may be right that Hegel gave his outline the shape it has, because of Thesis III (*Faith and Knowledge*, *NKA*, iv. 408, 11–35, Cerf and Harris, pp. 181–2, confirms that nature is the 'original fount' of spirit); and his 'construction' of the law of gravity as a 'square' may be right too (see p. 90, n. 1, below). All interpretations are uncertain; but it does seem certain that interpretation must begin from the concept of *gravity*.

The dividing line between nature and spirit is mortality. Death cuts off time from space, by making the temporal dimension finite. In mortal consciousness, infinity must now become inward, or ideal. This inwardness is its liberation. The four-square cycles of celestial nature repeat themselves identically. Living terrestrial nature does not. Even the life of the Earth itself (in the cycle of the *four* elements, and the *four* seasons) is endlessly various. But this standing variety is the background for the moving variety of mortal life. Hegel believed in the permanence of species; but because he was so deeply aware of the conceptual significance of mortality he drew the boundary between nature and spirit, in a way that can readily accommodate the Darwinian assumption that *living* variety is the expression of radical contingency, and hence provides the raw material for a self-directed process of selection in time.

This discussion of the placement of spirit within nature is only an anticipatory digression on my part, however. We must now return to the theory of the Solar System. Regarded as a 'line of cohesion' the planets form a 'pendulum of nature', and their elliptical orbits are the swinging of this infinite pendulum. Since they do not swing in a single line, it might seem more natural to speak of each of them as a separate pendulum. But Hegel wants to bring the mechanical conception of the pendulum under the more organic sway of the concept of magnetism.¹ The planets do not swing from their centre *independently*. Their motions express the field of force generated by their communal gravity. It is the idea of this field of force that Hegel wants to express by his combination of the idea of an *infinite* pendulum with that of a magnetic field. His fifth thesis says: 'As the magnet is the natural lever, so the

¹ This is one aspect of the *Dissertation* that can plausibly be attributed to the direct influence of Schelling. In the *Darstellung meines Systems* (Sect. 95, Zusatz 1) we read: 'Our planetary system, in particular, is formed by a cohesion process, and is, as a whole, a magnet in the same way that the Earth is one individually.' The reports of Rosenkranz indicate that the German text of Hegel's *Dissertation* although more copious than the Latin version, did not contain everything in our Latin text— see p. 76, n. 1, above. It is a plausible hypothesis, at least, that Hegel took over Schelling's general theory of magnetism and cohesion and integrated it with his own (Frankfurt?) theory of planetary motion as the 'pendulum of nature'. In that case, some of this second part of his *Dissertation* was probably freshly composed in 1801. In that case, too, Schelling's 'Addition' may have been directly suggested (in conversation) by Hegel.

gravitation of the planets toward the sun is the pendulum of nature'.¹ It is not at all obvious there, why he needs to put these two analogies together at all. The reason only emerges when we discover that he wants to interpret the elliptical orbits of the planets as the field of a celestial magnet. A magnet exerts force from its divided poles, not from its point of indifference. It is like a lever that contains its own Archimedes. In the 'pendulum of nature' this infinite lever has also achieved its own place to stand. The gravitational centre is an indifference point, from which no force is exerted. The centre of force is the ideal line that connects the umbilica of the planetary ellipses.

Hegel claims that 'physical philosophy teaches that the true centre of force(s) is necessarily the fount of light, and that the true force and virtue of the sun is to be posited in that fact.'² But in fact the Sun is the locus of only one of the umbilica, and it is for this reason that the pendulum analogy is more fundamental than the magnetic one. We have seen what makes the light-focus the significant one in our discussion of the aether above.³

The theory of the absolute magnet or pendulum is the formal displaying of the line that defines the first two dimensions. The concept of a centre of force upon which the whole line swings brings us to the exposition of the point itself as a non-spatial reality (a 'subject') relative to which motion in space is defined. The 'line of cohesion' provides us with the

¹ *Erste Druckschriften*, p. 404.

² *Erste Druckschriften*, p. 386.

³ I hope it is by now evident, however, that Hegel's conception of the aether as a self-create and self-intuitive activity is determined by the logical primacy of the question 'How must a world be constituted for a moral entity?' He frames his theory in terms of a posited identity between 'light' and 'life' and between 'inner' and 'outer' light (cf. *Difference*, NKA, iv. 73, 10-74, 9; Harris and Cerf, pp. 168-9, and the Introduction, pp. 55-6). This identity is posited in the *religious faith* of his community. Hence he expresses it also in terms of the Johannine Logos, and the dogma of the Trinity—see for instance, *Difference*, NKA, iv. 75, 17-25 (Harris and Cerf, p. 171); and the 'Divine Triangle' MS (*Hegel-Studien*, x. 1975, 133-5 discussed and translated below, pp. 157-88. But Hegel himself makes clear that the theological content of faith has only the significance that Reason gives it—i.e. the cogency that *our* reason can find in it. The 'history of God' presented by the Passion and Resurrection of Christ, must first become the experience of every man, and then be *interpreted* by philosophy (Rosenkranz, pp. 137-41; Harris and Knox, pp. 182-6—cf. *Faith and Knowledge*, NKA, iv. 413, 33-414, 13; Cerf and Harris, pp. 190-1).

The mathematical point itself is the primitive intuition of this, the reflective form of what we have already learned to call the 'negative infinite'. The simplest model for the reflective *Darstellung* of subjectivity is a line. The square is (as we have already seen) the mathematical schema of *natura naturans*. Following this process of intuitive construction, the schema for *natura naturata* will be the cube. Hegel's adoption of this mathematical model for the genesis of space confirms our interpretation of the proposition 'quadratum est lex naturae'; and it helps us to understand the occasional mysterious references to 'the cube of Spinoza'.¹ But it also testifies to Hegel's interest in the mathematical formulations of the laws of motion.

One would have expected that the alternative series: radius, circle, sphere, would interest Hegel more. But quite apart from the fact that the celestial orbits are elliptical not circular, his interest in the line, square, cube sequence was determined by the fact that when the 'cohesion' of the line fails, the rate of free fall toward the centre is the square of the distance involved: 'When [the separate bodies] remove that difference [i.e. their separateness] falling upon one another into one body, they change the line into a square; hence the law of falling is the ratio of the square of the distance, i.e. of the line changed to a square.'² Even more significant, perhaps, is the fact that Kepler's third law, the law of the planetary periods involves the cubing of a square root. For these planetary periods constitute the 'ideal body' (i.e. the total gravitational field) of the solar system.³

¹ e.g. *Faith and Knowledge, NKA*, iv. 392; Cerf and Harris, p. 160. The Jacobi quotation given in our note there explains the reference.

² *Erste Druckschriften*, p. 392. We should recognize, of course, that the *Potenz* theory itself dictated attention to the square and cubic ratios in mathematical physics. The difficulty is to decide how far the prominence of square and cubic ratios in physical calculation was itself an influential factor leading to the adoption and development of the *Potenz* theory. (My own belief is that Kepler's laws had a great deal to do with Hegel's acceptance of the *Potenz* approach to natural philosophy.)

³ What Hegel calls 'that most celebrated law of Kepler' (*Erste Druckschriften*, p. 392) is cited from Kepler's own text by Petry (*Nature*, i. 359–60). The concept of an 'ideal body' is partially illuminated by the remark in the *Natural Law* essay that 'space is the ideality of nature's appearing forms' (*NKA*, iv. 467, 24–5; Knox and Acton, p. 113).

In effect, Hegel is arguing for a return to the neo-Pythagorean assumptions of Kepler in the quest for the most elegant mathematical theory of the measured data of planetary astronomy. Kepler's own discoveries have convinced him that the true theory must be expressed in powers and roots. The three powers, linear, square, and cubic are the organic potencies of extension as a 'living expression of Reason and its image'.¹ If this view is accepted, it provides a theoretical basis for the framing of mathematical equations in physical theory. It tells us what potency-relations to expect and to look for in our raw data. Hegel's own attempt to frame a mathematical expression for the 'line of cohesion' itself is both the natural coping stone of his theory (for it involves the complex ratio of a 'squared square' and a cube) and a demonstration of its general utility.²

We can readily understand that the distance-ratios of the 'line of cohesion' ought not to be accidental upon Hegel's view. Upon any view at all, once the general law of gravitational attraction is recognized, the search for a mathematical pattern in the planetary intervals is a matter of some interest. It was, of course, a subject of burning interest, in its own

¹ *Erste Druckschriften*, p. 394; for 'Reason and its image' compare the 'logic' outline of 1801, Rosenkranz, pp. 190-1 (Cerf and Harris, pp. 9-10). Kepler himself took the sphere as the 'ideal body' within which his regular solids were to be inscribed. Hegel's main line of connection with Pythagorean speculation was through the Platonic theory of stable *ratios* as the 'bond' of identity. His approach to the mathematics of physical reality is conditioned by his acceptance of the view that 'whenever, of any three numbers, or masses, or forces, the middle is such that what the first is for it, it is for the last, and conversely, what the last is for the middle, the middle is just that for the first, then since the middle has become the first and last, and the last and first conversely, have both become the middle, in this way they will all necessarily be the same; but things which are the same as against each other are all one.' (*Timaeus* 31c-32a; translated from Hegel's own version in *Difference*, NKA, iv. 65; Harris and Cerf, p. 158). 'Masses' translates Plato's *δγκαι* (solids, cubes) and 'forces' translates his *δύναμεις* (powers, squares). Thus the connection with the *Potenz* theory is clearer in the Greek than in Hegel's German or the translation, because he has not yet decisively adopted the *Potenz* terminology. He uses the same translation again in the 'History of Philosophy' lectures after he had abandoned *Potenz* terminology. Thus the crucial importance of the Platonic theory of proportion for Hegel's *Potenz*-theory of nature never becomes fully visible.

² The text of the *Encyclopaedia*, and the general tone of Hegel's discussion of Kepler and Newton in the Berlin lectures show that he never abandoned his belief in the rationality and fertility of the 'potency' theory of the Solar System. See esp. *Encyclopaedia* (1831) sects. 267, 270, and Additions. The four-dimensional body that he is interested in is an 'ideal' one (the gravitational field of the Solar System).

right, to the first scientific observers of the heavens in our own Western tradition. Hegel's aim is to integrate the newest mathematical results into the context of their assumptions and methods. His 'outstanding example drawn from ancient philosophy' is the Pythagorean sequence which the Demiurge is supposed to have employed for the creation of the World-Soul in the 'likely story' recounted by Plato's *Timaeus*.¹ This series is the first three integers and their first three powers: 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 27. Hegel wanted to *generate* the required interval-ratios from this series by a 'potency' operation upon it. The required intervals ought to be the cube root of the fourth power of the successive terms of the Pythagorean sequence. But in order to get a series with an appropriate interval sequence, Hegel had to remove 2^3 and replace it by 4^2 . His other emendation is made without any such obvious reason. In his table of results he replaces 1 by the cube root of 3 (which means that he really required the fourth root of 3 in

¹ Hegel says *in utroque Timaeo*, which indicates that he was acquainted with the apocryphal *Timaeus Locrus*, as well as with the authentic dialogue of Plato. He also says, quite correctly, that 'Timaeus' did not refer the series to the planets. Plato's *Timaeus* combines two Pythagorean *tetractyes*, 1, 2, 4, 8 and 1, 3, 9, 27 in one series, terminating with the two cubes. This is clearly part of the development of *musical theory*, and its first use by the Demiurge mythically exemplifies the thesis that 'the soul is a harmony'. The seven planetary spheres to which *Timaeus* next proceeds are not directly related to these numbers, but obviously there must be some sort of harmonic relation between them as elements in the World-Soul. However, Petry is wrong to claim that it is 'evident' that putting the series in proper cardinal order gives us the ratio of planetary distances assumed by 'Timaeus' (*Nature*, i. 370). No serious astronomers would have blandly ignored the great interval between Mars and Jupiter. But I shall not pursue the difficult question of what the Pythagorean doctrine of planetary distances actually was, because what 'Timaeus' thought about this was as irrelevant to Hegel as it is to us. The first terms in the Pythagorean series were Earth, Moon, Sun, and they did not know that Uranus existed. Hence 'Timaeus' could not possibly have got the sequence of 'powers' right. What impressed Hegel about this ancient example, is that with seven moving bodies to organize in his World-Soul 'Timaeus' was already working with a series based on the powers of two and three. In this instinct of Reason Hegel saw a confirmation of his thesis that 'at all times there has been only one and the same philosophy'. His appeal to the *Timaeus* is part of his conscious revival of 'the oldest of old things'—cf. *Dass die Philosophie*, 20a, in *NKA*, v. 274). (Manfred Baum, *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 20, 1980, 138 n. 23, has pointed out that the *Timaeus Locrus*—which was probably composed about AD 100—was more easily assimilable with the views of Schelling and Hegel because it treats the visible universe as the ectype of the One—the unique and absolute Idea. Stephanus printed it—with the subtitle 'On the World Soul'—immediately after the *Timaeus*. See further A. E. Taylor, *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1928, pp. 655–64.)

his generative series). He gives no philosophical explanation for either of these changes. But the implication of his *breviter ut reliqua tradamus* is that he is hurrying to a conclusion, and does not wish to give explanations. In some measure, at least, we can plausibly infer what his reasons were. The removal of a cube in the middle, and the insertion of the fourth root of three at the beginning, to *balance* the cube of three at the end, and to *mirror* the fourth power of three in the final result can hardly be accidental.

Several things seem clear. First, the fourth root of three is to be thought of as the square root of a square root, and the fourth power of three is the square of a square.¹ Secondly, the whole pattern of squares and cubes of 2 and 3 (both roots and powers) is determined by the fact that Kepler's third law (which gives the formula for the generation of the 'ideal body' of the Solar System) involves the ratio of a square and a cube. Thirdly, although this is the reason why the fourth and third roots of three replace unity as the first term in the generative and the generated series, the replacement of the unit by some surd was necessary because the finite is to be generated by the Infinite. Zero and One, the negative and positive expressions of the pure Absolute, are not 'generative'. Fourthly, the substitution of 16 for 8 was not only dictated by the empirical data, but by the fact that a cube cannot belong inside the series; and the square that does belong there is to be thought of (in that position) as a simple square, not as the fourth power of two.

¹ It is important to remember here that Hegel initially 'constructs' the four dimensions of the true infinite of nature, by positing two 'real' poles and then 'ideally' doubling them (cf. the circles of the Same and the Different in the *Timaeus*). In terms of his geometrical analogy this procedure is 'the squaring of a square'. What is introduced at the second stage is the opposition between reality (the third dimension of space) and the ideal dimension of time. The body he is interested in, is an 'ideal' one because it exists in the temporal dimension. The gravitational field will be comprehended as a stable 'totality' only when we have calculated the period of the Great Year. But this is a 'reflective' concern (because when we do this we are trying to overcome the ideal/real distinction, to reduce *natura naturans* to *natura naturata*). What matters is to know the dynamic gravitational relation of the planets as they move through their orbits—to know how, when, and why their velocities change. This is what Kepler's three laws tell us. It is my conviction that Hegel sees his *generative formula* ($\sqrt[3]{x^4}$) as an extension of Kepler's laws for the calculation of the *ideal body* of the system of real motion that has caused me to interpret all of his 'Pythagorean' formulas in terms of the *dimensions* of space and time.

Hegel's desire to establish a *general* physical theory is shown by the fact that he applies his results to the two planets with enough known satellites to make the application significant. The first three moons of Jupiter fit his theory well enough to satisfy him. The fourth is too far out. He makes no attempt to explain this, but given the rather special character of the final term in his full series, he probably thought that it was susceptible of explanation. The satellites of Saturn interested him more, because here he had a full set of seven; and the best series of cubes he could find began with the unit and proceeded in powers of two, at first regularly, then irregularly, terminating with $2^{25/2}$.¹

The holistic character of this philosophical approach to physical theory, requires that one's empirical data must in the relevant sense be complete. But it can be complete for the purpose of theory construction without being empirically correct. In Hegel's perspective, the mistaken assumption that the Moon was a planet was a fortunate error for the Pythagoreans; and its correction was a misfortune for Kepler since with only six moving bodies he was doomed to spend a lifetime trying to fill the five intervals with the five regular solids.²

In point of fact, they were *all* operating with incomplete data. Hegel wanted to show that the simple series (he calls it an 'arithmetic progression', but once the initial interval (3) is established it actually proceeds by powers of 2), originally formulated by Wolff but generally called 'Bode's Law' 'does not in any way pertain to philosophy'. According to the

¹ Hegel's series is: 1, 2, 2^2 , 2^3 , $2^{9/2}$, 2^8 , $2^{25/2}$. It should be noted that this case tells against my contention that a 'procreative' series of numbers ought, on philosophical grounds, to begin with a surd. This position accords well with Hegel's treatment of irrational ratios in the *Dissertation* and with all of his discussions, now and later, of the use of infinitesimal quantities in the differential calculus. He may therefore have regarded his calculations for Saturn's moons as still not expressed in final form. But in the immediate context, he was certainly pleased to be able to conclude with a series that contained 4 of the first 5 'Timaeon' numbers (including 8, which he had been obliged to modify for his primary series).

² Every book about Kepler deals with this. Petry quotes Kepler's own account of how his struggle began (*Nature*, i. 370). (Ironically enough, the quotation is itself a red herring at that point in the *Encyclopaedia*, since Hegel claims there (*Nature*, i. 281, line 2) that Kepler considered the *numbers* in the *Timaeus*. The correct data about these numbers are given in Petry's note on Kepler's *Harmonice Mundi*, op. cit., ii. 252-3.)

Wolff-Bode series there ought to be a planet between Mars and Jupiter. In the very months in which Hegel was turning back to his German manuscript and calculations, the Sicilian Piazzi, was reporting the successful verification of the 'law' to the Berlin astronomer, J. E. Bode. Their correspondence about the discovery of the asteroid Ceres was published almost exactly contemporaneously with Hegel's dissertation. Within a few years four asteroids were known, and Hegel duly takes account of them in his Berlin lectures on celestial physics.¹

This misfortune for his procreative numbers has brought a lot of undeserved obloquy upon poor Hegel's head. He committed none of the sins of apriorism that have so often been credited to him. He admits that the discovery of planets and their distances is a matter for empirical inquiry. He only claims, as any scientific investigator must, that the empirical inquiry is carried on in the belief that natural phenomena conform to a rational pattern. Having found a mathematical formula that not only fits the facts but is consistent with his general theory he declares that his opponents are wasting their time. If someone with hindsight wants to condemn Hegel for this he is laying it down that we must *always* look for something without finding it, before we are entitled to say that it is not there. Bode and the astronomers who found what his 'law' told them to look for, had *no* theoretical foundation for their position; and there is still no theoretical justification for the series (which does not work for Neptune).

Some lessons concerning the theory of scientific method can perhaps be drawn from this little episode. But the main one is depressing rather than encouraging. Thus we might say that one lesson is that a useful hypothesis must always go beyond the facts so that it will suggest its own tests. This is true enough, but its applicability to the philosophic attempt to

¹ Hegel explicitly acknowledged that his *Dissertation* was mistaken in the 1st edn. of the *Encyclopaedia* (1817, sect. 224). In his Berlin lectures he still regards the Timaeon numbers as a model of what is needed; but he accepts the Bode series as the necessary foundation of an up-to-date theory. He continues to treat it as an 'arithmetic' progression because the crucial distinction for him is still the one between a 'generative' sequence of *powers*, and any series produced without internal self-reference; and his results are clearly disappointing to him. But the fact that he now recognizes the essential incompleteness of the data as a radical difficulty, is shown by his explicit declaration at this point that we cannot demonstrate *everything* on the basis of the *Begriff*. (See Petry, *Nature*, i. 280-1).

make a coherent system of all the metaphysical assumptions and basic presuppositions of science is debatable. Here the attempt to avoid conflict with known facts is Herculean enough—and this attempt, which Hegel conscientiously made seems more admirable than the confident brashness with which Schelling offered his speculative physics as a guide for research, suggesting that where there were no known facts that answered to his theoretical requirements further research would bring them to light.¹ Hegel's rigorous concentration upon rendering coherent what is definitely known or believed is surely wiser, because enough unsolved difficulties and problems will always remain to ensure continued growth. The real lesson here is rather that even if our hypothesis is open to testing, we can have no secure grounds for believing that it is self-correcting in the relevant respects. For in so far as our hypothesis fits the *known* facts we cannot be certain what the relevant respects are. The hypothesis may point (as Hegel's did) directly *away* from the crucial line of inquiry; and since we cannot pursue all lines of inquiry, we must resign ourselves to the fact that we are bound to keep on looking where our theories tell us to. One thing that does seem to follow from this is that the development of a variety of competitive theories is healthy; and it must be admitted that the thrust of Hegel's philosophy of nature is rather opposed to that, precisely because of his laudable desire to embrace the actual data of science in his coherently organized philosophical account.

3. *Mechanism, Chemism, and Organism*

The *Dissertation* has a restricted goal. Even from the internal evidence—e.g. the remark about what 'physical philosophy teaches' regarding the necessary identity of the gravitational centre with the source of light² we can see that there was more

¹ 'Darstellung', *Werke*, iv. 114.

² *Erste Druckschriften*, p. 386; as shown above (pp. 76–77), the *Natural Law* essay helps us to understand this. But anyone who wants to know more can depend with perfect safety upon Schelling's *Von der Weltseele* (1798) with its introductory treatise 'On the relation of the Real and Ideal in Nature or development of the primary axioms of natural "philosophy" on the principles of gravity and light'.

in Hegel's general theory of the 'body of the Idea' than can be securely recovered from this source. But we are better off with respect to this first part of his earliest philosophy of nature than with respect to any other. The career of the Idea when, to use Hegel's suggestive theological metaphor, it 'comes down to Earth', is illumined for us in its details only by some fairly direct remarks and illustrations in the *Difference* essay and the Divine Triangle report; and by a few more oblique references elsewhere.

One important fact indicated by Hegel's summary for the 'Introduction to Philosophy' of October 1801 is that the straightforward opposition between 'physics' as a speculative concept, and 'mechanics' as a reflective one, was not maintained even in his first course at Jena. This simple opposition is typical of Hegel's Frankfurt standpoint; it forms a link between the *Dissertation* and the 'System-Programme'. When we read that the Idea comes on Earth 'to the organic or to individuality, after it has comprehended the ideal moments of the concept of the organic, namely the mechanical *as it is posited on Earth*, and the chemical'¹ we can fairly safely infer that Hegel has already begun to frame his polemic against Newton in terms of a contrast between 'absolute or infinite mechanics' and 'finite mechanics', and not, any longer, in terms of the simpler opposition of speculative 'physics' and reflective 'mechanics'. This conceptual development is directly coherent with the establishment of 'absolute reflection' as a bridge between finite thought and speculation in the *Difference* essay.² The fact that it has not already happened in

¹ *Die Idee des absoluten Wesens*, 2a (in *NKA*, v. 263); cf. Baum and Meist, *Hegel-Studien*, xii. 1977, 48 (my italics). The fact that these two are given as moments of the concept of organism helps us to interpret the complaint in the *Natural Law* essay that 'the principle of mechanics has intruded into chemistry and *Naturwissenschaft*, and that of chemistry again has intruded quite particularly into the latter.' Each moment has its sphere; and *Naturwissenschaft* here means 'organic science' since it is only an organism that has a self-sustaining *Natur*. The employment of mechanical analysis at this level will be 'formal' like Fichte's theory of natural law; and the employment of chemical concepts will be merely 'relative' like Hobbes's theory of the State of Nature.

² *Difference*, *NKA*, iv. 16, 15-19, 36; Harris and Cerf, pp. 94-8. (At the beginning of the *Natural Law* essay, 'Mechanics and Physics' are coupled as 'essentially philosophical sciences', *NKA*, iv. 417, 5-6; Knox and Acton, p. 55.)

the *Dissertation* is persuasive evidence that the main body of that work is older than the *Difference* essay.

'Finite' or Newtonian mechanics is evidently the first moment in the life of the Earth as a 'universal individual'. Chemism, as the second moment, embraced all the polarized phenomena of magnetism, electricity, and chemical affinity.¹ The 'totality' of mechanism and chemism—the 'individuality' of the Earth itself—is reached in the 'meteorological process' of the physical elements. Hegel could not help being immensely interested in this, because he was convinced that climate conditions the temperament of the *Volksgeist*, and hence influences all the higher manifestations of *spiritual* culture.² But information on his views about meteorology in the early Jena period is very sparse. He certainly held that the 'chemism' of the Earth-process is total or 'infinite'—or, in other words, that the process of elementary 'tension' can produce an absolute transmutation, specifically of air into water and water into air.³

This meteorological process is the formative context for the mineral system of the Earth. Hegel was always very much interested in geology. In the sporadically ordered variety of

¹ For this stage the *Difference* essay provides some indirect evidence. See *NKA*, iv, 73, 7–74, 9 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 168–9; cf. sect. 'IA' in my proposed reconstruction, *ibid.*, p. 59). There is an interesting illustration of how magnetism is the dominant *intuition* of chemism, and 'electricity' is the dominant *concept*, in the analogy that Hegel draws in the *System of Ethical Life* (*Schriften*, 1913, p. 440; Harris and Knox, p. 120).

Some very plausible hypotheses about the 'mechanism' and 'chemism' of the Earth as Hegel conceived them in 1801/2 can be derived from the earliest fragmentary drafts of his natural philosophy in 1803/4. But I have chosen to discuss them in Ch. VI (see pp. 254–5, 259, 280–2, below) for the reasons given in p. 259 n. 45. For retrospective notes and conjectures see pp. 240, 242–4, 246–51, 253 n. 2, 254–5, 259–60, 261, 263 n. 1, 264 nn. 2, 4, 268 nn. 275, 278–9, 280–3, 292 n. 3, 294 n. 1.

² See, e.g. *Natural Law*, *NKA*, iv, 479, 1–37 (Knox and Acton, pp. 126–7); *Difference*, *NKA*, iv, 14, 13–21 and 80, 2–15 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 91, 177). The application of the theory in this latter passage shows that Schelling's theory of terrestrial *magnetism* is the conceptual context for this interaction of physical and ethical nature. (Schelling's own application of the theory can be found in *Bruno*, *Werke*, iv, 309–10.) It is fairly safe to assume that a theory of biological influence (ecological adaptation and distribution of species) went hand in hand with this ecology of ideas (though our first evidence is only for 1803—see Ch. VI, p. 282, n. 3, below).

³ See *Hegel-Studien*, x, 1975, 135 (the 'Divine Triangle'), for the dating of this piece see pp. 178–9, below; it is translated in the Appendix to Ch. IV.

geological formations he saw a frozen image of the dynamic processes of meteorology¹ and in the self-shaping of crystals, he saw an anticipatory hint of the self-generation and self-maintenance of the organism.² The mineral kingdom reveals in this way the life that is present in its seeming petrification—which our labour can only mechanically disturb—when we sow seeds and plant things in the appropriate soil and climatic conditions.³

The Earth-process, moving in the meteorological cycle, and stabilized in the mineral kingdom, brings forth plants, which Hegel regarded as living species that were not properly individuated because they are rooted in the universal individual (the Earth), and as a rule the whole plant can be propagated from a small part—sometimes even from any part—of a living specimen. Thus the plant is life generally as an objective intuition (i.e. without subjective *sensibility*) 'subsumed under the Concept'.⁴ Hegel was always an enthusiastic botanist, but I think it was the peculiarly ambivalent logical character of plants that caused his frequent appeal to flowers and fruit as analogical metaphors both for celestial structures far lower in the scale, and for spiritual phenomena far higher up.⁵

The animal is the 'Concept of the living thing subsumed under intuition'. The concept is *particularized* in the two sexes, so one needs a pair—ideally a pair coupling—for the complete intuition (instantiation in perception) of the concept. In their mating relation even a human couple is just an

¹ See esp. *Natural Law*, NKA, iv. 462, 37–463, 31 (Knox and Acton, pp. 109–10).

² The crystal is the final 'totality of the totality' for the inorganic world. This is clearly evident from *Difference*; NKA, iv. 73, 18–20 (Harris and Cerf, p. 168) and *Natural Law*; NKA, iv. 463 (Knox and Acton, p. 109).

³ Cf. Hegel's comments on the *mechanical* labour of agriculture in the *System of Ethical Life* (see esp. *Schriften*, 1913, pp. 426–7; Harris and Knox, p. 108).

⁴ See the *System of Ethical Life*, *Schriften* (1913), 426–7; Harris and Knox, p. 108.

⁵ For a good example of lower use—the Solar System—see *Natural Law*, NKA, iv. 464, 8–20 (Knox and Acton, p. 111); for a higher use (the highest!) see the metaphor in the 'Spirit of Christianity', *TW-A*, i. 376–7 (Knox and Kroner, p. 261); cf. *Toward the Sunlight*, pp. 360–1. (The example of the polyp—in *Natural Law*, NKA, iv. 479, 30–480, 18; Knox and Acton, p. 127—seems to have been chosen because it is transitional between plants and animals. In his later philosophy of nature Hegel avoids transitional forms as far as possible.)

'empirical universal'.¹ With the theory of the self-aware and self-moving, but not yet rational, animal organism the philosophy of nature reaches its final totality, the point of contraction, or unified centre of force which is the axis around which everything rotates. Here the evidence of the *Difference* essay is direct.² The 'construction of the organism' *resumes* the whole process of the Earth's individuality especially the stages of the chemical process. Mesmer's theory of animal magnetism provided a sort of 'gravitational' context here, for Hegel's own 'chemistic' theory of sexual differentiation and attraction. From the *Natural Law* essay, we learn that he had already adopted the view that organic health involves a kind of warfare of the functioning sub-systems, and that disease arises when this struggle of the members gets out of hand.³

The inwardness expressed by the animal's cry, its inarticulate demand for recognition, is the moment of the birth of consciousness where nature passes over into spirit. This dawning of independent consciousness in the 'struggle for recognition' is directly alluded to in the *Difference* essay⁴ and in the *System of Ethical Life*;⁵ the animal's cry for recognition is connected with the approach of death. All of these themes—animal magnetism, sexual chemism, the war of the organs, and the mortal struggle for recognition, are destined to become permanent features of Hegel's philosophy of organism and/or of subjective spirit.

¹ See the *System of Ethical Life, Schriften* (1913), pp. 427, 448; Harris and Knox, pp. 108, 127. The 'herdwise life of animals', *Natural Law, NKA*, iv. 463, 37-9 (Knox and Acton, p. 111) is an anticipation in nature of the 'subsumption' of this 'intuition' under the 'concept' of *Sittlichkeit*.

² *NKA*, iv. 73, 10-74, 9 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 168-9).

³ This analogy was always important for his theory of society—see *NKA*, iv. 476, 18-23 (Knox and Acton, p. 123).

⁴ *NKA*, iv. 73, 28-9 and 74, 7-9 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 168-9).

⁵ *Schriften* (1913), pp. 435-6 (Harris and Knox, pp. 115-16).

CHAPTER III

The Nature of Finite Spirit

1. *The 'System of Ethical Life'*

We are more fortunate with respect to the philosophy of Spirit at the beginning of the Jena period than we are with respect either to Logic or philosophy of Nature. Hegel's actual lecture manuscripts (on 'Natural Law') have disappeared; but his first attempt to write a systematic treatise for use in connection with these lectures has survived. This is the so-called *System der Sittlichkeit*, or 'System of Ethical Life'.¹

In his first term Hegel offered only a general survey of his system (in the 'Introduction to Philosophy') and his course on 'Logic and Metaphysics'. But for the Summer semester of 1802 he announced a course of 'Natural Law'; and it is clear that this course was given, since Rosenkranz had at least one lecture-manuscript before him upon which our systematic manuscript was based.²

By the beginning of the Winter semester 1802, Hegel's 'Logic and Metaphysics' was almost ready for the printer.³ But he was not satisfied with the state of his practical philosophy;

¹ A more detailed discussion both of the background and of the content of this MS will be found in my Introduction to the translation. The present discussion is concerned only with placing it in context so that its relation to Hegel's other systematic MSS can be clearly perceived. I have had to make a number of corrections here, but I have avoided mere repetition as far as possible. I have also adopted Lasson's first edition (1913) as the reference text here, because the editors of Vol. v. of the Critical Edition have informed me that, although far from perfect, it is better than the 2nd edition of 1923—on which the translation was based. (Users of the 1967 *Sonderdruck* of the 1923 text will usually be able to find the page by subtracting 412 from the page reference for 1913. The pagination of the 1923 edition itself is indicated in the margin of the translation.)

² See *Hegel's Leben*, pp. 132–41. The whole passage is translated in the Appendix to the translation (Harris and Knox, pp. 178–86).

³ See *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 53 (lecture announcement for Winter 1802/3).

his students could not understand him, and the class broke up early.¹ Something of the same sort happened in Hegel's first class on 'Logic and Metaphysics'² and the result seems to have been the same. In both cases Hegel retired to his study to produce the manuscript for a class manual in preparation for the lectures of the following term. But in this second instance it is apparent that the new project involved the absorption and 'sublation' of the old one. For the *System of Ethical Life* is clearly *not* designed as an independent treatise but as a part—specifically as the *third* part—of a single textbook of systematic philosophy. The already completed 'Logic and Metaphysics' text became merely the first part of the new project. The middle part, the 'philosophy of nature' was written up (at least roughly).³ Much of the concluding 'resumption of the whole into one' was already discursively contained in the lecture manuscripts; but we have no surviving evidence tending to show that it was written up as part of the 'system' as Hegel projected it at this time.

This general view is the only one that can account for the rigorously 'speculative' character of the manuscript that we have. For we know that Hegel was plentifully supplied with critical discussions of the prevailing trends and concepts in Natural Law and ethical theory. He proposed to lecture gratis on Fichte's *Grundlage des Naturrechts* in Summer 1802. It is not likely that he did so—indeed it seems almost certain that he did not⁴—but his own essay on *Natural Law* gives us a fairly clear picture of what he wanted to say. This essay was completed at about the time that he embarked on the actual writing of the *System of Ethical Life*.⁵ As we read it we can

¹ For this we have the testimony of Henry Crabb Robinson (see H. Marquardt: *Crabb Robinson und seine deutsche Freunde*, i. 84). The hypothesis about how the writing of the *System der Sittlichkeit* MS fits into this context was suggested to me orally by Kurt Meist. But it is only a further refinement of my general hypothesis regarding the way this MS was generated and rendered obsolete—see my Introduction to the translation, pp. 3–7.

² Nicolin, report 50.

³ See Ch. II, above, p. 74 and n. 1.

⁴ See *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 56–8 for the documents regarding this controversial proposal; and cf. the Prelude, pp. xxxii–xxxiii, above.

⁵ The essay appeared in the last two issues of the *Critical Journal*. For the last date at which the MS could have gone to the printer see H. Buchner in *Hegel-Studien*, iii. 127–8. (The *probable* date is in my view at least one month sooner—i.e. Oct. 1802. The theoretical possibility that Hegel could have worked on the concluding

appreciate, readily enough, why students would have found Hegel's *critical* approach to the subject difficult to follow. But the starkly speculative approach of the *System of Ethical Life* is certainly not easier; and the almost complete exclusion of a critical preamble and accompaniment to the discussion would be quite incomprehensible in a treatise that was meant to stand on its own feet. It is natural, even necessary, on the other hand, in the 'encyclopaedia' or 'compendium of universal philosophy' which Hegel promised for the Summer course of 1803.¹ The *System of Ethical Life* was conceived as a part of that compendium.

Even for us, it is helpful to read it in that context—as far as we can. J. H. Trede has rightly directed attention to the analogy that exists between the programme and structure of the 'Logic' of 1801/2 and the programme and structure of the *System of Ethical Life*.² I shall try to illustrate this in what follows; but illuminating as it is, it is insufficient, and it would still be inadequate even if we had the whole manuscript of the 'Logic and Metaphysics' which Hegel had by this time written. We must rely even more on the critical commentary on the rival 'reflective' views of the subject that Hegel provided in his *Natural Law* essay. The two texts—on *Natural Law* and *Ethical Life*—are opaque for different and complementary reasons; and they become much more nearly transparent when they are put together, and subjected to close scrutiny in double harness.

Thus, the main structure of the *System der Sittlichkeit* mirrors the 'Logic' in the sense that all of the main 'forms of life' (categories) established by 'nature' (i.e. the biological organism and the stable environment) are swallowed up in a 'negative infinite' which can finally be recognized as the Ego (the practical Ego now, not the theoretical one). Then practical Reason develops to a totality of absolute reflection in

instalment of the essay later seems to be decisively excluded by the fact that *the whole text* of the essay was printed with continuous page numbering in some copies of Vol. ii. part 2—see *NKA*, iv. 532). The text of the essay is now in *NKA*, iv. 417–85; and there is a translation by T. M. Knox (Philadelphia, 1975).

¹ See *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 54.

² See 'Hegels frühe Logik', *Hegel-Studien*, vii. 1972, 152–6. (Trede's conception of the 'systematic' structure of the *System der Sittlichkeit* is more fully developed in his 'Mythologie und Idee', *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 9, 1973, pp. 170–204).

the 'syllogistic' relations of the social classes; and finally the whole organization of finite experience is transcended in the conceptual evolution of Religion, regarded as the biography of God. This real appearance of the positive or 'true Infinite' corresponds to the Idea of the one perennial philosophy in the Metaphysics. At its climax it becomes the last phase of the system itself, the 'resumption of the whole into one'.

As far as we know, Hegel did not write out any of this phenomenology of the 'true Infinite' systematically. But we can see from the reports of Rosenkranz, that this was what stood in his lecture-manuscript; and with the clues provided by a correct appreciation of the 'Logic and Metaphysics' outline we can see what the total pattern of the argument was. But our knowledge of the logic itself is too fragmentary and hypothetical to offer much help with the interpretation of the detailed argument of the fully systematic manuscript that we have. Here, on the contrary, it is our interpretation of what we have that must confirm and illuminate the more hypothetical reconstruction already proposed for the manuscript that is lost.

The parallel between Hegel's logic and his ethics, at this stage, throws light on the ambiguities of the adjective 'critical' which he himself applied to the former. For the ethical documents that are preserved illustrate the two very different senses of 'critical' in Hegel's usage at this time. It is the *Natural Law* essay that is 'critical' in the obvious sense of being directed at the overthrow of all 'reflective' theories, and especially of the system of 'finite subjectivity' established by Fichte on Kantian foundations. In this perspective, the *System of Ethical Life* clearly corresponds to the 'speculative' or reconstructed logic, of which some elements can still be detected in our sources, and especially in the Kant section of *Faith and Knowledge*. But the *System of Ethical Life* is itself 'critical' in another deeper sense—and so was the 'speculative' logic whose structure it mirrors for us. It is 'critical' because it is concerned with the 'finite *Bild*, or image, of the Absolute Idea. Its ultimate aim therefore, must be the negative one of showing up the limit, the aspect of finitude, the essential mortality of the *Bild*, the inevitable dissolution of the union between its 'soul' and its 'body'. The truly infinite (and hence

immortal) union of soul and body (God and Nature) is the theme of the religious 'biography of God' which corresponds to Metaphysics.¹ Similarly Hegel's 'logic' is critical in the Kantian sense that he sees it as concerned with the limitations of our nature, and the conditions of our mortal existence, and our finite cognition. He contrasts this with the recovery of the divine standpoint of the older speculative theology achieved in his 'Metaphysics' through the proper comprehension of the logical and historical dialectic which Kant saw as fatal to all the pretensions of pure Reason in its independent or unbounded exercise. The logical dialectic (the antinomies of pure Reason), is overcome by the speculative reconstruction of what still remains an essentially critical logic. The historical dialectic is overcome in Metaphysics.

It would seem that the crucial step in the programme is the first. The antinomic character of finite experience is to be overcome *progressively* through the connection of its forms with each other in speculation: 'What they are [as finite] they are only through their opposition; thus as soon as the opposition is sublated, and they are posited as identical [with their opposites], their finitude is at once sublated too.'² The same is true for the forms of 'ethical life according to relation'; and the 'opposition' that must ultimately be overcome is that between logic and life itself, or between the form and content of experience, between logical concept and empirical intuition.

That Hegel is thinking in this context is shown by his adoption of the Kantian dichotomy of *Anschauung* and *Begriff*. The *System of Ethical Life* is organized as a series of 'potencies' (*Potenzen*), in each of which a final equilibrium of 'intuition' and 'concept' is achieved, after each side has reciprocally 'subsumed' the other. The term *Potenz* Hegel took over from Schelling; but, as far as I have been able to discover, Schelling never used the Kantian *Anschauung* and

¹ 'Theme' is used here to mean 'discursive thread'. The substantial *topic* of Hegel's practical philosophy in 1801-3 is the integral stability and self-sufficiency of the public life. Even the 'biography of God' returns in a circle to the intuitive 'life in the Volk', from which it takes its rise (and which has already engulfed the private life of natural or relational ethics).

² *Dass die Philosophie*, 17b (in *NKA*, v. 271-2); see Baum and Meist, *Hegel-Studien*, xii. 1977, 55.

Begriff, or the logical relation of 'subsumption' in anything like the same way. Hegel's usage was suggested by one of Kant's dialectical boundary-lines in the *Critique of Judgement*. Speaking of 'intuitive understanding' which, of course, he claims we do not have, Kant says that it moves from the 'synthetic universal, or intuition of a whole as a whole, to the particular—that is to say from the whole to the parts'.¹ What Hegel calls 'Anschauung' is exactly the sort of singular perception which because it embraces a tension of opposite forces as one whole, can reveal itself as a 'synthetic universal'—the 'concept' which it is therefore said to 'subsume'. The concept which then, in its turn, subsumes intuition, is the *wider* whole, not yet perceived as a whole but only as a 'motion', through which the dependence of the already intuited whole, its status as a moment or a part of a greater whole, is revealed. When the intuitive movement from whole to parts, and the conceptual movement from parts to whole are perfectly reciprocal, we have a 'totality' or an Idea.

The *System of Ethical Life* thus presents us with a progressive conceptual movement from an undeveloped intuition toward the conceptual whole that is implicit in it. But there is an important sense in which the intuitive movement from whole to parts is primary for Hegel's systematic method. What guides his whole argument is the positive intuition of the Absolute Idea, the determinate, fully individuated conception of the life of the *Volk*, constructed like a mathematical ideal, in 'pure intuition' (but obviously suggested and pointed to by our historical experience); and the negative intuition of the 'Absolute Concept', the unity of contradictions that is directly intuited as the freedom of the singular rational agent.

From Hegel's positive appreciation of the achievements of the empirical and formal schools in natural law theory we can see that he credits the empiricists with having grasped the primacy of intuitive wholeness in the positive sense (the

¹ *Critique of Judgement* § 77; *Akad.* v. 407 (Meredith, *Teleological Judgement*, p. 63). See further my discussion in the Introduction to the translation (Harris and Knox, pp. 12–20). The present account of the 'Motion of the Begriff', however, is a correction of my naïve oversimplification there. The dialectical union of 'intuition' and 'concept' certainly antedates the adoption of *Potenz* terminology. In the *Difference* essay Hegel calls the union a 'synthesis' (Kant's name) or a 'totality' (Fichte's). cf. p. 71, above.

shining example is Montesquieu);¹ while the formalists grasped the primacy of the negative intuition of freedom.² Of course, each side misunderstood what it had grasped. The empiricists substituted haphazard conceptual sequences for their unified intuition; and the formalists expressed their conceptual infinite in dogmatic intuitive postulation. From Hegel's critical exposure of the failures of the two parties we can learn in each case what the required complementary term signifies. His criticism of the empiricists for the naïve way in which they put forward one side of a system of conceptual relationships as absolute, shows us what the *infinity* (i.e. circularity) of the concept means in his understanding of it.³ And his critique of the *emptiness* of the Categorical Imperative shows us what it means for the concept to be 'subsumed by intuition'.⁴ But the most important of all the insights that we can gain from the *Natural Law* essay for the understanding of the *System der Sittlichkeit* is the recognition that speculative construction, like speculative criticism, really begins from the 'intuition of the whole as a whole'. It is the 'intuition of the *Volk*' and the pure Concept of 'absolute life in the *Volk*' (i.e. voluntary self-sacrifice) that is the *ratio essendi et cognoscendi* of the *System of Ethical Life*.

2. *The intuition of life*

Having said this much about what is really primary in the treatise, let us now turn our attention to the 'intuition' which Hegel actually proposes first for our attention, the primitive root of human experience from which both the negative and the positive infinite are to unfold. The opposition which speculative insight must ultimately overcome is that between logic and life itself, or between the form and the content of experience (the aspects designated by Kant's terms 'concept' and 'intuition').

But if intuition is to be posited transcendently, i.e. as identical with its 'concept', how are we to free the forms of

¹ See *NKA*, iv. 428, 8-27; 481, 1-23; Knox and Acton, pp. 67-8, 128-9.

² *NKA*, iv. 441, 36-443, 3; Knox and Acton, pp. 83-5.

³ *NKA*, iv. 421, 16-422, 6; 427, 29-428, 27; 430, 1-30; Knox and Acton, pp. 59-60, 67-8, 69-70.

⁴ *NKA*, iv. 438, 18-441, 2; Knox and Acton, pp. 79-82.

intuition from the accidental bundling in which they empirically occur, and array them in the order in which they 'come forth from Reason'? One of Hegel's most powerful complaints against the 'empirical' approach to natural law is that the 'state of nature' from which they begin is a matter of arbitrary selection and stipulated definition.¹ How can he avoid the reproach himself?

In the *Difference* essay he offers us a description of his method that includes the criterion by which the starting-point is chosen: 'The identity that is least dichotomous—at the objective pole, matter, at the subjective pole, feeling (self-consciousness)—is at the same time an infinitely opposed identity, a thoroughly relative identity.'²

But this only really takes us a small part of the way toward adequate understanding of Hegel's actual starting-point. Thus there are quite primitive 'feelings' (e.g. fear) which seem to be most 'dichotomous' (rather than least) and which have been posited as fundamental (e.g. by Hobbes). Hegel's choice of terms was clearly influenced by that of Fichte before him.³ But his interpretation of his primary intuition is rooted in the independent meditations of his Frankfurt years. The 'feeling' that is 'least dichotomous' is that of *love*; and out of it, Hegel evolves his Idea (his intuitive concept) of the family. The Hobbesian emotion of *fear* is crucial, as we shall see, in the transition from natural to social ethics. But Hegel posits it 'identically', that is he posits it as indissolubly united with 'glory'—which Hobbes regards as more primitive. For Hegel, it is glory, rather than fear, which mediates the transition to society proper. But that comes later; the negative moment that brings natural consciousness to birth is not the *emotion* of fear, but rather the *drive* of need. It is the love which meets that need (and prevents the occurrence of the radical Hobbesian fear of death) which brings Reason to birth. And, of course, what comes to birth under that name is very different from the Hobbesian ability to calculate the requirements for self-preservation.

¹ NKA, iv. 421–30 (esp. 430); Knox and Acton, pp. 59–70, esp. 69–70.

² NKA, iv. 31, 5–8; Harris and Cerf, pp. 113–14. (The passage is quoted in its context on p. 71, above.)

³ Cf. *Wissenschaftslehre* (1794), *Werke*, i. 289 (Heath and Lachs, pp. 254–5); and *Difference*, NKA, iv. 48, 21–2 (Harris and Cerf, p. 136).

It is only by replacing the *System of Ethical Life* in the context for which it was intended, that we can either properly justify, or properly interpret its starting-point. Hegel's determination to bring Hobbes and Fichte together, and to criticize them both at once, is strongly suggested by a reading of the *Natural Law* essay, and confirmed by the later evolution of Hegel's philosophy of spirit. But it was the theory of the animal organism in its specific relations that Hegel relied on to rescue his spiritual starting-point from the real contingency of experience, and to banish any surviving appearance of it: 'the manifold of these connections finally frees itself from contingency: they get their places in the context of the objective totality of knowledge, and their objective completeness is accomplished. The philosophizing that does not construct itself into a system is a constant flight from limitations.'¹ We must avoid this fate of empiricism by depending on the foundation already established in the Philosophy of Nature.²

In nature, nothing thinks. Thus here the universality of the Concept can be expressed only externally in the order of the whole: in the stable individuation of the ever-changing chaos (as when the motions of the wandering planets reveal themselves as an eternally inviolable pattern); in the inexorable transience of whatever seems permanent though not rational (as when the very elements are, supposedly, transformed in the meteorological process). When man is considered in a 'state of nature', the rationality which is his 'concept' becomes *ideally* external to him, and reveals itself as an

¹ *Difference*, NKA, iv. 30, 24-8 (Harris and Cerf, p. 113).

² The impassioned polemic against the empiricists and the formalists in the *Natural Law* essay would all recoil upon Hegel's own head (as his extremely active philosophical conscience would forcibly inform him) if he did not have his own philosophy of nature—the *real* career of the Idea from the 'simple substance' of the Aether to its 'marriage with absolute infinity' (in rational self-consciousness) clearly worked out. The *amount* of 'natural philosophy' in the *Natural Law* essay not only shows Hegel's awareness of this; it shows that he has done his duty in this regard, and that he wants to *demonstrate* this as far as the limited forum available to him would permit—see esp. NKA, iv. 461, 35-468, 19 (Knox and Acton, pp. 108-13). My own attack here is directed mainly at Kimmerle, *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 1967, 162. He does not repeat the error explicitly in his book, though he still depends upon it by implication (*Abgeschlossenheit des Denkens*, pp. 113-15). It is a mistake of Kimmerle against himself, for he was the first to see how fundamental the concept of 'Nature' is for Hegel in these early Jena years. I am a supporter of his main position, rather than a critic.

external fate that controls him like gravity in the sky or 'chemistry' in the elements. It is the gravity of human feeling which 'subsumes' natural need and natural desire, only to be engulfed in its turn in the chemism of human freedom. Then the organic balance of stable necessity and unstable contingency is exhibited in its true equilibrium, the life of the *Volk*. Since this equilibrium, unlike the gravitational one in the heavens or the chemical one on earth, has to make itself before it can come to know itself, both the phase of 'natural ethics' or 'ethics according to [naturally determined] relation', and the transition from that state to the condition of political freedom are also identifiable as stages in the historical development of human society. But Hegel is not directly concerned with any historic transition. He is concerned rather with the *logical* transition from the reflective to the speculative standpoint by way of what he calls 'absolute reflection'.

From the standpoint of simple reflection human society is explained by fictional constructions which would make it an unintelligible miracle if we allowed them any real existence—just as Newtonian 'empirical physics' makes the existence of the Solar System a miracle. The Newtonian theorist of society is Hobbes. On his principles we ought all to have perished,¹ just as surely as everything ought to fall to one centre at the very beginning of things upon Newtonian principles. Instead what we find is a veritable 'war of all against all' among these reflective fictions²—the Kantian dialectic of pure Reason. The aim of Hegel's method is to show how that dialectic can be exhibited as a connected progression.

Given that the immediate presupposition of natural ethics is the theory of the animal organism as a self-sustaining, self-reproducing *Gattung*, it is not surprising to find that the substantial foundation of natural ethics is a nuclear *family*. Hegel's discussion of family relations is couched in sufficiently general terms to cover the patriarchal polygamy and adoption

¹ Cf. *NKA*, iv. 425, 21–426, 5; Knox and Acton, pp. 64–5.

² Cf. *NKA*, iv. 421, 16–422, 6; Knox and Acton, pp. 59–60. (On the relation between Hegel and Hobbes in this period, see esp. Ludwig Siep, 'Der Kampf um Anerkennung', *Hegel-Studien*, ix. 1974, 155–207. I do not agree with Siep in every particular, and I hope to have clarified the relation somewhat further, but I have consciously built upon his work.)

of servile children that we find in the Old Testament; and in his account of the negative phase, the family assumes a tribal or clan-like character. But his norm for 'natural ethics' is the establishment and secure reproduction of independent family units like those postulated in Plato's *Laws*, and assumed as civic elements in Aristotle's *Politics*. It is the relations accepted as 'natural' in the *polis*, that are treated as *normal* in Hegel's 'natural ethics'.¹ Thus it is indeed the 'nature' of the *politikon zōon* that is viewed as the universal chemically buried within, or gravitationally floating above, the individual self in the ethics of biological dependence.

In this context, too, we can understand why Hegel begins with the feeling of 'satisfied desire'. Even in Hobbesian terms the cycle of need and satisfaction is more primitive than the dialectic of dominance and submissiveness which is Hegel's speculative integration of the Hobbesian principle of 'glory'. Hegel takes dominance and submissiveness to be both *equally* natural and, of course, he accepts this from Aristotle rather than from Hobbes. But it is some time before his analysis gets to it. He begins with 'the subsumption of concept [nature in general] under intuition [the conscious organism]'. His 'feeling' is an active process which he defines in terms of its goal. The natural stimulus of need and the organic response of consumption are both present (but already overcome) in the primitive mode of 'practical feeling' which is *enjoyment*. Hegel insists that in the original 'identity' of practical feeling there is no 'intuition' of singleness (that begins as the sense of 'need') and hence 'no self-knowledge in the subject'.² It is the unconscious satisfaction of the baby, or of the sleeping adult. Only this unconsciousness is the 'feeling' that is 'least

¹ Here I am consciously close to the position of K.-H. Ilting, ('Hegels Auseinandersetzung mit der aristotelischen Politik', *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, lxxi. 1963/4, 38-58) and M. Riedel, *Studien zu Hegels Rechtsphilosophie*, Frankfurt, 1971. But in the end I am closer to Siep (see esp. 'Praktische philosophie und Geschichte beim Jenaer Hegel' in *Der Idealismus und sein Gegenwart*, Hamburg, Meiner, pp. 388-411).

² The absolute primacy of this 'identity'—which corresponds to the methodical requirement of *Difference* (see p. 109) is made clear at *Schriften* (1913), p. 423. (The paragraph is marked 'aaa' because Hegel first wrote 'aa' and then realized he needed the main heading '(a)' before he began subdivisions. He failed to cross out his proleptic error and Lasson read the result as a triple alpha. Hegel's putative intention is correctly indicated in the translation, Harris and Knox, p. 104.

dichotomous' for the single individual; and it is primary because all consciousness is naturally determined to begin as a cycle of need, consumption, and satisfaction without labour.

It may be that I am wrong to be guided by the *Difference* essay into underlining the unconscious night of satisfied desire as the logical starting-point of the *System of Ethical Life*. The moving principle of Hegel's philosophy of action is the singular consciousness as a negative response (consumption) to the negative stimulus of nature (felt need). But whether we think of it as at rest or in motion, the unity of the cycle is in its goal of achieved satisfaction. Natural ethics is the structure of the complete, self-maintaining cycle of the satisfaction of natural need. On the other hand, the fact that what is thus established is a precarious balance of *negative* forces becomes the ground of the movement to a higher level.

Satisfaction is only 'realized' through labour. Man differs from the animals in that he is not just a particular organism achieving the satisfaction of particular need through the finding and consumption of particular objects in the environment. Labour differs from the effort of simple consumption (which logically includes all hunting and gathering), because it produces things that are intended for retention as possessions (consumables) and things that essentially must be so retained (tools, including tilled and planted soil as a crucial paradigm case).¹ The first form of true labour is the *conceptualization* of the particular elements involved in the cycle of desire and satisfaction. This is the first 'subsumption of intuition under concept'. One can only be said to labour when one thinks of 'needs in general', and of consumables as the means to the satisfaction of needs that do not yet exist (are not yet felt). Once one gets to that stage even such a simple response to need as the plucking of a ripe fruit can be seen as the first moment of labour (taking possession). The full significance of Hegel's retroactive glance at this will become apparent later on.²

¹ Like Plato, I find the big letters of social organization easier to read than the small ones of the individual soul. Each has its risks and difficulties, however. Thus, for instance, I suppose that even the most primitive hunting and gathering culture has possessions and even tools. But only an agricultural society, I think, exemplifies Hegel's concept of 'labour' completely. The crucial points are the reduction of territory to a possession, and labouring to make tools which are for use in other labours.

² See *Schriften*, usw. (1913), p. 425; Harris and Knox, p. 107, lines 3-7.

For the moment what matters is the distinction of the 'syllogistic' forms of labour in the full sense: *generic* labour (on the earth, to make it our tool for the production of plants); *specific* labour (on animals, to make them tools for labour itself); *individual* labour (on ourselves, to make ourselves the actuality of Reason). At this point the reactive conception of labour reveals its one-sidedness and a return to the beginning of the argument becomes necessary. For human intelligence is not properly a tool, and the *Bildung* which forms it is a reciprocal interaction, so that the agent/patient contrast which is basic to the concept of labour, must now be superseded. Also the opposition between working on the universal environment (the soil) and forming the active agent (the beast of burden) is superseded, because in forming himself, man also, simultaneously, forms his own cultural environment.

The fact that *Bildung* is only half-comprehended as labour is crucial. We must go back to the beginning now because *Bildung* is not just work, but work that carries its own immediate satisfaction with it. Because it is relational, because it is essentially a mediating process, it belongs properly to the moment of labour as the 'dominance of the concept'. But in order to grasp it correctly we must go back to the original dichotomy of feeling into the opposition of two negations: natural stimulus and conscious response. The immediate totality of this relation (or 'concept' of feeling) was not discussed then, because it is the mediation of a relation that carries us forward. But we need it now, as an essential moment of the totality that we are interested in. The 'totality' of need or desire is a reciprocal matching of stimulus and response, such that each side stimulates the other, and by its own response to the stimulus received, satisfies the need created by its own stimulating. This is the relation of sexual attraction (through which the 'concept' of the natural kind dominates its realized moments). The identity of desire and satisfaction is so immediate here, that only logic can lead us to regard this as a moment of human labour. But logic similarly requires us to regard the unconscious state prior to stimulus as satisfaction; and it will presently require us to regard the 'labour' of birth as directed to the making of an 'absolute

feeling'. These three moments of absence: the absence of consciousness, the absence of mediating labour, the absence of Reason, are the points where the darkness of nature and the dawn of spirit meet.

We need to insert this logical moment here because the totality of labour as such, the moment where the ultimate purpose of labour is made manifest as a form of labouring, is in the general dependence of children on their parents. Here labour is present in the form of a burden of responsibility, but it exists transcended in the satisfaction of achieving the goal of our natural existence. We should notice that since it exists here as a relationship, as a dominant 'concept' it is not necessarily a success at the level of direct perception. The dreams of parents may go unfulfilled, and the real needs of children may not be met. Thus, the relationship is not yet the *perfect* totality of labour and satisfaction; it is only the totality of labour as labour, i.e. as a mediating activity.

Bildung, the sharing of conceptualized experience on an equal footing, can now be seen as the relational totality towards which the whole evolution of 'feeling' has been moving. Because it is a relation, a concept, it is subject to empirical failure, like the dependence-relation of parents and children. But that absence of finality is less important than the potential for further development that is opened up by the abolition of familial dependence in *Bildung*. What we have when parents and children reach the stage of converse as equals is the independent individuals who can become citizens.

The *Potenz* of achieved satisfaction, or of the perfectly individuated totality of desire and labour, is now easy to comprehend. The relations are perfectly individuated in their middle terms, because the middle terms are perceived or intuited as referring directly to the relations. All that needs to be underlined here in Hegel's discussion is the way that these easily intuited entities represent, not the 'dominance of intuition' but a perfect balance of intuition and concept.

Thus Hegel has remarked earlier that 'the concept of the living thing subsumed under intuition is the animal.'¹ And he specifically pointed out there that the subsumption was not

¹ *Schriften* (1913), p. 427; Harris and Knox, p. 108.

reciprocal. The animal *is* the concept of its Kind, but it does not *have* the concept of itself as alive. We may say the same for the child. But it would not exist as a *human* baby, as the desired end of a conscious relationship, if it did not have parents who have some concept of humanity under which it is subsumed. Their concept of humanity is what is realized, or individuated in the family which is completed by the baby's arrival; and this is what gives to the baby its quite immediately intuited significance as a destined participant in the world of *Bildung*, not a mere half-link in the chain of species-maintenance.

The 'labour' that produces the potentially rational being is less rational than that which produces a tool in the ordinary sense. Tools are the products of labour that are made for the purpose of labouring; hence they can be intuitively identified by those who know what they are, precisely because their use in the 'conceptual' process or 'relation' of labouring is known.

The final totality (of human animal and tool), through which the child gets its destined status as an individuated intelligence, is speech (as the 'tool of Reason'). Man becomes a participant in the realm of *Bildung* as a speaker. What he utters is minimally, an intuited sound. But if that sound is a *logos*, what is directly intuited is a concept. The problem of whether we have intuited the speaker's meaning *correctly* refers us to the essentially relational character of intelligence as a process; and the *tool* through which that process itself is made visible, so that the world of *Bildung* can (at the higher political level) be intuited, is the 'corporeal sign'. But, of course, the adequacy and even the correctness of our understanding of an individual's utterance is largely a matter of whether we have intuited his behaviour pattern as a whole, whether we have attended to the total body-language which Hegel calls 'gesture' or 'mien'.¹ All too often, a speaker's words

¹ *Schriften* (1913), pp. 433-4; Harris and Knox, p. 114. Hegel even suggests that gesture (the active expression) and mien (the stable body-context) have a 'totality' in 'the glance of the eye'. Even if we do not accept the view that a speaker's basic sincerity or hypocrisy can be reliably evident 'from his look' to an interlocutor who is sufficiently 'intuitive', this comment provides a very clear illustration of what 'the totality of *Anschauung* and *Begriff*' means in Hegel's usage. His view does not require that we should be able to trust our intuitions implicitly; it only requires that we

are interpreted as if they stood independently at the conceptual pole of language as a totality, like signs left by an agent who is not now present. Pointing out that this can happen, and that it gives rise to misunderstanding, seems to me to be the best way of exhibiting the sense in which speech proper is the 'totality', whereas this present book, for example, exemplifies language at its conceptual extreme.

Having thus completed the development of the first *Potenz* of natural ethics—which we can call the 'level of finitude, reality, in the matter, or in the substance' in direct antithesis to the one we are coming to—Hegel mentions the 'negative' which was there all the time, but which he has deliberately avoided appealing to in his argument. The raising of children is the naturally necessary goal of human ethical endeavour because we are *mortal*. Death is the negative which every natural species must overcome, but Hegel has avoided stressing this external natural stimulus against which all life strives, preferring to present conscious need and striving under the positive aspect of desire. Even now he does not need to refer to the natural negative of feeling consciousness for the advancement of his own argument. He only does so for formal reasons, because he wants this *Potenz* to be visible to us as a whole. But 'death' is like 'sex' in the sub-*Potenz* of desire, or 'the tool' in the sub-*Potenz* of labour: it will get its proper place in the argument later on.

3. *The institution of property*

Whereas the first *Potenz* deals with the empirical necessities of life, the second deals with the formal necessities of thought. These formal necessities are necessities of life also, but their status as such is the result of human volition, not of natural conditions. This is the 'formal' necessity of a concept 'which is not in itself either absolute concept or absolute movement' to quote Hegel's first attempt to characterize formality. The whole development of natural law theory by Kant and Fichte has this formal character, and we can see by reference to the critique of the Categorical Imperative that the 'infinity' of the

should admit that we cannot help having intuitions, and that we must trust some of them—at least 'for the moment'.

¹ *Schriften* (1913), p. 420; Harris and Knox, p. 102.

'formal concept' is identical with its emptiness, its indifferent acceptance of any content because no content is really called for by it.¹ It does not have the 'absolute movement' of a self-maintaining mode of life in it, and it is not the 'absolute Concept' which, like Mephistopheles, condemns everything to *death*. But everything it deals with must suffer the formal death of being frozen into a reflective concept, a concept of the understanding.

It is easy enough to see why the first formal concept that Hegel needs to establish is that of *property*. The security of the family is embodied here, and in particular, the full development of the concept of labour requires secure possession of *territory*. The absolutely fundamental status of property in his social theory explains why Hegel continually reverts to this paradigm case in his criticisms of Kant. But it is not so obvious why he leads up to it through the concepts of 'division of labour' and 'surplus production'. Indeed, it requires careful consideration in order to recognize, that the dominant 'intuition' involved in the 'division of labour' is that of 'pure practical Reason' (in the sense not of Kant, but of Adam Smith, and later of Benedetto Croce). Hegel is not thinking of the division of labour that arises from specialization of skills, but rather of the processes of mechanization and homogenization which seem now to have reached their terminus in perfect automation. The logical tendency of these processes is to make labour a quantitative affair, in which no special skills, (no qualitative differences) are involved. It is fairly clear, I think, that the conceptual quantification of labour and possession is logically presupposed by the formal concept of property as something that can be alienated in fair exchange. All property must be quantifiable if we are to compare 'values'. But the *real* quantification of labour and production—the reduction of all labour to 'man-hours'—is a phenomenon of modern industrialized society. Thus Hegel's insistence on it here must be taken as an earnest of his concern with the establishment of a real 'ethical life' in his own time. His characterization of the

¹ NKA, iv. 431, 7–439, 20; Knox and Acton, pp. 71–80. (Read as a whole this critique of Kant's formalism throws light on both the 'absolute' and the 'formal' concept. Hegel's critique of Kant is focused by the paradigm case of *property*. When he turns to the problem of *coercion* he is thinking more of Fichte.)

process provides clear evidence that he recognized and understood the process of 'rationalization' which was later to occupy a focal position in the work of Max Weber. But the order of real development in history is quite the opposite of the order of logical connection which Hegel proposes; and his own historical discussions—especially in the *Natural Law* essay¹—show that Hegel recognized this. Historically, the universal acceptance of the concepts of property and legal right are the precondition of the rational quantification of labour and the establishment of a universal market, not its result. Perhaps, however, Hegel *did* believe that the ideal of *economic efficiency* was the conceptual driving force behind the triumph of Rome over the political order established by the Greeks. In that case his ordering of the conceptual moments of the family as a legal entity (the topic of this *Potenz* of 'formal infinity') makes perfect sense even in terms of the order of historical development.²

Reference to the negative of this whole formal level (violation of right) is functionally necessary at this point (whereas Hegel's passing reference to natural negation earlier was not) because the occurrence of violations is what leads on to the 'subsumption' of intuition (*my* property right) under concept (communal recognition). Stealing reveals both the universal significance of what is possessed, and the contingent, accidental, character of the relation of possession. These two logical moments are exactly what the whole institution of exchange by agreement is founded upon. The 'universal' which now emerges as subsuming the 'intuition' of utility, is the abstract concept of 'value'. 'Value' is what must remain identical in the process of fair 'exchange'. But the potential

¹ See *NKA*, iv. 454, 34–458, 20; Knox and Acton, pp. 99–103. This is the first of a series of discussions of the *Rechtzustand*; the contrast between the quotation from Plato's *Politicus* and the quotation from Gibbon illustrates the way in which Hegel wanted to distinguish the aristocratic *political* order from the bourgeois or post-political order.

² It seems to me that Hegel's general interpretation of Roman religion in his mature thought supports this hypothesis. But it is not strictly required for the understanding of the *System of Ethical Life*. Once we recognize that the infinite *Potenz* is concerned with the concepts in which 'natural law' theory has been framed since the time of Cicero, it becomes entirely natural that its development should begin from the most far-reaching 'intuition' of where modern society is going. Whichever way we interpret the text, Hegel's intuitive far-sightedness seems equally astounding.

range of the process of exchange is only fully articulated through the institution of 'contract'; and contract is a verbal entity established as *real* by its publicity, by the fact that there are witnesses. The essentially 'formal' character of what is realized in a contract becomes evident when we recognize that disputes about whether contracts have been properly fulfilled are inevitable. We are bound to find ourselves arguing about what the contract 'really means' because 'true reality cannot fall within this level.'

In this 'infinite' *Potenz* Hegel includes both the 'relative' and the 'intuitive' totalities in the final phase, where the Idea of the *Potenz* is established. This is because the concept is 'dominant' here, whereas the 'finite' *Potenz* was 'dominated by intuition'. Money and trade are the rest and motion of the concept of value; but this is only the concept in its formal or reflective mode. The speculative concept which is here realized as an Idea is that of *social recognition*.

In the development of this speculative totality we see, once more, how Hegel has held back the moments which form the logical completion of the earlier stages regarded as self-subsistent, because the dynamism of his argument requires them now. Thus he gave us 'legal right' as the totality of the first stage, but the individual bearer of legal right is the 'person': and the concept of legal personality appears now as the first moment of the totality. In the present instance, an important insight is mediated by the delay. For the immediate relationship established by nature between 'persons' is that of *Herrschaft* and *Knechtschaft* (or Lordship and Service). Thus the fact that only property was given as the instantiation of the infinite concept of legal right is significant. All that is revealed anywhere in this *Potenz* is the 'concept at rest'. And from the point of view of the static concept of 'legal right' anything, including the being who counts as a legal person, can be legal property. Property must have an owner, but the only natural right of ownership is the right of the stronger.² Only the

¹ *Schriften* (1913), p. 443; Harris and Knox, p. 123.

² When Hegel does introduce the 'Idea' of personality he says trenchantly: 'The life of the individual is the abstraction, pushed to its extreme, of his intuition, but the person is the pure concept of this intuition, *and indeed this concept is the absolute concept itself*', *Schriften* (1913), p. 445; Harris and Knox, p. 124 (italics mine). This then is the 'subsuming universality' which appears throughout the *Potenz* as a drive

'movement of the concept' will reveal that the subjective focus of legal right must not be disposed of simply as property.

The phenomenology of noble and bourgeois values which Hegel gives in the *Natural Law* essay clearly indicates that those who live by the standards of the market, are properly the 'natural slaves' in Aristotle's sense, of those who are committed to 'absolute life in the *Volk*', i.e. to the risk of life in defence of the City.¹ Thus both the original subjection of the agricultural population in Greece by an invading military aristocracy—if that is what happened—and the subsequent evolution of political democracy on the basis of military service are in accordance with the *resting* concept. The institution of slavery remained unchallenged throughout. But when the *polis* was swept away and everyone became the *property* of the one universal Lord, the *real* movement of the concept of legal right began: 'with the loss of freedom, slavery ceased of necessity.'²

Thus slavery is only necessary as a transitional phenomenon. But personal *service* as a contractual relation between individuals is part of the permanent natural foundation of society. Hegel contrasts this personal service, with personal *allegiance* which is also natural, and has much the same outward appearance, but is really very different. Allegiance is given to some universal institution or value which the person who is the object of allegiance represents or incarnates. Service on the other hand is simply a bond of economic dependence. That we are dealing with the dialectical moment of a concept (personality as the demand for recognition) which involves a life-and-death struggle will become evident later on. But in the concept as it exists naturally there is no struggle. It is simply a fact of life that when we are in need, and we have nothing else to offer for the surplus that someone else has, we offer our labour. It is equally a fact of life that we give

toward rational equality, *Schriften* (1913), pp. 436–7; Harris and Knox, p. 117. But 'legal right' is only 'the abstraction of universality in property' and there is no *natural* right of property (even in one's own life): 'The individual is not a property-owner, a rightful possessor, absolutely in and of himself. His personality, or the abstraction of his unity and singularity is purely an abstraction and an *ens rationis*', *Schriften* (1913) p. 438; Harris and Knox, p. 118).

¹ *NKA*, iv. 454, 23–458, 34; Knox and Acton, pp. 99–104.

² *NKA*, iv. 456, 15; Knox and Acton, p. 101.

unhesitating obedience to a military order even if it seems foolish.¹

Both of these forms of service are part of the necessary structure of every human life-career. Thus the realization of the emergent concept of personality, and the sublation of its essential moments, property and contract, in the life of the family exhibits the perfect totality of natural ethics. The *normal* family appears, as before, to be the one that is the constituent unit of the *polis*. But in Hegel's account there is no hint of its involving either slaves, or contractual servants. Thus the norm has been abstracted from any particular historical context. It is the pure intuition of love, developed into an organic system, which we now examine from the legal point of view. That the ideal has Greek roots we can only demonstrate from the sequel (and especially from the historical sidelights provided by the *Natural Law* essay). That it is also designed as an ideal for the *present* is indicated in the text itself by the fairly explicit critique of Kant's view of marriage.

With respect to labour this ideal family exhibits a natural division. There is specialization with respect to skill, but not the kind of rationalization that makes skill unnecessary. The product of family labour is common property for the benefit of all. But family property is not alienable by the 'master'—who is thus no true 'master' of his family in either the noble or the bourgeois sense.

In the ideal marriage-relation the moment of authority does not enter at all. Marriage is an 'empirical universal'. Here the

¹ I used the example of a military order in my 'Interpretation' (Harris and Knox, p. 41); but I did not grasp that Hegel is much more concerned with the nationalized form of 'ethical obedience'—the charismatic authority of a national leader who incarnates Reason itself because his words 'summon up the shape' of a world still unborn—than with its natural manifestation as pre-political clan-loyalty or post-political fealty. Military discipline is the universal formal manifestation of it. The oath of fealty is a formalization of the natural ties of blood and feeling; but Theseus, Alexander, and Napoleon all typify 'obedience with respect to what is most ethical' in its fully speculative sense. It seems to me highly probable that Hegel's thought on this question was influenced by the report in Plutarch of Aristotle's advice to Alexander; and by the Stoic universalist sentiments that Plutarch ascribes to Alexander himself. See *De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute, Moralia* 329b: (trans. F. C. Babbitt and W. C. Helmbold, Loeb Classical Library, iv. 397–9). Hegel subscribed for J. G. Hutten's edition of Plutarch (14 vols., Tübingen, 1791–8) while he was still in the *Stift*—see Hölderlin, *GSA*, vii. 1, 424. He still owned it when he died. His own interest in Alexander would certainly have led him to study *this* particular treatise.

inspiration of Hegel's ideal is clearly not Greek but Christian. 'These twain are one flesh', a particular whole, because they *feel* the bond between them (it is *empirical*) as the reality of their rational nature (the universal). 'In religion things are different' because in the Kingdom of God the perfect union of love extends to the whole community—'there is neither marrying nor giving in marriage'. The universal is not particularized, but individualized or perfectly instantiated as an Idea—the community, not *a* marriage which death can and will dissolve. How Hegel conceptualized this religious level in its full articulation we do not know. But the conception both of marriage in its singularity and of charity in its universality is unchanged from its first formulation in the Frankfurt years.¹

The existence of such a particular bond of feeling has its natural origin in a felt affinity. It cannot be entered into as a contract. Since each party surrenders itself completely there is no 'personality' left to possess what is given. The universal is particularized, but not individualized. Marriage, as Hegel analyses it, is essentially a relation, but the relation is that of 'identity'. The two partners identify with one another. They do not recognize themselves *in* the other (that is the *developed* relation of recognition) but rather each recognizes itself *as* the other. From the side of nature they are parts of one whole, and the sexual urge is, as Plato made Aristophanes say, 'the desire and pursuit of the whole'. In conscious experience, this appears as the feeling of wholeness in, through, and with the other. To analyse out the natural urge, treat it as a 'property' of the rational personality, and regard marriage as a 'contract', is not just an intellectual mistake but a moral abomination. Any such analysis, no matter how duty-dominated and other-regarding it may be, is a violation of the deepest human feeling—a feeling which, however 'different' things may be in 'religion', never ceases to be sacred. Whenever we are puzzled about Hegel's insistence that the principle of Kantian morality is immoral, we should remember the primacy of 'love' in

¹ For the marriage-relation see esp. *welchem Zwecke denn alles Uebrige dient*, TW-A, i. 244–50 (Knox and Kroner, pp. 302–8); for the religious ideal of love see esp. the account of the primitive Christian community in 'The Spirit of Christianity', TW-A, i. 393–418 (Knox and Kroner, pp. 277–301). It would be particularly interesting to know how Hegel handled the problem of the 'fate of the community' in his ideal religion of 1802. (On this see further, pp. 148–55, below.)

Hegel's ethics, and the Kantian analysis of marriage as a rational contract.

The empirical limit of marriage as an achieved community (or 'universal') is death. But the child overcomes this limit. In the child the union of the parents lives on in a quite singular way. Their particular relation is individualized in the child because they give it all that they have. In the spring of 1804 we shall find Hegel saying that the parents 'prepare their own death' as they educate the child.¹ He avoids all such dramatic emphasis in the *System of Ethical Life*. He wants us to see the family as 'the supreme totality of which nature is capable', or the perfect equilibrium of natural ethics, and hence he must emphasize how the family *overcomes* all dialectical tensions. But just as the disciplinary aspect of education, its aspect of 'lordship and obedience', underlies the earlier presentation of the child as the embodiment of Reason, so the aspect of self-supersession, of making oneself redundant and voluntarily retiring, underlies Hegel's conclusion here: 'Might and understanding [both ethically developed], the differentiating-characters of the parents stand in an inverse relation with the youth and force [naturally given] of the child, and these two aspects of life fly from and follow one another.'² The child gains authority and understanding as he loses youth and strength; but only because those who have already gained and lost, willingly transmit the moral virtue (*Beharrlichkeit*) they have gained, and surrender the functions in which it is exercised.

4. *The experience of liberty*

At the beginning of the *Potenz* of formal infinity Hegel said that 'in this subsumption singularity immediately ceases.'³ And it did cease, for the very first 'intuition' was the bare abstraction of labour-power, and everything that followed was equally abstract and purely conceptual. Hegel also noted,

¹ *NKA*, vi. 303, 12-13; Harris and Knox, p. 233.

² *Schriften* (1913) p. 450; Harris and Knox, p. 129. No conception of 'natural' education is clearly and explicitly formulated in the *System of Ethical Life*. But the *disciplinary* concept of social education is sketched at the end (*Schriften* (1913), p. 502; Harris and Knox, p. 176); and it is developed a bit more in the *Natural Law* essay (*NKA*, iv. 469, 21-37; Knox and Acton, p. 115).

³ *Schriften* (1913), p. 436; Harris and Knox, p. 116.

however, that 'Beyond this formal concept . . . the living natural relation becomes on that account a fixed relation.' It is still the same individual life that is formally subordinated (*unterworfen*) to the mechanical regulation of the understanding. The 'intuition' of individual labour subsuming the 'concept' of the 'whole object' is just the human understanding in its practical aspect *mastering* the natural environment. But the mastery is a reflective, external one. The singular intelligence is the absolute Concept in its negative manifestation. It cannot be 'fixed' once and for all as something finally understood. The understanding cannot finally master itself, just as the person cannot finally be property. We shall see now how the principle of singular intelligence breaks out of all such external conceptual fixing, and makes a real supersession of the principle of rational singularity necessary (not just a formal one). It is the actuality designated by the legal concept of 'personality', the actuality of the independent rational agent, which upsets the natural equilibrium of the family as a self-maintaining individuality and threatens it with destruction. But this actuality is a strictly negative one. It has no positive subsistence of its own, either natural or intellectual. The singular agent dies in the course of nature, and his intellectual world is a Hobbesian struggle in which there are no winners, no truth emerges except that of critical scepticism.

It is the *transgression* of natural relations by this self-asserting negative that reveals the higher realm of the free political community. But, of course, the natural community has both its defence against transgression and its means of spiritual reconciliation with natural death. 'The state of nature is not unjust, and it is on that account that it must be left behind', according to the ninth Thesis that Hegel defended for his licence to teach.¹ The justice of natural ethics is perfect reciprocity. The criminal must suffer what he did. His own inward consciousness of this creates a sense of guilt. Hegel's view that one who is conscious of guilt must go on provoking attack until his debt is paid, is one of the most interesting anticipations of modern depth psychology produced by his conception of our universal human nature as an inwardness that must utter itself.²

¹ *Erste Druckschriften*, p. 404.

² *Schriften* (1913), pp. 453-4; Harris and Knox, pp. 132-3.

The whole conception of nature as an external fate that is just one's own attitude to the world reflected back upon oneself was developed at Frankfurt and is unchanged here.¹ What is new is the concentration upon the workings of individual fate, and the consequent awareness of how the fear of death dissolves all natural relationships, including the bond of guilt. It is the fact that there is a form of conscious life which does not give way before the fear of death which makes it necessary, in terms of natural justice itself, to pass over to the political condition founded upon a constitution that is publicly established, generally recognized, and impartially maintained.

The natural existence of this *indomitable* consciousness is the barbarian horde. Just as he began the exposition of formal rationality with its highest limit of practical achievement (in the factory system as presented by Adam Smith)² so Hegel begins his exposition of the principle of freedom with its highest realization as a natural force, the negative power strong enough to smash even the Empire that swept away the *polis* which seemed to Plato to be 'wonderfully strong'.³ It was Aristotle who first drew the distinction between the indomitable northern barbarians and the 'natural slaves' of the Oriental Empires.⁴ But Hegel's distinction between the completely natural barbarism of the Tartars and the more intellectualized barbarism of the Goths and Huns seems to me to be derived from Gibbon.⁵

¹ See esp. 'The Spirit of Christianity', *TW-A*, i. 336-59 (Knox and Kroner, pp. 224-44).

² I cannot conclusively prove that Hegel's characterization of the division of labour was originally prompted by the reading of Adam Smith, because he makes no unambiguously certain reference to the *Wealth of Nations* until 1804 (see *NKA*, vi. 323). But his edition of Smith's book was the *English* text published at Basel in 1791. I find it incredible that he should have bought this edition *after* his move to Frankfurt because Garve's German translation had appeared there (1796) just before he arrived. Hence I infer that he owned and studied *The Wealth of Nations* already at Berne, and that when he chose to work on Steuart at Frankfurt, his choice was determined by the view that Smith was a 'mechanical' (Newtonian) economist, while Steuart's approach was more 'organic'. On that view it was equally natural for him to turn to the *Wealth of Nations* in formulating the problem that he aims to resolve in the *System of Ethical Life*.

³ *Politicus* 302a, cited by Hegel in the *Natural Law* essay (*NKA*, iv. 460, 17-18; Knox and Acton, p. 106).

⁴ *Politics*, 1327b 19 ff.

⁵ *Decline and Fall*, Ch. 34 (Everyman, Vol. iii. pp. 352-8). There are no *direct* echoes here, but Gibbon speaks of the Huns destroying cities 'where every

The havoc of the barbarians is 'wholly within the Concept', i.e. it is completely destructive, not in any way purposive. But its essential incapacity for discipline causes it to turn directly into its opposite, the principle of pure self-assertion, or 'the real being of absolute subjectivity'. This is also the criminal impulse within ethical life itself, but it only exists as a *criminal* impulse in the context of a system of recognized legal right. This environing context of his own practical knowledge is the 'concept' that subsumes the criminal self. The criminal knows he is doing wrong, whereas the barbarian is only taking what he wants, and destroying what he does not understand.¹

Hegel's second discussion of the violation of property is confusing unless we both keep this distinction in mind, and remember that the concept of property right is more primitive in the order of rational legal development than the fact of personal recognition. Between the barbarian and the cultured society there can be no question of legal right or contractual relations. The empirical fact of robbery is simply part of the dialectical establishment of lordship and bondage. The ques-

circumstance in the discipline of the people and the construction of the buildings had been gradually adapted to the sole purpose of defence' (p. 352). He cites Ammianus Marcellinus: 'Pene totam Europam, invasis *excisisque* civitatibus atque castellis, *conrasit*' (p. 353 n. 1, Gibbon's italics). He remarks how the 'laws of war' depend on a conception of property which pastoral nomads do not have; and in this connection he continues, 'The Huns of Attila may without injustice be compared to the Moguls and Tartars before their primitive manners were changed by religion and luxury' (p. 354). Gibbon does not support Hegel's distinction between the Huns and the Mongols for he argues that both were equally influenced by considerations of rational utility. But his story of 'Zingis' (Genghis Khan) and the mandarin who persuaded him not to depopulate 4 conquered provinces for pasture, illustrates Hegel's point; and so does his footnote on Tamerlane when he concludes in his *text* that 'if Attila equalled the hostile ravages of Tamerlane, either the Tartar or the Hun might deserve the epithet of the SCOURGE OF GOD' (p. 355). Finally the 'narrow range of cultural development' that the northern barbarians have achieved is illustrated by Gibbon's comment that the Huns were 'ambitious, of conversing in Latin' and that 'The mechanic arts were encouraged and esteemed, as they tended to satisfy the wants of the Huns . . . the trades of the smith, the carpenter, the armourer . . . the merit of the physician was received with universal favour and respect: the barbarians who despised death, might be apprehensive of disease' (p. 356). (T. M. Knox drew my attention to this passage in Gibbon as a possible stimulus for Hegel's meditation on *havoc*.)

¹ *Schriften* (1913), p. 456; Harris and Knox, p. 134: 'die Indifferenz des Besitzes oder das Recht geht sie nicht an.' Cf. Gibbon: 'The pastoral tribes, who were ignorant of the distinction of landed property, must have disregarded the use as well as the abuse of civil jurisprudence' (Everyman, iii. 356).

tion is one of personal freedom. One side must subjugate the other; and in the first encounter there is not even the possibility of submission and slavery. There is only death in battle or slaughter after it. But even the victorious barbarian will enslave women, and keep a conquered population in subjection, once the conquered can show him the profit of doing so.¹ And on the side of culture—which Hegel is more interested in, and which the main thread of his argument follows—the Romans showed that—in spite of the opinion of Aristotle—the northern barbarians could be subjugated and made into slaves, even though they were not slaves ‘by nature’.

Thus there is a kind of *robbery or theft* for which enslavement—‘loss of personality’ says Hegel, though he was earlier willing to call natural subjection a ‘relation of person to person’²—is the only appropriate penalty (speaking now from the side of culture victorious). It is in this guise that robbery appears in the dialectic of havoc. Theft proper, which we encountered in the dialectic of property and exchange, and which is referred to now only for clarification, cannot rationally be penalized in this way. On the one hand the thief does not deserve it, and on the other hand he has shown himself unworthy of trust in any personal relation. Personal trust can arise, on the other hand, from the struggle with a barbaric type of robber. Thus *rapine*, as we may call it, is a moment in the dialectic of noble ethics; theft proper, belongs to the evolution of the bourgeois code.

The justice of nature is ultimately the justice of the noble code. A peaceable society, i.e. one that develops naturally on the basis of the bourgeois natural ethics (as for instance, in the vision of Locke) must inevitably suffer social subjection. Hobbes is therefore correct in deducing this consequence; but he goes wrong when he applies the bourgeois standard of

¹ All the details of Mogul massacres in Gibbon are relevant to the concept of ‘absolute subjugation’; and the story of Zingis and the Mandarin illustrates exactly the transition from ‘absolute’ subjugation to ‘finite’ subjugation or enslavement (see p. 126, n. 5, above).

² Cf. *Schriften* (1913), pp. 447, 457–8; Harris and Knox, pp. 126, 136. This dialectical contradiction makes it clear that we must distinguish the two kinds of *Knechtschaft* sharply. There is ‘natural slavery’ (which passes into contractual service, and for which I use the term ‘subjection’) and there is ‘enslavement’ (which can pass into ethical obedience, and for which Hegel uses the term *Bezwungung* (my ‘subjugation’)).

economic interest to it, and concludes that this subjection is rational. Only the willingness to sacrifice life itself, rather than accept a violation of one's right can mediate the transition to a properly *political* condition (which is quite distinct from the state of natural subjection accepted on the basis of utilitarian calculation).

This willingness to sacrifice even one's life, is the ideal of *honour*. Honour is the standard of natural justice which makes it, at once, both possible and necessary to leave the state of nature behind. *Possible* because the recognition of the other as a man of honour is the foundation of *trust* and 'ethical obedience'; *necessary* because the willingness to risk life in defence of one's honour—or the honour of the family—wipes out all finite ethical distinctions of right and wrong, and abolishes all consciousness of guilt. Even someone who is hag-ridden by his crimes, like Macbeth, becomes as bold as ever, when the die of battle is cast.

But this utilitarian necessity is not what is crucial in Hegel's eyes. Feud and vendetta can regulate clan relations for ever, and the fickleness of Mars flitting from side to side, can settle all conflicts between communities established on the foundation of natural trust and ethical obedience. The 'wild justice' of revenge gives meaning to existence, and the outcome of a battle is a decision of fate however unpalatable. It is not here that the 'tragedy of the ethical' is to be found. The ethical tragedy arises rather from the conflict of personal honour with family piety in the family which has become the focus of trust and ethical obedience in the state of nature. Orestes and Electra cannot defend the right of murdered Agamemnon in fair fight. So they resort to murder themselves. This is part of the working of natural ethics; and between families, even between the families of brothers, it would merely be the beginning of a feud not the end of a social order. But in defence of his father's right which devolves upon him, Orestes has killed his own mother. The piety of the family has been completely violated and polluted, and Ares is not the god who can restore it to health. This is the kind of crisis that makes the break between natural and political ethics inevitable.¹

¹ For the 'tragedy of the ethical' as exemplified in the *Oresteia* of Aeschylus see the *Natural Law* essay (NKA, iv. 458, 35-459, 31; Knox and Acton, pp. 104-5). That it

It is also a crisis whose resolution reveals the nature of the transition. The transition from natural to political ethics occurs when individual loyalties (the bond of ethical obedience, which extends either to voluntary risk of life, or to the acknowledgment of a jurisdiction that extends to the death penalty) are transferred from a person or a family to an institution. Sovereignty is a natural notion; and war has an important place in the 'state of nature' though it by no means exhausts that state. Hence the murder of a king is as much a natural wrong, as the murder of anyone else; but unlike murder in a civil context, it can be justified as an act of war if it is meant as the signal for a rebellion.¹ Political sovereignty, however, resides in the publicly established constitution, not in a personal bond of loyalty to someone recognized as one's *lord*.

The *Potenz* of the negative goes from absolute subjugation (the killing of a wild beast) through lordship and bondage, to ethical obedience. It shows us the forms of natural justice and their limits, and the means by which a political constitution can be established. For the undecided battle, the equilibrium of Mars, with which it ends, can end without decision in a peace of mutual recognition and alliance. Hegel is concerned only with the logical development of each *Potenz* to a totality. As such a totality each *Potenz* is an eternally necessary moment in the order of things. Thus this second *Potenz* does justice to the validity of Hobbes' 'intuition' in spite of the one-sidedness of his reasoning. Life is an equilibrium of hostility, as well as being an equilibrium of love. The hearth, and the battle for the hearth, are the poles of natural ethics. The hearth is the symbol of 'particularity as such', i.e. of the

is the tragedy of natural ethics, leading to the proper establishment of the *polis* is evident. That it is in Hegel's mind as he traces the evolution of justice by combat is shown by the way he introduces the justification of murder by stealth (as *revenge*) into his account of *battle* (*Schriften*, 1913, p. 462; Harris and Knox, p. 140). although he has earlier distinguished murder (as the wrong which is the proper occasion for revenge) *from* battle (*Schriften*, 1913, pp. 459-60; Harris and Knox, p. 138).

¹ *Schriften* (1913), p. 460; Harris and Knox, p. 138. The anonymous 'Italians' referred to here, are probably Machiavelli and his school (*Discorsi*, iii. 6 contains nothing exactly apposite, but it provides the right thought-context). But, whatever its provenance, the remark is important because it shows that Hegel still has his eye on the modern problem of natural justice in the relations of nations, as well as on the Hellenic 'tragedy of the ethical'.

family as a particular life-line; and death in battle is the manifestation of the 'abstract concept' as an actuality for which family life is not adequate. *Sittlichkeit*, political existence, is the *spiritual shape* of 'absolute nature', the substantial embodiment of the ethical life which has so far appeared only as 'concept', i.e. as a moving force (either within the related term or above it like gravity) which overthrows all stable patterns.

5. *The Idea of the Community*

The principle of indomitable freedom, revealed at the moment when the singular intelligence coincides with the 'absolute concept', and all finite distinctions are drowned in the 'negative infinite', is the spiritual analogue of the force of gravity intuited as a real centre, or an immediate identity of attraction and repulsion. Now the real centre of spiritual gravity will reveal itself as the source of light. In the *Potenz* of *Sittlichkeit* proper we begin from the 'intuition of the Volk'. Socrates' knowledge that he is, first of all, an Athenian, is what determines for him whether or not he should escape from prison after his condemnation. On Hobbesian principles it is clear that his decision to remain, when he could save his life by going was irrational. It is not clear—at least to me—what his Kantian duty was in the situation as Plato causes him to describe it. But it is clear that his argument is morally confused, not cogent, in a Kantian perspective; and it seems to me that an argument for his escape could be formulated on Kantian grounds that would have at least as much cogency as any Kantian argument for his staying to be executed. This illustrates perfectly what Hegel means by saying that 'Intellectual intuition is realized by and in ethical life alone.' Socrates intuits Athens as his ethical substance. His life has been an education (*Bildung*) in and through the institutions of Athenian life. He differs from his fellow citizens in that he has conceptualized his intuition more clearly and adequately than they have. But all who stood firm beside him at Potidaea or on the retreat from Delium have demonstrated their possession of the same 'intuition'. That

¹ *Schriften* (1913), p. 465; Harris and Knox, p. 143.

intuition constitutes Socrates as a 'self' with a will very different from the self-preservative impulse of the natural organism—those 'sinews and bones' which 'would have been in the neighbourhood of Megara or Boeotia long ago—impelled by a conviction of what is best!—if I did not think that it was more right and *honourable* to submit to whatever penalty my country orders'.¹ The soldier 'intuits himself as himself in every other individual'² because he knows that he must die to defend them if necessary. This intuition is quite independent of any principle of civic equality. Soldiers are not equal to bourgeois in Hegel's class-theory. They have to be different in order to bring home the significance of absolute life in the *Volk* to the bourgeoisie who do not enjoy it.³ But the whole city needs its God and its religion in order that this substance may be ever present in its consciousness, not symbolically but as the deepest truth of every individual existence. Religion is not the ceremony of 'divine service' but the unceasing awareness of 'walking in the sight of God'.⁴

Because the intuition is now 'objective', i.e. we are directly apprehending the 'substance' of which our mortal existence is only the outward show, the whole exposition—the unfolding of the concept, and even its 'motion' which is the way the totality specifies itself in its 'parts'—can proceed without any real dialectic. The pattern unfolds without any reversal or revolutionary overthrow.

The Idea of ethical life at rest, is the theory of *political*

¹ *Phaedo* 99a (trans. Hugh Tredennick—my italics). See also *Crito*, *passim*, and *Symposium* 220d–221b.

² *Schriften* (1913), p. 466; Harris and Knox, p. 144.

³ *Schriften* (1913), pp. 476–7; Harris and Knox, p. 153. In Athens every able-bodied freeman served as a soldier. In the modern world (before 1789) this is not so. The distinction of class responsibilities makes a rational difference in the way that the *Volk* is intuited, which corresponds to the natural difference between the citizen and the slave at Athens; and even for a 'nation in arms' like the French, it is clear (to Hegel) that the *officer* class must be (or in course of time become) a professional caste. What that caste represents must continue to be recognized and revered, if the 'intuition of the *Volk*' is to remain strong and vital.

⁴ Cf. *Schriften* (1913), p. 465; Harris and Knox, p. 143. What is there called 'Philosophy's view of the world' is precisely the religious consciousness that 'In God we live and move and have our being.' The philosophical view is a pure or completely intellectualized intuition; whereas the intuition of the 'God of the *Volk*' is particular, *Schriften* (1913), p. 467; Harris and Knox, p. 144. But the former can only be realized through the latter.

virtue. This begins from the intuition of the *polis* as 'marvelously strong'. The *Schmerz* of the 'ethical tragedy' that went into its establishment does not endure.¹ Athena has reconciled the Eumenides with Apollo; and if a tragic conflict does arise, like that between Antigone and Creon, the man of insight can see, even if he is himself involved, that it arises only from the accidental difference of empirical points of view which is as transient as it is inevitable. Socrates does not go to his death proclaiming the authority of the eternal law against all human ordinance, but only claiming to have truer insight into the laws of the City than his accusers.

The intuition of 'self' which the citizen has is the direct awareness of being an organ of the social whole; he is an arm of Briareus (the giant with a hundred hands), or an eye of Argus. Of course it is only as a *family* member that he can count as an 'absolute individual'. Socrates is identified as the 'son of Sophroniscus' and his last words to his judges are a request that they should do for his children what he Socrates had always tried to do for his fellow-citizens:

When my sons grow up, men of Athens, if you think that they are putting money or anything else before goodness, take your revenge by plaguing them as I plagued you; and if they fancy themselves for no reason, you must scold them just as I scolded you, for neglecting the important things and thinking that they are good for something when they are good for nothing. If you do this, *I shall have had justice at your hands*, both I myself and my children.²

The ethical life of the individual is his pursuit of virtue. Thus the Idea of the City in its eternal stillness is the Idea of

¹ *Schriften* (1913), p. 468; Harris and Knox, p. 146. It appears to me that the 'tragedy which the Absolute eternally enacts with itself' in the *Natural Law* essay (*NKA*, iv. 458, 35-6; Knox and Acton, p. 104) can be identified with the intuition of 'der Schmerz in seiner Objektivität angeschaut' here. In that case my interpretation of 'die sittliche Handlung' is confirmed (cf. further the quotations in p. 134, n. 2, below). The most plausible interpretation is certainly by reference to the *Antigone*; and the attitude of Socrates toward 'the Laws' exemplifies the contrast that Hegel clearly intends to draw between Greek *Sittlichkeit* and Kantian *Moralität*. (*Antigone*, of course, is not a proto-Kant but a sort of Hellenic Moses in this perspective.)

² *Apology* 41c-42a (trans. Hugh Tredennick). I have replaced Tredennick's 'gentlemen' by 'men of Athens', so that the ethical sun may not be left out of sight, and have italicized the remark that illuminates Hegel's doctrine of 'absolute individuality' and explains how the fate of Socrates can be seen by Socrates himself as a mere 'Zufälligkeit der Einsicht'. The 'grief does not endure' because it is the family-life, not the singular death that matters.

the Good differentiating itself into the human virtues. The unity of virtue cannot in this context appear as a nameable positive goal. It can appear that way (as 'devotion to the City' or 'patriotism') only for those who will never really achieve it—the bourgeoisie. The pursuit of absolute virtue is a negative quest. 'Absolute life in the *Volk*' is the pursuit of death; and not, at least in the first instance,¹ the Socratic 'pursuit of death' but that of Achilles. The completely virtuous citizen demonstrates his identity with the City by dying for it. There is no real tragedy in such a death for it is the highest thing a man can achieve.²

There is thus a direct transition from the *Potenz* of the Negative to that of *Sittlichkeit* proper, since the unfolding of the latter begins with the moment of suspense between life and death in battle. But Hegel is quick to point out that the war is not now a war of family against family (as it was, by implication, earlier) but of *Volk* against *Volk*. Here again, he brings us into the world of Napoleon and the embattled French nation by pointing out that firearms have formally universalized the danger of death in the way that mechanization has universalized labour.³ The implication is that the overcoming of tragedy at the ethical level is valid not just for the Greeks but for us—even though the reconciliation of the individual with fate will be different in our religion, so that 'the grief will endure'.

The virtue of peacetime is bourgeois virtue, Aristotelian moral virtue, differentiated according to status and circumstance. Here patriotism has its place as a formal or reflective

¹ The report of Rosenkranz (pp. 132–3; Harris and Knox, p. 178) shows that in one version of his philosophy of spirit, Hegel returned finally to the philosophic 'pursuit of death' as an *Aufhebung* of the military one. It is almost certain that that fragment was from a later version of the system. Hence I shall deal with it in a later chapter. But Rosenkranz was not mistaken about the thematic connection.

² It is precisely when 'the single individual abandons himself to the danger of death for the *Volk*' (*Schriften* (1913), p. 470; Harris and Knox, pp. 147–8) that the ethical whole is intuited 'immediately and absolutely' as 'without suffering and blessed (*selig*)'. For only in courage do we have the 'indifference of the virtues' and in the absolute intuition 'all difference and all *Schmerz* is sublated', *Schriften* (1913), p. 469; Harris and Knox, p. 147). This is precisely what Hegel already felt about dying for one's country in 1796 (see *Toward the Sunlight*, pp. 192 n. 1, and 227).

³ *Schriften* (1913), pp. 471–2; Harris and Knox, p. 149. Cf. here the report of Rosenkranz regarding a lacuna in the *Verfassungsschrift* (pp. 236–8; *Toward the Sunlight*, pp. 457–8).

concept—the common good in terms of which every particular form of virtue is oriented. Everything is calculated in Benthamite fashion, and we do not find here the intuitive or ‘momentary’ virtue of the spontaneous impulse that ‘takes no thought for the morrow’.¹

What remains the same in war and peace is the stolid reliability of peasant virtue, labouring and fighting with equal steadiness. The name of ‘Trust’ (*Zutrauen*) which Hegel gives to this virtue is medieval rather than Hellenic in its overtones. For it refers to a kind of feudal loyalty whose genesis we have already observed (as ‘lordship and obedience’) at the level of natural ethics.² None of the *content* of Hegel’s doctrine of virtue comes from the classical tradition. The model for what he is doing is Plato’s *Republic*, but it is his own ethical world of the ‘nation’ that he is thinking about.

Only the class-structure of society with all its differentiated functions and values can properly exemplify the differentiation of virtue in ethical life. From the individual level we must move on to the standing structure of particular functions in society. There is no need to go into the details here since Hegel’s discussion presents almost no novel difficulties. Some applications of the doctrine of virtue have a paradoxical appearance but they are not hard to understand. Thus, for instance, it is the very fact that the bourgeoisie has all the ‘know-how’ of ordinary life that Hegel is referring to when he says that this class has ‘no wisdom’.³ We may note that it is in the life of the bourgeoisie that all the moments of the ‘formally infinite’ *Potenz* can be recognized.

There is one unresolved ambiguity in the practical realization of ‘trust’ (the relation between the nobility and the peasantry). These two classes are associated in war, but it seems that Hegel did not regard their economic association in peacetime as fully rational. He seems to distinguish the feudal

¹ *Schriften* (1913), pp. 472–3, 479; Harris and Knox, pp. 149–50, 155–6. My echo of the Gospel is not in Hegel’s text, but I believe it explains what he means by ‘a virtue’—cf. ‘The Spirit of Christianity’, *TW-A*, i. pp. 359–62 (Knox and Kroner, pp. 244–6).

² *Schriften* (1913), pp. 473, 480; Harris and Knox, pp. 150, 156. For ‘Lordship and Obedience’ see *Schriften* (1913), p. 446; Harris and Knox, p. 126.

³ Cf. *Schriften* (1913), pp. 477, 486–7, and 496; Harris and Knox, pp. 154, 162, 171. (The bourgeoisie has no real wisdom because its goal is wealth; but it has the formal ‘wisdom’ of understanding ‘floating over it’.)

relation of serfdom from the true relation of trust,¹ and when he discusses the economic necessities of the military class he says fairly explicitly that their maintenance is the equal responsibility of all private citizens.² Yet he leaves the peasantry under manorial jurisdiction;³ and there is reason for transcending this in his view, for if 'trust' like 'honour' is to become impersonal or 'national' then the peasantry are going to need *Bildung*, and their ethical life is destined to become less crude than Hegel consistently makes out. (His critical notes on 'aristocracy' at the end of our text are an indication that he looked forward to a resolution of the ambiguity in this sense.)⁴

In the actual process of government the boundaries between the classes become still more fluid. The responsibility of 'absolute government' (the maintenance of the constitution) seems by definition to belong to the *first* class (the military nobility). But here the possibility of a *Socratic* 'pursuit of death' becomes important. Hegel has denied that the bourgeoisie has any wisdom. But it is mainly from this class that the clergy is recruited—Hegel himself is a case in point—and it is to 'the elders and the priests' that the 'absolute government' belongs. The wisdom of the community resides in this group in virtue of their devotion to the ethical substance over a long life; and the advance of age marks the end of some of the bonds of natural desire.

This reverence for age as such seems rather superstitious—as Hegel acknowledges when he remarks that 'ethical life seems to have to take flight out of its own sphere, to nature and the unconscious.'⁵ There is a *real* natural necessity at work here, however, since reverence for the constitution must somehow be secured. The principle of sovereignty in the

¹ *Schriften* (1913), p. 480; Harris and Knox, p. 156.

² *Schriften* (1913), p. 476; Harris and Knox, p. 153.

³ This is the clear implication of '... the third which is under civil law within the first', *Schriften* (1913), p. 500; Harris and Knox, p. 174.

⁴ Aristocracy 'is distinguished from the absolute constitution by hereditaryness, *still more by landed estate*', *Schriften* (1913), p. 502; Harris and Knox, pp. 176–7.) It seems clear that Hegel's ideal is ultimately 'republican'. It requires a Platonic aristocracy of talent. See further the discussion below, pp. 139–43.

⁵ *Schriften* (1913), p. 483; Harris and Knox, p. 159. We should note that 'Religion' is indeed another *higher* sphere.

social whole cannot be maintained by an act of public declaration or by popular choice. The constitution as a differentiated structure in which the performance of different functions creates different responsibilities and hence different needs and rights must be hedged by the recognition of natural necessity and a sense of religious awe. Hegel had watched the structure of the *ancien régime* collapse into the crude 'barbarian clump' of the National Assembly, and he had studied the constitution-making of the following years in detail.¹ The first germ of his developed critique of the Terror is to be found in the remark that 'this crude clump would have at its apex its equally crude power undivided and without wisdom. In the clump there cannot be any true and objective difference, and what should hover over its internal differences is a pure Nothing.'²

It is interesting and very significant that Hegel says that 'universal government'—the actual movement and working of the social order—is the *cause* of the absolute government which is its 'resting substance'. To anyone trained in traditional metaphysics it must appear odd that operation should be declared to be the cause of substance. But when we are interested in human social commitments, especially in a revolutionary period, the oddity vanishes. (What remains interesting is the reactive application of the insight to all of our more theoretical concepts, i.e. to the conception of nature generally).

We may be more doubtful of the validity of Hegel's reduction of the three separate 'powers' of legislative, executive, and judiciary to the one real power of the executive. But this, too, was a lesson of the early Revolutionary years. Hegel has taken the lesson to heart. He wants to begin again from the 'raw clump' and study first the jobs that government has to do (as shown by his analysis of 'natural ethics') with concurrent attention to internal and external policy (another reflective opposition that must be speculatively integrated). Only after that can the structure of the executive itself be sensibly discussed.³

¹ The catalogue of Hegel's library for the auction after his death records a whole series of French constitutional pamphlets from the years 1789 to 1796.

² *Schriften* (1913), p. 486; Harris and Knox, p. 162.

³ The place for the discussion would have been the next section on 'Free Government'.

What corresponds to the material *Potenz* of 'feeling' is the economic life of the State (including its foreign trade). What corresponds to the formal *Potenz* is civil and criminal justice, diplomacy, and war. Finally what corresponds positively to the actualization of the negative is education and social discipline, and imperialist expansion.

The influence of Adam Smith can, I think, be detected negatively in Hegel's account of the formal theory of economics.¹ In other words, Smith's gospel of free trade is the 'reflective' doctrine that he wants to overcome. The government must seek to regulate the economy precisely because the rationalization of labour and commerce has produced an 'incalculable power' in whose grip the individual is helpless. From the point of view of the government, however, the workings of the system are not incalculable. Hegel's examples of economic planning are primitive; but they are vivid and pertinent. Thus, the government *can* do something about a poor harvest before its effects become catastrophic (and the course of events in 1789 might well have been different if something positive had been done about the bad harvest of 1788). Apart from this, Hegel's economic thought does not get much beyond Plato: extremes of wealth and poverty must be avoided, the seeker after wealth cannot be wise, and so on. He recognizes what the mechanization of labour does to the labourer but he accepts it as necessary, and he speaks of it here, as if the extent of it can be controlled.² His plan for taxation (a levy on the value of raw materials) is hardly calculated to control either individual capital accumulation or industrial expansion.

The most important thing in Hegel's theory of civil justice is his plain declaration that 'The organic principle is freedom, the fact that the ruler is himself the ruled.'³ The implication of this is that the noble conception of 'the peerage' must be developed into 'equality before the law'. By a 'free constitution' Hegel

¹ The nearest thing to an identifiable echo is the description of the economic system as 'eine wenig erkennbare, unsichtbare, unberechenbare Macht', *Schriften* (1913), p. 492; Harris and Knox, p. 167). But my main reasons for believing Hegel has studied the *Wealth of Nations* at this date are given in n. 2 on p. 126, above.

² How clearly he understood the human cost of the process becomes apparent when he develops his view phenomenologically (in 1804). Only in 1805 does it become clear that he thought of the process as an aspect of uncontrollable fate (pointing towards a revolution of the 'guild Socialist' kind).

³ *Schriften* (1913), p. 500; Knox and Harris, p. 174.

means one based on the Aristotelian principle of the 'sovereignty of law'. He tells us nothing clear about the codification of law that is to go hand in hand with the achievement of equity in individual decisions, though this is the organic unity of opposite aspects which he obviously has in mind. His frequent criticisms of Fichte's moral, political, and legal theory might be thought to show that he believed that no theoretical development is possible here—that, as Aristotle said 'the decision lies with perception'.¹ He did indeed, believe this, but he also held that Reason could establish a sort of regulative ideal. That is what he is doing in the *System of Ethical Life*; and one of his most eloquent attacks on the 'machine State' (in the *Verfassungsschrift*) offers us a vivid picture of just how the absolute government can 'leave the second class and the third, which is under civil law within the first, to themselves, and leave them alone in the vain endeavour to assume into the infinite the absolutely settled finitude of possession.'² It was his study of how the German *Reich* had turned into a mass of legal fictions, under which state power and public authority was treated like private property that caused him to emphasize the bad infinity of the task in this area.

Also, the identification of freedom with law teaches the properly ethical interpretation of the doctrine of the conceptual identity of freedom and coercion which Hegel expounds in the *Natural Law* essay.³ Only in the *Phenomenology* will Hegel finally attempt to trace the whole *Bildung* of the rational will from slavery to the fullest possible freedom of conscience; but the outline of that pattern can already be seen in the *System of Ethical Life*.

When he reaches the threshold of criminal law and the theory of punishment Hegel's always very summary discourse degenerates into mere headings. The same is true for his next topic: the social reproductive system.⁴ We can see, however, that

¹ *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book II, 9 (1109b 20–24).

² *Schriften* (1913), p. 500; Harris and Knox, p. 174. Cf. esp. *TW-A*, i. 479–85; Knox and Pelczynski, 159–64.

³ See *NKA*, iv. 473, 7–475, 22; Knox and Acton, pp. 119–22.

⁴ *Schriften* (1913), pp. 501–2; Harris and Knox, pp. 175–6. There is no discussion of diplomacy and international relations at all, though we were led to expect one. But the transitional paragraph relating the social reproduction system to the systems of

Bildung which was the highest flower of natural ethics, was now destined to take its place on the negative side of the full concept. It is the individualized aspect of *Zucht*, for which the great agency is the social order itself (for the bourgeoisie) and the military establishment (for nobility and peasantry). The positive aspect—the development of the sciences, scientific discovery, and philosophy is briefly alluded to, but because of its theoretical character it forms only an aside in the thread of Hegel's essentially practical argument. If I am right in supposing that the manuscript was originally drafted as part of an outline of systematic philosophy, then here at the end we can see very clearly why Hegel became dissatisfied with a 'philosophy of spirit' that is founded on 'Natural Law'. A better balance between theoretical and practical concerns is obviously necessary.

The final brief notes on the forms of constitution are interesting because they tell us that Hegel was consciously operating in the tradition of the 'mixed' constitution. It may be significant too that he inverts the Aristotelian order of the constitutions as if he intended to work up from a democratic base to a monarchic executive. But there is not enough evidence here for any reliable inferences. We must turn now to the *Verfassungsschrift* and the reports of Rosenkranz about the manuscript from which these notes were made.

The little that Rosenkranz says, before he passes on to the evolution of Religion—where he is much more helpful—suggests that the lecture-manuscript contained a *developmental* account of constitutional theory: 'He worked out the concept of the distinction of constitutions further, and identified the free estate in Monarchy as the Nobility which stands opposed to Majesty in a tacit *battle* that has the *form of obedience*.'¹ This reminds us irresistibly of the dialectic of the 'noble' consciousness in the *Phenomenology*.² But that forms part of an analysis of decadence; and we can see from the *Natural Law* essay how the aspect of decadence in the history of Europe since the time of Marcus Aurelius dominated

sensibility and irritability (so to speak) is written out in the textbook style of the earlier discussion.

¹ *Hegels Leben*, p. 133; Harris and Knox, p. 179.

² *NKA*, ix. 274–9; Miller, sects. 503–13.

Hegel's mind.¹ For his present purpose, however, he needed to emphasize the positive aspect of all this history—the evolution of the Nation-State. This is what he does in the *Verfassungsschrift*. If his lecture manuscript on 'Natural Law' was unsatisfactory for system-building purposes because it was too negative, Hegel's turning at this point to write the final draft of his constitutional study becomes entirely natural.

I have already written at length about the *Verfassungsschrift*,² so I shall only recall briefly here the points that are directly relevant. The modern state must have first of all an *army* (not the civic levies of the *polis*) and a central financial authority; but the outward form of the sovereign authority is a matter of chance; and a free government should leave as much as possible to the initiative of locally autonomous bodies outside this core of sovereign power. This is what the note 'For the absolute constitution the form of aristocracy or monarchy is equally good; it is also democracy in the classes' means in our manuscript.³ When Hegel applies this ideal to Germany we can see that the 'democracy' he is speaking of is a *representative* one.⁴ The 'democratic constitution that Theseus gave to his own people' is self-contradictory in modern times.⁵

The 'aristocratic' element in Hegel's constitution—the 'exhibition of the absolute reality of ethical life' in a class—is likewise preserved by separate representation. The dedicated pursuit of death, in its two kinds, physical and spiritual, constitutes the 'Lords temporal and spiritual' in the English Parliament or the French Estates. The 'Lords spiritual' are

¹ See *NKA*, iv. 456–7 (Knox and Acton, pp. 101–2) on Rome; and *NKA*, iv. 480, 18–39 (Knox and Acton, pp. 127–8) on the Feudal System.

² See *Toward the Sunlight*, pp. 436–77.

³ *Schriften* (1913), p. 502; Harris and Knox, p. 177. Cf. *TW-A*, i. 472–85; Knox and Pelczynski, pp. 153–64. (See p. 139 for that part of the discussion that concerns the 'organic' ideal.)

⁴ *TW-A*, i. 577–80; Knox and Pelczynski, pp. 238–41. This point is almost, but not quite explicit, in Hegel's first reference to the difference in scale between the Greek *polis* and a modern nation, *TW-A*, i. 479–80; Knox and Pelczynski, p. 160). As we have seen, the project of the *System of Ethical Life* is plainly to state an ideal for contemporary application.

⁵ *TW-A*, i. 580; Knox and Pelczynski, p. 241. This comes from the earlier draft of the 'Constitution' essay. It is hard to believe that Hegel would have let the claim that Theseus gave Athens a democratic constitution stand unqualified if he had completed his revision after writing the *System of Ethical Life*.

not visible in Hegel's proposals for the reform of the German Diet. This illustrates how application of the ideal is conditioned by the accidents of historical tradition and circumstance. Hegel's remarks about the 'College of Cities' indicate his own belief that the Diet would be better organized in two Houses than in three. But this is a matter of personal insight only; so he does not prophesy how things must actually go if Germany is to be rejuvenated. His commitment to the organic ideal only logically justifies insistence that the system must be made functional somehow. At present, as he says, 'there is no knowing what significance the Cities Bench possesses'.¹

'For the absolute constitution the form of aristocracy or monarchy is equally valid' says Hegel in his textbook notes. He may be thinking that a functional German State could very well have an Executive Cabinet chosen by and responsible to the Diet.² But his own preference in the matter of form is clear, and it never varied. Hegel was a monarchist: 'The Emperor would be placed again at the head of the German Empire.'³ As a matter of *pure* form, he regarded monarchy as the only adequate expression of the natural givenness of the political condition, and hence of the sacredness of the 'absolute government' (or of the fact that, if we are citizens, we must accept the fate that 'the Laws' decree for us). A real aristocracy is the worst of constitutions because it corrupts the principle of legal universality, equal citizenship. It parcels the *Volk* up into client groups, keeping men in the status of children, 'des allgemeinen Breys willen', 'for the sake of their porridge'.⁴ No doubt this opinion was influenced by Hegel's own experience at Berne.⁵ But it is mainly the result of his reflections on the fate of Germany, which degenerated into a bourgeois struggle over property rights, where 'the bestiality of contempt for all higher things enters' and 'the absolute

¹ TW-A, i. 579; Knox and Pelczynski, p. 240.

² *Schriften* (1913), p. 502; (Harris and Knox, p. 177) should be compared with the comment about the 'modern republican form' of government (TW-A, i. 550-1; Knox and Pelczynski, p. 217).

³ TW-A, i. 579; Knox and Pelczynski, p. 240.

⁴ Lasson misread *Brey* as *Begriff* (*Schriften*, 1913, p. 503; Harris and Knox, p. 177).

⁵ Cf. Letter 11 to Schelling, (16.IV.1795) *Briefe*, i. 23—cited in *Toward the Sunlight*, p. 158.

bond of the people . . . is dissolved.¹ This degeneration occurred because the aristocratic principle prevailed in Germany over the monarchic one. If it had triumphed completely, as in Italy, it would have become barbaric particularism. The Italy of 1800 was an open anarchy; and Italy had been a prey to any conqueror over the centuries. Germany was a legalized anarchy, and a prey thus far, only to civil war. But Napoleon's conquest of Venice was a portent for the *Reich* likewise.² Whatever republican forms the essentially aristocratic 'lordship' of a nation might assume once it was made, the history of Europe showed that the making of it required a strong monarchy. Hence Germany needed, first of all, its own Theseus.³ The struggle between King and barons, which even in Germany retained the 'form of obedience', must be resolved into the reality of ethical obedience (an effective national bond of feudal fealty) in order that it might pass over into true *Sittlichkeit* (reverence for 'the Laws' as 'what is most ethical').⁴

¹ *Schriften* (1913), p. 496; Harris and Knox, p. 171. Hegel's critique of bourgeois values in the *System of Ethical Life*, should be compared throughout with his analysis of Germany as an aristocratic legal anarchy in the *Verfassungsschrift*. The reference to the 'absolute bond' here makes the connection explicit.

² When we read Hegel's comment on the fall of Venice (*TW-A*, i. 552; Knox and Pelczynski, 218-19) we should not forget the context of military defeat in which the *Verfassungsschrift* originated (see *Toward and Sunlight*, pp. 436-44) which is still visible in the final version.

³ *TW-A*, i. 551-8, 580; Knox and Pelczynski, pp. 217-23, 241.

⁴ This is an attempt to interpret what Rosenkranz tells us, (p. 133; Harris and Knox, p. 179) in terms of *Schriften* (1913), p. 446; Harris and Knox, p. 125. Hegel's political ideal in this early period has been convincingly portrayed by Otto Pöggeler in 'Hegels Option für Österreich', *Hegel-Studien*, XII, 1977, 83-128. But with respect to Hegel's republican sympathies we should never forget that Germany has a lot of catching up to do, in order to become a modern nation. So Hegel's practical programme for the *Reich* is in the nature of an interim plan for expected further development.

CHAPTER IV

The 'Resumption of the Whole into One'

I. *The life story of God*

In the 'Natural Law' lectures, Hegel passed straight from political theory to the evolution of religious consciousness: 'But more especially', says Rosenkranz 'he followed out the concept of the religious *cult* as that in which a people comes to its highest self-enjoyment . . . He claimed that in *Religion* the reality of the objective world itself, and subjectivity and particularity along with it, are posited *as sublated*.'

The moving principle of natural ethics is the singular consciousness of the individual. As that consciousness matures, the individual becomes aware that he lives, moves, and has his being in a naturally given whole which expresses his nature as a rational being. This natural whole is the *family*. He is a mortal creature. But in passing from the family in which he is a dependent to the one that is dependent on him, and so finally to an old age that is naturally dependent again but spiritually authoritative, he realizes an immortal essence; and he knows that through the family piety of which he is already an object in old age, he will become an immortal moment of that essence.

It is the family that is the principle of social ethics in its turn. Only under the protection of an established constitution does every individual's transition from one family role to the others become truly safe; and only in that secure context can the cycle of roles reveal its true meaning as *Bildung*. We pass from the simple maintenance of life, to the living of the good life, when we recognize that our *Bildung* is a negative training in self-sacrifice. Athena is then truly present before our eyes as

¹ Rosenkranz, p. 133; Harris and Knox, p. 179.

the living spirit of the City, the immortal life of the *Volk* itself.

Athena is the self-conscious spirit of the *Volk*. The people as the ethical substance manifested externally in the constitution of the City and the institutions of communal life, is the divine spirit which every citizen instinctively reverences as the source of absolute government: 'spirit recognizes itself in the individual, and the individual recognizes himself in it.'¹

But the *Volk* is one among others. Athena is a particular deity in the waywardly quarrelsome college of Olympus: 'The *religious tradition* thus expresses two things at once: on one side the *speculative Idea* of the spirit, and on the other the limitation derived from the *empirical* existence of the people.'² 'The *essence* of God has a history for the spirit'—and a crucial part of that history is that the goddess Athena is long dead as a religious presence, the presence of a real *Volk*. She survives only as an ideal presence in Greek Art (and the modern art inspired by it).³ The Greeks never became a nation. Zeus was the ruler of Olympus, but the effectiveness of his *imperium* was not unlike that of the German Emperor in Hegel's own time; and beyond the range of his Olympian fatherhood, the rest of the world (except the Jews) worshipped his Titanic predecessors in their pre-political barbarian darkness.

Greek politics is the crowning perfection of man's natural development. It is the culmination of his discovery of his 'nature'. The Greeks made the discovery fully whereas other 'peoples' discovered and accentuated single aspects or moments of rational freedom. Thus the evolution of 'natural religion' is not a historical process either. It is the prehistory of God and man, the spontaneous *human* realization of the creation-myth, or man's discovery of himself in the Garden of Eden. The world embraced by the life of one great tragic dramatist—Sophocles—from the battle of Marathon to the

¹ Ibid., p. 134; Harris and Knox, p. 179.

² Loc. cit.; Harris and Knox, p. 180. Cf. further the fragment quoted by Rosenkranz (pp. 180–1; Harris and Knox, pp. 254–6). The original MS of this fragment has been discovered, and will be published in *NKA*, v. It probably comes from the *Delineatio* of Summer 1803. The relation of this course to the *System of Ethical Life* is discussed in Ch. V, below, pp. 207–25.

³ Art is 'the only form of spiritual ideality that can exist in a nature-religion', Rosenkranz, p. 139 (Harris and Knox, p. 184).

Spartan occupation of Athens— is the real Eden of human history, and the moment of man's expulsion from it.

In 'natural religion' therefore, the Concept is 'at rest'. Its stages are spread out over the world like the phases of the order of physical nature. But we can easily fit the 'moments' that Rosenkranz's report provides, into the pattern of reciprocal dominance of intuition and concept, that we learned to interpret in 'natural ethics'. Thus, *Gentile religion*, the folk-religion that Abraham turned his back upon,¹ is the 'intuitive' manifestation of religious 'feeling'; and *Judaism*, the religion of an invisible 'Lord of Lords' is the subsumption of that 'intuition' under a formally 'infinite' concept—where communal *singularity* remains the real principle, because this Universal Lord has chosen a single people for his own, and he behaves as arbitrarily as any Gentile Zeus. (Mosaic Judaism is the religion of Lordship and Bondage as the immediate or natural relation.)

Finally, of course, Greek religion corresponds to the organic natural totality of the family. This is the religion that is 'natural' to man, the spontaneous reconciliation of spirit with its external expression in society, achieved by an art that *discovers* the inward rational nature of man. In this totality there is a perfect balance of intuition and concept, feeling and thought, so that, as Rosenkranz reports, '*the eternity of the ideals of a beautiful mythology* rests neither on its perfect artistic beauty, nor on the truth of the Ideas that they express, nor on the actuality to which they belong, but precisely on the identity of all of these factors, and their indivisibility.'²

Hegel's project, ever since the 'System-Programme' of 1797, had been the 'reconstruction' of this 'mythology of Reason'.³ 'Reconstruction' is conscious *recreation* of nature. The recreation is a real process; it involves the conscious repetition of the achievement of totality through the stages of

¹ See *Toward the Sunlight*, pp. 272–86 (and the references given there—the pieces that Nohl did not print can now be found in Hegel, *Geist des Christentums*, ed. W. Hamacher, 1977.

² pp. 135–6; Harris and Knox, p. 181. Cf. further, Rosenkranz, pp. 180–1 (Harris and Knox, pp. 254–6).

³ See the text in *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 9, pp. 264–5; *Toward the Sunlight*, pp. 511–12.

reciprocal subsumption. This is only possible by advancing to a higher level of conceptual generality in thought and embracing a correspondingly greater universal community in action. From the first (at Berne in 1796) Hegel had recognized Kant's moral philosophy as the requisite conceptual universalization of Greek 'intuition'.¹ Hence it is quite justifiable to speak of the 'System-Programme' as a project of 'reconstruction' in the sense Hegel gives to the word in 1801, even though he developed the theory of the 'formal' and 'real' infinity of the Concept only in the interim between 1797 and 1801. From the beginning he recognized the promulgation of the Critical Philosophy as the signal that the world was now ready for the reconstruction of the natural 'totality'. But because he now understood what a tremendous advance 'reconstruction' represents, his conception of the history of Christianity is now progressive instead of being a story of decline and fall. Far from being the mere degeneration of the great intuition of universal life as *love* into formal abstraction and 'positivity', the history of Christianity is the true 'history of God'—the Absolute Concept advancing to self-consciousness, in its *negative* guise as the process of the universal *Bildung* of the race.

The first stage, the 'havoc' of the Concept cleaning the slate of culture for a new beginning, is the 'boredom of the world'.² The Romans were the true 'broom of God' (God's broom for his own history, not the broom in his standing or natural image). They imposed bondage on all the peoples that were 'by nature' free; thus the bondage they imposed was experienced not as a natural condition but as a human creation. The whole achievement of the Greeks, as the spontaneous expression of human nature had to be swept away. The Greeks thought of themselves as enjoying a kind of natural luck as compared with their barbarian neighbours, in whom the balance of nature was less fortunate, so that they either could not master themselves or were too easily mastered by others. So the Greeks had to learn that they were mistaken just as

¹ See the conclusion added to the 'Positivity' essay in April 1796, *TW-A*, i. 188 (Knox and Kroner, p. 143); and *Toward the Sunlight*, pp. 228–9.

² Rosenkranz, p. 136; Harris and Knox, p. 181.

much as the 'barbarians' did. Nature had to be violated in order that its 'reconstruction' might be recognized as the universal task of humanity. The Romans banished folk-freedom (the living presence of the communal God) from the world; and Jesus urged men to forsake that Godless world and seek the higher freedom of a life beyond death.

The history of religion proper, is the history of the Catholic or universal religion because 'the history of God is the history of the whole race.' In this history every human individual must be able to recognize himself equally, regardless of the luck of his birth and social *Bildung*. Since the whole history of the rational individual is a passage from slavery to free self-sacrifice, God must become incarnate in the most unfortunate of all beings, one rejected by his own people (themselves rejected and in bondage) treated as a slave—though, like Socrates, he refuses to react like one—and executed as a malefactor by the authority of the Empire which had eradicated the Greek conception of autonomy from the world altogether.²

The other-worldliness of Jesus is the infinity of a 'formal' Concept. If the Roman Empire is the 'havoc' of the Concept, Jesus is its *Wut*, or mania. His gospel of love is the 'intensification of purity'.³ But this flight from the world by an individual, becomes a means of reconciliation with the world for the enslaved peoples. And the religion of the other world has first a natural or intuitive phase: Catholicism, as the reconciliatory ideology of the politics of universal subjection, is a *religion of beauty*. What is intuited is everywhere and always the beauty of suffering and sacrifice, the reconciliation of martyrdom; and the fallen world outside God's garden is hallowed everywhere as a place of pilgrimage.⁴

¹ Rosenkranz, p. 138; Harris and Knox, p. 183. Hegel is discussing the evolution of *Catholicism*, the spreading of Christianity as a universal gospel of salvation, which refused to leave man's reconciliation with God to the *chance* of whether one was a Greek or a barbarian, a Jew or a Gentile.

² Rosenkranz, pp. 136-7; Harris and Knox, pp. 181-3.

³ See *Schriften* (1913), p. 455, (Harris and Knox, p. 134) for the dialectic of 'havoc'.

⁴ Rosenkranz, pp. 138-9, (Harris and Knox, pp. 183-4). The whole discussion is concerned with Catholic piety and Catholic theology—as is shown by the reference to the *Mother of God* at the end.

With the resurgence of political freedom at the national level—the nations being consciously members of the universal community of humanity—there was need for a *Reformation* of religion because its function changed. Now we have the subsumption of intuition under concept. The 'infinite grief' spread out everywhere in the world, is now concentrated into an 'infinite yearning' of the mind alone, a practical mission of the human will, not a contemplative appreciation of God's grace. But this *inward* dialectic of infinite striving for liberation from bondage is the reconciliatory ideology of a new politics of universal conquest. Man is everywhere conquering Nature and enjoying its fruits. The problem now is to avoid the repetition of Adam's sin, by preserving the sense of it. The Catholic 'Sabbath of the world' was everywhere before our eyes because Good Friday, the sense of pilgrimage, was revived in every experience of real life. Now the 'speculative Good Friday' must be maintained in pure thought—as the inward unity of concept and intuition whose actuality is *self-consciousness*: 'The intuition' must appear as 'a living motion [i.e. an actual concept] which, being subjective, and only momentary can be taken by the intellect as something merely internal; it is the single individual'.¹ When the intellect does get control, the cultural world degenerates into enlightened eudaemonism ('empirical reconciliation with the actuality of existence').²

A true balance of outward and inward intuition, and of outward and inward concept, must now be established. The negative infinity of the 'infinite progress' which is always a striving, never actual enjoyment, must be turned back upon itself for intuition. The nations exist, and they need a religion of freedom in which the moment of suffering and sacrifice is securely maintained but transcended. The 'grief must endure'—for the liberation of individual life is the end of finite striving, not just the means for living the good life.³ Everyone

¹ *Difference*, NKA, iv. 75 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 171–2).

² Rosenkranz, p. 140 (Harris and Knox, p. 184). Cf. *Faith and Knowledge*, NKA, iv. 316–19 (Cerf and Harris, pp. 56–61).

³ Cf. *Schriften* (1913), p. 468 (Harris and Knox, p. 146) with the last para. of *Faith and Knowledge* (NKA, iv. 413, 34–414, 13—Cerf and Harris, pp. 190–1).

is a person, not formally but really—a child of God, an object of God's love, a mask under which God is incarnated. But the incarnation of God is a life of sacrifice. For the Greek, the fact that he must be ready to die for the City was made vivid by the City's frequent warfare. For the citizen of a free nation the goal of 'perpetual peace' appears as a regulative moral ideal. But that is only the misconceived end of the 'infinite yearning'. The real object of human striving is the 'resumption of the whole into one' in Art and Science conceived as modes of 'divine service'.¹ The 'Kingdom of Heaven' is here and now, in art, religion, and speculation—it is the world of Absolute Culture.

Art is the mode in which 'Nature takes itself back into itself and lifts its original, unborrowed, real beauty, into the ideal realm, the realm of possibility'.² The original aesthetic mode in which the intuition of life as a reconciliation with fate, achieved through suffering and learning, was expressed, was *Tragedy*. In human nature, divine and human being are united. But ethical action separates the two aspects and opposes the higher (civic duty) to the lower (family interest). The family ties of nature reassert their necessary or fateful character, their ethical status has to be acknowledged, and thus 'ethical nature is reconciled with the Divine nature as the unity of both'.³ Greek tragedy enacts the cosmic drama of the Incarnation, Passion, Death, and Resurrection of God in the way that is appropriate to natural religion at its most perfect. The union of the two natures divides, but then each side reveals itself as a union of divine and human, and as necessary to the other. The hero identifies with the City and sacrifices his life for it. We should note that Orestes actually sacrifices his mother's life, but this only reveals to us the fact that the real actors in the tragedy are City and Family. In the killing of Clytaemnestra Orestes sacrifices his own life because he cannot break the natural tie between himself and his mother.

¹ Cf. *Difference*, NKA, iv. 75, 17-76, 8 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 170-2) and my introduction to it (*ibid.*, pp. 50-2).

² *Faith and Knowledge*, NKA, iv. 408, 25-35; Cerf and Harris p. 182.

³ *Natural Law*, NKA, iv. 459, 27-31; Knox and Acton, p. 105. It is advisable to begin with this *simple* definition in order to understand the earlier discussion.

She haunts him as the Furies of his own violated life. Orestes dies with her, and is only resurrected through the *divine* reconciliation produced when Athena resolves the human deadlock of ethical claims between political commitment and family piety. Her casting vote is achieved through the resurrection and transfiguration of the natural life that was violated. Apollo is the God of conscious Reason, the Furies are the powers of unconscious nature; and Athena is the political Reason that accepts embodiment, and gives Nature its ethical right. The fundamental right of Nature is to give life and death to the body with equal inevitability. In the story Agamemnon and Clytaemnestra die *really*, Orestes dies metaphorically, Orestes is resurrected *really*, and Clytaemnestra and Agamemnon metaphorically. But they are all one life, all alike subject to the fate of death that belongs to it, and dependent all alike for their resurrection upon the piety of the family, which is what must be cleansed from pollution. What matters is that City and Family survive in immortal harmony, and are not destroyed by the rational negative, the duty of vengeance. The family is absorbed into the *polis* and becomes the instrument of higher purposes, the producer of citizens whose loyalty is unconditional; but only because family piety itself is unconditionally protected and sustained.¹

In this perspective the *tragedy* of family loyalty (thus resolved by divine recognition, i.e. by universal and unconditional civic respect, the respect accorded to 'absolute government' or the institutions which—as Creon learns in the *Antigone*—no one must ever challenge, becomes the foundation of the *human comedy*. Everyone could be an athlete or an artist for the City in his own way—until Socrates made life itself his art. When the salvation of the single soul became an absolute concern, the piety of the ethical substance was no longer enough. Socrates himself accepted it and died for it, but nothing could make his *personal* fate just.²

In Catholic Christianity the human comedy becomes a *Divine Comedy*. The drama takes place in the world of eternal life ('absolute vitality'); and singular individual fate is the absolute concern, but there is no struggle with fate (i.e. no

¹ NKA, iv. 458, 35-459, 31; Knox and Acton, pp. 104-5.

² NKA, iv. 460, 8-34 (Knox and Acton, pp. 106-7).

sense that salvation depends on the outcome of a struggle between higher and lower nature) since God's grace itself is the fate that brings salvation. Tragedy survives only as the eternal impotence of the souls in Hell who will not surrender their right of personal initiative. 'Fate' has now changed its shape. For the individual who has broken out of the ethical substance, it is not the relational consequences of his own deed that appear as an alien power. It is his very own deed and choice, his act of self-definition, and hence of self-closure, that is the focus of damnation.¹ The *Comedy* itself is played out for the *Bildung* of the single individual (Dante the pilgrim in the poem); but he is a powerless spectator. In this phase of the 'history of God' humanity is in divine leading-strings. There cannot be any real tragedy because the hero does not act; he suffers or he has adventures.²

In Protestant Christianity this divine comedy becomes the worldly *farce* of bourgeois ethics. Here the ethical nature or impulse does not separate itself from the mortal life which is its fate. It is entangled in fate (i.e. committed to the 'pursuit of happiness') and instead of passively acknowledging its own impotence, it experiences it in action. Both the Classical tragedy and the Divine Comedy have now lost their absolute meaning. Goethe's Orestes goes down to Hell, like Dante, and finds that his united family have *forgotten* their ethical struggle.³ But the worldly comedy of moral effort has a new Hell of its own. The damned souls in Klopstock's *Messiah* are like Sisyphus—the gale of transient life sweeps away whatever any generation achieves.⁴ Goethe's Faust learns the same

¹ NKA, iv. 459, 37–460, 8 (Knox and Acton, pp. 105–6). Cf. also *Faith and Knowledge*, NKA, iv. 382, 30–3 (Cerf and Harris, pp. 146–7) for the new shape that fate assumes in the Christian tragedy of personality.

² See Haym, p. 165 (Harris and Knox, p. 185); and cf. the fragment *ist nur die Form* (NKA, vi. 330, 7–10; Harris and Knox, p. 252). This last belongs to the later, fully personalized, form of Hegel's system but expresses the doctrine unchanged.

³ See *Faith and Knowledge*, NKA, iv. 382, 30–3 (Cerf and Harris, p. 147). The rationale of this example of 'being bound forever to one's subjective deed' only becomes clear when it is set in the context of 'modern comedy' as defined and exemplified in the *Natural Law* essay (see next note). Hence our note in the translation at this point was mistaken.

⁴ NKA, iv. 459, 35–7, and 460, 35–461, 30 (Knox and Acton, pp. 105, 107–8). For the speculative significance of the rational myth here, cf. the critique of Fichte's moral optimism in *Faith and Knowledge*, NKA, iv. 394, 17–395, 22; 402, 8–408, 10 (Cerf and Harris, pp. 162–4, 173–81).

lesson from the Earth-Spirit. But that is only a speculative symbol for the moral that Faust has already drawn from the obsolescence of all his medieval 'sciences'.¹ The Protestant urge (*Trieb*) towards action represents an advance. But it needs to be more than a formal commitment. Salvation must indeed be achieved here in our world. God is incarnate, suffers, dies, and rises *here*; but he does *die*. Only what one will die for is a positive ethical value. Ethics becomes a formality when Heaven is the contractual reward for good behaviour, and the maintenance of the state and its law is a contractual commitment for the security of life and property. Hence Kant and Fichte are really apologists for immorality, and it is the immoralist Machiavelli who knows what the time needs to restore the seriousness of tragedy to its striving. In this cry for the establishment of the Nation we can recognize the return of the 'conscious absolute ethical nature'.²

As a purely inward conceptual subsumption of religious truth, the Protestant religion cannot have any art at all except a kind of Socratic art of soul-cultivation. Protestant art is the worldly comedy because the divine comedy is now hidden in the inner heart. Jacobi tries to present this inner drama in his novels; but Schleiermacher is the consistent Protestant who insists that true religious communication must be an 'art without works of art'.³ Against the Protestant fear of *idolatry* Hegel reasserted the Catholic principle of a *universal consecration* that expresses itself everywhere in artistic symbols. In the dawning religion of the free nation it will once more be true that 'the Spirit is not ashamed of any of its

¹ *Natural Law*, NKA, iv. 461, 12-21 (Knox and Acton, p. 107). Hegel seems to be referring to the Revolution in France as well as to the Scientific Revolution. (We should always remember that the only text that Hegel had for *Faust* was the *Fragment* of 1791; but of course he talked to Goethe—and listened to him talk—on a fair number of occasions during these years.)

² The following texts should be read together in the context of this explanation of 'the farce of ethical faith, which is most in the dark, where it stands in brightest light, being already in perdition and unrighteousness, where it takes itself to be in the arms of righteousness, salvation, and bliss' (NKA, iv. 461, 24-7; Knox and Acton, pp. 107-8): *Difference*, NKA, iv. 58, 32-62, 22 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 149-54); *Faith and Knowledge*, NKA, iv. 401, 5-412, 22 (Cerf and Harris, pp. 172-87); and 'The Constitution of Germany', TW-A, i. 481-5, 553-8 (Knox and Pelczynski, pp. 161-4, 219-23). (This last passage is the encomium of Machiavelli.)

³ *Faith and Knowledge*, NKA, iv. 381, 20-386, 36 (Cerf and Harris, pp. 145-52).

individuals.¹ And because of the national focus of all ethical endeavour, its art will not be 'tumbled together at random from the histories and the imagination of all peoples and climates, without significance or truth for nature which is placed in subjection to it'.²

Organization in terms of an ethical focus, however, is a historical accident. This brings us to the essential weakness or one-sidedness of any 'resumption of the Whole into one' that can occur in the form of Art. Art is essentially a created world of *beings*; ³ so it has the characteristic weakness of nature generally. Everything is tumbled together without *explicit* rhyme or reason, and nothing carries its real meaning on its face. 'The ideality of the spirit in the form of thought' needs to be added to it.⁴

'In religion the ideal shape of the spirit is real' thanks to the artist who objectifies it for our contemplation and worship. But also 'its real side is ideal'—i.e. it is a *sign* which has to be given an intelligible meaning. This conceptual interpretation of the relation between life and art is the work of speculation. It is religious truth that is expressed both intuitively (by the artist) and conceptually (by the theologian). For this reason Hegel can say that 'In respect of its *subject matter, speculative knowledge has no special advantage over Religion.*' In all three of these supreme cultural activities, the whole life of spirit is concentrated into the 'supreme point of intensity'—the individual consciousness of artist, thinker, or worshipper, who expresses it either as an intuitive or as a conceptual whole—but in any case objectively. For ordinary religious consciousness God is simply there—as an intuitive reality outside the worshipper or a conceptual one within him. Art and Science 'resume' this absolute being into the single

¹ Rosenkranz, p. 133 (Harris and Knox, p. 179).

² Haym, p. 165 (Harris and Knox, p. 185). Cf. *ist nur die Form*, NKA, vi, 330, 7–10 (Harris and Knox, p. 252). Both Pöggeler and Düsing have directed our attention to the influence of Herder and F. Schlegel on Hegel's 'adventurous' image of Catholic Christendom ('Die Entstehung von Hegels Ästhetik in Jena', *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 20, 1980, 257 n. 9); and 'Idealistische Substanzmetaphysik', *ibid.*, 39–40).

³ Cf. *Difference*, NKA, iv, 75, 29–76, 8 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 171–2—but see p. 219, n. 1, below).

⁴ Rosenkranz, p. 139 (Harris and Knox, p. 184).

consciousness. Religion proper is the acting out of the contrary 'resumption', the resumption of each one into the whole. That is why the ceremony of sacrifice is always at the heart of religious cult.¹

From the point of view of the Absolute simply, we must therefore say that *Art and Speculation are the highest forms of divine service*. From the absolute standpoint, Religion is the form of experience that embraces and comprehends all others. As long as his concern remained predominantly *practical* Hegel maintained this position. The 'resumption of the whole into one' was ultimately the resumption of all the single ones into the one whole. Art and philosophy together produce the 'mythology of Reason'. Philosophy itself produces rational theology. The 'absolute Identity' in which there is a perfect equilibrium of subject and object is a *religious* experience. The 'preponderance of consciousness' in speculative thought is something inessential, something that can and should be got rid of. The communal celebration of the sacrifice gets rid of it.²

Thus the rational exposition of Trinitarian theology is the highest task of philosophy. This exposition identifies the Persons of the Trinity with the three phases of the speculative Idea: God the Father is the Absolute Thought—the Idea of Philosophy expounded in Metaphysics. God the Son is the Divine Life of the finite 'Universe', expounded in the philosophy of nature (including *Sittlichkeit*). God the Spirit is the totality of Speculation, the conceptual motion through which the life of the world receives its rational explanation.³

In all his versions of the 'mythology of Reason'—the earliest was probably in the 'System fragment' of 1800—Hegel gives the 'Mother of God' almost equal prominence with

¹ This paragraph attempts to explicate Rosenkranz, pp. 133–4 (Harris and Knox, pp. 179–80). All the quotations are from there. But see also *Difference*, NKA, iv. 75, 17–76, 8 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 171–2—but see p. 219, n. 1, below).

² *Difference*, NKA, iv. 23, 13–17; 75, 34–76, 8 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 103, 172); Rosenkranz, p. 134 (Harris and Knox, p. 180).

³ Rosenkranz, p. 139 (Harris and Knox, p. 184). Cf. *Difference*, NKA, iv. 75, 17–25 (Harris and Cerf, p. 171) and *Faith and Knowledge*, NKA, iv. 336, 19–31; 407, 16–408, 35 (Cerf and Harris, pp. 81, 180–2).

the Persons of the Trinity.¹ The bond of love between mother and child is the most primitive natural *feeling*. Thus Mary as the symbol that 'God is Love' stands at the beginning of an exposition of the Incarnation; and she forms the link between the exposition of the Infinite as the triune Idea, and the exposition of the finite as Nature, Spirit, and the 'resumption of the whole'. Hence we find her appended to the Trinity in Rosenkranz's account of the lectures,² but placed first in the later phenomenological 'history of God' of which one fragment survives.³

This is not the only 'Catholic' theme that we can discover in Hegel's 'mythology of Reason'. The very idea that a *beautiful* image of Reason is necessary, and that the consecration of this beauty must embrace the whole of nature, is Catholic in its inspiration, as Hegel himself said. The fact that Rosenkranz felt called upon to point out that instead of becoming a Catholic convert (like Friedrich Schlegel) Hegel envisaged a new religion altogether, shows his slightly uncomfortable consciousness of the Catholic influence.⁴ It is especially noteworthy that, in his critique of Fichte, Hegel associates the speculative aim of his own philosophy of nature with this religious doctrine of the universal consecration. For it is clear from the 'First System-Programme' that the original seed of Hegel's philosophy of nature was a Fichtean problem.⁵

¹ See *ein objektives Mittelpunkt*, TW-A, i. 424 (Knox and Kroner, p. 315). The claim that this is the culmination of an exposition of the 'mythology of Reason' must remain no more than a hypothesis. But in any case, it is the *pregnant mother* whom Hegel puts in his Holy of Holies, and his appeal to Luther's hymn is clearly a calculated defence of this Catholic motif—cf. *Toward the Sunlight*, pp. 392–3. (J. D'Hondt has suggested that reverence for the Virgin Mary is actually a *Masonic* theme in the new religion. The way the philosophy of Identity was first presented to French readers—by J.-G. Schweighaeuser in 1804—strongly suggests that the 'invisible Church' had an armoury of esoteric symbols of which this was one. See 'Première vue française sur Hegel et Schelling', *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 20, 1980, 49–50. Whether Rosenkranz knew or suspected this, when he underlined the fact that Hegel was never tempted to become a Catholic convert, deserves some investigation.)

² p. 139; Harris and Knox, p. 184.

³ *ist nur die Form*, NKA, vi. 330, 5–7 Harris and Knox, pp. 251–2. It is a plausible hypothesis that the 'form' referred to at the beginning here is the *Trinity*. In that case my view about the intermediary placement of the *Mother of God* would be confirmed.

⁴ p. 140; Harris and Knox, p. 185. (For a possible alternative explanation of this see n. 1, above.)

⁵ *Faith and Knowledge*, NKA, iv. 407, 5–408, 35 (Cerf and Harris, p. 181); for the origins of Hegel's *Naturphilosophie* see above, Ch. II, pp. 77–82.

2. *The Triangulation of the Trinity*

The most important speculative interpretation of the Trinity that Hegel attempted in this period was probably contained in the lost manuscript on the 'Triangle of triangles'. It is not possible to date this manuscript with certainty on any external grounds, but I believe that the demonstrable connections of thought with the *Difference* Essay, with the *Theses* and *Dissertation* of 1801, and with all the reports and evidence about Hegel's Trinitarian theology (especially his own fairly frequent asides about the Incarnation) are sufficient to show conclusively that the Triangle manuscript(s) represented the culmination of Hegel's speculative philosophy in this first phase of its development.¹

'The square is the law of nature, the triangle of spirit' says Thesis III.² We have seen how the square becomes the expression of a law in the speculative account of the Solar System as an 'ideal body' of gravitational force. The triangle becomes a law in the syllogistic operation of logical reasoning, because a syllogism connects three terms (subject, predicate, and middle) and these terms can be of *three* logical types (universal, particular, and singular). Bringing these logical facts together with his theory of the cosmic ontological process gave Hegel his 'speculative theory of the syllogism'. This 'speculative theory of the syllogism' was a major theme of his 'Metaphysics' (or more precisely of the transition from logic to Metaphysics) in the earliest form of Hegel's system.

It is clear enough that the 'triangle of triangles' was an application of this speculative theory of the syllogism. And it was natural that Rosenkranz, operating on the assumption

¹ The MS discussed by Rosenkranz (*Hegel-Studien*, x. 1975, 133-5—trans. in Appendix, pp. 184-8, below; and Rosenkranz, pp. 102-3) must be distinguished from the Triangle-Diagram that has survived. This belongs in the context of *magical* speculation (see H. Schneider, 'Zur Dreiecks-Symbolik bei Hegel', *Hegel-Studien*, viii. 1973, pp. 55-77). The date that Hegel made—or came into possession of—this diagram is quite uncertain, and what significance it had for him is scarcely less so. The philosophical background of the symbolism is Neo-Pythagorean, rather than Christian. Schneider's later article 'Anfänge der Systementwicklung Hegels in Jena', *Hegel-Studien*, x. 1975, 133-71, is the only adequate discussion of the Triangle MS known to me. My own conclusions were reached independently before I read it; but I have learned much from it.

² *Erste Druckschriften*, p. 404.

that 'Hegel's original system' was tripartite, should therefore assume that the Triangle manuscript was the earliest form of Hegel's metaphysics. Ordinary usage is on his side here, since the Triangle does explicate Hegel's view of 'ultimate reality'. But its topic is the speculative interpretation of Trinitarian theology; and in the context of the four-part system as we know it, this makes the Triangle part, not of 'Metaphysics' but of the 'resumption of the whole'.¹

As we shall see, the fact that Rosenkranz uses the word 'metaphysics' in a way different from Hegel's own, and that he was not conscious of the quarripartite structure of Hegel's early 'system' as anything more than a pedagogic device employed for a single semester, has caused confusion and misunderstanding in the interpretation of his reports. Still there is one important connection between Hegel's Metaphysics and his speculative theology which Rosenkranz grasped. Hegel's thesis about the 'laws' of nature and of mind was formulated in terms of Schelling's Spinozist parallel between thought and extension as equally complete images of the Absolute Identity. Thus each side forms its own order, the order of things and the order of ideas. But the Trinitarian theology makes intelligence more fundamental than nature. Nature was created. Translating this into Spinozist terms, there are two aspects to Nature, and they do not have the same law. The square is only the law of *natura naturata*; *natura naturans* is the absolute spirit of the whole, and as such it

¹ The proper placement of the fragment in Hegel's first system can be more safely inferred from the location of Trinitarian theology in the lectures of 1802 or 1803 (which Rosenkranz summarizes for us) than it can from the fact that Rosenkranz calls the Triangle MS 'the first form of Hegel's metaphysics'. Nothing in our surviving MSS suggests that Hegel would have classified it as 'Metaphysics', and nothing that Rosenkranz says indicates that the actual MS was so marked by Hegel. It was a piece which Rosenkranz recognized as early (because he saw its affinity with the *Barbarei* of the Boehme meditation in the *Wastebook*? He calls the Triangle *Barbarei* and connects it with Boehme's influence himself); and in seeking to locate it in the context of the 'first system', which he himself constructed for Hegel, he was guided by the presence of theological analogies in the *transition* from Metaphysics to Philosophy of Nature in that 'system', and by the recurrence of analogies directly reminiscent of the Triangle MS in what he *knew* (through Gabler surely?) to be the preamble to the 'Real Philosophy' course of Summer 1806 (which Gabler took—see *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 1967, 71). Rosenkranz, we should remember, could not assign the Triangle to the *fourth* part of the 'System'. He thought that the 'four-part system' was only a 'didactic modification' of an originally triadic plan.

obeys the law of Spirit even while laying down its own law for the manifest world of natural phenomena.¹

The 'triangle of triangles' as described by Rosenkranz, appears straightforward enough. But the simplest interpretation of what he tells us is not consistent either with what Hegel himself says in the fairly long quotation that Rosenkranz gives us, or with the Platonic philosophy of mathematics which provides the most plausible thought-context for Hegel's attempt to express his syllogistic theory geometrically. The right procedure, as I see it, is to begin from what *Hegel* says and see what plausible interpretation we can find for what Rosenkranz says in the course of making a consistent and unstrained interpretation of that.

The difficulty about the straightforward interpretation of Rosenkranz's summary can be quickly illustrated. 'To express the life of the Idea,' says our biographer, '[Hegel] constructed a triangle of triangles, which he allowed *to move through one another* in such a way that each one was not only at one time an *extreme* at another time a *middle*, but also it had to go through this process internally with each of its sides.'² There is only one way in which a triangle can be made out of triangles which *move* so that each triangle is a middle in turn, and each side is a middle in turn, for those triangles that are not in the middle. We must let an equilateral triangle cast its own mirror image downwards and then set it up again on each side of that image. (Figure 1.) I have deliberately described the 'construction' in the way that comes closest to Hegel's own procedure. But this only highlights the most striking inconsistency between the construction that *seems* to be indicated by Rosenkranz, and the one that Hegel actually performs. Adding a mirror image below an equilateral triangle produces

¹ This makes me feel slightly sceptical about Kimmerle's interpretation of Thesis III (see *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 20, 1980, 208–13). However, the absolute whole can also be thought of as Nature, and then it is a 'resting square'. (The square is the immediate expression of *mens*; the external schema of *natura naturans*—see *Erste Druckschriften*, p. 380 and pp. 89–92, above.) But even if Hegel had this in mind when he wrote out the *Theses*, the 'resting square' has nothing to do with the *Dissertation* topic or with his 'philosophy of nature' as such. So I feel sure that it was not mentioned or defended at the Disputation. (For the Absolute as Nature, and its resting square see the further discussion below.)

² 'Hegels ursprüngliches System', 159 (in *Hegel-Studien*, x, 1975, 133); Rosenkranz, p. 102.




Figure 1
The 'Athanasian' Triangle

Schneider, Helmut, 'Anfänge der Systementwicklung Hegels in Jena', *Hegel-Studien*, Band 10, p. 149. (Schneider very properly refrains from applying his diagram to Hegel's Trinitarian 'motion'. There is no non-arbitrary way of doing this. But the perfect equality of the figure makes all motion arbitrary.)

a diamond. But Hegel explicitly says that the duplication of his 'holy' triangle in this way produces a square: and according to another part of Rosenkranz's report, Hegel expressed the totality of his construction as a 'resting square'. Since a square cannot be constructed out of equilateral triangles, we can safely infer that Hegel was not using them. Both the evidence of Rosenkranz about the whole complex, and the evidence of the Hegel fragment itself shows that Hegel was working with equilateral right-angled triangles or half-squares. This means that the 'triangle of triangles' does not itself *form* a triangle, but neither Rosenkranz nor Hegel ever suggests that. They both assert that at different stages in their 'movement' the triangles *form squares*.

Rosenkranz also says that Hegel was 'straining to lay out the representation of the *Trinity* through the . . . thoughts of Plato in the *Timaeus* about the *bond of analogy*'. This may be no more than an interpretation on his part. But even at that

valuation, we can soon show that there is more foundation for it in Hegel's other remains than there is to support most of the other suggestions that Rosenkranz made about the sources of inspiration for this manuscript (none of which can be heavily relied upon, and some of which can definitely be set aside as worthless).¹ Hegel quotes the 'bond of analogy' passage in the *Difference* essay, and the influence of the *Timaeus* is visible everywhere in the *Dissertation*.² Thoughtful consideration of its demonstrable significance for him will provide us with a highly plausible reason for his choice of the right-angled isosceles triangle here.

Plato's Demiurge used two kinds of triangle for his construction of the elements. Both of them were 'Pythagorean' (right-angled) triangles, one being half of a square, the other one, half of an equilateral triangle. In terms of the 'bond of analogy' the first expresses the relation between a whole and its two halves (or between 1 and 2). The other expresses the relation between unity, two thirds, and one third (or 1, 2, and 3). The ratios involved are those that hold between the first prime numbers; and they are surds, they must be expressed

¹ Schneider has reprinted *all* the relevant assertions of Rosenkranz (some of which, including the *Timaeus* reference, were passed over by Hoffmeister); and he has shown what can be said for and against each of them (see the notes to my translation in the appendix to this chapter). There is only one case which he seems to me to have slighted somewhat—that of Boehme. It is true that we should be wary of accepting Rosenkranz's thesis about a theosophical *phase* in Hegel's development. But there are signs of an *evolving* interest in Boehme which began with fairly whole-hearted appreciation, and became predominantly critical only in 1804–5. In that later period Hegel wrote out what he then stigmatized as a 'myth or intuition of barbarism' about the origin of evil through the fall of Lucifer. It is unmistakable that it expresses the theory of the 'expansion' of the Universe as nature and its 'contraction' into the rational consciousness as spirit which we find both in 'Schelling's system' and in the *Natural Law* essay (cf. *NKA*, iv. 74, 10–75, 25 and 463, 17–464, 31 with the 'myth' in Rosenkranz, p. 547; Harris and Cerf, pp. 169–71, Knox and Acton, pp. 110–12, and M. H. Hoffheimer in *Clio*, xi. (forthcoming). Hegel was clearly criticizing his own earlier views, and presumably, therefore, his own earlier attitude to Boehme also. He may have composed the myth on the spot (because he was certainly interested in Boehme in 1804); but there are signs of Boehme's influence in the MSS of 1801–3, so it is quite plausible to suppose that the 'myth' expresses Hegel's most important conscious debt to Boehme in that early period—a debt which after its rather rough passage in 1804–5, is still visible in the *Phenomenology* (*NKA*, ix. 413–14; Miller, sects. 776–7). See further the notes on pp. 165, 167–8, below.

² See Ch. II, sect. 2 above, *passim*, esp. p. 92, n. 1 (where Hegel's translation of the 'bond of analogy' passage is quoted and discussed).

geometrically because perfect arithmetical expression is impossible.

The equilateral triangle, by contrast, expresses identity without difference. In it all ratios disappear into unity. It will do very well to express what Athanasius wanted to assert about the Trinity, but for that purpose there is no need to make it move, or to multiply itself by moving. In Hegel's Trinitarian theology the Spirit is the 'beautiful bond' between Father and Son, their *identity in difference*. Since he wanted to show the identity of two distinct equals (Father and Son), the bond that makes two units 'one', the isosceles right-angled triangle was the only proper one. The ratio that he needed, the bond between *one* and *another*, was the geometric mean between 1 and 2, or the square root of two, the diagonal of the square.

As we have already seen, this means that the figure formed by the movement of Hegel's 'triangle of triangles' which 'move *through* one another' (not *round* one another as they would have to do in the ring-dance of the equilaterals) cannot itself be a triangle. His triangle forms a square during its movement. But that is not the 'resting square' of which Rosenkranz speaks. Rather it is a restless square, which drives the movement of the triangle on toward a return to itself. The resting square of the 'totality' can only be constructed when the movement has been completed. The movement itself is the development of each remaining side of the first generated triangle into a triangle. Through this development the first generated triangle returns to its source, the original or given triangle.

Hegel's object in the Triangle manuscript was to exhibit the ontological primacy of *Geist*. 'Spirit' is the *totality* which is *also* the *origin*. Its true being is the movement which shows how and why it must be both Alpha and Omega. Thus it is the clear expression of the ultimate being that appears to be beyond all expression. God, the ultimate mystery, 'says' what he is, manifests himself, removes the veil of mystery, in the *Logos*, the divine Word. This *saying* is the mysterious nature which cannot be said, but which can, none the less, be known *as* saying. This is the 'procession of the Spirit', which unites the unrevealed Creator with all that is revealed in creation.

Thus Spirit, proceeding from Father and Son, is properly the *first* name of God, the name that names his essence. 'Spirit' names the essence which *appears* first as the unexpressed, and as what must always remain inexpressible.

The name of God's namelessness, the name that refers to him as an unexpressed striving for expression, as a mystery which can never perfectly express itself is 'Love'. Hegel himself had spoken of this as a 'miracle that we cannot grasp' in 1797.¹ But he was already speaking of this miracle as a 'spirit' even then. 'Love' is an 'understandable' name of God because we all *experience* it, and from our experience we know what God is. The doctrine of Christian love as the sum of all the virtues—which Hegel also espoused at Frankfurt²—rests upon this. Hence John wrote 'He that loveth not, knoweth not God, for God is love.'³

But because the object is, after all, to know God *conceptually*, experience is not enough. As 'love', God is not finally comprehensible. The infinite striving is a negative, engulfing experience of the Absolute, a defeat. (God is as much defeated in the effort to express himself, as we are in our attempt to comprehend his outpouring.) To 'comprehend' God we must take another route (as he has already done in order to comprehend himself). Thus 'Spirit is deeper' as a name of God, because it names a self-cognitive experience. 'God is a spirit, and they that worship him, must worship him in spirit and in truth',⁴ according to Jesus himself. This is the text upon which Hegel's sermon of the 'holy Triangle' is preached.

'Love' is the miracle of finding oneself outside oneself, recognizing oneself in another independent external being. It becomes quite comprehensible, non-miraculous, if one shifts one's point of view, and grants that the recognition of the other self as oneself is the admission that neither is really

¹ *so wie sie mehrere Gattungen*, TW-A, i. 243-4; *Clio*, viii. 1979, 261-3.

² See esp. 'The Spirit of Christianity', TW-A, i. 359-62; (Knox and Kroner, pp. 244-6).

³ I John 4: 8.

⁴ John 4:24. We should note that the placing of the sentence 'More intelligible for the concept of God as the life of all would be the expression Love; but Spirit is deeper' in quotation marks (as coming from the Triangle MS) is due to Haym—see p. 186, n. 3, below).

independent, that what is self-sustaining is the *whole* in which the process of self-recognition takes place. This is what is involved in establishing the *concept* of Spirit as primary. The Absolute Being, the Father, utters himself as the Son. He *says* what he is in order that he may himself know what he is. The *Universe* as a totality is this 'saying'. The order of Nature, regarded as self-contained and self-maintaining is the 'Kingdom of the Son'. But this Kingdom is the *same* order that the Father meant to express. The intelligibility of the world is *in* the world, it *exists* because the world is there exemplifying it; but its logical necessity is distinct from its physical reality. If we ask why things are the way they are (or why some specific thing is the way it is), we are talking within the 'Kingdom of the Son'. But if we ask why the world exists at all, we have entered the 'Kingdom of the Father'. (That there is such a kingdom, that the question makes any intelligible sense, is of course open to question. Hegel's doctrine of the primacy of logic—the 'Kingdom of the Father'—is an attempt to show just what sense it does make, by answering it. The first step on the road is to show why it must appear not to make any sense. The distinction between the two kingdoms does this; for the question cannot be asked at all, within the 'Kingdom of the Son'. The question shifts our perspective and establishes the very same world of things as the 'Kingdom of the Father'.)

The concern of Hegel's Trinitarian speculation, however, is not simply metaphysical but religious. The crucial problem is not 'Why is there anything at all?' but rather 'Why is there evil?' How can God's self-expression involve that when, by definition, evil is what is what is not God, what is opposed to his will, a will that has established itself in independence against him? The doctrine of the identity of the two Kingdoms *in the Spirit*, the claim that the world reflects God perfectly for his own self-cognition, can only be made out when we can show how the fact of evil returns to God as a moment of his essence. This is the problem of the 'Kingdom of the Spirit'; and because it is a problem, *the Kingdom of the Spirit is not a directly intelligible order, but a movement* both in the realm of existence, and in the realm of logic. The Spirit 'proceeds' from the Father (Logic) and from the Son (Nature).

If we simply suppose for the moment, that we have the solution of this problem, then we can set up the first of Hegel's Triangles: the Absolute Triangle of the Father. That its meaningfulness remains problematic is entirely appropriate. For the 'being' of the Father is the 'Night' of an unfathomable mystery. He is the 'Abyss'—an expression which Hegel uses in several places, and which the Identity philosophers found both in Kant and in Boehme.¹ In the more sedate, though less expressive language, of speculative philosophy, God the Father is the 'negative Absolute' (Figure 2).

All that this first Triangle expresses positively is the fact that for 'the Father' to exist at all, for him to be able to say 'I AM' (as he supposedly did to Moses), this triangular relationship must be set up. It represents what is necessarily involved in an 'absolute Being' that utters itself. What it shows us, negatively, is where the problem is, from our side, in accepting the claim that such a Being ever did speak (whether to Moses or to himself). We should never forget that it is our own existence as *rational mortals* (finite beings who can yet know eternal or infinite truth) that we are trying to explicate. Our problem is not whether God really spoke to Moses, but rather how it is *possible* for Thomas (let us say) to think of the Being whom he designates as God, as 'speaking' at all. Our

¹ See for instance *Difference*, NKA, iv. 23, 13–17; 80, 28–30; (Harris and Cerf, pp. 103, 178); and esp. *Faith and Knowledge*, NKA, iv. 413, 34–5 (Cerf and Harris, p. 190). Schelling was the first to employ the metaphor (see the 1st edn. of his *Ideen*, 1797). But Hegel's employment of it in the *Difference* essay may well have been inspired directly by the memory of Kant's remark that 'Unconditioned necessity, which we so indispensably require as the last bearer of all things is the true *Abgrund* for human reason' (*Critique of Pure Reason*, B641). In any case, the fact that Hegel himself employed the metaphor in his critical essays, makes Schelling's switch to Hegel's more sedate conceptual terminology in the 2nd edn. of the *Ideen* all the more significant (*Werke*, ii. 14–15 gives the text of both editions).

For the primacy of 'Night' see *Difference*, NKA, iv. 16, 1–7 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 93–4) and for the identity of the 'abyss' with 'Night' see esp. *Difference*, NKA, iv. 23, 13–17 (Harris and Cerf, p. 103). In Boehme's theosophy 'desire' is the *Abgrund* of the 'dark centre' into which self-consciousness 'contracts'. The full realization of the image of God requires that it should 'expand' again into the 'light centre'. The moment of absolute contraction where the transition occurs is a 'flash' (*Schrack*). Thus all the terminology of 'Schelling's System' (in the *Difference* essay) bears the clear impress of Boehme's vision. Robert Brown gives an admirably clear summary of the conceptual structure of the vision in his book *The Later Philosophy of Schelling*, Bucknell U.P., Lewisburg, 1978. But he does not seem to have recognized Boehme's influence on Schelling's earlier philosophy.




Figure 2
The First Triangle:
Pure Deity or the 'Kingdom of the Father'

first step shows that if that Being can be thought of, he must be thought of as speaking. *He is the comprehension of his own speech, or he is nothing.* For the moment we must take the alternative as rigidly exclusive, and the 'nothing' as passive non-existence; at the end of our journey 'either/or' will become 'both/and', and 'Nothing' will deserve a capital letter to show that it refers to 'intellectual *Anschauung*' and to the active capacity of rational freedom.

3. *The Motion of the Triangles*

We have already been forced to refer to the 'Kingdom of the Son' in order to raise the *problem* of the Father. The 'Kingdom of the Son' is where the problem of evil declares itself. We need to be clear, first, what the problem is. The primary problem of evil in the Kingdom of the Son is not the problem of moral evil, but the problem of finitude itself. The simple cognition of the order of nature, is marred by the problem of *how* such cognition can exist in a finite consciousness. How can a finite, mortal consciousness have secure possession of logical standards that are not finite? How can we

have secure (or 'scientific') cognition? Our consciousness is a 'bad' mixture of empirical data and *a priori* principles. They are so mixed up that they are hard to separate, but we are in no doubt that they are there to be separated. We separate them into the two 'Kingdoms'—the realms of logical necessity and physical fact. The 'order of nature' is what we try to mirror in the logical order of our science. But we can only do this because the order is itself logically distinct from the world in which it is expressed. We can only explore the Kingdom of the Son cognitively, by postulating the Kingdom of the Father. Human consciousness is the 'bad' mixture that has to be unscrambled into its logical and its empirical aspects. It is neither the Father (Logic) nor the Son (Nature) but the human spirit—this unscrambling process—that is the primary reality in and through which the two Kingdoms are separated and maintained. It is *for man* that the natural world appears as the *Bild* of an eternal *Logos*. The 'son', God's self-expression, moves from the status of arbitrary postulate, to that of necessary postulate, because we are here, in the mortal storm of nature, trying to make sense of it. We can say that the *Logos* is there in Heaven (the First Triangle) because we *know* that he rules our world (the Second Triangle). But by the same token, we can say he rules here (i.e. that there really is an 'order of Nature') because he is in Heaven. We can construct the Second Triangle (as we continually try to do) only by presupposing that the First is there to model it on.

Thus the Second Triangle is logically inseparable from the First. The two have a common side which is the diagonal of a square (Figure 3). The 'spirit' which was the required fulfilment of God's problematic being, actually *exists* in the mixture of infinite rational truth and finite empirical data, which is human consciousness.¹ Truth 'floats above' us as a

¹ In the Boehme-inspired 'myth' criticized in 1804/5 (see Rosenkranz, p. 547; trans. M. H. Hoffheimer in *Chio* (forthcoming)) God appears only as the 'negative Absolute' whose 'rage' (*Grimm*) over the bad infinite of extension powers the cycle of mortality and transience. This 'wrath' (*Zorn*) is fixated as Lucifer—the self-consciousness that has been 'lost' in the infinite extension of space and time—who rebels and exists as self-consciousness rejoicing in the beauty of his transient world. This self-consciousness is itself wrath, restlessness, not peaceful contemplation. But in it the consumed transience of nature is resurrected as spirit. The evil of rebellion, of self-existence, is now redeemed or overcome, because existence in the spirit involves the acceptance of mortality. The transcendental or intellectual intuition—called 'the




Figure 3
*The Second Triangle simply:
 Creation or the 'Kingdom of the Son'*

heaven of the intellect, while we laboriously try to make our fragmentary experience into a *picture* of the order of nature.

How can this inevitably incomplete task, be itself an experience of completeness? Is not the 'unhappiness' of being incomplete, a final truth, an inevitable fate of science? Indeed it is, but Hegel's religious doctrine is that we can be *reconciled* with our fate. That reconciliation of man with God (as a unity of two natures finite and infinite *in the spirit*) is the 'Kingdom of the Spirit', as the fully explicit 'holy Triangle of triangles' in which each side of the Triangle of the Son becomes one side of its own triangle (Figure 4). The construction of the two triangles of finite cognition (the sciences of nature and freedom) upon the undeveloped sides of the parent Triangle

pure Nothing' in the fragment—which enables us to know ourselves in God as 'free spirit which sees this transfiguration of itself only within nature' is achieved only at this price. Even from this summary interpretation, it will be obvious I hope, both that the 'myth' illuminates the doctrine of 'mixture' in the 'Triangle fragment', and that because of its close affinities with the *Difference* essay and *Natural Law* we can legitimately avail ourselves of this illumination. The critical commentary when we come to it later, will likewise be a critique of the whole conception of ultimate salvation contained in the 'Triangle' MS.




Figure 4
The Holy Triangle or the Triangle of Triangles
(the developed process from Triangle II to Triangle III)

The cognitive triangles should be thought of as becoming visible progressively *across* the visible triangle of life from which they are here folded out (as 'reflections'). This development of cognition *over* reality is the folding of the square into Triangle III. Thus man climbs out of nature to the *polis*, only to be cast back into servitude so as to *reconstruct* his freedom by rational volition.

(human experience in the visible world, the 'Kingdom of the Son') brings about the 'resumption of the whole into one'—the folding of the second triangle upon the first, to produce the Triangle of God as Spirit—an Absolute Being whose existence is quite unproblematic (Figure 5). If the triangles are to 'move through one another' they must all fold up into one. This they can fairly be said to do because the 'reconstruction' of the Second triangle through the erection of the two half-triangles of scientific cognition 'over' the Triangle of




Figure 5
The Third Triangle:
Christ Risen or the Kingdom of the Spirit
(Triangle II folded on to Triangle I)

Creation is identical with the folding of the realm of fact onto the realm of logic (or vice versa). 'In the beginning' God created the simple Triangle. But 'as being in the *Trennung* it is itself a *twofold* triangle'. This doubling is its created destiny, not a fact. The created world must know itself in relation to its creator. 'As being in the *Trennung*' it must look back across the gulf and recognize that it is God's own otherness. This is its task. But God's Providence, the Spirit uniting Father and Son in their absolute or heavenly Unity, floats over that first (simple) triangle of created nature, guiding its fulfilment of this task in history.¹

¹ The most crucial point in the interpretation of what Hegel says is the recognition that when he speaks of 'the all-producing force of the absolute Unity that floats over the first [triangle]' he means the 'first [triangle of the Second]'. The absolute *Unity* is itself the 'First' Triangle proper. *Nothing* could 'float over' that. To suppose that the 'all-producing force' of the Father *floats over* it would be to return to 'the *succession* of the church images'. 'God the Father' in his creative independence is the first Triangle, not *one side* of it. His Providence in history is the 'Spirit'—which is the *side* of the Father's Triangle that is made manifest in the movement of history—even though it remains an invisible and 'inward' power.

Hegel expresses his doctrine of reconciliation with fate first from the side of God. The fact that the Universe is God's self-expression must be made manifest, by God himself accepting the fate of finitude; and the fact that human Reason is the 'Kingdom of the Son' must be made manifest by his accepting finitude in the shape of human death. The fact that fate can be conquered by acceptance, that the unhappiness of man's endless trying to achieve scientific cognition can turn over into the achievement of absolute logical science, is manifested by God's resurrection from the grave, and his return to himself in Heaven. But this first 'religious' version of reconciliation is the triumph of faith only (Figure 5). The single Triangle of the Father, the doubled triangle of the Son, and the folded triangle of the Spirit are simply interpretations of Christian dogma. They are part of a sermon, which may or may not be acceptable to a believer—clearly Hegel tries to stay close to the most basic 'symbols' of the faith in order to make his sermon universally acceptable. But even with my philosophical commentary, the whole sermon is only a set of arbitrary dogmatic assertions to anyone who has not made the commitment of faith. That 'God' has *done* any of these things, must appear to a critical hearer even more problematic, than that he has simply said 'I AM' to Moses (or some other human interlocutor).

It is only the *full process* of the Second triangle that gets us from 'faith' to 'knowledge'. The First Triangle (of the Father) is 'only *one* side of the absolute eternal triangle'. We have seen that it is a side of the Second triangle (which becomes a square because it requires the First Triangle above it). But now Hegel tells us that the Second triangle 'as being in the *Trennung*, is herewith itself a twofold triangle, or its *two* sides are each a triangle'. Since every triangle has three sides, he must be referring to the two sides that are not already constituted as sides of another triangle. Now a right-angled triangle with one of these *sides* as its hypotenuse covers *half* of the parent triangle. So with the same construction on both sides the second triangle becomes 'twofold'. It is 'reconstructed' as a whole by the two half-triangles.

Thus it is the Second Triangle which is 'the absolute eternal Triangle' or the Holy Triangle made up of sides from three

other triangles. The 'side' of Spirit which has already been constructed as the triangle of the Father is destined to pass out of its unhappiness and become 'a beautiful, free, divine middle, the *Universe of God*' instead of being a 'bad' mixture. It brings itself to this consummation by being the means through which God appears in history. This is the side of human experience where we are conscious of our human fortunes as guided and controlled by 'Providence', and of our communal history as the 'history of God' himself.

4. *The Half-Triangles of Cognition*

This human consciousness, of the *history of the race* as the fulfilment of its Creator's plan for 'his Image', has a definite historical beginning. We can mark it quite unproblematically as 'the conversion of St. Paul'. Before that historical moment, two peoples intuitively grasped that human reason was an 'image of God'. The Greeks grasped it *materially* in their 'religion of art' (the outer, finite mode of intuition); the Jews *formally* in their 'religion of thought' (the inward, infinite mode of intuition). Because thought, the inner intuition, is essentially the 'motion of the Concept', the Jews also perceived that their history was the story of God's dealings with them, and that it was controlled by his plan. But it was only with the universal proclamation of the Christian Gospel that this intuition was properly conceptualized. In Paul's mission to the Gentiles the motion of human history generally was declared to be directed by God toward the salvation of his human children everywhere.

This is important because the two half-triangles of the cognition of the visible world are the triangles of Nature and Universal Culture respectively; and since man himself is part of Nature we have to know how to distinguish what belongs to his nature, and what to history proper. The Greeks completed the triangle of Nature itself. They *created Sittlichkeit*. So they (not God directly) planted the Garden of Eden and placed Adam in it. They did so by *realizing what man potentially is*, and by recognizing that they had realized it. Thus they knew what man is 'by nature'. As created by God, man is the free rational being. But he only is *both* free and rational when he

creates himself knowingly through his own effort. Thus in fulfilling their nature, the Greeks had to construct the triangle of natural cognition. But they did not know that what they had constructed was only *half* of the truth. Hence there was an error of perspective in everything they knew, and in their whole consciousness of what they were and what they had done. The Greek experience belongs to the natural fulfilment of man, just as they said, but not *only* in the way that they thought.¹ The *limit* of their natural knowledge manifests itself in the fact that their rational theory of human nature excused them from any historic mission to make their insight universally known. Those who naturally could receive it, would do so, and the rest would do whatever came naturally to their imperfect natures. Greek rationality was *theoretical* not practical. There is no development, only unfolding.

The Jewish experience belongs to the transition from nature to history, because although they had a practically rational concept of their relation to God, they did not have a fully rational concept of man. Hence they had a providential mission, but it was not a mission of universal salvation.²

The dividing line between nature and history is thus identified by a rational criterion, rather than marked by a supernatural event. It is given by the application of the second formula of the Categorical Imperative, to the beliefs and activities of the founders of the new religion, not by 'faith'—i.e. it does not involve a simple acceptance of the historical accuracy of what the founders proclaimed.³

¹ What is here called 'the Greek experience' comes to an end in 403 BC (as *art*) and in 323 BC (as *thought*). It is noteworthy that this conception of the Greek experience as part of 'ethical nature' and as the real 'age of innocence' is found in (Schelling's) 'Relation of Natural Philosophy to Philosophy in General' (NKA, iv. 273). The whole conception of the history of religion in this essay is close to Hegel's. Cf. esp. 'All the symbols of Christianity show the *Bestimmung* to represent the identity of God with the World in images' (ibid., 272, lines 25–6).

² 'The Jewish experience' ends even more cataclysmically in AD 70. The cultural life of the two peoples after these dates belongs to what should be called (in the present context) the Greek heritage and the Jewish heritage. Both of these *heritages* were of immense importance to the universal mission. (See the next note.)

³ As far as I can see the *historicity of Jesus is of no importance to Hegel's view*. The story of the Man-God is a symbol not a fact. The mission of the indubitably historical Hellenized Jew, Paul, to proclaim that symbol to the Gentiles is one half of the hinge of fate between nature and history; and the fact that the Logos doctrine was accepted as coming from the mouth of the apostle John, so that a confluence point between the

If anyone asks how, when Hegel's text only speaks in religious terms of 'the pure Light of Unity', 'the all-producing *Kraft* of the absolute Unity', and 'the invisible might working in the inward parts', I can be so sure that he means the might of Kantian practical Reason, I shall point first, to the first nine verses of the Gospel of John (and especially verses 3 and 9) as the evident theological foundation of Hegel's doctrine, and then direct the reader's attention to the interpretation of those verses that Hegel gave in his 'Life of Jesus' in 1794, and to his reworking of that position in the 'Spirit of Christianity' between 1798 and 1800.¹

Next we must consider the fact that the two triangles linked by this '*invisible middle*' of Divine Providence are explicitly said to be mirror-images.² This is the perfect parallelism of the two finite 'constructions' of the Absolute Identity in the *Difference* essay; and it is only if we include man in the order of Nature and distinguish natural ethics and natural religion, from transcendental morality and 'Religion within the bounds of Reason', that we can so interpret this parallelism as to arrive successfully at the culminating antithesis between Art and Speculation which Hegel speaks of as the essential problem of the final phase.³

historical theology of Judaism and the philosophical humanism of the Greeks was set up is the other half. Of course, the message of the Synoptic Gospels themselves was also immensely important no matter where it came from. But whether the Sermon on the Mount, for instance, was ever uttered by a man called Jesus, who later suffered judicial execution, is no more important to Hegel's view, than whether the fourth Gospel was really written by a disciple of his called John—which, I take it, the most committed believer will admit to be historically uncertain.

¹ Nohl, p. 75 (cf. *Toward the Sunlight*, pp. 198–9); and *TW-A*, i. 373–7 (Knox and Kroner, pp. 256–61).

² 'das eine das umgekehrte des andern' (*Hegel-Studien*, x. 1975, 135).

³ The fact that the Triangle MS enables us to solve *this* puzzle, is to my mind, a conclusive proof that it belongs to the quadripartite phase of Hegel's theory construction, and that Rosenkranz was not wrong—or certainly, not far wrong—to take it as the earliest formulation of Hegel's basic ontology. See esp. *Difference*, *NKA*, iv. 74, 10–76, 26 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 169–73—but see p. 219 n. 1, below). Cf. also the way the two sciences strain toward the same limit from opposite sides. That limit is the self-conscious rational organism—*NKA*, iv. 71, 10–72, 7 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 166–7). Finally the mirror-image reversal relation between the moments of 'real body' and 'real spirit' in the 'Introduction to Philosophy' outline should be considered (see Ch. I, pp. 67–9, above). But that reversal can appear only *diagonally* in any 'resting square'. It is spiritual, not natural, it arises from the hierarchical relation, not from the parallel between the two realms of cognition.

Finally, there is positive evidence about the content of the Triangle manuscript which has not been noticed before, and which supports this interpretation. Rosenkranz took the Triangle manuscript to be the very first formulation of Hegel's 'metaphysics'. When he discusses the 'development' at Jena of that first conception (which he assigned to the Frankfurt years) he makes a glancing reference backwards that is very helpful.

Hegel still loved, even yet [i.e. in Summer 1806], as we already saw above, in his first exposition of metaphysics [i.e. the Triangle manuscript], to present the creation of the Universe as the *utterance* of the absolute *Word* [cf. the 'first Triangle of the Second'], and the return of the Universe into itself as the *understanding* of the Word [cf. the 'Second Triangle of the Second'], so that nature and history become the *medium* between the speaking and the understanding of the Word—a medium which itself vanishes qua other-being.¹

There can be no denying that all this language suits Hegel's 'first exposition of metaphysics' absolutely perfectly. Thus what the absolute movement of the Divine Spirit in human history produces is the speculative cognition of 'nature' and 'history' which is itself the 'understanding of the Word' through which 'the Universe returns into itself'. The two half-triangles of *understanding* whose construction upon the sides of the 'triangle of the Son' brings about the folding of the triangle of the Son upon that of the Father to produce the consummatory triangle of the Spirit, are therefore the triangles of 'Nature' and 'History'.

We can discover a little more about the two *visible* triangles by considering their relation to the *invisible* one. The First Triangle is established by the 'mutual intuition and cognition' of Father and Son (in the eternal heaven of Logic). Thus the mediating Spirit is 'Anschauung und Erkennen'. The way Hegel insists on coupling these two (and giving them a

¹ Rosenkranz, p. 193; Harris and Knox, p. 265. The fact that the metaphor of 'the divine mystery' and the paradox of divine justice and mercy reappear in the introduction to the 'Real Philosophy' of Summer 1806, just as the Boehme myth is reinstated in the *Phenomenology*, points to 1804 rather than 1805 as the year of Hegel's *critical* meditation on the 'barbarity' of such talk. Only *positive* values, not 'the divine mystery' or 'the fall of Lucifer' are allowed to enter the Logic, Metaphysics, and Nature Philosophy of 1804/5.

singular verb) even in *Faith and Knowledge*, when he is discussing the *bipolarity* of empirical sensation which is the experienced 'middle' between the visible world and our cognition of it, refers us to his conception of philosophical method in the *Difference* essay (and the application of it in the *System of Ethical Life*).¹ But in the Triangle manuscript the 'middle' is primarily *Anschauung*; it is the triangle constructed on that hypotenuse that is *Erkennen*. Thus the Father *intuits* the Son as 'other', and the Son *intuits* his own otherness as the 'Earth' of which he is 'Lord'. *Intuition* is thus the primitive mode of *Spirit*. For it is 'spirit' that is the side shared by the invisible triangle with the visible one; and Hegel says that 'In the Second God's *Anschauung* has stepped to one side.' When the other sides of the visible Triangle become middles for the half-triangles of cognition in their turn, we can reasonably infer that each of them becomes (*qua* hypotenuse) the primary 'intuition' for the cognition of its half of the great triangle of visible creation.

That the first stage of the cognitive transformation of the 'visible world' was indeed the 'construction of the Absolute as Nature' is confirmed by what Rosenkranz tells us about how the manuscript continued: 'This triangular construction is now followed out in its details through Nature, though with frequent abandonment of the presupposed representation and with a peculiar mingling of purely logical and pictorial characteristics.'² Hegel's philosophy of nature makes this impression on a modern reader at every stage of its development. But if he was here working schematically with a 'pre-established harmony' in mind, we can well understand why the sense of artificiality was even more striking in this

¹ In *Faith and Knowledge* Hegel explicitly says that in the process of rational cognition 'unity and manifold detach themselves from one another within [the original identity] and are held together *forcefully*, as Plato says [*Timaeus* 35a] by the middle [transcendental imagination and rational cognition—treated here as a singular grammatical subject]' (*Faith and Knowledge*, NKA, iv. 372, 15–17; Cerf and Harris, p. 132). There he was talking about the theoretical cognition that begins from the 'bipolarity' of external sensation. For the evolution of internal or practical sensation we have his own worked-out model in the *System of Ethical Life*. (For his characterization of the method of philosophy as this *forceful* middle see *Difference*, NKA, iv. 31, 1–19—Harris and Cerf, pp. 113–14—quoted in Ch. I, p. 71, above.)

² *Dok.*, p. 305 (or Schneider, 'Anfänge usw'., p. 135).

instance. What is more significant is that Hegel apparently abandoned his efforts when he reached the level of the irrational animal (*Tier*). Beyond this point, he would have had to deal with *human nature*. At this stage, I think, the pre-established requirement of a parallel between nature and self-conscious Reason became too artificial even for Hegel himself. The providential process of history is not contained in the half-triangles of cognition. But it is the process of history that causes the greater triangles to 'move through one another'. The sensible meeting-point between the half-triangles, the hinge between nature and history, is the Greek *polis* as a living work of natural genius. The transition from drama to philosophy is where the true construction of the half-triangle of intelligence begins. But the comprehending of human history which is necessary for the construction of this 'transcendental' triangle is far more important than anything shown in the triangle itself. To show that the movement from *Sittlichkeit* to *Moralität* is the real Fall of Man is far more important than to show that there is a parallel between the City in the Heavens and the Empire of Rome. The essentially religious concern that led Hegel to construct the Triangles was bound to make him dissatisfied with them (and with the system they summed up) when he saw what they must leave out. They could show only results. In the case of the triangle of Nature this was interesting. But in the realm of Intelligence, it was the *movement*, the process of the three speculative triangles that mattered.

The most powerful argument in favour of my whole interpretation, is that it accounts for the curious antithetic *parallel* between Art and Speculation in the *Difference* essay. The 'Triangle of triangles' works perfectly as an explanation of 'God's eternal human Incarnation, the begetting of the Word from the beginning'. 'The internalization of the light of nature', or the 'self-constitution of intelligence as point' is the point where we pass from the half-triangle of Nature to that of Intelligence. But it is *also* the midpoint of Nature itself. Nature must develop its own 'order of ideas'—'intelligence as a point must likewise expand into a nature'—and *then* 'intelligence as a real factor [i.e. as this developed nature] takes the whole self-construction of nature on the other side

over into its own realm.” This generates a new ‘order of ideas’. The *System of Ethical Life* shows them both, and shows the relation between them. The ‘system of Intelligence’ could only show their identity. In my view, it was the ‘system of Intelligence’ that led Hegel to the formulation of the ‘Triangle of triangles’; and the inadequacy of that to express the historical concern that produced it, led in turn to the account of ‘ethical nature’ or ‘real spirit’ in the *System of Ethical Life*. But now a new difficulty comes to the fore. The ‘system of Intelligence’ could contain both a theoretical and a practical ‘reconstruction’; the *System of Ethical Life* can accommodate only the latter. The ‘theoretical construction of intelligence’ is now to be found only in the critical logic, which is the necessary preamble to the exposition of the Idea in Metaphysics. But that will not do either, if the deepest truth of philosophy is ‘the intuition of God’s eternal human Incarnation’. The ‘holy Triangle of triangles’ pushes Hegel first one way, then the other, and finally drives him out of his four-part system altogether. Then it attacks his separation of the logic of the finite from the metaphysics of the infinite; and finally the ‘biography of God’ which both produced and defeated the Triangle, gets a place of its own and the restlessness of human history ceases to disturb the calm of God’s self-cognition in Heaven.

But that is all hypothesis, and mostly anticipation. In its immediate context, the ‘Triangle of triangles’ was both a great success and a conspicuous failure. The successful aspect—the reconciliation of finite with Absolute Spirit—became a permanent feature of Hegel’s speculation. Hence we cannot hope to date the manuscript by that. The influence of the *Timaeus* is a more reliable index, but we must always remember that this Platonic inspiration was an equally permanent element in Hegel’s thought.²

¹ *Difference*, NKA, iv. 74, 32–75, 25 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 170–1). Cf. further NKA, iv. 72, 32–4 (Harris and Cerf, p. 165): ‘For since intelligence is posited in the Absolute, the form of being pertains to it too: it must split itself and appear: it is a fully developed organization of cognition [the *System of Ethical Life*] and intuition [the *polis* and the *Republic*].’

² Thus we find echoes of Timaeon geometry in the fragments of 1803 (see *seiner Form*, 3b, in NKA, v. 375) and in the ‘Logic and Metaphysics’ of 1804 (see NKA, vii. 114, 19–115, 28; 116, 16–28, and 118, 31–119, 7). What Rosenkranz tells us about

It is the peculiarly ambitious character of the undertaking—the combination of the success with the failure—that is only intelligible at one single juncture in Hegel's development—his projection of 'Schelling's System' as a *programme* in the *Difference* Essay. Because of this we can say with some considerable confidence that the Triangle manuscript was written no later than 1802—and more probably in 1801.

5. *The 'Resting Square'*

We have still to discuss the Resting Square. But as a prelude to that we must ask first what the 'movement' of the Triangles 'through one another', really achieves. This movement from 'faith' to 'knowledge' was the permanent achievement, the success from which Hegel never looked back, and which I have pictured as driving him relentlessly forward all through the Jena years. How does the comprehending cognition of Nature and History turn our continuing struggle for truth and justice into an experience of 'resurrection into eternal life'. Only, I think, by showing us that 'virtue is its own reward' and hence that heavenly joy can have no other real referent than the joy of self-understanding. Fate becomes acceptable, we are reconciled with it, when we understand its rationality. To understand anything is itself a joy; but to understand our own fate also *produces* a joy. For what we understand here is that *there can be no joy any other way*. The joy that comes from knowing that everything has its place in the closed cycle of 'infinite life', will not mitigate the pain of a toothache or remorse for a mistake, or indignation against an injustice. 'Nothing in fate is changed by it', says Rosenkranz;¹ and since

Hegel's still liking to use the Logos doctrine to express his deepest insights in 1806 (see p. 175 above) illustrates why we cannot take any *Christian* coincidences of language as finally decisive. But still it is worth reflecting on the way Hegel speaks of the Idea 'coming down' from Heaven to Earth and 'rising again' from Nature as Spirit in the 'Introduction to Philosophy' of Oct. 1801 (*NKA*, v. 263). Like the echoes of the *Timaeus* this is not decisive. But it helps.

¹ p. 135 (Harris and Knox, p. 180). This explains why so much emphasis is placed on the *enduring* of the 'infinite grief' in Hegel's version of the Identity Philosophy. Cf. *Faith and Knowledge*, *NKA*, iv. 413, 11–414, 13 (Cerf and Harris, pp. 190–1), and *System of Ethical Life*, *Schriften* (1913), p. 486 (Harris and Knox, p. 146). The necessity for this endurance is the main point of the 'Boehme myth'—and the criticism attacks it as an inadequate image because the grief does not endure properly

he used spread type here, he was probably quoting directly from Hegel's text. Only one's attitude is changed. To know that there is no joy except through conquest, is a joy because it is already what Hegel would call a 'formal' conquest of whatever is causing misery. Also, to know this, is to know that there cannot be such a thing as a final real conquest of misery, that the promised joy of a world *beyond* in which there is no strife, makes no intelligible sense. The only satisfaction that is intelligibly beyond desire is the natural satisfaction of sleep. There is *that* satisfaction in death too, as the poets have often noted. But no one wants it as long as life holds anything else but pain, precisely because of its finality.

The *eternity* of the resurrected life is a matter of the significance of one's reconciled words for others. Whenever one achieves the state of reconciled intuition or insight (I use 'insight' to designate the inward intuition of pure thought)—whether it be about some particular human experience or about life in general—one is in a position, either as artist or philosopher to say something that has eternal validity and import. It is through this kind of *objective* saying (effective utterance of what one simply sees and knows as true) that past worlds are resurrected in present consciousness. Poets achieve this for their own society; their work shows us who come after, how their world perceived itself when it was not struggling. Philosophers express this intuition as conceptual cognition. Hence they must find it complete in history behind them. Their comprehending activity is the active life of the 'world beyond'.

This leads us finally to a plausible hypothesis about the 'Resting Square'. It represents the heaven of the intellect, or the ideal of philosophy as a system. To begin with, the *resting* square is obviously quite different from the *unresting* or un-

as an individual experience. The standpoint is transcendent rather than transcendental. 'The individual . . . does not pass away, but rather is already passed away.' Both the lectures, with their attack on Schleiermacher, and the *System of Ethical Life* and explicitly wrestling with this as a *defect*; only the *Natural Law* essay seems content with an absolute intuition that involves *no* return of the subject into itself. Thus the *Natural Law* essay is the true high-water mark of Hegel's philosophy of Identity. But the tensions that generate the new tide of transcendental subjectivity are already apparent in *Faith and Knowledge* (where the criticism of 'reflective subjectivity' constitutes the declared agenda).

happy square set up by Triangle II. That square comes to rest in a triangle (Triangle III). Triangle I is, was, and ever shall be, at rest. The two triangles of finite cognition come to rest likewise when the unresting square folds into Triangle III. But the achievement of absolute cognition does not bring finite existence to an end in time. Both the 'visible' triangle and its scientific 'reflection' remain unfolded for continuing contemplation. As the extended 'Universe of God' they can be intuited in the stillness of their perfect equilibrium as an 'ideal body'. This is the ideal of scientific system. Thus the triangle of 'this world' and the two half-triangles of its cognition are the objectified content of Absolute self-cognition in its two opposite aspects (being and thought) connecting the pure Form of the Idea with its resumptive self-enjoyment as Absolute Spirit. As such they constitute a *resting square* (Figure 6) which was very probably the one that Hegel had in mind. It offers us an ideal reflection of the 'Universe at rest' which resembles the orbits of the planets in their four-dimensional 'ideal body'; but it has the two-dimensional form that Hegel holds to be proper for *mens*. What makes me feel fairly confident about this hypothesis is the fact that when the *movement* of the Idea is stilled in this way *the side of the Father moves at last into the middle*. He can be identified as the human 'intellectual intuition' from which speculative philosophy begins.¹ On the other hand, because the square is a visible thing, it is also the place where the side of 'Spirit' becomes everywhere an *extreme*. The square of Nature is an image of logical necessity or of eternal death. It is the Triangle of Spirit proper (Triangle III) which shows us the meaning of 'eternal life'. Everything that is folded in the moving totality of that final triangle is unfolded in the resting totality of the square. And between the resting and the moving whole (Figures 6 and 4) I believe the reader will see that what Rosenkranz's initial statement strictly requires is duly fulfilled. Either in the movement or in the stillness of the three triangles each side of each of them is somewhere a middle, and somewhere else an extreme.

¹ Actually this is where the side of the *Son* moves into the middle too. He is the 'divine light' or the Aether that posits itself as light and gravity, and also as empirical 'sense' and 'feeling'. ('In him was *Life* and the life was the *Light* of men.')




Figure 6

*The Resting Square:
Salvation in Thought*

(a conjecture guided by the parallelism of 'Schelling's System')

The task of the philosopher is to achieve systematic clarity in order to make the triangles move. This movement which he initiates is the folding in of the two finite constructions upon the Second Triangle (or their being made visible over it) so that that triangle can itself fold over upon the First to produce the Third. All this 'movement' is a religious experience. (Another value of the Resting Square is that it makes visible how the whole of life and experience—not just philosophical consciousness—is taken up in 'the resumption of the whole into One'.) Hegel's ideal philosopher at this time is a religious hero who by combining the talents of poet and philosopher, becomes a *rational prophet*. Philosophical speculation initiates

a movement that will generate a New Jerusalem. The absolute intuition that is both practical (as creative *art*) and theoretical (as speculative *comprehension*) is a form of divine service through which a new religion will be generated for the *Volk*—and that means a new *life*. Hegel sees himself in 1802 as a Platonic soldier of the spirit, a Guardian-candidate who has returned to the Cave:

Every single [person] is a blind link in the chain of absolute necessity on which the world develops. Every single [person] can extend his dominion over a greater length of this chain only if he recognizes the direction in which the great necessity will go, and learns from this cognition to utter the magic word which conjures up its shape. This cognition which can both embrace in itself the whole energy of the suffering and the antithesis which has ruled in the world and all the forms of its development (*Ausbildung*) for a couple of thousand years, and can raise itself above it all, this cognition only philosophy can give.¹

¹ Rosenkranz, p. 141; Harris and Knox, pp. 185–6.

APPENDIX

THE FULL REPORT OF ROSENKRANZ CONCERNING THE 'TRIANGLE OF TRIANGLES'

A: 'Hegel's Original System'¹

[Prutz, 157] Once Hegel had emerged from his limited concern with theology [*theologischen Beschränktheit*] and had resolutely recognized his vocation to speculation, he always worked out his philosophy as *system*, or as a self-articulating whole. But this whole lived through distinct epochs even in the period that ends with the *Phenomenology*.

The first of these epochs occurs already in the earlier half of the *Frankfurt* period, and has essentially a *theosophical* character. It is consumed with the effort to lay out the image [*Vorstellung*] of the *Trinity* by means of Plato's thoughts about the *bond of analogy* in the *Timaeus* (thoughts which are themselves still half in the mode of imagery). . . .

[159] So far as the first shape of the system is concerned, we can only form an inadequate picture of it for ourselves from certain sybilline ruins that it has left behind it. The likeliest thing is that Hegel never followed out any of these attempts quite to the end, because in the course of working on them the lack of correspondence [*Unangemessenheit*] between the image-form and the form of pure thinking became too great. But still there survives a fragment of some importance, which deals with the *divine triangle*. This geometrizing mode of imagery had been suggestively revived at that time by Franz von Baader in his [160] essay *On the Pythagorean Square <in Nature> or the four regions of the World* (Tübingen, 1798).² The philosopher of the Romantic School, Jacob Boehme, too, had returned to honour with his

¹ Excerpted from K. Rosenkranz, 'Hegels ursprüngliches System 1798-1806' (*Literarhistorisches Taschenbuch*, ed. R. E. Prutz, Vol. ii. 1844) by Helmut Schneider, reprinted in *Hegel-Studien*, x. 1975, 133-5. The pagination of the original publication is shown in square brackets.

² In Baader's essay the 3 domains of natural history (animal, vegetable, mineral) and the 3 types of matter (combustible, salty, earthy) are subordinated under 3 'basic forces' or 'principles' (fire, water, earth). These elements would remain inert, however, were it not for the 4th principle (air) which enlivens them. The relation of the 4 elements is symbolically portrayed as a triangle with a point in the middle (representing air). This symbol (triangle with point) Baader calls the *Quaternarius* or Pythagorean Square. No theological connection is made by Baader. (This summary is based on the report of Helmut Schneider in *Hegel-Studien*, x. 1975, 158-9.)

Ternary.¹ Hegel passed through this phase, too, in his philosophical formation. But because he wanted to penetrate it through and through with philosophical seriousness, and not merely to amuse himself in it with mystical game-playing, he was bound to orient it basically according to its geometric determinacy (as being precisely what should be accounted the most characteristic aspect of it).² There remained, accordingly, nothing else in it but the concept of the unity that distinguishes itself from itself in three ways. For Hegel's dialectical spirit a *simple* triangle was not sufficient. To express the life of the Idea, he constructed a *triangle of triangles*, which he suffered to *move through one another* in such a way that each one was not only at one time *extreme* and at another time *middle* generally, but also it had to go through this process internally with each of its *sides*. And then, in order to maintain the ideal plasticity of unity amid this rigidity and crudity of intuition, to maintain the fluidity of the distinctions represented as triangle and sides, he went on consistently to the further barbarity of expressing the totality as [a] *square resting* over the triangles and their process. But he seems to have got tired in the following out of his labour; at any rate he broke off at the construction of the *animal* [Thier]. The interest of this fragment consists especially in the active conflict between the woodenness of the form and the living vitality of the dialectic of the content. It was bound to prove to Hegel the impossibility of displaying what genuinely is [*das Wahrhafte*] for cognition in any [form] other than [its] logical determinacy, without violence and wild half-fancies.

[161] Up to this point, this work was for Hegel perhaps the most fearful, and at the same time the most fruitful effort. Through his works in Bern he had wrestled his way from the most bitter indignation against the manifold distortions of Christianity back to trust in it and in its fundamental images. He wanted now to *comprehend* [or conceptualize, *begreifen*] the *Trinity* in the triangle of triangles. He wanted at this date, not to banish this image from himself as irrational, in which the faith had for centuries revered its highest possession. His acquaintance with the German mystics of the

¹ Baader's triangle with central point is employed by Boehme—and probably derives from him. Moreover, Boehme used it as a Trinitarian symbol. Hegel's attitude to Boehme in 1804 to 1806 is critically appreciative, but he consistently attacks the direct acceptance of Boehme's metaphors and symbols as the simple truth. See esp. the *Wastebook*, items 45 and 48 (Rosenkranz, pp. 546, 547, and 199). So if we project this attitude back to an earlier period when Hegel was less discontented with pictorial modes of expression generally, we might fairly take the Triangle fragment as an attempt to *develop* what Hegel took to be Boehme's meaning in Boehme's own mode. (The extent of Boehme's influence is much disputed. For a more sceptical view than the one adopted in the present chapter see the summary account of Schneider in *Hegel-Studien*, x, 1975, 159–64.)

² To my eye, this sentence (and the one following) appear to be a direct summary by Rosenkranz from Hegel's own manuscript. I infer from this that Hegel himself connected his Triangle with Boehme's 'Ternary', and that he contrasted his own use of the symbol with the 'mystical game-playing' of Franz von Baader. (This hypothesis explains both why Rosenkranz is so ready with the Baader reference, and why Schneider is nevertheless right about its relative insignificance.)

Middle Ages, and their speech with its profound sense, strengthened this tendency. Already at the outset of the Swiss period we find among Hegel's papers excerpts of passages from Meister Eckhart and from Tauler, which he copied out for himself from literary journals.¹ But as he got involved with *Gnosis*, the concept of spirit forced itself upon him as opposed to them,² the concept which, because it is the *total concept*, escapes all *imagery* in the end. In the *succession* of ecclesiastical images it looks at first as if the Spirit were subordinate as against the Father and the Son who *breathe* it, according to the metaphor of the image. But the Church itself has expressly accorded to the Spirit the *same* independence and eternity, as are accorded to the two other so-called 'persons' of the Godhead. Spirit for the first time is the unity, without which the distinction of Father and Son would be without sense, or if it made sense, must lead to dualism. For this reason Hegel hurled himself about in the most peculiar expressions to display the *reciprocity of mediation* between the Persons. To this end he also availed himself of the ecclesiastical formula of the *Realm* (of Father, Son and Spirit) which he later retained in his philosophy of religion. *Love* would according to him be a more fitting, more understandable expression for the concept of God, but *Spirit* is deeper. [Haym: 'More understandable for the concept of God (as the life of all) would be the expression Love; but Spirit is deeper'.]³

'In the Son God is cognizant of Himself as God. He says to Himself: I am God. The within-itself ceases to be a negative. The distinction and the wealth of God's self-consciousness is reconciled therein with His simplicity, and the Realm of the Son of God is also wholly the Realm of the Father. The self-consciousness of God is not a withdrawal back within himself and an otherness of the Son, just as it is not an otherness of his withdrawal back within himself as simple God, but his intuition in the Son is the intuiting of

¹ This is an important piece of information about Hegel's studies at Berne (see *Toward the Sunlight*, pp. 230-1). But we can set it aside without hesitation as irrelevant to the *Triangle* fragment (which cannot be less than 5 years later than Hegel's departure from Berne).

² Hegel makes a *critical* reference to the Gnostics in the same breath with a critique of Schelling (Rosenkranz, p. 188; Harris and Knox, p. 262. See further, Ch. IX, below). The existence of this critique (after Schelling's departure from Jena) argues strongly in favour of some earlier studies in a more positive spirit. That a critical reaction to Gnosticism was the source of Hegel's conception of the primacy of Spirit is not very plausible, however, since Rosenkranz is right in thinking that the Berne period was crucial for that development, and there were few signs of an interest in Gnosticism on Hegel's part at *that* time. But see further, *Toward the Sunlight*, p. 212; and we should never forget that Rosenkranz had *other* MSS dating (at least, according to him!) from the Berne and Frankfurt years, in the context of which he chose to interpret the *Triangle* fragment.

³ Haym cites the sentence in this variant form as a direct quotation (*Hegel und seine Zeit*, Berlin, 1857, p. 101). The addition *als des Allebens* may be nothing more than Haym's own way of connecting this sentence from the *Triangle* fragment with the discussion of the *Systemfragment* of 1800 which he is there conducting. But it is plausible to suppose that Haym made his own direct transcription from the MS—since he did this in other instances where Rosenkranz had already transcribed passages in his biography. Hence I have inserted the quotation in the text.

the simple God as *his own self*,¹ but in such a way that the Son remains Son, or as not distinguished and at the same time distinguished; or the farspread Realm of the Universe, which has no longer any being-for-self over against itself, but rather its being-for-self is a returning back within God, or is God's returning back within himself, a joy over the majesty [*Herrlichkeit*] of the Son whom he intuits as himself. And the *Earth* thereby ceases to be something mixed [*ein Vermischtes*]² (for that its being-within-self is no longer pure being-for-self, or *Evil*). What stands over against the Son in his majesty as he intuits the Earth, is the majesty of God himself, the looking back and returning home to him. And for the consecrated Earth this *self-consciousness of God* is the *Spirit*, which proceeds from God, and in which the Earth is one with him and with the Son.³ This Spirit is here the eternal mediator between the Son returned unto the Father, who is now wholly and only one, and between the being of the Son within himself, or of the majesty of the Universe. The simplicity of the all-embracing Spirit has now stepped into the middle and there is now no distinction any more. For the Earth as the self-consciousness [163] of God is now the Spirit, yet it is also the eternal Son whom God intuits as himself, and the pair is One unity and the cognition of God within himself. Thus has the holy triangle of triangles closed itself. The First is the Idea of God which is carried out in the other triangles, and returns into itself by passing through them.

In this *First*, which is at the same time only One side of the absolutely unique Triangle, there is only the Godhead in reciprocal intuition and cognition with himself. It is his Idea, in which the pure light of unity is the middle, and whose sides are likewise the pure raying outwards, and the pure refraction of the ray back into itself.

In the *Second* God's intuiting has stepped over to one side. He has come into connection with Evil and the middle is the *bad[ness]* of the mixing of both. But this Triangle becomes a *Square*, in that the pure Godhead floats above it. Its unhappiness, however, does not let it remain thus as this triangle either, but instead it must overturn into its opposite,⁴ the Son must go right through the Earth, must overcome Evil, and in that he steps over to one side as the victor, must awaken the other, the self-cognition of God, as a new cognition that is one with God, or as the Spirit of God: whereby the middle becomes a beautiful, free, divine middle, the *Universe of*

¹ Cf. the definition of 'the Absolute' at the end of the first instalment of the *Natural Law* essay (NKA, iv. 464, 21–31; Knox and Acton, pp. 111–12).

² The metaphor of the 'mixing' comes from the second account of the creation of man in Genesis 2:7: 'And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath [Latin: *spiritus*] of life; and man became a living soul.' But Hegel generalizes the story into a 'breathing' of God's Spirit into the whole natural Universe.

³ Cf. the account of the *consecration* (*Heiligung*) of nature by the Catholic Church in the *Natural Law* lectures of 1802 or 1803 (Rosenkranz, pp. 138–9; Harris and Knox, pp. 183–4).

⁴ *Umschlagen in sein Entgegengesetztes*—cf. the end of *Faith and Knowledge*, NKA, iv. 413, 25–7: *die Unendlichkeit, Ich, . . . unmittelbar ins positive der absoluten Idee über zu schlagen* (Cerf and Harris, p. 191).

God.—This Second Triangle is (*qua* being in the separation) herewith itself a *twofold* Triangle, or its two sides are each a triangle, the one the converse of the other, and the middle is in this movement of history the all-effecting force of the absolute unity that floats above the first, and takes this up into itself and changes it into another within itself. But what is visible, that [164] are the two triangles, but the middle is only the invisible might at work in the inward [soul].

But through the second triangle of the Second, the *Third* has immediately formed itself, the *return of all into God himself*, or the having-been-poured-out of the Idea overall. What was only a mixture, is through this Spirit absolutely one with God, and as he is cognizant of himself in it, so it is cognizant of itself in God.¹

This triangular construction is now followed out in detail [*im Speciellen*] by Hegel through [the order of] Nature, though with frequent desertion of the premissed picture-image, and with a peculiar mingling of purely logical and pictorial characteristics. The *Sun* is called the *negative unity* of his system. The *Earth* is supposed to beget the antithesis of air and water, and what is more, to do it in such a way that they do not divide from one another in *polluted* form, but each expresses the opposite in itself and destroys itself, the air *fattens* [or *feeds*] itself with water, the water with air, and thereby both become at the same time so *tensed*, that they come to the leaping-point [*Sprung*], where each passes over into its opposite; and so on.—Even in later years Hegel still availed himself sometimes of the triangular schema.

B: *The Life of Hegel*

Everything in the direct report given in the biography (pp. 101–2) is condensed from the introductory discussion in the excerpt given above. Only one subsequent back reference adds anything new. At the end of a quotation from the lecture course on 'Real Philosophy' of Summer 1806, Rosenkranz comments as follows:

(*Leben Hegels*, 193)—Hegel still loved, even now, as it was put already above in his first exposition of metaphysics [i.e. in the *Triangle* fragment], to set forth the creation of the Universe as the *uttering* of the absolute *Word*, and the return of the Universe into itself as the understanding [*Vernehmen*] of the same, so that nature and history became the *medium*—itself a vanishing medium *qua* other-being—between the uttering and the understanding [of the Word].¹

¹ The preceding context of this passage is translated in Harris and Knox, pp. 264–5.

BOOK II

HESPERUS AND PHOSPHORUS

CHAPTER V

'Through Philosophy to Learn to Live'

1. *Night and Day*

In the spring of 1803 Schelling left Jena. That summer Hegel delivered the course for which, if my hypothesis is correct, the systematic manuscript of which the surviving *System of Ethical Life* formed the third part, was prepared. Part of what seems to be the introductory lecture for that systematic survey has recently been recovered.¹ From it we can see how Hegel's concern with the social mission of the philosopher became the growing point in the evolution of his System. It is a meditation on a theme which we can clearly trace in Hegel's texts, from the moment of his first public appearance on the cultural scene of Jena, in the *Difference* essay: the 'need of philosophy'. In that essay he argued that a culture that has developed tensions and conflicts that are not properly comprehended becomes a system of 'relative' necessity, in which spiritual freedom is reduced to a hopeless striving or is driven in upon itself so that it takes refuge in a dream world. Philosophical comprehension overcomes the 'dichotomies' which are thus set up—especially the dichotomy between the ideal and the real (in the striving mentality) and that between

¹ *ist auf das Allgemeine*, in NKA, v. 365–9. In view of the evident relation between the fragments found and the reports of Rosenkranz, we can be fairly certain that *he* selected these pieces and set them apart for his own use; in the case of this particular fragment we can also see that he chose it because it deals with the 'need of philosophy'. Eventually he chose to illustrate this theme from the 'Logic and Metaphysics' lectures of Oct. 1801, and the 'Natural Law' lectures of 1802. From this present MS he took only what he called one of Hegel's 'favourite metaphors': 'der reine durchsichtige Aether' (cf. Rosenkranz, p. 179; Harris and Knox, p. 254). But probably he had it in mind also when he wrote (Rosenkranz, p. 202) that Hegel 'developed the concept of the *experience* that consciousness makes of itself especially in his *introductions to Logic and Metaphysics*'.

the inner and the outer worlds (in the dreaming one). Philosophy is thus, for Hegel, the key to the re-establishment of social freedom. It restores courage and faith to the dreamer, and hope and charity to the striver, by directing the activity of both towards an achievable goal.¹

This is not fully explicit in Hegel's published work, because both in the *Difference* essay, and in *Faith and Knowledge* the emphasis is on the restoration of a *religious* significance to life; and it is easy to forget the this-worldly reference to life in one's own political community, that was the crucial feature of Hegel's concept of 'living religion' from the first. His great quarrel with the Christian religion was precisely that it encourages us to forget the world. But when we put the published essays into the context of what he said to his students we cannot fall into this error. The comprehension produced by philosophy is designed to change our perception of, and our attitude toward, our active lives in the world. 'For the true need of philosophy arises from nothing else but this', Hegel told his first class in his Introduction to Philosophy, 'to learn from it and through it how to live.'²

True philosophy *cannot* make the mistake of the strivers. For the striving mentality depends on the assumption that between the real and the ideal, between what is and what ought to be, there is a great gulf fixed; and 'the sole interest of Reason is to suspend such rigid antitheses.' It is true, of course, that 'this does not mean that Reason is altogether opposed to opposition and limitation.'³ Reason itself gets dichotomized in the striving mentality. On the finite side it is the might of the understanding itself 'which organizes the world of objective reality under its conceptual schemes; but on the infinite or ideal side, it is the absolutely commanding power of thinking itself' [i.e. practical Reason], which gradually engulfs all efforts for compromise that would leave the finite order of cognition standing, and emerges as the 'force of the negative Absolute, and hence as a negating that is

¹ Cf. *Difference*, NKA, iv. 12, 21-16, 14 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 89-94); and *Faith and Knowledge*, NKA, iv. 315, 5-324, 33 (Cerf and Harris, pp. 55-66).

² *Diese Vorlesungen*, 6b (in NKA, v. 261); see Baum and Meist, *Hegel-Studien*, xii. 1977, 45-6.

³ *Difference*, NKA, iv. 13, 33-5; Harris and Cerf, pp. 90-1.

absolute'.¹ Thus the overcoming of the *striving* mentality is the essential task of Hegel's propaedeutic or critical logic.

But speculative philosophy can then take the form of a *dream*. Once we get across the great divide, and into the ideal realm of the absolute Subject, we can be content to stay there. This will become vitally important to Hegel in his maturity, in the dark days of the political restoration. Once we get out of the Cave, we can stay out of it. But what pressed on Hegel in the early Jena years was his civic duty to return and help to organize it. The first sentence of his first logic lecture referred to this: 'The fact that philosophy unlocks its inner world for man and lets him endure the limitation of actuality, but not satisfy himself in it, does not exclude the possibility of this world's becoming a determinate ethical one as well.'² He begins this course by recalling Solon, the Athenian lawgiver-poet who was canonized as one of the 'Seven Wise Men' of the Greeks; and by evoking the mighty shade of Alexander who went forth from Aristotle's school to conquer the world. This conquest of the real world of human institutions was what mattered to him; the philosopher's life in the realm of pure thought is, by comparison, only a dream like that of Jacob when he wrestled with the angel. The proper goal of the philosopher is to communicate the revelation received in the dream, to arouse men to realize it in this world. The leader educated by the philosopher, can 'arouse to waking the still slumbering shape of a new ethical world';³ and the philosopher himself dies to the world, and lives among the shades, in order to 'utter the magic word which conjures up [the great necessity's] shape'.⁴

¹ *Difference*, NKA, iv. 17, 5-18, 12; Harris and Cerf, pp. 94-6.

² *Dass die Philosophie*, 15a, in NKA, v. 269. The practical imperative of *Der immer sich vergrößernde Widerspruch* is still evident ('*er muss auch das Dargestellte als ein Lebendiges finden*'). But now the inescapable necessity of action is not insisted on. The philosopher *can* 'live alone' in his inner world; all Hegel insists is that he is not obliged to do this in virtue of his calling. In 1800 he claimed that one *cannot* do it (TW-A, i. 457; *Clio*, 1981, n. 4).

³ *Dass die Philosophie*, 16b, in NKA, v. 270; Rosenkranz quoted a large part of this, pp. 189-90; Harris and Knox, pp. 263-4. (Hegel actually named Isaac in place of Jacob here. Some may feel, with me, that the error is symptomatic of the philosopher's relation with the world. Conceptually, at least, the philosopher already has one foot in the grave—cf. *System of Ethical Life, Schriften* (1913), p. 483; Harris and Knox, pp. 158-9.)

⁴ Rosenkranz, p. 141; Harris and Knox, p. 186.

We have seen how, in the *System of Ethical Life*, absolute *Sittlichkeit*, or 'life in the Volk', is identified as the conscious 'pursuit of death'. In its immediate form—i.e. in the shape that is manifest to the whole community as the life of voluntary self-sacrifice—this is the soldier's life. But the 'spiritual estate' of the 'priests and elders' presents us with the same pursuit in its speculative or reconciled form, as the properly Socratic 'pursuit of death' in the objectivity of pure thought, and the neutrality of absolutely impartial counsel and judgement. The philosopher is he who goes to the limit in this pursuit, who does away with the last biases of personal subjectivity and utters the moral imperative of his world as a whole.¹ The middle between these two forms of absolute ethical life, the agent who takes the *word* of the philosopher, and translates it into the *work* of the people as a whole, is the political leader who knows how to inspire ethical obedience. It is through the agency of Theseus and his like, that divine providence guides human history, and the invisible Spirit of God becomes manifest in this world of appearance. Art and philosophy serve God, because they educate and inspire the human statesman.

On this view it is *social achievement* that is the ultimate standard of truth. For it is only in and through social achievement, that our philosophical knowledge is validated; only thereby does our absolute cognition become not merely something negative, but positive and real. The philosopher's existence is all in the realm of darkness; he is the evening star, outshining all others because he stands close to the sun when it sets; and equally he is the morning star, which heralds the sun again as it rises. But it is the daylight world of ethical achievement whose passing he observes, and whose dawn he once more announces.

If we take the metaphor in this way we can fully appreciate Hegel's eulogy of the night. 'The Absolute is the night and the

¹ I am assuming that the fragment cited by Rosenkranz as the conclusion of 'Hegel's first system' (pp. 132–3; Harris and Knox, p. 178) is in fact the conclusion of the *Delineatio* lectures of Summer 1803. In that case he was not far wrong in associating it with the *System of Ethical Life*. But my argument is not seriously affected even if the fragment comes from the first *tripartite* system of Winter 1803/4. (I do not see how it can be later than that.)

light is younger than it.¹ Empirical consciousness emerges out of the 'night' of unconscious life and goes down again into the night of the grave. In terms of Hegel's panpsychist philosophy of nature, this darkness of death is only a deeper level of the unconscious life of nature. To penetrate this darkness, to unite finite life with infinite life, by showing that the whole pattern of our finite existence is a full circle in the *divine* light, that is the function and the achievement of the philosopher. He establishes as knowledge, what the common sense of the good citizen asserts, and what the sacrifice of the soldier shows forth as true faith: that 'in God we live and move and have our being.'² The finite understanding is trapped between the boundaries established by the utter indeterminacy of unconscious life and the absolute darkness of death. But both religious intuition and philosophical conception can close the circle. Hence they can meet 'in this night which is the noonday of life'.³

At first sight this supposed identity of night with noonday looks like the direct transformation of a metaphor into a paradox. But apart from the 'identity' of light and darkness in Hegel's speculative theory of light and colour, and the less controversial 'darkness' of private personal consciousness, which is where the true light of the Spirit shines—and also where ultimate moral darkness can be mistaken for light⁴—the physical facts will actually carry the proposed metaphorical interpretation in two different ways—a theoretical sense and a practical one.

¹ *Difference*, NKA, iv. 16, 1; Harris and Cerf, p. 93.

² Cf. *System of Ethical Life*, *Schriften* (1913), p. 465 (Harris and Knox, p. 143) where the asserted identity between the points of view of philosophy and religion can only be understood in the light of this unmentioned text.

³ *Difference*, NKA, iv. 23, 16–17; Harris and Cerf, p. 103.

⁴ The moral enlightenment of Kant and Fichte is declared to be darkness in the *Natural Law* essay (NKA, iv. 461, 23–7; Knox and Acton, pp. 107–8); this is the negative form of the identity that is asserted positively in the *Difference* essay. Hegel explains the doctrine in the *Naturphilosophie* of 1805 (NKA, viii. 83, 4–18—trans. in Ch. X, p. 434–5, below); and again—with specific reference to the 'night' of consciousness in the *Geistesphilosophie* (NKA, viii. 186, 10–187, 10—see Ch. XI, pp. 471–2, below). I cannot prove that the astronomical interpretation that I am proposing ever occurred to him; but in view of his interest in 'the starry heavens' I find it hard to believe that it did not (the address to 'Night' in *Eleusis*, 133 is a pointer in my favour here—see *Briefe*, i. 38; Mueller, p. 60). The metaphor of 'Hesperus and Phosphorus' for the philosopher is mine alone, however.

We will begin with the theoretical interpretation precisely because there is no paradox in it. All we have to do is to ask what 'night' literally *is*, according to the scientific consciousness of it. The answer—which was known not only to the Greeks, but to the medieval world of Christian *Bildung* as we find it in Dante—is that 'night' is actually the cone-shaped shadow cast by the earth itself in the sunlight. The earth is always in the sunlight, and it is always casting the shadow of night in some direction. And it is only when we are ourselves within that cone that we can perceive the wider universe of which our earth is a part. When it shadows us from the sun, the earth makes visible to us the moon and all the other planets which, like itself, are always there in the sunlight. When we are in the daylight ourselves, the very brightness of the sun hides our total situation from us. In the cycle of day and night, *it is the night that reveals to us the eternity of day*. Of course, this revelation only comes to us through the long and hard labour of studying the night sky. That long struggle of nomads, farmers, priests, mariners, and finally astronomers, is what the rather shorter struggle of the philosopher to interpret the inner world of thought is metaphorically compared with. Just as Kepler finally mapped the solar system, once Copernicus had identified the resting point on which it all turned, so Schelling and Hegel were mapping the world of the mind, now that Kant and Fichte had between them found its centre.

It is the fact that man himself is the *sun* of the noumenal world-system that makes the difference between the theoretical interpretation of the metaphor and the practical one. What the contrast of day and night teaches common sense is how much lies hidden in the daylight of ordinary practical life. In this perspective the ordinary light of day is (paradoxically) a kind of night because it conceals the whole truth rather than revealing it. The sun blinds us, and it is only when we come to terms with our blindness that we can grasp the real meaning of our existence.

On both views it is the same divine life and light that is signified by the sun. But it is only in the practical interpretation that the 'night' (of God the *Father*) is really 'older than the light' (of Reason or the Spirit). In that context God is the

infinite Night within which our brief and blinded day of finite life is engulfed. The noonday of our mortal life, the moment of our clearest vision, is the warrior's 'absolute life in the *Volk*', the moment when we realize what it means to say 'In God we live and move and have our being.' All the nocturnal exploration of the philosopher, showing that moon and planets shine by the reflected light of eternal day is only a play of shadows in the moonlight compared with this awful earnestness of real life.

It is easy to see why this practical perspective was bound to be predominant at first. For although there is an immense difference between saying that 'we live and move and have our being in God' (the common sense view which takes the ordinary noonday of finite life as its centre) and 'God lives and moves and has his being in us' (the philosophical view which takes the eternal noonday of infinite life as its centre), it is a difference which *comes to nothing* if the philosopher's abolition of the limits of his human consciousness is really an abolition of consciousness as such. The difference between eternal night and eternal day is null if to be in the full light of day is *always* to be blinded; or the identification of man as the true sun is no better than a funeral pyre on earth, if to be at one with the sun is to be consumed. Whichever way we make the journey, any life-experience that culminates in an immediate or intuitive union with God is just 'the dark night in which all cows are black'.

Hegel speaks as if that intuitive union with God were the goal, when he says that 'speculation can rid itself of the preponderance consciousness has in it' and goes on to characterize that process abstractly as abstracting from the subjective aspect of transcendental intuition 'so that transcendental intuition, as the foundation of philosophy, may be neither subjective nor objective for it'.¹ But this 'intuition' is only the beginning of philosophy, the speculative foundation and yardstick even of Hegel's critical logic. The philosopher overcomes 'the preponderance of consciousness', he escapes from his subjectivity into the neutrality of philosophical logic in order to know the whole finite world properly from its true centre. The finite world is now transformed for him into 'the

¹ *Difference*, NKA, iv. 76, 5-77, 14 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 172-3).

Universe of God' (to borrow the appropriate phrase from the Triangle manuscript); or his intellectual intuition is 'the intuition of God's eternal human Incarnation' (to stay with the language of the *Difference* essay itself). The point is that it is finite life that he now intuits from the infinite standpoint. Hence philosophy itself when it reaches the goal which is its own starting-point, validates the viewpoint of common sense. In knowing the identity of finite life with infinite life, of empirical consciousness with pure consciousness, from the infinite point of view, the philosopher knows his own finite self as just a moment in the greater whole of the transfigured community which is 'God's Incarnation'.

This is the real sense in which 'the preponderance of consciousness' is overcome and the good sense of genuine *Sittlichkeit* is vindicated. 'The whole is resumed into one' by the one which knows itself as resumed into the whole. But this is only half of the story. The 'Universe of God' is not just 'God's Incarnation' or the 'resurrection of the body'. It is the 'resurrection of the spirit' too. This does not appear in the *Difference* essay but it does appear in *Faith and Knowledge*,¹ and we do not have to trust any particular theory about the Triangle manuscript to know that it is more important for Hegel. The common sense version of this spiritual resurrection is that although the political leader mediates the translation of the philosophic ideal into real life, the philosopher thereby gains a permanent place of pre-eminence in the realized ideal, as the now generally recognized channel of spiritual *Bildung*. It is he who must make the people alive to the speculative meaning of their art, and their traditions. (We are not speaking now of the creation of practical religious insight into what makes their life *possible*, but of theoretically human insight into what makes life truly *enjoyable*.)

The philosopher's own enjoyment of his life must inevitably

¹ NKA, iv. 407, 23-6; Cerf and Harris, pp. 180-1: 'The original possibility of this reconciliation lies in the original image of God on the subjective side [i.e. the theory of *human cognition in the logic*]; its actuality, the objective side lies in God's eternal Incarnation in man, and the identity of the possibility with the actuality *through the spirit* is the union of the subjective side with God made man' (my italics). This means, I take it, that the philosopher has the permanently necessary office of educating the people as well as the crucial role of educating the prince at the moment when the ideal and the real can be united.

bring about the supersession of the religious or instrumental view of his social function. This is because philosophy is now recognized as the art of life itself, or the science that shows us what makes life worth living; what is implicit in that recognition is that philosophy is itself the highest mode of life, that all truly spiritual enjoyment of life is properly philosophical. Philosophy is not just a nocturnal study of shadows and reflections; it is the perfected consciousness of human living, or an actual experience of living in the light of the eternal day. Because it is the individual life that is thus resurrected in the spirit, this can be aptly expressed through the metaphor of the evening and the morning star. In nature these are one and the same; and so too in the spirit, Hegel's philosophy (the morning star of the new world) is identical with that of Plato and Aristotle (the evening star of the old one). The identity is an intensely *personal* one. Hegel's Plato is not the Plato of Schelling (to look no further afield). His Spinoza is not the Spinoza of Herder, and both would seem strange (so I say) to the historic individual who wrote the *Ethics*. But in order to say that, I have to create for myself an intellectual universe that contains all three of them. That 'universe' is mine, and it would all of it be strange to the living author of the *Ethics*. It would also be strange in fact, but not in principle to Hegel.¹ Since none of the three can return to my world in the flesh, however, that strangeness too is a concern of mine but not of theirs. On the other hand, the absence of estrangement in principle between my thought-world and Hegel's is not just a subjective matter. Unless someone can show that I have misinterpreted Hegel, it is an eternal or logical fact; and behind it lies the important empirical fact that Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, and Hegel all enjoy a continued existence, which in spite of its problematic character, is rooted in the surviving record of what those historic individuals did and said.

¹ See specifically passage 10 in the *Wastebook* (Rosenkranz, p. 539; *IJP*, iii. 1979, p. 1, no. 4). I suspect that this passage may belong to 1805 (and hence to the *third phase* that I have distinguished in the Jena period). But the theme is a perennial one in Hegel's thought. See e.g. *Difference*, *NKA*, iv. 12, 8–20 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 88–9) for the mode of its typical expression in the earlier period. There the *artists* are allowed to recognize one another, but speculative Reason remains impersonal. For a further characterization of the new accent see Ch. VII, pp. 336–9, below (and cf. esp. p. 339 n.).

That *this* sort of resurrection should be the highest meaning of existence may well offend common sense, whether religious or secular; and that the structure of this identity in diversity is a more ultimate problem than the nature of matter may well surprise many philosophers. But we can leave that problem to unfold in its own good time. For the present it is enough for us to grant that Hegel could not avoid being concerned to comprehend the movement of the spirit during the great stretch of intellectual night that lay between the evening star of Greek philosophy and the morning star of his own. For it was only by comprehending this great chain of necessity that he could show himself to be the morning star of the new world. His speculative revelation was not a matter of a new faith, but rather one of transforming the promise of a superannuated faith into the self-enjoyment of a life-experience fully rationalized and transparent to itself.

2. *The 'Outline of Universal Philosophy'*

In what we have of the manuscript of 1803 this historical dimension of the philosopher's problem does not come to utterance. This is not surprising because the *Philosophiae universae delineatio* had to begin with 'Logic or the science of the Idea as such'. Our manuscript begins in the middle of a sentence, because Hegel revised his opening so much that he eventually had to use another sheet for it; and that sheet is now lost. But we have one cancelled opening in which Hegel refers to his intentions, standing between two briefer ones in which he does not. We do not know how he actually began, but even if he finally decided not to say how he intended to proceed, there is no reason to suppose that he was not going to proceed in the way that he announces in the cancelled text: 'I develop the need of philosophy <and shall> proceed in this way: first I shall define in general terms the conflict upon which it is grounded; then I shall point out the universal forms of its resolution in their necessity, and make the application of them to cognition, and point out the universal forms in cognition.'¹

¹ *ist auf das Allgemeine*, 7a, in *NKA*, v. 365 (Apparatus); cf. Baum and Meist, *Hegel-Studien*, xii. 1977, 58.

We have very little reliable knowledge of the evolution of Hegel's logic and metaphysics between the first sketch of 1801 and the manuscript of Winter 1804. But from this present passage we can tentatively infer that a considerable revolution has already occurred within it.

Hegel is here discussing only the constructive or metaphysical part of his speculative Logic or 'Science of the Idea as such'. Logic is said to be just this science in the 'Introduction to Philosophy' of 1801/2 even though Hegel was expounding a destructive or critical conception of logic proper in his contemporaneous course on 'Logic and Metaphysics'. In that same 'Introduction' of 1801 the *system* of philosophy begins with the 'Idea' which is the topic of metaphysics proper. The 'Science of the Idea' is called Logic, even though logic proper is only a critical preamble for it, which can at need be almost completely dispensed with. Critical logic is the *systema reflexionis*, in which 'reflection' is reduced to nothing by being brought back to its source in Reason. The *systema rationis* itself is Metaphysics,¹ and when one sets out to expound the system of philosophy as a whole, the constructive exposition of Reason's reality in nature and spirit takes the place of the destructive criticism of the forms of finite awareness in critical logic. Both in 1801 and again in 1803, Hegel expounds the *system as a whole* beginning with the Idea as a positive structure which can be directly presented; in this systematic context 'Logic' as the 'science of the Idea' means primarily Metaphysics.

We ought, therefore, to compare Hegel's proposed order of procedure for the systematic course of 1803, with the summary that he gave for his 'Metaphysics' in 1801. When we do that the revolution shows itself. In 1801 the structure of subjective cognition is a major topic of the critical logic that leads up to the exposition of the Idea of Philosophy in Metaphysics; and the speculative forms of philosophy are the main topic of metaphysical exposition. In 1803 that order is reversed. Critical logic is here to be replaced by an exposition of the 'need of philosophy'; and the (imperfect reflective)

¹ Cf. the announcement for Summer 1802: '*Logicam et Metaphysicam sive systema reflexionis et rationis*'—*Hegel-Studien*, iv, 53.

forms of philosophy are the theme whose critical development leads us to the Idea of philosophy proper. The substantial exposition of that Idea is now constituted by 'the universal forms in cognition', in other words, by a *constructive* treatment of the theory of knowledge.

We must leave the detailed discussion of this revolution, until we come to the 'Logic and Metaphysics' of 1804, where we finally have enough evidence to be able to see what it meant. It is sufficient, for the moment, to notice that it has happened.

There is also an important difference between the way that Hegel discusses the 'need of philosophy' in the *Difference* essay (of 1801) and the way that he speaks of it here. In the *Difference* essay philosophy is presented as something needed by the community. Here, on the other hand, Hegel approaches it as a need of the individual subject; and in this connection we should remember that—as we can see from the *System of Ethical Life*—'need' is a primitive category of his philosophy of subjective consciousness.

It is easy to see how the 'need of philosophy' as a phenomenon occurring quite widely in individual consciousness (almost universally, perhaps, in any audience willing to pay fees to listen to a lecturer expound his philosophic system) forms a natural bridge between the world of ordinary life and that of 'the Idea'. But I believe that from the very fact that Hegel chose this line of approach we can infer with considerable probability that the structure of subjectivity is now the main theme of his Metaphysics. The reason for this—and another pointer to the actual occurrence of the change—is given in one of Hegel's speculative asides in *Faith and Knowledge*, when he says that 'the original possibility of this reconciliation [the resolution of the problem of evil] lies in the original image of God on the subjective side.'¹ Once Hegel had formulated the 'Triangle of Triangles' to express the 'resumption of the whole' his estimate of the significance of his logical construction of 'the organization of the human spirit' and of man's *Verstand* or finite thinking, was bound to change.²

¹ NKA, iv. 407, 23–4 (Cerf and Harris, p. 180). The italics are mine.

² See *Dass die Philosophie*, 19a, in NKA, v. 273. Rosenkranz omitted the relevant passage (but see Baum and Meist, *Hegel-Studien*, xii. 1977, 56). It is quite probable

The 'need of philosophy' only arises for an individual consciousness that has 'lost everything' and feels itself to be cut off or abandoned. This consciousness is aware of itself as an 'absolute person' but it needs to re-establish some definite relationship with the world that it has lost, and the God by whom it has been abandoned.¹ This cognitive need is a theoretical analogue of the practical need which unfolds in the 'ethics of relation' in the *System of Ethical Life*. The dialectic of satiation and returning drive is here replaced by the dialectic of empirical belief and doubt caused by the essential transience of things in the world as we know it; and the finite world of natural relations, the world of family and face to face community is replaced by the finite world of the understanding:

In the awakening of consciousness the individual constitutes himself in his freedom as something which wrests itself away from the play of that necessity and sets his will against that blind monstrous <might>, employs a power of its own [*Eigengewalt*] against the singular [circumstances] of the contingent [situation], and builds a circle of its own from them as if from raw materials, a circle over which that power will let the breath of destruction blow as a blind [might], i.e. only over it as a whole, but in whose inner organization it has not interfered. But this stemming of the tide against that absolutely blind power is only a deceit, the conviction of having wrenched away from it a bit of its riches, and of having established a sphere of one's own, is only a delusion. For those threads thou thinkst to have woven into thine own web, are the might of the world, and they have not escaped from belonging to it; and thy activity of putting them to rights is nothing else but thine own weaving of thyself into them, and the giving of thyself to that might completely for its own.²

that this change began to occur at once, at the end of 1801/2, when Hegel retired from the lecture hall to his study to write the first version of his textbook for 'Logic and Metaphysics'. A parallel between the critical reduction of the *systema reflexionis* and the metaphysical construction of the *systema rationis* would be natural. But in any case, the way that conceptual movements or 'relations' are regularly brought to their equilibrium or 'totality' in an individual mode of consciousness in the *System of Ethical Life*, virtually guarantees that the theory of subjectivity had to form part of the metaphysical 'totality' in the first part of the system into which that MS was designed to fit.

¹ Although no historical context is given, it is easy to recognize here the formal characteristics of the 'condition of Right' and the 'boredom of the world'.

² *ist auf das Allgemeine*, 7b-8a, in *NKA*, v. 366. In the margin Hegel wrote 'everyone establishes his own little housekeeping in the world'. This further

Just as the free citizen must have ceased to strive for family self-sufficiency, so the philosophical consciousness must have passed beyond this illusion (shared by Kant, Fichte, Reinhold, and Schulze, all alike) that every thinker makes a philosophy 'of his own'. The philosopher must realize that every effort at world interpretation is part of the universe of human thought, in which the Spirit moves and upon which it operates with conceptual necessity, just as the order of nature is governed by physical necessity.

Hegel's critique is aimed not so much at Reinhold and Fichte's positive, or Kant and Schulze's negative, conception of the history of philosophy, as at the formal conception of practical Reason and of moral freedom that underlies that conceptual anarchy in the realm of thought. It is a basic mistake to suppose that one can establish one's absolute freedom by setting oneself against 'the course of the world' (as Hegel will call this web of conceptual relations embodied in the life of the community, in the *Phenomenology*). In order to set up one's own consciousness as an ideal world of pure thought, opposed to the real world, or in order to generate a systematic conception of how things ought to be, one must accept the necessary structure of the web of real life itself. Those who follow Kant in proclaiming the dialectical futility of pure Reason, find themselves trapped in the dialectic of conflicting goals and ambitions. Thus the intuition that man is indeed a free moral being is not the ultimate truth of philosophy, but only the ultimate, and clearest, expression of the conscious *need* for it.¹

strengthens the analogy with the *System of Ethical Life*. The overthrow of the illusion that one can own part of God's Universe looks forward to the version of the 'struggle for recognition' that we shall find in the *Philosophy of Spirit* of 1803/4. But the present passage is more directly reminiscent of Hegel's evocation of Klopstock's Hell in the *Natural Law* essay (NKA, iv. 461, 10–21; Knox and Acton, p. 107).

¹ The best commentary on Hegel's claim that 'this pure freedom is only the supreme expression of that illusion' (*ist auf das Allgemeine*, 8a, in NKA, v. 367—cf. Baum and Meist, *Hegel-Studien*, xii. 1977, 41) is provided by his critique of Fichte's ethics in *Faith and Knowledge*, NKA, iv. 397–412 (Cerf and Harris, pp. 167–87). One can see here how Hegel identifies 'faith' as the conscious *need* for philosophy, and so can regard the Critical Philosophy as the last rearguard action of the 'age of Faith'. As part of the Enlightenment, and of the great claim for the certainty of individual rational intuition that began with Descartes (and in religion with Luther) it is also the last act and final form of the 'fall of Man'. That is why Hegel is so insistent that *Moralität* is in principle evil. The dialectical futility of the virtuous struggle against

Just as moral opposition does not resolve the problem posed by the need of philosophy, so no eudaemonist doctrine of 'living according to nature', can resolve it either. The clearest expression of eudaemonism (in the monadic theory of Leibniz) gets beyond the formal opposition of nature and freedom that we find in Kant and Fichte, and recognizes that we must start from the essential identity of consciousness with its world. But the immediate distinction between the 'inner' and the 'outer' points of view upon which the reconciliation of freedom and necessity rests here is called by Hegel a 'deceitfully premirrored agreement'.¹

Philosophy can only answer or resolve the felt need that brings it into being, by comprehending how the problem of reconciling the singular individual with the universal was solved before it became a conscious need at all. There was nothing specious about the harmony of private and public life in the *Sittlichkeit* of the *polis*, or the harmony of singular and general consciousness in Greek religion. This harmony was the realization of man's natural freedom. It was destroyed when the universal community began to appear to the singular consciousness as an alien reality, determinate and contingent, rather than as the substantial frame and fount of his own rational thought and action. Our fragment concludes with a description of this moment of disruption which, like much of the *System of Ethical Life*, is designedly ambiguous in its historical reference. It is clearly Hegel's intention to bring the birth-time of Christianity and his own revolutionary political world into one single focus. When he speaks of the one

the world (see *Faith and Knowledge*, NKA, iv. 406, 9–407, 15; Cerf and Harris, pp. 179–80) is what should reveal to us the active presence of the serpent.

¹ *ist auf das Allgemeine*, 8b–9a, in NKA, v. 367. Whether a *direct* reference to Leibniz is intended, is debatable—that Fichte's *Vocation of Man* is the target is more probable (see Baum and Meist, *Hegel-Studien*, xii. 1977, 61). Jacobi, the apostle of 'faith', dismisses 'The Leibniz-Wolfian philosophy' as 'no less fatalistic than the Spinozistic'. (*Werke*, iv. i. 221). The Spinoza controversy is the context for Hegel's division of the reflective philosophers into two camps both in *Faith and Knowledge* (NKA, iv. 315–24; Cerf and Harris, pp. 55–66) and here. The treatment of Leibniz's system as an 'imperfect' philosophy here should be compared with the defence of Leibniz in the 'Scepticism' essay (NKA, iv. 230, 4–237, 13) which gives us some idea of how Leibniz would appear in a metaphysical discussion of the 'forms of philosophy' as contrasted with a critical discussion of the 'need' for it. There is the same contrast between Hegel's two treatments of Fichte (in *Difference* and *Faith and Knowledge*).

for whom likewise the determinate customs and laws of his people are something contingent, the work of an alien arbitrary will, and the shape of religious intuition as something historical that is not for him, and he views himself in opposition to the blind almightiness of the world, as a contingent being, for whom it is immaterial how he stands in it, then he is unfortunate, and in so far as he acts in this sense he is a transgressor¹

we are bound to think of Goethe's 'Prometheus' ode, and of Schiller's Karl Moor, but also of Jesus; and when Hegel goes on to speak of the community in which 'the estates and the laws, the customs and the religion are down, and the whole of its cohesive bond [*Zusammenhalt*], its constitution is lost' we must think of the German Empire dying but also of the Roman Empire being born.

What is decisive in favour of the contemporary interpretation of this passage is the fact that it is, after all, *Hegel's* philosophy, that is here coming to birth. The history of humanity as a single conscious cultural world since the time of Augustus has all of it been covertly evoked in order to prove that 'the time is now ripe'. Consciousness has now been thoroughly clarified. We have reached the 'pure transparent aether' of absolute cognition. That 'aether' is *consciousness*, not as a point of light but as the transparent medium in which points of light are posited. Hegel will develop this extremely subtle conception in the 'System of Speculative Philosophy' of Winter 1803/4. For the present we may notice that by calling it 'cognition which shapes itself infinitely within itself' he is assimilating his 'aether' to the Aristotelian intellect which is not merely 'the place of forms' but also makes itself into the intelligible form that it knows. The 'shaping' here, however, takes place 'in abstract singularity'. So what we are dealing with is a capacity that operates at what Aristotle, too, would have called the level of imagination—in other words, this aether of consciousness is the 'productive imagination', which Kant is lauded for discovering in *Faith and Knowledge*.²

¹ *ist auf das Allgemeine*, 10a, in *NKA*, v. 368. Cf. Baum and Meist, *Hegel-Studien*, xii. 1977, 63—they point out also the echo of Lessing's claim 'the orthodox concepts of the Godhead are no longer for me' in his correspondence with Jacobi (Jacobi, *Werke*, iv. 54).

² Aristotle, *De Anima* III, 5; *Faith and Knowledge*, *NKA*, iv. 327, 3–330, 7 (Cerf and Harris, pp. 69–73).

3. 'Consciousness' and 'Spirit'

In the tripartite 'system of speculative philosophy' that is soon to follow, this concept of 'consciousness' becomes the basic theme of the 'philosophy of spirit' (into which the final 'resumption of the whole into one' is absorbed). Obviously the 'forms of cognition' must have been treated in the *Logic* of that system too; but since that *Logic* is lost, any hypothesis about it must be extremely conjectural. For the 'delineation of universal philosophy', with which we are for the moment concerned, we have not only the preamble for the *Metaphysics* but the preamble for the philosophy of spirit; and then, if I am right, we have almost all of the philosophy of spirit itself in the shape of the *System of Ethical Life*.

The *System of Ethical Life* will eventually help to show that we are right to treat our fragment about 'the essence of spirit' as part of the *philosophiae universae delineatio*. Leaving that matter aside for the moment, a comparison of the two fragments shows that consciousness (as 'cognition') was a basic theme of the 'Metaphysics', but that it was not an opening theme of the philosophy of spirit at all, and only became thematic as spirit reached its goal of 'returning to itself' in the 'resumption of the whole'. The 'aether' where logical cognition properly begins is the 'emptiness or universality' where the coming-to-be of spirit terminates.¹

In the *Delineatio*, therefore, Hegel treated 'consciousness' as strictly equivalent to the theoretical activity of cognition. As the theme of logic it is the *impersonal medium* of intuition within which the intuiting subject and intuited object first emerge. Spirit, on the other hand is the *supra-personal power* which practically produces this transparent medium.² Of course, when I call spirit a 'supra-personal power', this must not be taken to mean that it is an independent *entity* which intervenes in the order of nature from outside. Spirit is human nature itself striving for expression in the subhuman natural

¹ Cf. *ist auf das Allgemeine*, 10b, and *Das Wesen des Geistes*, 14b, in *NKA*, v. 369, 373.

² In this summing-up nothing is 'left aside'—or at least I have tried not to leave anything relevant aside. Specifically, I have interpreted the first fragment in the context of *Faith and Knowledge*, and the second in the context both of the 'Triangle' fragment and of the *System of Ethical Life*.

environment—partly present to consciousness as an *ideal* ‘floating above’, and partly unconscious as an *essence* ‘buried within’ the individual. It is supra-personal in the sense that its realization absolutely requires interaction of persons in a world of things—but without the medium of interaction no ‘person’ could exist; and it is a ‘power’ because the world of other persons and of things absolutely controls and disposes of every initiative the singular person produces.

Although the stark contrast between the absolute theoretical need that is the germ of consciousness, and the absolute practical need that is the germ of spirit is obviously intentional, there is a moment when we are allowed to see that the two needs mirror one another: ‘Not just this is the being-in-bonds of the spirit, that it has an opposition, but that the whole [fullness of the Universe] is opposed to it’, says Hegel, just as he insisted to begin with that ‘the subject which has this need [of philosophy] is an absolutely singular and forlorn being, and what it desires is Everything.’¹ This absolute opposition to nature as the totality of what already is, is the primitive essence of spirit. Spirit itself is not what already is, but what is to be. The essence of spirit is that it finds itself set against nature, and comes to itself by conquering nature. Real spirit, which has thus come to itself, has the being that it has conquered for itself. If the concept of spirit is that which is to be (as opposed to the concept of nature simply as that which always is) the reality of spirit is that which has come to be what it should (as opposed to the reality of nature simply as what ever was).

Hegel is anxious to define the sense in which spirit is or has a kind of being, because spirit is a realm in the Universe of real determinate individuated beings. This real world that spirit establishes for itself by *taking over* the primary order of nature, is the *Volk* (with the way of life and world of thought that it has created for itself). The order of nature thus re-made according to an ideal pattern, is the ‘natural’ environment, in which the young animals born to the naked ape in its normal biological cycle, become human. Their education as humans is at one and the same time, the takeover of their given natures

¹ *Das Wesen des Geistes*, 12b, and *ist auf das Allgemeine*, 7a, in *NKA*, v. 371, 365.

by the community that has already made its own nature, *and* their own discovery of themselves as a native capacity for making over what nature gives them into a shape of their own choosing.

Thus 'the essence [of spirit] is not identity with itself but the making of itself identical with itself', says Hegel—expressing in practical terms the problem of the 'adequation' of intuition and concept, with which the *System of Ethical Life* opens. He goes on to make the connection explicit by saying that this identity is produced by Spirit's *cognizing* nature as its own self. Nature is the 'other-being' (*Andersseyn*) out of which spirit makes its own self-identity.¹ The language ceases to be strange, or at least it ceases to be opaque, as soon as we apply it to the natural self which is made over in our training and education. This re-making is not, of course, just a matter of the control of our own body and of our physical and mental powers, but of our learning to control the world. None the less, in spite of the evident sense in which a skilled craftsman's tools—even a car or boat for a skilled driver or seaman—become 'part of himself' or 'extensions of the self', an element of strain or paradox enters as soon as we begin speaking of external nature *generally* as the 'other-being' of the spirit.

The first thing to note here is that this way of speaking does not imply that the natural world as a whole is the 'other-being' of any particular self. It is the *Volk* which has Nature generally as its 'other-being'; and since the 'intuition of the *Volk*' as an individuated being is quite difficult to achieve, we ought not to be disturbed by the fact that some rather strained, or paradoxical, modes of speech are helpful in the achievement of it. Secondly, the strangeness is something that Hegel himself finds significant and takes care to explain. Once we have developed the human capacity to 'make nature over' in our thought, physical nature appears to become almost completely superfluous to the further exercise of this capacity, and to the resulting construction of our own 'spiritual world'. Hegel himself comments that this is how things may appear; and we

¹ A good discussion of the transformation of the relation of 'Spirit' to 'Nature'—first evident in this fragment of 1803—can be found in Dieter Henrich's 'Absoluter Geist und Logik des Endlichen' (*Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 20, 1980, 103–18).

already know, from his critique of moral formalism, how deceitful he thinks the appearance is. This opposition is a falsification of the truth of spirit; it is a 'fall' caused by knowledge. The alienation of nature must be overcome in reconciliation, not allowed to persist. But all the same, it is a fortunate or necessary fall, in the sense that, without it, the spirit cannot be at all. The freedom that the power to imagine a world for ourselves gives us, whatever illusions it may breed, is of immense importance for the development of the spirit. For this voluntary separation and alienation of spirit from body is the beginning of freedom; it is negative freedom, the power to wipe the slate, to refuse to accept identity with what is. Hence 'it is a fact that the single [spirit] is only great and free in the measure that he is contemptuous of nature'.¹

Thus nature is the 'other-being' of spirit, most importantly in the sense that we can and do, set ourselves against it, even when we are fully conscious of it as our own. For before we can arrive at the contempt of which Hegel speaks, we must first have the sense of the identity. To say 'Nature is the other-being of spirit' is quite different from saying 'Nature is other than spirit', or 'the world out there will go its way regardless of me'. This is the ordinary consciousness of nature; and we cannot go straight from this attitude to the contempt that is the beginning of true freedom. To recognize that Nature as a whole is the 'other-being' of Spirit involves realizing the identity of God with Nature, and further realizing the possibility of freedom through the comprehension of necessity. Moral contempt is directed at nature as a total system of necessity.

If we are to arrive at this attitude of moral negation validly, the crucial thing is to know from experience that there is another way of being conscious of Nature as a whole. We learn what freedom is, and we prove that it is real, not an illusion, through the experience of harmony with nature. Our ordinary consciousness of nature can only be developed into a fatalistic sense of helplessness in the grip of fate. One cannot despise necessity, set oneself against it, if this fate is all that one is

¹ *Das Wesen des Geistes*, 111b-12a, (in *NKA*, v. 371); quoted by Rosenkranz, p. 187 (Harris and Knox, p. 261).

aware of. The sense of a higher destiny, of a world beyond this one, of a world in which we would not be trapped, and our striving would not be frustrated, must have come from somewhere. The poetic intuition of nature as a living community, a brotherhood in which we too have our place, tells us where this conviction came from. Our freedom to despise nature is unintelligible apart from this sense of an original identity with it.

In the Frankfurt fragments of 1797, where this ideal of Nature as a *living* whole is first clearly formulated,¹ the fall from this paradisaical condition appears simply as a condition that must be overcome, and natural freedom is just the condition that we have to recover. But now the fall is seen as an advance. The loss of Paradise is a felt pain (*empfindsamer Schmerz*); and the condition of the fallen is Hobbesian, 'everyone goes against the next with equal right'. But this is the rationally justifiable advance of 'infinity' (in its negative shape); and poetic intuition must present this in its ideal significance too.² The idyllic retreat of Theocritus, and the idyllic interpretations of Rousseau's cry 'back to Nature' are both mistaken.

It is not yet the destruction of the *polis* that Hegel is justifying here, but only the downfall of Plato's 'City of pigs', of Locke's State of Nature, or of Marie Antoinette's Arcadian play-acting in the gardens of Versailles. Even the *polis* had to overcome and absorb the bonds of natural or blood-relationship, the tribal and patriarchal organization of human communities; and the standing relations of the Greek cities were as Hobbesian as those of any barbarian communities. So the *idyll* of Nature is part of Plato's story too. From our study of the *System of Ethical Life*, however, we know that in the great array of natural forms of society that the Romans wiped out and replaced by the 'condition of law', the Greeks created the naturally perfect model. By contrast, the *idyllic* state of Nature that Hegel is discussing here has never existed

¹ See esp. *Positiv wird ein Glauben genannt*, TW-A, i. 241-3; *Clio*, viii. 1979, 260-1.

² *Das Wesen des Geistes*, 13a-b in NKA, v. 372; quoted by Rosenkranz, p. 187 (Harris and Knox, p. 261). The *Faust* allusion, which Rosenkranz noticed, is to the scene 'Forest and Cave'—*Faust, Ein Fragment*, 1791, 1847-9 (cf. Part I, 3225-7).

anywhere outside poetry; it is simply the generalized form of the Garden of Eden myth, abstracted by the understanding. The fact that Hegel uses this myth as the intuition from which the concept of freedom is developed plausibly suggests that we are dealing with a *four*-part system. For he is evidently introducing a philosophy of finite spirit, or an account of 'ethical nature'. The 'intuition' that he sets forth here is going to be developed into the man-made 'reality' of Paradise in the Greek experience. That reality already involves and presupposes, the 'tragedy of the ethical', or the necessary and inevitable fall and self-redemption of man within Nature. Only when that is complete, only when we know what human nature is truly capable of, can the *self-willed and self-conscious* fall of man begin. This too is an advance because Paradise Regained will be ours, whereas Paradise Lost belonged to God or Nature. It is the *real* Paradise appointed for man by nature, which a particular *Volk* had to discover and realize, and which we have now to regain as a race (a universal community or genus).

'Genuine cognition, or the philosophy of nature does what art generally cannot do, it raises nature not to a formal but to an absolute whole.' Greek philosophy rose above Greek poetry (including the poetic achievement of the *polis*); it comprehended the nature of man universally as rational or free. Greek philosophy made even the loss of the *polis* endurable. Free natural communities have been conquered many times; there were empires before Rome. But Rome was the empire that came to be in the Hellenistic world, the thought-world of the Stoic 'universal city'. In this world the free man lost everything—except that consciousness of his own autonomy which Greek philosophy had distilled from political existence as the goal of existence for the rational individual. *Historically* it is Greek philosophy that is the 'philosophy of nature' to which Hegel here refers. For this reason the Greek inspiration of his philosophy of nature is just as important, and has the same significance, as the Greek inspiration of his philosophy of spirit. The Greeks were the

¹ *Das Wesen des Geistes*, 14a (in *NKA*, v. 373); cf. Baum and Meist, *Hegel-Studien*, xii. 1977, 72.

first to see nature as a teleological process directed towards the goal of self-conscious rational autonomy. We have seen how the identity in difference of the Hellenic Paradise Lost and the Paradise Regained of a free national constitution formed the theme of the *System of Ethical Life*. The early evidence regarding the origins of Hegel's philosophy of nature is more fragmentary. But we can easily recognize the same theme, all the same, in his attempt to integrate Newtonian cosmology into the Platonic-Pythagorean *Weltanschauung*. As the true philosophy of Nature as a whole (including *human* nature), Greek philosophy is the first form of genuine cognition; and just as Newtonian physics must be reintegrated into Greek natural philosophy, so Kantian morality must be reintegrated into Greek political ethics.

4. *Absolute Spirit in the 'Outline'*

This real Garden of Eden in the Greek *religion of art* fascinated Rosenkranz. From his reports it is clear that he found more than one account of it in Hegel's manuscripts. The earliest was in the lecture manuscripts from which the *System of Ethical Life* was written up. But the fragment of manuscript from which one of his most remarkable quotations was taken¹ has recently been rediscovered; and it appears to belong to the *Delineatio* of Summer 1803. There is no essential change in Hegel's view (which was first stated in its barest outline in the *Difference* essay).² I shall therefore concentrate here on the demonstrable connections between this fragment and Hegel's project for a 'rational mythology' as part of a 'reconstructed religion'.

In his notes at the end of the *System of Ethical Life* Hegel distinguishes between 'Homeric religion' in which the elements themselves are Gods (Jupiter and Juno *are* the air, Neptune the water, and so on) and the 'imagination (*Phantasie*) of the absolute religion, the art which has produced a Jupiter, Apollo, Venus'.³ This same distinction is applied

¹ Rosenkranz, pp. 180-1 (Harris and Knox, pp. 254-6).

² NKA, iv. 75, 26-76, 8; Harris and Cerf, pp. 171-2. Rosenkranz's report of the developed statement in the Natural Law lectures of Summer 1802 is in *Hegels Leben*, pp. 135-6 (Harris and Knox, pp. 180-2).

³ *Schriften* (1913), p. 503; Harris and Knox, p. 178.

empirically in rather a different way here, when he claims that mythology as the 'intuition of free vitality' '*begins in nature*', which shapes itself into an abiding life out of its neediness and precisely in so doing becomes consciousness'; here the reference is to the Titanic phase of Greek religion which must be distinguished from the 'higher mythology' of the mature Olympian phase wherein the ethical gods of the City are dominant, although those older powers of the natural world still keep their place as the Gods of the darkness, the deities of unconscious life, of natural need, and of natural death. The barbarians—among whom Hegel at least momentarily classed the historic Homer in the *System of Ethical Life*—know only the Gods of the natural world. The Greeks have recognized that their own will as a people creates a new world, the daylight world of conscious freedom; and this freedom expresses itself as the pursuit of *beauty*. But their own will as a people is still immediate and undeveloped. They exist as communities which are still natural, even though they are consciously made; they are one people, but their gods quarrel, and their cities live in a state of nature that is almost as Hobbesian as the existence of barbarian tribes. The 'form' of their ideal (an infinite life that is perfectly self-sufficient and free) is opposed to its content (a finite life that must sacrifice itself in warfare, and so render the abiding life of the ideal itself unstable).¹

The Greek world is an individuated intuition of what the whole human world is to become. Even its instability, which eventually brought it to its downfall in the Peloponnesian War, will become a stably necessary factor in the universal life of mankind, for although the shifting fortunes of war may

¹ See esp. *seiner Form*, 3b, in *NKA*, v. 375 (cf. Baum and Meist, *Hegel-Studien*, xii. 1977, 75–8. When we compare the first 2 pages of our fragment with the summary in Rosenkranz (p. 134; Harris and Knox, p. 180): 'The most living God of a people is its *national* God, in whom its spirit appears transfigured, and not just its spirit but its empirical existence, the untruth and uncertainty of its life, appears as a sum of singular traits', we are bound to wonder whether it was not this *Delineatio* MS whose affinity with the *System of Ethical Life* was so evident that Rosenkranz naturally used it to complete the account of the 'first system'. The assumption that a lecture MS must have preceded the writing of the *System of Ethical Life* may be mistaken—or that earlier MS may have perished. Or it may be the case, of course, that *this* present fragment comes from a MS of 1802. The rest of this present fragment—on which the next paragraph is based—is *quoted* by Rosenkranz in his chapter on 'didactic modifications' of the system, pp. 180–1—Harris and Knox, pp. 254–6.

destroy the balance of power between the nations, this can only be part of the establishment of a new balance; there is no place outside the order, from which a new Alexander can emerge. Thus the Olympian ideal created in Greek art is the intuitive expression of human nature, it is the intuition that is to be unfolded conceptually in world history. The Greek experience is part of world history as *art*. The mind and work of the artist is the individuated totality of the conceptual process of *Sittlichkeit* (or of the public life). What is called the artist's 'genius', or his 'invention', when he takes the stuff of popular religious tradition and makes it into a thing of beauty that all can appreciate, reverence, and carefully preserve, 'is not his invention, but the invention of the people as a whole, or the *finding*, that the people has found its essence'. This artistic function which the Greeks brought to perfection, is a permanent moment of culture generally, even in its perfected conceptual exposition and reconstruction. Hegel expresses this fact in a sequence of similes that refer to the stages of world-culture as the 'history of God'. First, in the original creation of the Greek *polis*, culture was an arch to which the artist added the keystone. At this stage we have a construction in natural daylight, with an earth foundation and material supplied by the earth. Then in the long pilgrimage from Rome to the dawn of the Enlightenment, culture was a well-spring, and the artist was he who dug out the last spade full to make it gush forth. (We have moved into the spiritual world for which water is the natural symbol; but no construction is going on.) And finally, in the spiritual darkness of the contemporary Cave which takes itself to be enlightened in its bourgeois pursuit of individual happiness, but which has in fact lost the noble spirit of self-sacrifice and 'life in the *Volk*' so that it has no sight of the Idea, the artist is he who precipitates the political revolution. The old life is drowned because he chips away the keystone of the *underground* arch, and lets in the spiritual flood-water of the lake above. In this cave-like situation the artist must be a dreamer who *remembers* the ideal world of life outside the Cave, as it was lived far away and long ago. But that world is dead and gone, and it is only death that the artist now brings on himself and his world. The office of building the new arch in the real daylight of the world outside

once again, must (by implication) belong to another. Not Hölderlin with his *Hyperion* but Hegel with his 'Universe of God' is the architect of the world to come.

We think of Hölderlin here, and probably Hegel did too.¹ But the more obvious public reference of his metaphor for the modern poet was to works like Schiller's *Robbers*, Goethe's *Faust* fragment, and the *Heinrich von Ofterdingen* of Novalis. The poem from which his characterization of the Greek poet's role derives is clearly the *Oresteia* of Aeschylus (which shows the Volk the essence of the constitutional government they have created).² But the poet who made the water gush forth for those who were digging for the well-spring was Dante, on his pilgrimage to Heaven via Hell. We have another fragment in which Hegel discusses the *mythology* of Christendom, with special reference to Dante's work. This piece belongs, more probably, to the first tripartite system of Winter 1803/4; but for reasons which will soon emerge, this makes no real difference to the formulation of the doctrine, so I can deal with it here without having to make assumptions about the dating.³

¹ The thesis that the political poet must die, may well have come from Hölderlin in the first place, since it is at the core of his Empedocles-project (cf. p. 8, n. 1, above). But also Hegel would have seen the onset of Hölderlin's insanity as directly conditioned by his fear of prosecution for treason in the company of his friend Sinclair. Thus Hölderlin's own reason was the first thing drowned in the flood that he was releasing.

² But Homer is the author and teacher of the *noble* ethics embodied in that constitution. We can regard Hegel's remarks about the Homeric gods at the end of the *System of Ethical Life* in either of two ways. Possibly it was just a thought experiment which he abandoned. But since he had already developed his view of Greek religion as a synthesis of Olympian (daylight) deities and Titanic (underworld) elements and expressed it in a highly sophisticated form in the *Natural Law* essay (*NKA*, iv. 458, 35–459, 27; Knox and Acton, pp. 104–5) the hypothesis that he consigned Homer's definitely Olympian figures to the level of *natural* mythology only experimentally, and rapidly changed his mind is not attractive. It is more likely that he seriously held that the outwardly Olympian religion of Homer was only natural mythology, and that it was the genius of the *Volk* itself that found the way to give it an ethical significance. On that view 'Homer' is a perfect example of Hegel's view that the poet's invention is really the invention of the people as a whole. Homer was the educator of Greece because *they* 'found their essence' in him. But he himself did not intend the education they received, and could not even have imagined the essence that they found. (Hegel would naturally have accepted Wolf's view that 'Homer' was just a shorthand expression for a communal succession of popular bards.)

³ Kimmerle assigns the fragment *ist nur die Form* (*NKA*, vi. 330–1; Harris and Knox, pp. 251–3) to 1804. But the handwriting provides only a fragile basis for

In this Christian universal culture the intuition of God, or of the universal brotherhood of man, has no outward expression. Universal Christendom does not exist as a community with a constitution, or as a world of publicly constituted communities that have come to self-consciousness in their religion. God is intuited inwardly as universal love. The only proper shape that the imagination can give to this intellectual intuition is that of the 'mother of God'.¹ God exists for us as the power who loves every one of his children as a private person, a family member, because he has come to us as a child in the most primitive and most inviolable of human family relations. He has a mother; but his father is (as fathers sometimes are in natural ethics) unknown.

Because we know him personally, in the privacy of inner consciousness, and because the empirical structures of public existence, which caused the conflict of the Olympians and the downfall of Father Zeus, are indifferent and irrelevant to this new Universal Father, our lives in his service can only be our own personal adventure or pilgrimage.²

dating the remains of 1801-4; and it cannot be *conclusive* in the case of a short piece. The coincidences of terminology (*Form*, *Innhalt*, and particularly *Stoff*) make one more inclined to associate it with *seine Form*. But because this coincidence breaks down at a certain point (see p. 219, n. 1) the later date is, in fact, more probable. None the less I have already appealed to it for support in interpreting the Natural Law lectures of 1802; and I have suggested that the MSS of 1803 may have contributed to the synthesis that Rosenkranz provides for those. Hegel's philosophy of Absolute Spirit is almost homogeneous from 1802 to 1804 (and perhaps to the very end of the Jena period). The shift of emphasis caused by Hegel's move to a 'transcendental subjective' standpoint is a subtle one (see Ch. VII, pp. 334-9, below).

¹ Hegel says 'when it is shaped, it is love toward what *is*, therefore as a *woman*'. His 'therefore' depends here on his theory of the natural union of the sexes, not on their empirical distinction. His political theory (including his theory of the *political* religion of the Greeks) is deeply marked by sexual chauvinism. But (as he says more than once in the *System of Ethical Life*) 'in [absolute] religion things are different'. The universal religion is the religion of infinite *life*. Mother and child are the simplest expression of this in finite nature. Mother-love is the most primitive natural 'relation', and the one that is closest to 'identity'.

² It would be easy enough for Hegel to use his Greek model as the absolute pattern and point to the Catholic Christian analogue of 'absolute life in the *Volks*' that is presented by the ideals of knighthood and chivalry. (He does this—to the disadvantage of Christianity—in one of the historical fragments from the Frankfurt period—see Rosenkranz, pp. 523-4 or *TW-A*, i. 436-7; *Clio* vii. 1977, 122-3.) But here he chooses rather to emphasize that the sexes are equally represented in the calendar of Saints—a point which is very much to the advantage of Christianity, as any reader of Greek tragedy will agree.

The channels of our inspiration in this personal pilgrimage are not artistic creations but historic leaders. Hegel speaks of them paradoxically as 'the founders of the religions' of this new world. We can see by looking back to the fragment *seine Form* that the 'absolutely free shapes' with whom he contrasts them are the Greek gods (whose existence was not determinate in time and space as theirs is). We can see readily enough how the Christian religion had many such 'founders'; but how can the participation of many human agents in the spreading of the Gospel be consistently thought of as pluralizing it, if the essence of it was its universality? Paul founded many 'churches'; and some of them refused from the beginning to accept the authority of the Petrine episcopate at Rome. But in the West (which is the cultural world that Hegel is concerned about) the Roman See established its doctrinal supremacy and a large measure of administrative control. The early heresiarchs (Arius, Mani, and so on) could be called 'founders of religions'. But their foundations have perished. Only the critics who came *after* the definition of doctrine, and the establishment of Church authority (Waldo, Hus, Luther, Calvin, etc.), produced lasting results; and we know that Hegel was more concerned about them than he was about religious reformers who instituted distinct cults within the sphere of effective Catholic authority (Benedict, Dominic, Francis, Teresa, etc.). So the only natural interpretation of his words must rest on the assumption that he is treating Christianity as one historic whole (just as he treats Greek religion as one whole from Homer to the execution of Socrates). What he means by 'founders of religions' is founders of Christian sects that have survived into the present world (Peter and Paul being the first members of the class thus designated). Hegel himself *can* be thought of as the newest candidate for membership in this class. But his work is different. He wants to do two things: first, to bring out the essentially Protestant character of Christianity when it is viewed as historic in this way; and secondly, to overcome the other-worldliness of the 'Protestant principle' by reintegrating all the sects in a *philosophical* vision that is inspired by the Greek *imaginative* model.

Apart from going far beyond the text here, my interpreta-

tion appears to be contradicted by, or at least to conflict with, the fact that Hegel takes Dante's *Comedy* as the supreme imaginative expression of the religion he is discussing. But in this connection we should note that he took both the *Iliad* of Homer and the *Oresteia* of Aeschylus as the poetic expression of Greek religion. For Greek religion, 'Homer' (i.e. the Homeridae) was the fountain-head. For Christianity the first 'founder' (presumably Jesus of Nazareth) was the fountain-head. Dante stands at the watershed where the absolute authority of the Pope has just been proclaimed; and his poem is 'Protestant' at least in its vitriolic critique of that authority. Hegel therefore treats the *Comedy* as the poetic 'intuition' of the 'Protestant principle' (just as the *Oresteia* was the 'intuition' of Aristotle's *Politics*). This involves considerable injustice to the faith and goals of the historic Dante. But then what the Greeks made of Homer was not in accord with what the dubiously historic blind bard believed and intended either.

The 'Protestant principle' is an attitude of yearning. Life in this world is regarded as an ascetic preparation for another life in the world beyond. The direct relation of singular consciousness to the Absolute Consciousness¹ is an experience of

¹ Kimmerle (*NKA*, viii, 355) takes the use of these terms for the relation of the private person to God as a clear indication that this fragment belongs to the tripartite system of Winter-Spring 1803/4. It is a pointer, but not a very secure one. The 'singular consciousness' is already established as the starting-point of philosophy for the *Delineatio* of Summer 1803. And although Nature and Real Spirit are below and above singular consciousness respectively (in their objective reality) the 'resumption of the whole into one' was always conceived by Hegel as the stage where subjectivity is again the theme, and where its opposite poles (singular and universal or finite and absolute) are brought to their coincidence. Even in the *Difference* essay the intuition of God's Incarnation is said to belong in religion 'to each single [individual]' and 'in speculation it appears more as consciousness, and as extended in consciousness, as an activity of subjective Reason'. (*NKA*, iv, 75, 36-8 the translation—Harris and Cerf, p. 172—is defective because a line fell out. The final clause about religion should read: 'it is the product of a crowd, of a communal genius, yet it belongs also to each single individual'.) Thus already in the *Difference* essay the 'resumption of the whole' is both the 'resumption' of the logical 'extension' of the Idea in the singular consciousness or *cognition*, and the simultaneous assumption of all the singulars into the absolute consciousness. It is a pointer, nevertheless, because the critique of the Boehme myth shows that Hegel felt that in his own Identity Philosophy 'the individual is nothing in the Absolute'. But a more telling point *against* the association of *ist nur die Form* with *seine Form* is the fact that the word *Gegenwart* does not occur in latter. The contrast of 'presence' and 'the beyond', where the 'living motion' of consciousness is nullified, so that art has to make absence (*Sehnsucht*) present, is

sinfulness—i.e. of nothingness and helplessness. Nothing in this life is valuable and the Christian experience of this life cannot be beautiful as the Greek experience was. The *heroes* of Christianity are paragons of asceticism 'who represent the absolute *Schmerz* in suffering and martyrdom of the most lurid type'. The Homeric epic, by contrast, was a living work in which the *Volk* 'intuit their absolute consciousness as shape', i.e. as the council of the Gods on Olympus. The matter of the Epic was the life of the *Volk*, the self-sacrifice of the individual, for the *polis*. Athena is the *Gestalt* in which the constitution of Athens is intuited as the 'work of all'. But the Christian God's great plan of universal salvation has—as yet—no such objective *presence* for the single worshipper. The action of grace is not my action now and here, it is the work of the dead Saviour (in the past) and of the invisible inward spirit (in the future and again beyond the pale of death). Man cannot be active in this realm beyond death; it is a land of dreams even more emphatically than the historic Earthly Paradise of Hellas. For a poet may dream, however misguidedly, of restoring that once actual Paradise upon earth. Whereas if one has a vision of the Life Beyond, any attachment to this life must appear as a subject for repentance. Tears are all that this life can contribute to the divine plan.

As an account of the poet's purpose in the *Comedy*, and even of the pilgrim's experience in the poem, this is outrageous. Dante the pilgrim travels an enormous journey on his own feet, and he interacts with others vigorously both in speech and in action. It might be held (though I think the view is mistaken) that Hegel's remark shows that he was not interested in any part of the *Comedy* except the *Inferno*. Dante's *Hell* does represent the fate of those who identify with the life of this world; and although the pilgrim occasionally makes an active contribution to Divine Justice, we could

clearly part of the continuing contrast between Christianity and Greek religion that typifies this fragment throughout. Yet the contrast of *Gegenwart* with *Vergangenheit* and *Zukunft* has no answering echo in *seine Form*. Of course we do not have all of Hegel's discussion of Greek religion, but slight as it is, this is at least an unambiguous hint that the two fragments were conceived separately. (As evidence of the focal significance of the word 'Gegenwart' in, and after 1804 cf. Hegel's discussion of the 'bad infinite' in the 'logic' of 1804. The bad infinite of the Kantian sublime, or of Fichte's moral progress is 'without *Gegenwart*', vii. 32, 19 and 30.)

plausibly argue that his only non-illusory response is tears.¹ But the *Purgatory* of Dante's *Comedy* is also part of this world. It is the *other side* of our Earth, whereas *Hell* is the *inwardness of this side*. And since Hegel's own ideal of the active individual life is 'absolute life in the *Volk*' one would expect him to be appreciative of Dante's ideal of self-discipline and self-denial through active membership in the community of universal love—an ideal which is vividly expounded in *Purgatory*. Hegel does not show any such appreciation because *Purgatory* is a concept that is of no use to him. Just as the historic Homer's putative beliefs about the divinity of the elements belong to his pre-political culture, so *Purgatory* belongs to Dante's historic world only. It is inconsistent with the 'Protestant principle' which makes a stark separation between this world and the world beyond, so that a true Protestant can only fear Hell and long for Heaven in the

¹ It is worth giving some attention to the question *why* Hegel says 'the man who attends this stage-show can only dissolve (*zerfliessen*) in tears'. Dante does not often weep over what he beholds. Pöggeler thinks the reference must be to the Paolo and Francesca encounter (*Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 20, 1980, 262). It is true that after Dante calls the pair to him his first words to Francesca are 'Francesca your torments make me weep for grief and pity' (*Francesca i tuoi martiri la lagrimar mi fanno tristo e pio*, *Inferno* V, 116–17). But his final reaction to her story is the far more dramatic one of falling in a dead faint, while Paolo weeps (*Inferno* V, 140–2). So if Hegel had this case in mind, it retorts upon his critique in a way which he would hardly have forgotten, because this is one of the moments that no one forgets. After this, Dante has many reactions in Hell, but he only actually weeps once, and then Virgil reproves him for it. He is so overcome with pity for Pier delle Vigne that he cannot speak (*Inferno* XIII, 82–4); and his heart is again 'full' for Brunetto Latini (*Inferno* XV, 79–87). He actually weeps only for the soothsayers—whose twisted shape portrays exactly what Adam's desire for a forbidden knowledge did to the human image generally. In spite of Virgil's reproof, Hegel may well be thinking of this passage (*Inferno* XX, 18–30). But the game is not quite over, for there is one denizen of Hell who goes with Dante to the verge of the Earthly Paradise; and for him it is more legitimate to weep than it was even for Francesca. To weep for Virgil, the figure of the virtuous pagan and the poet of the whole 'mythology of Reason', is to weep for the *historical fixity* of God's Will itself; also to weep in Eden is a tragic extreme that exceeds even 'falling like one dead' in Hell. So I think the reference of Hegel's 'nur in Thränen zerfliessen kann' is primarily to *Purgatorio* XXX, 49–54: 'But Virgil had left us bereft of himself, Virgil sweetest father, Virgil to whom I gave myself for my salvation; nor did all that our ancient mother lost, keep my dew-washed cheeks [washed free of 'the colour of Hell' by Virgil, *Purgatorio* I, 121–9 and there has been no occasion for weeping in *Purgatory* itself] from turning black [*atra*, the colour of death and of hell] with weeping.' (If Hegel's reference is to this passage then he is a very perceptive critic indeed! I leave the student of Hegel's own views about the story of man's redemption to decide for himself.)

beyond. Purgatory is a reflective corruption of the clear conceptual advance that the Protestant principle represents; and if we want to understand why Hegel ignores the poetic or intuitive form of it in Dante, we have only to consider what he says about the purgatorial *concept* of 'infinite progress' in Fichte's philosophical formulation of it.¹

At the very end of this fragment Hegel looks forward to the task of philosophy in reconstructing this religion of the life beyond, as a religion of 'presence', i.e. of this present life. The two worlds of Christian faith are the opposite sides of the Greek contradiction of form and content separated and held apart. The Christian Heaven is the world of Reason's self-enjoyment which has to be raised up out of its existence in the bodily tomb of Nature and enjoyed as the free consciousness of absolute truth. Thus Heaven is only this world properly appreciated. The goal of history is achieved, the divine plan of salvation is fulfilled when we are conscious of this world as 'the Universe of God'.

What has happened through Hegel's *practical* working out of the parallelism of the two sciences of the Absolute—its construction as human nature and its reconstruction as transcendental consciousness—is that he has recognized the first construction to be necessary only as the preamble for the long process of *Bildung* through which mankind moves from the 'natural' to the 'transcendental' standpoint. It is the work of the Spirit in history to make possible the reconstruction of the 'universe' as cognition. Our understanding of our place in Nature, and our subsequent spiritual history is all of it a preamble. Philosophy proper is the 'reconstruction' only; and it cannot even begin until the historical-religious phase of the 'resumption of the whole' is complete. It must then retrace the whole pattern of the 'Universe' as a construction (Logic, Nature, Spirit) from the absolute or transcendental point of

¹ See esp. *Faith and Knowledge*, NKA, iv. 407 (Cerf and Harris, pp. 180–2). Hegel does not refer explicitly to Dante's *Paradise* either, but of course that is simply the 'beyond'—where Dante no longer travels on his own feet—so it is not relevant to Hegel's immediate concern. But his study of medieval culture was certainly not extensive; so it seems to me highly probable that both *Purgatory* and *Paradise* weighed quite heavily in the balance to produce his judgement that 'In Catholicism this religion [of the infinite *Schmerz*] has become a beautiful religion' (Rosenkranz, p. 139, Harris and Knox, p. 184).

view. Once we come to this understanding of cultural history from Aristotle (and Alexander) to Kant (and Napoleon), we can see why Hegel's four-part system collapsed into a triadic one. Outwardly it is the culminating phase of Hegel's philosophy (regarded as a process of self-construction) that disappears. But it disappears only because all true philosophy is recognized as the work of Absolute Spirit. It has only just come to be true *now* that we can 'learn from philosophy and through it, how to live'. From the historically speculative point of view we must first learn from life (as the object of our natural philosophizing) how to do philosophy properly (i.e. transcendently). The philosopher will be (as Hobbes thought) the true pastor of the world that is in its birth-throes. But the philosopher can only take on this function, because he has already received and absorbed the long *Bildung* of the *Weltgeist*. His *learning* must be distinguished from his *teaching*. The learning had four phases. The teaching has only three. Or to be more exact, philosophy in the learning had three phases of preparation that led to one of doctrine; philosophy in the teaching will have one phase of preparation that leads to three phases of doctrine.

Hegel's move from the learning perspective to the teaching perspective occurs gradually and painfully. The drive towards it is implicit in the Triangle fragment; and it begins to become explicit when philosophy is identified as a 'need' of the singular consciousness first (not as a science that some superhuman consciousness already has, and which the world needs). For the implication of the singular starting-point is that the singular consciousness will come to possess the science and will be able to unfold it. Philosophy, the felt need for wisdom, will become wisdom, not as an intuitive sight of everything *sub specie aeternitatis* but as a science that can be expounded.

The science, however, can only be expounded meaningfully to those who have suffered the long agony of the quest. It is the quest that incarnates the whole meaning of life, and it is through his explication of the quest that the philosopher can teach the non-philosopher how to live. We catch a glimpse of the philosopher in this guise in the fragment preserved by Rosenkranz as the culmination of the 'first system'. It seems probable to me that this is the conclusion of the *Delineatio* of

Summer 1803 (where Hegel began with the 'need' of philosophy as the 'aether of cognition', and expounded it as a 'Universe'):

Hegel made the conclusion of his philosophy of spirit at the end of the system of philosophy itself initially by seeking to make out the necessity of philosophy in [the life of] a people as the *ideal complement of war*. The *absolute labour* is simply death, in that it suspends the determinate singularity; for this reason *military valor* brings into [the life of] the State the *absolute sacrifice*. But since for those who do not die fighting, there remains the *humiliation of not being dead*, and of still having the selfish enjoyment of their own singularity, there remains only *speculation* as the *absolute cognition of truth*, as the form in which the simple consciousness of the infinite is possible without the determinacy of the individual, independent, life. 'The absolute consciousness of the individuals of the people, the living spirit of the same, must be pure, absolute consciousness, absolute spirit both in respect of form, and in respect of content; and the *spirit of the people* becomes spirit of the *natural and ethical universe*. Only then is the spirit absolute in its absolute self-equality, in the aether of its simple Idea [so that] the end of philosophy returns again to its beginning.'

Rosenkranz definitely believed that this was the 'conclusion' of the earliest form of Hegel's 'system'. But he could not help knowing that it was not demonstrably the intended conclusion of the *System of Ethical Life* to which he appends it; and if it was part of another relatively continuous manuscript, then he knew for certain that it was not written as part of that system. From his words we cannot be completely certain what he knew about the facts; but it is quite clear that he saw the affinity between this conclusion and the *System of Ethical Life*. And what we know about the facts supports the view that the affinity reflects temporal proximity. For there is also an affinity between the context that Rosenkranz provides for this fragment, and the description of speculation in the *Difference*

¹ Rosenkranz, pp. 132-3 (Harris and Knox, p. 178). This quotation *must* (obviously) come at (or near) the end of some course. Before 1803 there is nothing except the 'Introduction' (of 1801/2) in which it would be logically required (but a bird's-eye view of philosophy as a system *might* come at the end of almost *any* course). The most plausible alternative to the *Delineatio* of Summer 1803, however, is the 'System of Speculative Philosophy' of Winter 1803/4. For an attempt to deal with the difficulties involved in *that* hypothesis see Harris and Knox, pp. 200-1.

essay: 'speculation can rid itself of the preponderance that consciousness has in it; the preponderance is in any case something inessential.'¹ From the summer of 1803 onwards this attitude toward 'consciousness' disappears in Hegel's texts. Far from being inessential the 'preponderance of consciousness' becomes the essential thing; and the emphasis on the role of speculation as a negative critique of 'consciousness' soon diminishes to the vanishing point. The turning-point is the identification of the standpoint of transcendental consciousness as defined by Kant and Fichte as the subject's 'need of philosophy', i.e. as something that needs not to be removed, or annulled, but rather to be fulfilled. Thus the *Delineatio* has both a starting-point (the 'aether of cognition') that makes this conclusion appropriate here, and a preamble whose potential significance will make it quite inappropriate later.

But as in the case of the fragment *ist nur die Form* (where the balance of probability leans the other way towards 1804) the exact date does not ultimately matter. Even if it does belong to 1804, the affinity of the Rosenkranz fragment with 'Schelling's System' makes it a perfect expression of Hegel's attitude during the period of their collaboration before Schelling's departure from Jena. In the circle from the *social* need of philosophy to the speculative intuition of 'the natural and ethical Universe', it is reality, Nature, Substance, that is the focus of attention. The 'Idea' is the theme; but its goal is to 'realize' itself. Objectivity is what matters. Both Schelling and Hegel concentrate on it, because it is what both the speculative and the reflective 'philosophy of subjectivity' lacks. What Hegel has discovered by finally getting his solution to the problem of 'nature' clear, is that *subject and object are not equal*. It is the reality of the subject as subject that matters, and that reality is a process in which objectivity is a moment, and does not have the rank of an equal complement. Not the objective realization of the Idea, but its subjective (i.e. spiritual) enjoyment of its own reality becomes the topic of philosophy proper from now on.

¹ *NKA*, iv. 76, 5-7 (Harris and Cerf, p. 172).

5. *Philosophy as Absolute Cognition*

When philosophy ceases to be the quest for wisdom and becomes the exposition of wisdom itself, the focus of interest moves from the object known to the process of knowing itself. The relation of Nature and Spirit changes when we are no longer primarily concerned with the function of nature in the *evolution* of spirit (in which context it appears as the reality of the concept, or the body of spirit) but with what nature is for spirit, when that function has been fulfilled, and spirit has come to itself. This is a question about the relation between the absolute cognition of nature, and the absolute self-cognition of spirit (and in this context, nature or body, appears as 'otherness', it is spirit *uttered*, externalized, outwardly expressed, and the cognition of it is the knowledge that spirit has of itself as an *alien* object). The difference is a subtle one, and it is also one with which we are already familiar, for the relation between discursive philosophical cognition and nature now, is the relation between God and Nature, apprehended in intellectual intuition previously. To Hegel the difference was certainly important, for he worked intensively on his philosophy of nature from the middle of 1803 onwards.¹ His 'Logic and Metaphysics' was even more deeply affected. Once the story of the realization of human nature through the operation of the Spirit in history, was recognized as the absolute preamble to philosophy proper, logic was bound to lose its introductory or critical function, and retain only its constructive or metaphysical one. But Hegel had been working on his 'Logic and Metaphysics' textbook for some time; and for two years he concentrated on revising it, before he scrapped the old plan altogether.

It is, of course, always dangerous to argue from silence; and the risk of over-interpreting the few fragments that remain to

¹ The new standpoint on Nature is first proclaimed in the fragments of Summer 1803. (See *NKA*, v. 372-3.) But it was still the older standpoint that was adopted in the content and organization of that course. Of course, Hegel's intensive concern with the detail of his philosophy of nature, reflects the fact that Schelling's departure left him with both the opportunity and the moral obligation to give courses on the topic. His 'outline of universal philosophy' would not be adequate for that. But given that there was such an outline, the inchoate condition of the philosophy of nature fragments in the 1803/4 system, are evidence of a fairly radical *conceptual* upheaval.

us from what was perhaps a large mass of drafts of Hegel's early Logic and Metaphysics is evident enough. None the less I think it is significant that what we *do* have from this period of its evolution is two preliminary outlines for the exposition of 'absolute cognition' as the 'first Idea' of Metaphysics, and two 'remarks' concerned with philosophy as 'absolute cognition', which were obviously written as appendices to some larger whole.¹ All this evidence suggests that Hegel was trying to make piecemeal revisions in a systematic manuscript—and we know that he had one, though it is lost to us. The fragmentary introduction for the 'Outline of Universal Philosophy' shows how and why *Erkennen* became the 'first Idea' of Metaphysics, and helps to confirm Trede's contention that the 'beginning of the philosophical system' referred to in the first 'Remark' means the beginning not of logic but of Metaphysics. And from the two outlines and the two remarks, we can safely infer that Hegel made a considerable revision of the transition from logic to Metaphysics in his long-suffering manuscript.

We should begin with the two outlines.

The Idea of cognition is the first Idea of metaphysics. In cognition [the first moment] (α) is that cognition is outside cognition—the thing-in-itself is outside the representation, [the second moment] (β) [is that] the same is related to cognition, so that it becomes content, active against the indifference of cognition. [The third moment (γ) is] cognition itself, where what is posited in (β) as a moment is the universal. In (β) it is the passive, in (γ) the negative, that into which this content disappears, and another enters in its place.²

The expression is rough and clumsy, but Hegel is obviously describing the way in which the process of cognition, at its simplest, appears to ordinary consciousness. There is first of all an object and a mind, unrelated to one another; then the mind passively receives the impression of the object; and finally it actively derives from that impression, a universal concept which is its actual cognition of the object.

¹ All these fragments are printed as *Beilagen* in *NKA*, vii. 341–9. (Their dating and significance have been ably discussed by J. H. Trede in his essay 'Hegels frühe Logik', *Hegel-Studien*, vii. 160–5).

² *NKA*, vii. 341. (cf. further *System of Ethical Life*, *Schriften* (1913), p. 451, Harris and Knox, p. 130).

The Idea within which this process achieves its totality (to use the language of the *System of Ethical Life*) is that of the 'soul'. The soul as cognitive is 'absolute reflexion', i.e. it is a mirror for the totality of things, which is 'the World'; and the ultimate ground of the relation between soul and world is 'God'.

Thus the thread of Hegel's Metaphysics is provided in this outline by the three Ideas of Pure Reason in Kant's first Critique: Soul, World, and God. The outline is a very bare schema, and seems only significant for the fact that the Ideas are taken in their Kantian order, and are logically related in terms of the cognitive process. This is almost certainly a reversal of the procedure of 1801 (where we cannot be sure that 'world' and 'self' played any significant part in the argument at all, but where the guiding motto was plainly *a Deo principium*).¹ Looking back to the procedure of the *System of Ethical Life* on one side, and forward to the structure of the 'Metaphysics' of 1804/5 on the other, we can infer that soul, world, and God are the foci of a metaphysics of subjective intuition, objective conception, and absolute substantiality (in which relation is finally transcended) respectively. This hypothesis squares with, and is at least partially confirmed by, the summary of the 'Metaphysics' of Winter 1803/4 given at the beginning of the 'Philosophy of Spirit' which survives: 'The first part of philosophy constructed the Spirit as Idea; and it arrived at the absolute self-identity, at absolute substance which in coming to be through the activity against the passivity within the absolute antithesis absolutely is just as it absolutely *comes to be*'.²

¹ The outline of 'Metaphysics' that Hegel gave in 1801 was for a course that was never completed. Perhaps nothing corresponding to that outline was ever written out. But if my hypothesis about the speculative inversion of Kant's table of the categories in the logic of 1801 is accepted (see pp. 42-3) then a similar relation between Kant's Dialectic (of the Ideas of Pure Reason) and the Metaphysics of 1802 (the *systema rationis*) is at least a plausible postulate. In that case this sketch is a *return* to the Kantian order of approach (and this inversion of Hegel's own previous speculative inversion may be part of what is signaled by his calling Logic and Metaphysics 'transcendental idealism' in announcing his 'System of Speculative Philosophy' for Winter 1803/4—see the next note. But all this is extremely conjectural (since 'transcendental philosophy' is one of the twin sciences of 'Schelling's system' in 1801 and 'Idealism or Logic' is the 'extended science of the Idea' at this stage also).

² NKA, vi. 268, 3-6; Harris and Knox, p. 205. From the summary it would almost appear that the 'System of Speculative Philosophy' of 1803/4 began directly with

The other outline¹ is not overtly either Kantian or metaphysical. The language is rather that of the *System of Ethical Life* and of the introductory lecture for the 'Outline of Universal Philosophy' of 1803. It could, indeed, be a fragment of the promised discussion of *Erkennen* in that course; but if we assume that the Metaphysics of 1803/4 was actually developed and organized in terms of the three Kantian Ideas, then it fits equally well into the transition from the Logic to the Metaphysics in that Winter course.² It is only an outline, not part of a proper lecture manuscript—being written on the back of a sheet of mathematical calculations. But it does look like the outline for one lecture (or part of one) rather than the skeleton for several lectures, like the sheet headed *Metaphysik*.

The fragment deals with 'cognition' as a whole or totality. The 'result' (of a preceding evolution whose stages can be partially inferred from it) is that the simple Idea of cognition, present as intuition, is expressed as a real antithesis in two ways through the motion of the absolute concept.³ First it is the antithesis of the different subsistence of the terms (mind and world?); secondly, it is the antithesis of their indifferent

Metaphysics like the 'Outline of Universal Philosophy' of 1803. But we know from the announcement that this is not so. The first part of the 'system' was 'Logic and Metaphysics or *Transcendental Idealism*' (the italics are Hegel's—*Hegel-Studien*, iv, 1967, 54). It is safe to infer that everything had to be reduced to the barest outline; and it seems to me highly plausible to suppose that the sketch we are examining was (one of) Hegel's attempt(s) to reduce the metaphysical part of his 'transcendental philosophy' to its Kantian bones. (I agree with Horstmann and Trede that it can scarcely be connected directly with the Metaphysics of 1804/5; but I think there is no need to be as cautious as they are about whether Hegel has already made the distinction between the 'metaphysics of subjectivity' and the 'metaphysics of objectivity' at this stage. He may not have been intending to make much formal use of it in the lectures for which this sketch was written; but that would just be a matter of time economy—like the abbreviated informality of his transition to the *Volk* in the 'Philosophy of Spirit' (*NKA*, vi, 315, 1–2; Harris and Knox, p. 242, n. 49). In my view the presence of the distinction is almost as evident here as is its Kantian origin.

¹ 'Ein Blatt zum System', *NKA*, vii, 348–9.

² The fragment may represent Hegel's 'resolution' of the 'need of philosophy' in preparation for the Metaphysics of the Summer 1803 course. But it could serve the same purpose in the 'System of Speculative Philosophy' of Winter 1803/4; the brevity of the fragment does not allow any reliable inferences to be drawn from handwriting and spelling.

³ We may remember here that in the *System of Ethical Life*, the absolute concept is real as individual intelligence, *Schriften* (1913), p. 428; Harris and Knox, p. 109.

subsistence. The *Metaphysik* outline makes it possible to interpret this with some security. The Kantian Idea of the World is the 'indifferent' subsistence of the terms; for in the *Metaphysik* outline Hegel says: 'the indifference [of the soul] is the soul posited as sublated; it as soul and what is outside of it, related to each other, but in such a way that the soul is not this relation, [this unrelated subsistence] is the world.' Thus the indifferent antithesis of mind and world is what exists when the self subsists independently as part of the world, which is a whole that the self does not constitute and cannot define.

It follows that the differentiated antithesis is what is constituted by the activity of the soul in cognition. This is the relation to the world that it sets up in its freedom, i.e. in its indifference. The soul posits itself as sublated when it sets itself up as nothing but a mirror in which everything is simply reflected (and so known just as it is). Now the terms are differentiated theoretically as subject and object, and practically as freedom and possibility. What the world is, is now what the soul knows it as, or what it can make of it. But this knowing and making is likewise what the soul itself is (as absolute concept or intelligence).

The 'unity' of the differentiated antithesis is the (simple or logical) Idea; that of the indifferent antithesis is (if I am not mistaken) God. Hegel refers to the latter as 'the unity [of the simple Idea?] with the real antithesis, which is not posited in the antithesis itself, because that is not required by the simple Idea itself'. This is the union of finite and infinite consciousness that is, as we shall see in due course, the goal of Hegel's 'real philosophy'.

Hegel now argues that these two modes of relation between the terms, are really what constitutes the terms themselves. This is easily seen on our interpretation. The relation of knower and known as independent is the Idea of the world. It is in this context that the problem of determinism arises, for I know my own real self as a link in the web of contingent necessities that constitutes the world. But Hegel does not mention that here; rather he emphasizes the other side of antinomy—that my activity as an independent knower is the revelation of my freedom. This is what emerges from

reflection on the relation that I constitute between myself and the world in my cognition of it. Thus, 'absolute knowledge', which Hegel refers to in his final paragraph as the problem of modern philosophy would involve the resolution of the problem of determinism, and the establishment of the absolute freedom of the knower.¹

The two 'Remarks' are easier to follow and understand, because they are written for an audience, not as a memorandum for the author himself; but at the same time they are harder to interpret because they are footnotes to a text that we do not have, and they refer to, and depend upon it in a crucial way. Interpretation depends absolutely upon the identification of a single unknown: the unique proposition that defines the Idea of Philosophy. The whole content of systematic philosophy can be developed from this single proposition, which thus constitutes the true 'beginning' of philosophy.

I agree with J. H. Trede that the clue to this 'Idea' of philosophy which is its 'beginning' must be looked for in the reports and fragments about Hegel's *Logic and Metaphysics* in 1801; and I think further that he is right in identifying the unique proposition that defines the Idea of philosophy as the *principle of ground* (or of Sufficient Reason).² The newly discovered fragments of the 'Introduction to Philosophy' have greatly strengthened the case that Trede made before they were known. For this new evidence confirms that in Hegel's first system philosophy begins from an Idea which is deceptively *simple*; and that the science of it in its unity is 'Metaphysics'.³

The new discoveries have also demonstrated another

¹ Hegel does not say *this* in his final paragraph. The editors suspect that the paragraph may be a later addition (see *NKA*, vii. 366). I am merely offering a hypothesis to explain why he added it, in the light of two principal facts: the way Hegel characterizes the human situation that makes philosophical cognition a 'need', and the goal that he arrives at in the 'real philosophy' that fulfils the need. The formal theory of cognition (in *Logic and Metaphysics*) only defines the need itself completely.

² For this the main evidence is to be found in *Faith and Knowledge*—see *NKA*, iv. 348, 7–16; 373, 22–374, 9; Cerf and Harris, pp. 98–9, 134–5. (This evidence is very slippery because we have to infer Hegel's own position from his ironic account of Jacobi.)

³ See *Die Idee des absoluten Wesens*, 2b and *Dass die Philosophie*, 19b–20b, (in *NKA*, v. 264, 274–5); Trede, *Hegel-Studien*, vii. 160–5.

element of continuity between 1801 and 1803: Hegel's concern with philosophy as a 'need'. I think that it can be shown that this concern helped to focus his attention upon the 'principle of ground' as the nucleus of systematic philosophy. But now the *caveats* must begin. The 'need of philosophy' is seen in 1803 as a need of the individual, whereas in 1801 it is discussed and analysed as a need of society. By the same token, Hegel thinks in 1801 that the attempt to find a 'fundamental proposition' which can be set up as the beginning of systematic philosophizing is a mistake.¹ He promises to dictate 'propositions' about the Idea of Philosophy in 1801, but he says nothing to suggest that there is any fundamental proposition upon which the others depend.² His praise of Jacobi, for giving the principle of ground its full philosophical significance, is concessive only; Jacobi has used a bad method to the best advantage; but it remains misleading, and Jacobi has himself been misled by it. Only Spinoza, in his artlessness, was not tripped up by it (though he did not start from the principle of ground).³ If there is any proposition which Hegel himself is in any way disposed to treat as fundamental in 1801 it is the *principle of Identity*; but the way that he treats it shows us why he felt that the quest for a propositional beginning for systematic philosophy was mistaken. The principle of Identity itself has to be read as a contradiction before it can be taken as a philosophical proposition.⁴ The continuity between 1801 and 1803 is only important as the context of these notable differences.

In my discussion of the lecture outline for the projected Metaphysics of 1801, I suggested very tentatively that Hegel may well have taken some reformulation of the Ontological Argument as his 'oldest of old things'.⁵ Perhaps there never was any evidence either for or against this hypothesis, outside Hegel's own mind. For I am inclined to believe that the metaphysical *systema rationis* of 1802—which certainly was

¹ See esp. *Difference*, NKA, iv, 23, 18–27, 18 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 103–9).

² See the passages cited in p. 231, n. 3, above.

³ For the Jacobi reference see p. 231, n. 2, above; the praise of Spinoza is in *Difference*, NKA, iv, 24, 20–7 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 105–6).

⁴ See *Difference*, NKA, iv, 24, 28–27, 18 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 106–9).

⁵ See above, Ch. I, p. 58.

not just a project but a performance—began with logical principles (not with an Ontological Argument); but it seems virtually certain that it began with a 'system of principles'. For only through systematic complementarity could the natural tendency of rational propositions to pass over into a reflective significance¹ be overcome. This does not give us any basis, however for inferring that the Metaphysics of 1802 was closer to that of 1804 than the intervening 'philosophy of the unique proposition' of 1803. For we can prove the contrary with virtual certainty. The 'system of Reason', however it was constituted, came to birth in the polemical context of the attack on 'the reflective philosophy of subjectivity'. The fundamental error of philosophy from Descartes to Fichte, according to Hegel in 1802, was its adoption of 'the one self-certifying certainty (*das an sich und einzige Gewisse*) that there is a thinking subject, a Reason affected with finitude' as a starting-point, and its assumption that 'the whole of philosophy consists in defining the Universe for this finite Reason'.² When he begins the 'Outline of Universal Philosophy' with the *individual's* need for philosophical knowledge he is proclaiming his own conversion, his willingness to begin from this certainty and to adopt this conception of the philosopher's project. The articulation of Metaphysics through the Ideas of Reason taken in their Kantian order, and the attachment of the label 'transcendental idealism' to Logic and Metaphysics, should be seen and understood as part of this conversion.³ For only in this way can we understand the enormous revolution in the programme and method of Hegel's philosophy of spirit. The *System of Ethical Life* is not an autonomous philosophy of spirit at all, but a theory of the place of spirit in

¹ Hegel's most laudatory remark about the principle of ground in 1802, illustrates this: 'The earlier philosophical culture has deposited the testimony of its rational endeavours in the formulation of the principle of ground. The principle has swayed between Reason and reflection, and passed over into the latter.' (NKA, iv. 348, 7-9; Cerf and Harris, p. 98).

² NKA, iv. 322, 25-7; Cerf and Harris, p. 64. In this passage the basic assumption of 'the reflective philosophy of subjectivity' is only identified; but anyone who reads the Introduction to *Faith and Knowledge* as a whole, can see how firmly Hegel is opposed to this starting-point because it makes the reflective degeneration of Reason inevitable (as he views the matter in 1802).

³ In a heuristic sense this is true, in spite of the *caveat* regarding the interpretation of the lecture announcement given earlier (p. 228, n. 1, above).

nature. It begins with the practical, natural needs of the individual as a physical organism; in this way, the ethical *community*, can be revealed as the true bearer of the spirit; only in Religion is spirit truly autonomous, and only when he lives and moves in God is the individual truly free. In the first declared 'Philosophy of Spirit', on the other hand, spirit has its autonomous existence in the singular consciousness, as a self-cognitive activity. The evolution of philosophical or transcendental awareness is now the primary theme, not the evolution of practical consciousness and moral commitment. The goal of philosophical union with God remains the same, but now it is not the 'union of the mind with the whole of Nature' that is the means for this, but rather the recognition that 'nature' is essentially the 'otherness' of the mind, its own expression in objective form. Spinoza's conception of the goal of philosophy—and by implication the goal of the Identity Philosophy—was fundamentally mistaken. The 'otherness' of nature is essential to its being; and hence Kant and Fichte were on the right track after all. The first truth of man's existence as a spiritual being is his freedom *from* Nature.¹

That Hegel should turn first to the principle of ground—in which he had already said that 'the earlier philosophical culture has deposited the testimony of its rational efforts'²—when he abandoned the principle of Identity and went over (in principle at least!) to the enemy, is natural. Once we understand the situation properly, all of Trede's arguments regarding the unique philosophical proposition are

¹ In the *Metaphysik* outline, Hegel comments that the relation of the soul to the independent world is 'bad necessity; the soul opposed to it as soul, or the first [truth? principle?] of the sublated relation [i.e. what the soul is as *independent*] is freedom' (NKA, vii. 342, 1-2). cf. the passage cited by Rosenkranz from *Das Wesen des Geistes*, 11b-12a—*Leben Hegels*, p. 187 (Harris and Knox, p. 261). Ludwig Siep, in his marvellously brief and incisive survey of the evolution of Hegel's concept of freedom between 1794 and 1806 ('Zum Freiheitsbegriff der praktischen philosophie Hegels in Jena', *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 20, 1980, 217-28) has grasped the crucial significance of this change without exactly identifying when and how it happened. He couples the moments of *Autonomie* and *Freigabe* as 'gaining room and meaning once more' in the second Jena period (p. 223). But if I understand his distinctions correctly, *Freigabe* is the constant of the *whole* Jena period, since it is the 'organic' principle of the *Verfassungsschrift* (TW-A, i. 479-85, Knox and Pelczynski, pp. 159-64) and the *System of Ethical Life* (*Schriften*, 1913, p. 500; Harris and Knox, pp. 174-5).

² NKA, iv. 348, 7-8; Cerf and Harris, p. 98.

strengthened to the point of virtual certainty. But it is essential that we should recognize here, a crucial break with his earlier metaphysics—the *beginning of his breach with Schelling*.

Philosophy is completely explicated as a 'need', when we lay down the requirement that there must be a sufficient reason why things are as they are and not otherwise: to know what this reason is, would be *absolute* cognition, not dependent on anything else; the insistence that it must be self-sufficient cuts off the possibility of a 'bad infinite' regress of reasons.¹ 'If, however, it were granted that there is a more absolute proposition, upon which all the others depend, this dependence itself must either have the form of a straight line proceeding outwards to infinity, or that of a circular line returning upon itself.' This latter form offers the only means by which the unique proposition can be self-sufficient, and self-justifying. In the 'bad infinite' mode the first step must appear to be arbitrarily posited.

The ideal of philosophy as a self-justifying circle is definitive for Hegel's concept of system from the beginning. Thus the 'principle of ground' emerges here as the life-line of salvation by which he guarantees from the beginning that his acceptance of the Cartesian starting-point will not result in a fall into the bad infinity of reflective consciousness. The *beginning* position of the unique principle is only a false semblance (*nur ein Schein*). It is only through its development and *at the end* that the proposition becomes an Idea. 'End' would be as deceitful a name for it as 'beginning', however, since every stage conditions every other.² The 'seeming' of the beginning must be matched by a 'counter-seeming of the process' when it returns to the same point as the end.

This self-sufficiency, continues Hegel in his second note, is therefore the abolition of all presuppositions and residues. As beginning and end together, absolute philosophical cognition

¹ The expression 'schlechte Unendlichkeit' occurs here (*NKA*, vii. 343, 15) for the first time in Hegel's surviving texts.

² The point of Hegel's marginal addition (*NKA*, vii. 344, 28–9) seems to be that 'end', and 'beginning' are in themselves arbitrary, even in their mutual identity. Only the *end as the purpose present throughout*, is the Idea.

embraces within itself, all life and experience. This is the best way to understand Hegel's doctrine of the unity of the knowing with its object in philosophical cognition. That human reason creates its own transcendental 'forms' is the Kantian conception of subjective reflection which Hegel here ascribes to ordinary or common knowledge.¹ Hegel's doctrine is that human life itself is a process of self-interpretation that creates signs and meanings together, and because the meanings are eternal and universal 'the spirit of the subject, of man, is as spirit, the absolute spirit.'² The implication of this claim, for Hegel's earlier doctrine is that philosophical consciousness could, and so far as it existed did, comprehend and express the 'movement of the Spirit' in history at every stage. For 'It is the Idea of philosophy itself, in which this sundering [of cognition and its object] brings itself to nothing.' But Hegel is not here interested in the history of philosophy or of culture. The history of the spirit has vanished for the moment from the purview of his *Metaphysics* (as the 'extended theory of the Idea'); and it will return only when it takes over the place of critical logic.

Cognition of this philosophical kind, in which the distinction of knowing and known is posited only as sublated, Hegel now identifies as *Wissen*. One principal reason for this is that he wants to set up a contrast between his speculative starting- (and ending-) point and the certainty (*Gewissheit*) from which the 'reflective philosophy of subjectivity' starts. He needs this contrast precisely because his starting-point is now just as subjective as that of the reflective philosophy. Reflective certainty, be it the inward certainty of thought, or the outward one of sense impression, is precisely *not Wissen* itself. In the reflective view a means of transition from pure to empirical cognition (or conversely) is required; and none can be produced.

Here the manuscript is broken off; and with it our

¹ See esp. the 2nd marginal addition of *NKA*, vii. 345, 23-8.

² Loc. cit. Hegel does not say anything except what I have put in quotation marks here. I am merely trying to interpret what he means by this seemingly dogmatic assertion in opposition to the 'ordinary' or Kantian position. (My interpretation is, however, strongly supported by Hegel's last marginal addition; *NKA*, vii. 346, 28-347, 10.)

knowledge of the 'transcendental idealism' of 1803/4 ends. I hope that I have shown, however, that we have just enough data to see how Hegel proposed to make the bridge between his systematic ideals, which remained unchanged, and the standpoint of 'consciousness' which he now adopted. Thus the stone which the builders (of the Identity Philosophy) rejected has been made the head of the corner.

CHAPTER VI

The Philosophy of Nature in 1803 and 1804

1. *Hegel's materialism*

Nature is not now a stage in the evolution of spirit. We no longer need to discover man's place in nature as the necessary preamble to transcendental philosophy proper. Rather nature has a necessary function both in the evolution and in the developed existence of spirit. No longer is it exactly true to say that Nature is the 'reality' of the Idea—so that Nature includes the self-realization of finite spirit, which takes over the order of physical nature as its 'body'. Hegel will no more speak of the Idea as 'embodied' in the Heavens, or as 'coming down' to Earth etc.—or at least, when he does so, this language will be more picturesquely metaphorical than it was before. From now on, the philosophical truth about nature can only be expressed by saying that it is the being of spirit in alienated form or 'in its other-being'. It is the negative side of the Incarnation dogma that is hence forward uppermost. Incarnation is *kenosis*, the body is a tomb, the spirit in nature is the spirit in bonds. This embodiment, this bondage, is a necessary moment in the self-realization of spirit, but embodiment is no longer 'realization' all by itself. The reality of the spirit is its freedom, which is its self-redemption from this bondage, not its use of physical nature as the matter for spiritual or self-made nature. Nature is still the 'instrument' of spirit, but it is now primarily a *cognitive* instrument.¹ It is a

¹ What remains outwardly constant in this evolution is the doctrine that nature is unconscious spirit. But now the analysis of 'unconsciousness' is different. Hegel is deliberately contrasting his new view with his older one when he writes in 1804: 'But Nature, which in itself is already spirit, is no longer real (*real*) as that [logical] infinity, or ideal (*ideal*) as the process to spirit (*werden zum Geiste*) . . . and its existence as much as its ideality, or its process to absolute spirit, is the metaphysical

mirror, in which spirit can know itself, as one does in a mirror, only by standing still. Thus cognition in the 'uttered' form of nature, is the condition of free or spiritual activity. No longer, therefore, is there a continuum between unconscious nature, and the 'second nature' in which the spirit actively expresses itself. Rather there is a radical break between spirit and nature, and nothing spiritual is nature. Man, as the bearer of the spirit, does not, cannot, exist in the state of nature at all.

Hegel's philosophy of nature is preserved, almost complete, from 1803 onwards. That is to say, it is preserved, in all probability, almost as completely as Hegel wrote it out. But in the system of 1803/4 it is fragmentary largely because Hegel himself is still experimenting, still struggling to decide for himself the ontological implications of the great shift of perspective involved in his acceptance of the singular consciousness as the primary expression of incarnate divinity; and the system of 1804/5 breaks off short just when Hegel is about to embark on his theory of the organism.¹

There are, of course, observable differences between the two versions of natural philosophy. But it is also plain that they represent a continuous development of thought that broke off some time in the spring of 1805. I intend therefore, to treat them together and to fill the gaps in each from the appropriate parts of the other. The result may not represent exactly what Hegel actually thought at any one time, but I believe that it will be more intelligible as well as more compendious and that no serious distortion will result.²

process, or the process of cognition to self-cognition' (*NKA*, vii. 180, 11–23). In the 'holy Triangle of triangles' it is precisely an Absolute Logos that is 'real' as Nature and 'ideal' as Spirit.

¹ Since this was plainly a MS that he was preparing for publication, the reason for abandoning it (in view of the fact that he went on to produce another) can only have been that he had become dissatisfied somehow with the principles and method upon which it was based.

² This view appears to be challenged by P. E. Cain (*Widerspruch und Subjektivität*, Bonn, Bouvier, 1978). For he claims that there is a notable advance in the conceptual theory of the individual as subject between the Philosophy of Spirit of 1803/4 and the Logic and Metaphysics of 1804/5. (See his Ch. III, and esp. pp. 229–30.) In my view the advance is programmatically completed already in the drafts of 1803, and does not appear to be spelt out in all its aspects only because the first Philosophy of Spirit is so fragmentary. I believe that Cain himself would not seriously dissent from this view, though he might well prefer to see it stated in a more tentative way. But if my view is adopted as a working hypothesis, there is the significant

The 'aether' continues to be the foundation stone of Hegel's philosophy of nature; and it is apparently unaffected by the move from the natural to the transcendental starting-point for philosophy. I say 'apparently unaffected' because I believe that the appearance is belying—but our information about Hegel's doctrine of the aether before the end of 1803 is so sketchy that we cannot be sure.¹ It seems quite likely, however, that the characterization of aether as 'absolute matter' in 1804 (taken in conjunction with the insistence that the aether is not itself God) represents a radical shift. For aether is the point of union between extension and thought, between the physical and the intellectual, between objective reality and subjective cognition. The concept of absolute matter is the outward reflection of the 'passive' power of the intellect to become anything knowable. Taking these two sides together—and Hegel always continued to speak of the 'intellectual aether', though the physical aether disappears from view in the works of his maturity—we could say (and I am assuming that until the end of 1803, at least, Hegel *did* say) that the aether is the 'divine life', the immediate existence of God. From 1804 onwards the immediate existence of God is rather the immediate existence of man, or of human cognition as the communal ground and medium of finite

advantage that we shall have a virtually complete 'system' before us (whether it existed in Hegel's mind already in 1803 or only at the end of 1804 is not vitally important). From the latter date we have the Logic and Metaphysics almost intact; from the earlier one we have a (rather fragmentary) Philosophy of Spirit. Such evidence as there is about Absolute Spirit, is mainly early and has therefore been presented already. The only adequate statement of Logic and Metaphysics is that of 1804/5; so it is presented last. But anyone who wants to can easily complete the process of conflation, and put the *disiecta membra* together into a composite picture of Hegel's system as it was between the Summer of 1803 and the Spring of 1805. (To achieve this end it is advisable to read most of Book II twice. First, straight through, then Ch. V, sect. 5 followed by Chs. VIII, VI, and VII and Ch. V, sect. 4.)

¹ Both the evident continuity between the 1804 doctrine and that of the *Natural Law* essay, and incidental remarks in the fragments of 1803/4 guarantee that the aether kept its position as the starting-point in 1803. (It is still the starting-point, indeed, in 1806.) But the contrast between Schelling's emphasis on the living God in Nature (see for instance *Bruno, Werke*, iv. 329) and Hegel's proclamation that the aether is *not* 'the living God' but only 'the Idea of God' is stark. The inference that it is a novelty connected with the new *transcendental idealist* approach to the 'Idea of absolute cognition' seems inescapable. (See further J.-L. Vieillard-Baron, 'Matière et matérialisme vrai selon Hegel et Schelling', *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 20, 1980, 197–206.)

consciousness. Once Hegel has said that the aether is not God, the physical role of the aether as the universal presence of the divine power becomes philosophically unimportant. If the aether is the immediate presence of the Spirit, then it can have no proper role in the philosophical conception of nature as spirit that is not yet present to itself. So, in the end, saying that the physical aether was 'not God' was not radical enough. The system of 1805/6 proved to be the sunset of the Greek concept of nature as the divine life.

It is not surprising, however, that Hegel was slow to accept the view that in the conception of nature as the death of God, the divine life must remain just beyond the horizon. For he was now wrestling with the concept of finite consciousness itself as the metaphysical *process* of the divine life. Instead of being a journey to the terminus of human cognition (in religious experience) philosophy is now the recognition of divinity *in* human cognition. Hence, when Hegel first identified the aether of cognition with man's *need* of God, the implicit identity of the physical aether as God's presence must have seemed vitally important. This explains why the kind of philosophical interpretation of theological dogmas which had earlier formed the *culmination* of speculation in the Triangle manuscript is now found in the *introduction* to the philosophy of nature. It forms the metaphysical context for our philosophical interpretation of natural science. The creation of nature is God's moment of self-loss, his *kenosis*. But the metaphysical process of the divine life for which this is the beginning, is the 'goodness' of God, his *essence*, the necessary being spoken of in the Ontological Argument.¹ The 'formal' life which is the subjective aspect of the starting-point, we can recognize at once (from the *System of Ethical Life*) as the self-intuitive capacity of the living human organism.² But as natural life it is not yet necessarily a potential for rational comprehension or intelligence. It is distributed over the whole

¹ For the 'goodness' of God see *NKA*, vii. 181, 22-3; it seems to me that the 'absolute essence' of the Metaphysics is plainly the 'necessary being' of the Ontological Argument. Hegel does not call it *God* precisely because, in its first moment, as 'absolute matter', it is *not* God. (For this reason, too, he emphasizes the metaphysical *freedom* of the transition from Logic to Nature in his mature theory.)

² *Schriften* (1913), p. 445; Harris and Knox, pp. 124-5.

chain of living species. The 'goodness of God', in other words, seems to be identical with the instinct not of self-preservation, but of species-maintenance. Natural life, as self-intuitive, is the potentiality of spirit only; it is buried or entombed (*verborgen*). Only in the intelligent consciousness of the rational animal is this dispersal of life resumed into a comprehensive unity.¹

This formal life of the singular organism, coming to its totality in the reproductive cycle of the 'kind' (*Gattung*), is the goal of nature, and the climax of natural philosophy. The beginning, as we saw, is the eternally and universally present, but always invisible, self-movement of the aether. The aether is a world-soul in the Greek sense, i.e. it is a life-principle. Hegel calls it the 'blessed Spirit', but he insists nevertheless that it is not the 'living God' because it is only one side of the absolute Spirit, the side of identity. It is absolute spirit but it does not know itself as such. Since the essence of spirit is its self-cognitive *process*, to say that aether is absolute spirit involves the paradox that has already been made explicit by calling it, in the first place, 'absolute matter'. The life of God is the whole circular process by which this seeming contradiction is mediated. The aether as absolute matter is (like Aristotle's prime matter) *infinitely elastic*, it can take any resting form; but as spirit it is absolute unrest, it must take every form. As matter it must appear; as absolute matter it must remain invisible; likewise as spirit, it both must and cannot express itself. So whichever way we take it, it is an immediate identity of day and night.²

In the *Natural Law* essay Hegel said that nature is 'absolute self-intuition' while spirit is 'absolute intuition of itself as

¹ NKA, vii. 185, 31–186, 16.

² NKA, vii. 189, 13–190, 2. When Hegel says that it is not a 'twilight middle' between them ('kein solches Mittelding . . . als das Trübe ist') we should notice the near-echo of the attack on Boehme quoted by Rosenkranz (p. 182; Harris and Knox, p. 257). We cannot take this coincidence as a *certain* indication that the introductory lecture he quotes was delivered in Oct. 1804. But either then or Summer 1805 is strongly indicated by the fact that Rosenkranz tells us he is quoting from 'one of these introductions to a lecture course on the whole system'. Hegel did not lecture on the whole system in Winter 1805 or Summer 1806; he did not lecture at all in Summer 1804; and Oct. 1803 seems rather early for the all-out attack on Schelling's philosophy of nature that was combined with this criticism of Boehme.

itself'.¹ Now, after saying that aether is not the living God because it does not know itself as absolute Spirit, he asserts nevertheless that it knows itself. In both contexts, he must be thinking of the aether as the identical ground, subjective and objective, of finite cognition, i.e. his doctrine of the aether is a version of what is often called 'neutral monism'. His monism is a very stringent one, for it is the essence of the one aether to come to know itself as itself. The theological dogma of the Logos is transparently alluded to when he says that the 'speaking of the aether with itself is its reality' and a Trinitarian preoccupation is evident when he adds that 'what it utters is itself, what speaks is itself, and that to which it speaks is again itself.' The otherness of nature is the otherness of his own uttered word as perceived by an intelligent speaker who is not deaf.

But once we have said that the aether is not God, we must recognize that we have only a picture or a reflected image of this divine speech in nature. The aether contracts itself into a point, and posits itself as light in the darkness, a star. This could be conceived (as it was by Berkeley) as a speaking of the Creator to us, his created audience. But even in the Triangle manuscript Hegel did not take it this way. Nature is not rightly understood as utterance until speaker and audience coincide and we comprehend it as our own utterance. The sense of awe, of sublimity, which Kant felt at the spectacle of the starry heavens, arose from his own comprehension as an 'intellectual point' of the way in which he was himself comprehended as a physical point. Without the real contraction of his consciousness, there could be no wonder (either subjective or objective). The 'word' of the physical aether is 'unarticulated, formal speech'; it has no meaning, it is only an externalized image of what intellectual expression and comprehension is. The fixed stars are not even a moving picture. They do not shine for others, but only for themselves. Their indefinite multiplication in the depths of celestial space is an image of bad infinity; the starry heavens exemplify the range of possible geometric shapes, and the endlessness of the number system. But nothing interacts. Until we attend to Sun, Moon, and planets we can find nothing in the heavens

¹ *NKA*, iv. 464, 24-7 (Knox and Acton, p. 111)—cf. Ch. II, pp. 76-7, above.

but a reflection of the finite mind in its most purely theoretical activity.¹

2. *Matter conceived as motion*

The Solar System is an orderly self-moving *whole*; this is apparent as soon as we recognize that there is a perfect periodicity in all the motions that it contains. Thus it offers us an image of the 'true infinite'. It is the *real* concept of motion. Periodic motion is what Hegel characterizes as the temporalizing of space and the spatializing of time.² Time is the moment of 'infinity' (i.e. of endless succession, transience, othering) and space the moment of self-identity (since any point can be regarded as fixed once and for all). As we shall see when we come to the philosophy of spirit, the union of these two moments is an outward image of consciousness. Thus the fact that periodic motion provides a comprehensible 'totality' of these moments (i.e. concretely, it makes time determinable and measurable) is of the utmost analogical significance to Hegel's theory of intelligence (the 'absolute concept') as 'motion'.

The passage of time is the transient permanence of the present moment. This exemplifies the dialectic of quality (reality and negation or being and nothing)³ at the beginning of the logic. For the present moment is the reality of the first 'totality'; it is 'simple connection' in the form of 'limit'. What it

¹ *NKA*, vii. 190, 3–192, 15. There is a considerable difference between this view of the fixed stars and the view of them expressed in *Bruno* (Schelling, *Werke*, iv. 261–2). But we do not have enough evidence to be sure that this is something new in the MS of 1804. Hegel speaks of the self-moving planets resembling 'immortal Gods' in the *Dissertation*, and he is not so poetically inclined even about them now. But we cannot be sure that this is more than a new severity of scientific (or theological) exposition. Vieillard-Baron overestimates whatever change in Hegel's views there may be here. Certainly Hegel does *not* 'renier sa propre Dissertation' (*Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 20, 1980, p. 198). The next section of this chapter will demonstrate the contrary. (The crucial change is probably one of emphasis. The 'speculative' exposition of the aether in terms of light and gravity—which was taken over from Schelling—now yields pride of place to the 'reflective' exposition of it in terms of space and time—terms which are plainly dictated by Kant.)

² 'dass aus Raum Zeit, aus Zeit Raum wird', *NKA*, vii. 193, 16. That periodicity is the 'unity' here referred to emerges from the subsequent discussion.

³ The first pages of the Logic MS are lost so we cannot be certain how Hegel denominated the moments of Quality. Use of the Kantian terminology (Reality, Negation, Limitation) seems most probable but the point is not one of great importance.

relates is the past which ever will be as it was (the bare concept of essence) and the future which never will be till it is (the bare concept of freedom).¹ The future moves 'irresistibly' into the present, and it is only in the fixity of the past that the difference between them can be identified as an ordering or succession. This succession which realizes itself as the order of the past is the bad infinite. The moments are all in themselves, the same (like the units in arithmetic) but their order is as inexorable as the sequence of the cardinal numbers. Thus the past is the externalized reality of time, 'the paralysed unrest of the absolute concept', while the future is its inward reality, its active presence.²

The mutual externality of the distinct moments in the past is the spatiality of time itself. Time thus 'comes out of itself' into space; and when space 'goes into itself' we have the point, which is the outward or positive expression of the self-negating moment of the present in time. The whole process of time can be 'posited as sublated' in its spatial expression. The negativity, or transience, of time here appears as the fact that any finite space has a 'bad infinity' of extension beyond or outside it. We passed over into space by comprehending the moments of time as a single dimension. But it is impossible to posit just one dimension in space. The positing of the one dimension is a demand that implies more than is expressed in that one. The single, infinitely extendable line defines a direction. But that direction is itself only determined by its relation to others. Space is real only in its full three dimensions; we can define a single dimension only through a process of double negation in which surface appears as the limit of a spatial volume and line as the limit of surface. The spatial point is the terminus of this process of negative limitation. Line and surface are the 'middles' between the

¹ These characterizations of 'past' and 'future' are mine, not Hegel's. I cannot see any way to summarize what he says. It is all fairly easy to follow (much easier certainly than the dialectic of the *Logic* itself, which it exemplifies).

² *NKA*, vii. 194, 5-197, 16. The fact that the past has a necessary order distinguishes it from the indefinite (rather than infinite) spatiality of the night sky, where order is only arbitrarily and artificially imposed. (Of course, our cosmological hypothesis of the 'big bang' provides us with a *temporal* frame for the discovery of a natural order in the heavenly chaos.)

point which is the inwardness of space and the volume which is its full realization or explication.¹

The unity of space and time, of point and moment, is the point in motion. Real matter is motion. The aether, as absolute or prime matter 'is essentially motion. Inert matter is a metaphysical fiction, an abstraction given out as a reality.' But phenomenal matter consists of bodies which also move in the invisible force field that we call empty space. The Cartesians and the Newtonians alike assumed that this phenomenal motion was what has to be explained, and that rest (which is phenomenally distinguishable from it) is what naturally pertains to matter. We could say that Hegel assumes rather that motion is the primitive phenomenon, and rest or stability is the state whose coming into being requires explanation. But, although illuminating, this would be slightly misleading. For phenomenal rest and motion, are both involved in the stability of the Solar System as a totality; and 'absolute matter' is not just motion but 'contains rest and motion within itself'.² What this means, I think, is that it can only manifest itself as an energetic equilibrium.

Hegel has the same conception of the free motion of the heavenly bodies here, that he expressed more poetically, and hence less plausibly in the *Dissertation* of 1801. We ought not to approach the Solar System with mechanical notions like attraction and impact as our explanatory principles. Phenomenal motion is rather to be seen as the outward expression of the energetic equilibrium of 'real matter'. As absolute matter everything is self-moving; but at the phenomenal level some things move themselves, and others are moved. Nothing stands still, for even the Sun rotates upon its axis. Stillness is

¹ NKA, vii. 197, 17–202, 8. The volume that can be most simply defined by these two means is the sphere. The radial line defines a circular plane, and the rotation of that plan upon an axial line defines the sphere. The whole process depends upon, and hence logically fixes, precisely one point (the centre). But it also requires the arbitrary determination of another point (the moving end of the radial line). Hegel may still have the sequence, line, square, cube in mind, however, since *Potenz* organization has only just now vanished from his philosophy of nature; and his interest in the laws of motion, especially Kepler's laws of planetary motion, is unabated.

² NKA, vii. 204, 2–23. (Hegel's concept of 'absolute matter' has obvious affinities with the views of Heraclitus; but it is more to the point to notice how close he is to the modern conception of energy.)

found only in the axial line, or if that sways, only in the centre point.

What Hegel wants to do, is to 'construct the ideal body' of the Solar System. His discussion is a bit clearer than in the *Dissertation*, but it follows the same pattern. What moves is the point, and the pattern of its movement constitutes a line. Thus the positing of a line involves a time interval. Time itself conceived in this way as a dimension is endurance (*Dauer*). Phenomenal motion presupposes the motion of time itself in this dimension. This passing of time is both continuous and divisible. Hence local motion has a velocity which is the ratio between a certain continuous quantum of time elapsed, and the space traversed. We know that the law of acceleration in free fall involves a square ratio, and Hegel takes this law as expressing 'the absolute nature of space and time'. This is the law by which a point becomes a spatial line. Hegel quite rightly sees and says that no mathematical 'proof' of the law can be given.¹

The free-falling bodies in space, however, act as if they were attached to the point of origin by a line upon which they swing. In this swinging (through which the line generates a surface) their velocity rises and falls, they accelerate and decelerate. But (by Kepler's second law) the surface is generated at a constant rate. And for this reason the surface generated is elliptic. The acceleration occurs when the radial line is shorter, the deceleration when it is longer; and the proportion is again a square ratio, but this time it arises from geometrical considerations, not from the law of falling bodies.

Thus far motion exists as a planar expression of time in space. But real space has three dimensions, and these moving points are actually solid bodies. The expression of real space in real time requires a cubic ratio, since both of them are properly three-dimensional. (This is supposed to show why Kepler's third law holds—why the cube of the orbital distance equals the square of the orbital period.)

¹ *NKA*, vii. 205, 9–210, 13. (It seems to me that the definitional use of Galileo's law (209, 16–17) only represents the shift in perspective regarding what is taken as a *priori*, when motion rather than rest, or as much as rest, is accepted as a primitive datum in mechanics. For us, however, it is the speed of light, rather than the law of free fall that expresses 'the absolute nature of space and time'.)

Finally the linear axis of the ellipse must be constituted by the regular alternation of acceleration and deceleration. This ellipse is the Idea of real motion, to which Hegel now proceeds. The centre point of the elliptical system of free motion is the 'infinite point' from which the self-expression of the aether radiates. This point is a point of axial rotation, and the whole system of motions that depends on it is as independent of, and as indifferent to, everything else in the Universe as a fixed star. But its structure is not simple like that of a star; and Hegel now considers how the constitutive resting and moving points of his mathematical model are actually constituted.

He said in the *Dissertation* that the true physics would show that the centre of the system of motion was necessarily the light source. This 'necessity' seems to be no more than the simple assumption that the aether must express itself first as light, it is the 'nature of light'.¹ (But that light should be identified with the aether itself—and darkness presumably with its self-alienation—is clearly a spiritual rather than a physical necessity, if it is a necessity at all.)

The fact that the satellite bodies that are both moved and lit by this rotating centre also rotate, illustrates the operation of reciprocal subsumption. Axial rotation is rest subsuming motion. Thus the orbital motion of the planet is motion subsuming rest (the unmoving axis of rotation). The whole system is an infinite totality or a periodic equilibrium.

This perfect equilibrium (which we could not interpret properly if there were not other planets to observe) is further complicated by the comets with their erratic orbits and periods. The comets are a physical expression of the arbitrary moment in freedom. They have no self-maintaining motion of axial rotation (which represents the rational element). They are held in their orbit by the Sun, but their eccentric wilfulness makes them an anticipation of organic life.

The planets on the other hand, are little systems of periodic equilibrium ('reduced infinity') on their own account, because they have moons. The relation of Sun and Earth prefigures

¹ *NKA*, vii. 218, 11 (cf. *Dissertation, Erste Druckschriften*, p. 386). The thesis comes from Schelling. It is a principal theme of *Von der Weltseele* (and of its associated treatise 'Über das Verhältnis des Realen und Idealen in der Natur').

that of the rational individual and the community (for Hegel identifies the Sun proper with the whole sphere of its radiant energy—the Sun as a visible sphere is its ‘resumption into itself out of its otherness’).¹ Recognition of this prefiguring gives the counter-subsumption of the Sun by the Earth great practical significance. This is the topic to which we now advance.

At this point we can begin to consider the fragments of 1803—the first of which deals with the transition to the ‘Earthly System’. The evident continuity of the 1804 doctrine of the Solar System with that of the *Dissertation* of 1801 virtually guarantees that we are not wrong in any important way in assuming that the lecture courses of 1803 followed this same general line of argument. But as soon as we come to the fragments actually remaining from that course we can see that the *critical* concern of the *Dissertation* was also prominent in the lectures, whereas the systematic manuscript of 1804 confines itself—apart from two brief asides on supposed mathematical ‘proofs’ of the law of falling bodies, and on the fictive character of the inertial theory of matter—to a straight exposition of the ‘true physics’. In the first fragment of 1803 (first in the systematic, not the chronological sense) we find Hegel discussing (and rejecting) the hypothesis—which Kant, and before him, Newton, had entertained—that the density of the planets decreases as their distance from the Sun increases.² Otherwise, comparison of the two versions only serves to show how much Hegel’s mode of presentation improves with every draft.

The first section of Hegel’s discussion of the ‘Terrestrial System’ is the ‘Construction of Real Matter or Mechanics’.³

¹ *NKA*, vii. 225, 9–10. Hegel does not draw attention to the prefiguring of the *Volks* here, but the characterization of the Sun in 1804 suggests it, while the corresponding passage in 1803 did not (*NKA*, vi. 4, 2–15). He does, moreover, call celestial time the ‘soulless image of infinity’ (*NKA*, vii. 228, 15–16) which looks like a conscious imitation of Plato (*Timaeus*, 37d) adjusted to fit the conception of nature as a reflection of the transcendental structure of consciousness. The contrast is not with Plato, who works with a very similar dualism, but with the soul–body *identity* of Schelling’s theory.

² *NKA*, vi. 3; cf. Kant’s *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens*, *Akad.* i. 270–1 (Hastie, pp. 83–5), and Newton’s *Principia* (trans. Cajori) ii. 566.

³ Hegel omitted this heading in its proper place (*NKA*, vii. 228) but gives it later in a marginal review (*NKA*, vii. 250, 25). It ought not to be abbreviated to

Here he develops the theory of gravity. In the lecture notes of 1803 he says: 'As *that indifferent* self-equivalent inertia, substantiality was the essential [character] of the heavenly bodies; it has [now] *become* its own opposite, namely *independence as sublation of independence*.' In 1804, as we have seen, he refuses to allow the approach to celestial motion as an inertial system altogether. Gravity is now treated as the negation of motion, as motion toward rest; the motion of the planets is positive, or self-maintaining motion.² This is a return to the polemical stance of the *Dissertation* from what seems a more balanced presentation in the fragments of 1803. But Hegel insists on the mutual relativity of motion and rest (or inertia); and as a resting equilibrium the Solar System is therefore a gravitational system.

Inertia proper, belongs to what is moved only by the gravitational pull of something else. If the planets did not have a motion of their own, simple gravity would pull them straight into the Sun. Not gravity, therefore, but motion is the primitive concept, of the Solar System; and the laws of planetary motion must therefore not be reduced to the single law of gravity, since gravity can only account for the straight-line motion of bodies falling toward one another. In this 'realization' of matter as *mass*, the source of motion is in the body that remains at rest. Thus Hegel can speak of this stage as 'the existing concept of motion which does not have its reality in itself'.³

In his first treatment of mechanics Hegel operated with atoms of an Epicurean kind; and his discussion is evidently an application of the dialectic of discrete quantity (numerical one and many) in his logic.⁴ But this theoretical background

'Mechanics'—as Düsing and Kimmerle decided—because this obscures the conceptual sequence that Hegel wanted to make plain. The Solar System was the 'construction of absolute matter or real motion'. (It is true, that Hegel called this phase 'Mechanics' in 1803, *NKA*, vi. 19, 6—and he returns to that simple heading in 1805, *NKA*, viii. 3, 2. But in 1803 he apparently called his earliest discussion of mechanics 'Construction of the Earth' (*NKA*, vi. 10, fn. 1).

¹ *NKA*, vi. 26, 3–5.

² *Ibid.*, vii. 229, 19–22.

³ *Ibid.*, vii. 232, 29–30.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vi. 13, 17–15, 17 (cf. vii. 7, 15–12, 7). Reference to atoms ceases as soon as Hegel begins to discuss projectiles; and in the next draft—vi. 19 ff.—the atom is mentioned as a paradigm of equal quantity (vi. 25, 8–9) but not used as a model of

disappears in the manuscript of 1804. Falling, being thrown, and pendular swinging on a line are the stages by which the point moved by inertial force, passes from straight-line motion toward self-sustaining motion in a circle. But this array of mechanical possibilities is itself mechanical. All that matters is that in the end gravity reduces all finite motion to a fall toward rest.

With the lever we advance from the concept of mass to those of weight and rigidity. In the process of the lever mass and distance become abstract (interchangeable) *quantities*. The principle of the lever is the balancing of two weights on a supported bar so that the smallest impulse will move the side one desires. It is this establishment of a dynamic equilibrium that Hegel is referring to when he says that 'the lever is as the developed nature of body'.¹ When the weights are unequal, the balanced lever also separates the moments of gravity that are united in the simple existence of mass. For the smaller weight can balance the larger on if it is at a greater distance from the fulcrum. But if a perfect balance is set swaying, the motion does not continue for ever in spite of the equality of forces. It is brought to rest by the frictional resistance of the testing environment. In heavenly motion there is no friction, but a resting balance of perfectly reciprocal motion; on earth any such motion has a distinct cause and it must come to an end; here the only mechanical equilibrium is a state of rest. The rest is not absolute, for any small impulse can upset the balance; the small stone slipping can start an avalanche. But it is the destiny of matter, as rigid, to be inert, to be at rest. My

gravitational fall. (Handwriting taken alone suggests that this 'next' draft was actually the first—see *Hegel-Studien*, iv, 156. In that case, Hegel tried to develop the atomic model as an experiment, but simply eliminated reference to the dialectic of Quantity in the end because the *law* of free fall is the same for all quantities—cf. *NKA*, vii, 232, 29–234, 2). The natural hypothesis, in that case, is that this fragment, *bezieht sich auf*, belongs to the *Delineatio* of Summer 1803, and that the thought-experiment (in *Aus dem himmlischen Systeme*) reflects Hegel's first attempt to apply his transcendental standpoint of 'consciousness'—the *one* that is immediately a *many*—to the theory of mechanics. By 1804 he had decided that this Epicurean approach had only a 'phenomenological' validity—or that the Newtonian position was one that consciousness must pass through and overcome in the discovery of the truth. Thus the dialectic of Quantity remains Epicurean in the logic of 1804, but the realization of this dialectic is in the *physical* 'definition of the Earth' not in 'Mechanics' (the construction of the *concept* of matter).

¹ *NKA*, vii, 243, 1.

example of the avalanche is chosen deliberately because at the stage of the lever, we must think of the world as composed of discrete solids which are heaped or hung in equilibrium. Nothing can happen to such a heap. If an avalanche starts it must come from some transformative power in matter, some continuity between the separately balanced bits which suspends their inertia and opposition, and so upsets the balance (avalanches start, typically, because ice melts).

3. *The fluidity of matter*

The self-transforming continuity of matter, which gives rise to a continual need for mechanical readjustment of the gravitational balance, Hegel calls 'absolute *fluidity*, the truly real earthy matter'.

Once we admit the presence of any such fluidity in the elementary constitution of the Earth, we can see how its periodic approach to, and recession from the source of celestial heat and light must set up a dynamic cycle in its mechanical equilibrium. But since that periodic approach and recession is the result of the Earth's own motion, Hegel calls the fluidity of the Earth-process, the 'Mother of all things'. He ignores the Sky Father, and treats Earth as a virgin-mother who has 'infinity, the principle of generation in herself'.¹ But he can only afford to do this because the terrestrial phase of natural development contains the solar phase sublated within itself.

This fluidity of real matter is to be conceived as the collapsing of the Earth's two celestial motions into one: ('it has

¹ Ibid., vii. 248, 23-6. Hegel does seem to display at times an uncomfortably Aristotelian attitude toward the Heavens—as if no significant change occurs there, so that as far as the Earth's orbital motion is concerned every seasonal cycle is exactly like every other (and hence the ground of all the evident variation is to be looked for in the Earth itself). The appearance is misleading. No such attitude is required by his theory of nature generally. Indeed any such assumption is outlawed by the view that the *Aufhebung* of any stage involves its preservation and persistence. One who was willing to credit, as Hegel was in his maturity, the hypothesis that the vintage is especially good in the year that a comet returns (*Philosophy of Nature*, § 279Z; Petry II, 29-30) would hardly make light of the correlation of sunspots with the terrestrial weather cycle. It must be acknowledged that Hegel's general conception of comets would lead him to look for odd phenomena associated with them, but the case illustrates the holistic character of his method. (In my opinion the natural *reflection* of Hegel's fundamentally Christian 'mythology of Reason' is more important here than any Greek philosophical influence. But Vieillard-Baron is no doubt justified in pointing to the *μήτηρ τιθήνη* of the *Timaeus* (*Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 20, 1980, 200.)

taken the bad reality [i.e. the linear endlessness] of time . . . back into one.¹) The axial and the solar rotation of the Earth is an image of how the balance of tensions is maintained in each distinct bit of matter as its characteristic *Tone*. Hegel's analogy here has obvious Pythagorean roots, and he means us to hear the 'music of the spheres' in it. But the Heracleitean and Stoic root (which is less obvious) is actually more important. The types of matter are to be arrayed on a scale of 'rigidity' so that the audible tone which a solid body emits becomes an index of the 'tension' of its inner equilibrium.² Through this conceptual hypothesis, Hegel makes the principle into an ideal bridge from the conception of mechanical gravity operating on discrete bodies, to that of specific gravity existing differentially within each different type of discrete body. The explication of this array of inward 'tones' is what he calls the 'ideal process' of matter.³

Before we proceed with the account of this 'ideal process',

¹ *NKA*, vii. 248.

² The importance of *rigidity* and the fact that 'shaped body is the oneness of the fluid and the rigid through the tone' is much clearer in the earlier versions (see esp. *NKA*, vi. 21, 11–22, 17). But there is no variation of doctrine on this front. What really does drop out in the later version (along with the atoms) is the concept of *cohesion*. This concept was of central importance in the *Dissertation*. But just as the atoms offer an absolutely simple (mechanical) intuition of discreteness, so cohesion is a simple (mechanical) concept of continuity. 'Fluidity' and 'tone' are the dynamic conceptions that the priority of motion in Hegel's theory requires. (In his unpublished dissertation—see Bibliographical Index—Michael Hoffheimer points out that *Ton* also means 'clay'. He is probably right in thinking that there is a systematic ambiguity in Hegel's application of the term to the physical phenomena of inorganic nature. Hoffheimer's discussion of the MSS of 1803/4 is full of insights. I have not been able to incorporate all that I have learned from it, because it came to my notice too late. The dissertation is still in the process of gestation as my own MS goes to press.)

³ Since Hegel conceived of this inward balance of specific gravity or tone on the model of the Solar System, he sometimes says things that sound like anticipations of modern atomic theory: 'Real matter . . . is the totality of moments or the absolute cyclic motion of opposed cyclic motions' (vii. 250, 15–17). 'This *bondedness* (*Gebundenseyn*) of motion within shape, it [motion] must just as absolutely tear itself away from, and go over against shape as free process in chemistry' (vi. 22, 7–9). How close this conception of a bonded equilibrium of motions was to our 'chemical bond' we cannot rightly say, because it had so little empirical application in Hegel's own scientific world. But Hegel deserves some credit certainly, for his consistent development of a dynamic conception of matter in opposition to the Newtonian inert conception. This is the significance of the fact that for him the Solar System expresses the 'concept' of motion. The 'concept of motion' becomes for Hegel the very 'nature' of matter which Newton thought of as 'occult'. The supposedly 'occult' aspect, is exactly what is revealed in the sky.

however, a few remarks about the evolution of the 'chemical phase' in Hegel's theory are needed. The sections which we have just been discussing—called in 1804 'the construction of shape' and 'the lever'—were part of 'the construction of the earth' in 1803; and what is called (in 1804) 'the absolute construction of matter',¹ originally led up to the theory of terrestrial magnetism, of the tides, and of climate. It is likely that in his 'Outline of Universal Philosophy' Hegel treated the Earth's polar axis as the axis of rigidity (and of magnetism); the equatorial axis, on the other hand, was the axis of fluidity (and the variable declination of the magnetic poles was a variation of 'cohesion' arising from the tension in the Earth between rigidity and fluidity).² This tension he also describes as a strain between the lunar (rigid) and cometary (fluid) nature of the Earth. The rigid, magnetic, structure of the Earth is its 'shape', 'the mechanical moment <in the> displaying of the chemical process of the Earth'.³ The 'fluid' equatorial belt is electrically charged by the Sun, and this is the engine, so to speak, of barometric pressure, and other climatic variations.⁴ In conformity with this 'construction of the Earth' Hegel went on to deal with the specific gravity of finite bodies under a new heading 'chemism'.

All this 'construction of the Earth', and the theory of magnetism and the points of the compass, is directly continuous with the *Dissertation* and the outline of 1801. But in this respect the manuscript of 1804/5 represents a break and a new departure. The 'shape' of the Earth is not dealt with at this mechanical level at all, and we hear nothing of the Earth's

¹ NKA, vii. 249, 14–15.

² Ibid., vi. 31–36, 2. The likelihood that in the *first state* these 2 fragments (5 and 6) belong to the *Delineatio* of Summer 1803 seems quite strong.

³ NKA, vi. 38, 7–8. We can surely recognize here what Hegel refers to in the outline of 1801 as 'the ideal moments of the concept of the organic, namely the mechanical as it is posited on Earth, and the chemical'—*Die Idee des absoluten Wesens*, 2a (in NKA, v. 263). This whole discussion probably represents the final development of Hegel's earlier philosophy of nature.

⁴ This is what I gather from the difficult comment that 'ideal specific gravity' is 'the opposition of light within itself, the self-substantiating specific gravity of electricity' (NKA, vi. 41, 5–8) taken in the total context of the discussion that begins on vi. 32. As I remarked earlier, Hegel can treat the Earth-process as self-generating (vii. 248, 25–6) only because it actively sublates the Solar process. This is quite clear in the earlier discussion—for instance in Hegel's remarks about the Moon's control of the tides (vi. 32, 7–33, 4).

magnetic properties. 'Cohesion' disappears from Hegel's conceptual armoury, and he explicitly dismisses the atoms from his catalogue of real entities.¹

In the new dispensation we continue with the evolution of finite bodies (which have specific gravity, rather than general cohesion) all through mechanism and chemism, and we arrive at the 'definition of the Earth' only in physics. When we get that far, we shall see that the new order reflects Hegel's attempt to develop the philosophy of nature according to the standpoint of 'consciousness'. The 'definition of the earth' is the realization of 'cognition'. In the approach to it through finite observation of 'inorganic' phenomena, the total environment of the Earth is present only as a negative absolute. The lecture notes of 1803 simply show us the materials of Hegel's earlier system thrown into disarray by his new methodical requirements. Only the manuscript of 1804 presents a construction in accordance with those requirements.

We can proceed now with the 'ideal process of matter'. As part of the general gravitational field, all bodies on Earth have *weight* (the quantitative expression of general gravity). But as distinct one from another, different types of material body have each their own specific gravity. Having this definite place on a continuous (or fluid) scale gives to each its *tone*. Hegel objects to the reduction of 'specific gravity' to a merely quantitative measure.² The specific gravity of a piece of matter is an intensive quantity which marks it as what it is (like its melting-point, which is the breaking point of what Hegel calls 'shape').

'Shape' is properly the unity of gravity and tone. Air is perfectly fluid. Water in its ordinary condition has specific gravity but no fixed tone, hence no determinate shape. Natural shaping, the clear expression of a fixed tone, is what crystals have. Every type of solid matter that can be crystal-

¹ 'Real matter is not an absolute many as atoms, but as matter' *NKA*, vii. 251, 26. So far as I am aware Hegel never tolerated any atomic theory in natural philosophy after 1803. 'Cohesion' recovers its place by the end of 1805 (viii. 47-8). Hegel comments then that there has been a lot of loose talk about it, and identifies it as 'specific gravity'.

² 'Specific gravity presented as a ratio between empirical gravity (or absolute gravity which is the same thing) and volume is a nominal definition' (*NKA*, vii. 253, 1-3).

lized out of a liquid medium has its own distinctive *Gestalt*; and, of course, whatever crystallizes can be dissolved again.

This capacity of solid matter to crystallize from a liquid medium is one aspect of the 'ideal process' of shape. At the other extreme very many types of naturally solid, but not crystalline, matter will melt when sufficiently heated. This loss of shape is different from the dissolving of crystals, since when the cooling matter regains its tone it takes the shape of whatever unmelted vessel or mould it may be in. Specific gravity and tone are stages in the logical evolution of the self-shaping capacity that crystals have. The middle stage (tone proper) is important because it shows us the earth-process itself at work. 'The universal on its own account, as what dissolves the singularity of the body is light, insofar as it is heat.'¹ The light of the Sun alone 'dissolves' the shape of a crystal ideally, by making it transparent; but if I am not mistaken, Hegel thinks it is the earth-process that transforms sunlight into heat. In any case he mentions both light and heat and identifies them because he wants to justify his linking of tone and its dissolution with *Gestalt* and its dissolution.

Simple heating and cooling removes and restores tone, but does not change it. This is the 'ideal process' of matter which is so neatly exemplified in the three states of water that we have based one of our temperature scales on it. The 'real process' of matter is a hidden one for which the model is provided by the experimental procedure through which specific gravity and tone are brought to the perfect equilibrium that gives rise to crystalline shape: or, in other words, the neutralization of acid and base to produce a salt. For this two different complementary materials are necessary, and they cannot themselves be solids. Hegel does not expound this process concretely; the process that he is interested in is the interaction of what he calls 'the chemical elements'. There are four of them, and as 'fluidities' they are gases, recognized as types of 'air' in the chemistry of the time: nitrogen, hydrogen, oxygen, and carbon dioxide. These are the elements of the process through which the 'light unfolds itself as the expressed infinity'.² It is plain, I think, that Hegel is now concerned

¹ NKA, vii. 254, 13-14.

² Ibid., 256, 8-9.

with the 'chemism' of the Earth itself, or with the way that sunlight is transformed into heat. But just as the Earth operated at the mechanical stage, only as the negative power of universal gravity, so it operates here only as the invisible environment of the atmosphere.

Hegel's identification of the chemical elements is determined partly by what he knew about combustion, and partly by what he knew about the composition of atmospheric air and water. He himself distinguishes what he calls chemical elements from the 'tables of elements' found in chemistry textbooks. He thinks of the gases as elementary moments of a real process, but not proper 'things', in the sense that although they are simple, and can be isolated, they do not maintain a separate identity in their combinations.¹ Carbon itself is a form of the *real* physical element, of earth. Hegel accepted the identification of phlogiston as hydrogen from Cavendish. It seems certain also that he knew the later work of Cavendish on the chemical composition of water.²

¹ The meaning of 'element' here is most explicit at *NKA*, vi. 44, 11–45, 9. At vi. 49, 8–10, Hegel remarks that each of them is strictly determinate and is something material, 'but still nothing earthly; to which carbon, the earthly element among them, makes the transition'. But carbon itself, as an earthly matter, is not a 'chemical element'. The 'elements' listed in chemical textbooks 'belong in another *Potenz* with the unanalysed [*unzerlegten*] earths sulphur, phosphorus, acids, metals; they are simple in quite another sense, unanalysable; simple as moments of the earthy, or of carbon' (*NKA*, vi. 49, 17–50, 4. What appears in this list as 'acids' is a cross-sign replacing a capital S with the n-ending below the line. I do not think we can be certain how this was to be read, or even that it was to be read at all. Apart from this one oddity, Hegel's list appears to derive from Trommsdorf—see the editorial note at vi. 362).

² For the influence of Cavendish on Hegel's conception of phlogiston see *NKA*, vi. 153, 2–3 and the note thereto (vi. 373–4). From Hegel's frequent (though anonymous) reference to Priestley's *Researches and Observations*—available in German translation—we know that he must have been familiar with the earlier experiments with explosive mixtures that led to Cavendish's discovery of the composition of water. That Hegel would keep watch as well as he could on the *Transactions of the Royal Society*, and that he would study with interest a paper by Cavendish entitled 'Experiments on Air' (1784) appear highly plausible assumptions; but I do not know what sort of access to the *Transactions* Hegel had, if any. In any case the work of Cavendish received a lot of notice. It is highly significant that Cavendish himself regarded water as an *element*, so that his view of what he had done by 'producing' it was very different from ours (our view was first advanced by Lavoisier in 1783, and Cavendish discussed it in an addition to his printed paper). The interpretation given by Cavendish himself involved a retreat from his earlier direct identification of phlogiston with hydrogen. He now assumed that oxygen was the dephlogisticated form of water, and hydrogen the superphlogisticated form. Thus if we use W for the

Nitrogen (which Cavendish and Priestley called 'phlogisticated air') is defined by Hegel as the 'inert and passive' form of fluidity. The differentiated moments of the infinite process of this inert identity are hydrogen (Cavendish's 'inflammable air') and oxygen ('dephlogisticated air'). The self-resuming identity of fluidity, which contains this cyclic opposition within itself is carbon dioxide (which Hegel and a host of chemists called 'fixed air').¹ The pure *Begriff* of this fluidity (i.e. the motor of the cyclic process) is heat, 'the immaterial matter of the determinacies', an active power which can only exist, like these phases themselves, in a fluid medium. The medium cannot exist unqualified; there is no 'primary gas', so to speak. Nor can the quality exist unmediated; there is no nitric 'stuff'. But there is nitrogen-gas (as a phase of the air-process) at a certain temperature. The fluidity of the chemical elements is latent heat not air itself. For air is a physical element, and as such 'has no place in this sphere'.²

If I understand Hegel's doctrine rightly, this means that nitrogen, hydrogen, oxygen, and carbon dioxide are distinct, analytically simple forms of physical air; but that it is a mistake to think of them as mixing physically. Their appearance and disappearance is rather the manifestation of the 'chemical process' *in* the air—a process which is not independently maintained by the air, but depends on the physical process of the real elements in the total life of the Earth. Thus we can no more expect to reproduce the whole cycle of atmospheric chemism with finite portions of air, heat, reagents, etc., in a laboratory, than we can hope to produce a real

'element' Water and φ for phlogiston, we can express his equation for what happened thus: $(W - \varphi) + (W + \varphi) = 2W$. The assumed relation between the 'forms of air' and the *physical* element Water seems to me to be very close to Hegel's own view of the chemical and the physical elements: Indeed, Hegel's peculiar remark about phlogiston and hydrogen is easier to interpret in terms of Cavendish's mature view than in terms of a supposed identity of H and φ . Hence I think that my view can be regarded as demonstrable from the MSS. (My understanding of Cavendish's view derives from Partington, iii. 334-7; from the same source I note that 'a long summary' was published in German by Crell in his *Chemische Annalen*, 1785, Vol. i.).

¹ See esp. *NKA*, vi. 53, 9-55, 14 (where Hegel is the victim of one of Priestley's more than usually erroneous findings). Hegel also employs the terminology of 'phlogisticated' and 'dephlogisticated' air here.

² Except for the air-terminology—which is not employed in the textbook for the reason here given—this paragraph summarizes *NKA*, vii. 256, 12-259, 9.

perpetual motion machine. For whereas the death-dealing power of gravity is manifest in finite mechanics, the life-giving force of the Earth-process is only known by its absence, in finite chemistry. When we fully grasp the cyclic character of the infinite chemical process we have arrived at physics proper.¹

In the earlier lecture manuscripts the whole dialectic of the elements, physical as well as chemical, is treated under the heading 'chemism'. The reason for this emerges when Hegel reviews his argument upon reaching the level of what he calls 'physics' in 1803. The protagonist of the conceptual movement in the earlier course is the Earth itself. 'Shape, the result of mechanics is the simple formation of the Earth within itself . . . in *chemism* this simple [positing of tone and fluidity within one another] goes into otherness [with its moments] *outside* one another.'² Thus the chemism of the Earth-process embraces the whole of what Hegel would have called then, 'the movement of its concept'. Mechanics is the realization of the *shape* of the Earth as an 'intuition' (Poles, Equator, compass points, climatic zones, all the things with which a scientific *geography* text must begin). Then this intuition disappears from view, and the cycle of the meteorological process takes over. This is the chemical process of the Earth but the Earth is only the stage upon which the 'movement of the concept' occurs. We arrive at terrestrial *physics* only when that mere stage is recognized again as the living body of continents and oceans, mountains and deserts, etc. to which that process belongs as its life. For now concept and intuition are reunited in the 'Idea' of the Earth.³

¹ The reader can decide whether he agrees with me by examining Hegel's own summing-up, *NKA*, vii. 259, 10-260, 10. But Hegel justifies my final assertion best in his summary of results as a springboard for the next stage (vii. 262, 10-263, 12). In physics itself we shall learn that sunlight is the engine of the air-water process, i.e. of the rain-cycle. This is the *physical* context of chemical reaction in the atmosphere, vii. 275, 17-30.

² *NKA*, vi. 110, 6.

³ This is not the first time that I have remarked on the persistence of the 1801/2 pattern in the natural philosophy lectures of 1803. The reader may wonder therefore why I did not simply separate the lectures from the textbook of 1804, and call upon them for evidence to fill out the scraps and glimpses of Hegel's natural philosophy which are all that we can get before this time. There are three reasons for not doing this. First, the new standpoint of 'consciousness' was clearly proclaimed in Summer

It is easy to see the rationale of this conceptual pattern. But it is also easy to see how full of ambiguity all of the language used must become. The Earth does not have an intuitive *Gestalt* like that of a crystal; there is a gulf between the 'infinite' use of the term and all the 'finite' ones; and when we come to the 'movement of its concept' we find that on the other side of the gulf, our chemical and our physical concepts alike are just phases in its chemistry.

Hegel's new method seeks to establish a continuum in the place of this gulf. Our concepts, the concepts that we need for our finite situation, must evolve in accordance with the deeper need for the comprehension of the infinite totality (which is equally a need of ours). Thus we do not begin with 'the world' like the student opening his geography book. We must discover (from our mechanical problems with perpetual motion) why we need chemistry, and from there why we need physics; and the map of our progress must be drawn in terms of the frontiers that we need for our scientific use. It is still true that the frontiers on our map can only be drawn by one whose consciousness contains the whole globe of Earth, and the whole cycle of the sciences that deal with it. There were no noteworthy working chemists at this time who would have drawn the boundary between chemistry and physics as sciences, where Hegel drew it in 1804. Except for mechanics, none of the boundaries he proposed was of much use then. (I am not sure that they are equally useless now.) But in 1804 he was trying to map the distinct levels of our scientific *consciousness* of nature, not (as previously) the levels or phases of a

1803 and all of Hegel's subsequent system construction (however faulty) must be assessed in the light of that until he abandons it. Secondly, the new standpoint does create *disarray* in the old order of things even before that order is overthrown; so inferences from the 1803/4 lectures about the natural philosophy that went with the *System of Ethical Life* would be intrinsically unreliable. Thirdly, one of the reasons why Hegel has trouble in developing the new standpoint is that he is visibly dealing with great masses of data which (however long he may have been studying some of it) he has not previously tried to organize systematically. I think that those who (like Kimmerle, in discussing the Triangle fragment) argue as if Hegel did not have a developed philosophy of nature before the Summer of 1803 are quite certainly (and even demonstrably) wrong. But it would be confusing and misleading to ignore the enormous *effort* which Hegel only began to make in that summer to develop and apply his theory in detail. The fact that this effort coincided with a major shift of standpoint largely explains why he was bound, at first, to fall between two stools.

process that was independent of consciousness. The evolution of Hegel's natural philosophy resembles that of Greek Drama. It has now reached its Aeschylean phase. At first there was only one actor, the Earth, which spoke and acted its story for the chorus of philosophers. Now the protagonist is man the scientist (who used to be the Chorus leader) and the Earth is his antagonist (with whom he will finally be united in the way that Prometheus is united with the Earth in Shelley rather than as he is reconciled with Zeus in Aeschylus).

The intolerable artificiality of the boundary lines that he had to draw for this cosmic dialogue may have been one of the factors that led Hegel to abandon it unfinished. The distinction between chemical and physical elements was obviously a vital one in his view, for he always maintained it; but the 'infinite' standpoint of his earlier theory at least allowed him to deal with the whole range of inquiries engaged in by those who were for good practical reasons all called chemists; and he could even point out the 'chemical' character (in his own narrow sense of the word) of such processes as organic putrefaction after death¹—a matter which in the evolution of 'consciousness' must necessarily wait until we have attained to cognition of the organism itself.

4. *Terrestrial 'physics'*

In 1804 physics is still the science in which we eventually comprehend the nature of our world as an individual whole. But our approach begins with the process of the real elements, a process which cycles deep underground and far above our heads, but has its focal centre on the surface where we are. This is the process of the Earth's own life. There was no individuated 'world' in which the solar process or the mechanical and chemical processes happened. The solar process of

¹ *NKA*, vi. 59, 8–10. The following critique of chemical analogies in the theory of the living organism, is perhaps the first sign of Hegel's violent reaction against what was happening to the philosophy of nature in 'Schelling's School'. The elimination of the magnetic theory of the Earth's 'shape' in the textbook of 1804 is a more radical manifestation of this reaction, which critically touches Schelling himself—see the editorial notes on 60, 13 to 62, 5 in *NKA*, vi. 365–7. But since Schelling's own views were continually evolving this need not imply any disagreement between Hegel and Schelling (cf. p. 296, n. 3, below).

motions *constitute* a world, they do not happen within it or belong to it. The mechanical and chemical processes do not belong to any individuated world constituted by that process either. Infinite mechanics is the solar process itself and ought not to be thought of mechanically at all. 'Finite mechanics' is the constitution process of finite individuals (and the comprehension of the inevitable triumph of inertia). 'Chemism' is the process (from light to heat) that takes place *between* the free motion of the heavens, and the one world-order constituted in that motion that is itself free (not dominated by an inertial equilibrium). The Moon has a shape as fixed as a crystal. The Earth, in contrast, has an atmospheric process that sustains its life. Physics is the study of how the chemical interaction between Earth and Sun sustains the life cycle of the Earth itself.

The step from chemistry to physics is an easy one (what is difficult is precisely not to take that step while one is studying chemism). For the chemical process presupposes a real substrate.¹ The real physical elements, fire, air, water, earth, each pass through the whole cycle of chemism, and also represent one moment of that cycle. The real elements maintain themselves by self-transformation into the others, and eventually return to their own form through that transformation. This cyclic process gives each of them a definite shape (unlike the chemical elements, which remain invisible gases throughout their 'conceptual' exemplification of the process).

The unity of light and heat (from which we must start) is *fire*. Fire first exists on Earth, not in the Sun. Hegel takes fire as an element, but since all of his 'elements' are *processes* this turns out to be less ridiculous than it sounds in the context of present day usage. It is light 'as the tone [i.e. tension] of shape' and as heat it is 'formal resolution', i.e. chemical agency. In its essential transience we have the first visible model of what the chemical elements are—conceptual abstractions. Fire itself involves hydrogen and oxygen and produces carbon dioxide. (The seemingly gratuitous assumption that nitrogen is the neutral state of air that passes over into the process, reflects the theory of the great English

¹ NKA, vii. 261, 6-19; cf. vi. 63, 2-64, 7.

investigators who called nitrogen 'phlogisticated air'.) In fact, it is their place in the fire-process that determines the order of the phases in chemism. Fire is the 'concept' of the physical elements (and as such stands first among them).¹ The very fact that fire is a process is what leads Hegel to make of it the foundation stone of his dynamic conception of what *we* call chemistry.

Hydrogen ('inflammable air') is the moment of kindling. But the explosion of hydrogen is momentary; combustion requires oxygen for its maintenance. Phlogiston is the 'latent being' of hydrogen, (a mode of speech which seems to express the *mature* view of Cavendish very well).² Only in the transient existence of the flame does it have a demonstrable existence.

Oxygen, on the other hand, is 'the moment of infinity of fire . . . the immediate relation of fire to otherness'. If I understand it rightly, this means that oxygen is the active, moving force in the process of combustion ('infinity' being the motion of the concept). In that case Hegel is one step ahead of Cavendish who still called oxidation 'phlogistication'.³ Fire, as the moving concept itself, is 'turned against' both shape and gravity. (It is a free-moving shape that reduces fixed shapes to the indefiniteness of ashes; and the flame of fire itself always rises.)

Fire will not burn either in nitrogen or in carbon dioxide. These are the opposite extremes of the process. Hegel clearly recognizes that 'carbonic acid' is a chemical compound ('synthetic unity') involving carbon and 'the unity of oxygen and hydrogen'—but this last is not called a 'synthetic unity' so I do not think he is proposing a chemical formula.⁴ The

¹ *NKA*, vii. 263, 13–23. (cf. vi. 63, 14–17; notice that the reference to electricity here, disappears in the later version. This is another sign of Hegel's *break* with the Schellingian framework.)

² *NKA*, vii. 264, 24; cf. 265, 26–8. (The language of vi. 64, 12–13, reflects rather the way in which Priestley—and Watt—spoke of *any* inflammable gas as 'phlogiston'. But the conception of 'chemical process' as the neutralization of acid and base in a salt is there very clear.)

³ *NKA*, vii. 264, 30–2 (cf. vi. 67, 1–4). I only mean, of course, that Hegel is a step ahead of where Cavendish was in 1784. (Henry Cavendish—b. 1731—was nearly 40 years older than Hegel, and some years before Hegel's lectures A. F. Fourcroy had already listed him as one who had 'absolutely renounced the phlogiston hypothesis'—Partington, iii. 337).

⁴ *NKA*, vii. 266, 7–11.

process of burning itself is an escape from gravity, whereas both the initial components of the process and the products are gravitational matters. This moment of freedom in the process is *phlogiston* 'which is afterwards hydrogen'.¹

At the end of the fire-process, the active (acidic) product we are left with is CO₂ or 'fixed air'. Thus *air* is the next term in the ideal cycle of the elements. Air in its simple (unfixed) state is the element in which the chemical elements are 'simply inside one another'.² Since it is not immediately perceptible Hegel does not regard it as an 'intuition'; it is rather the 'paralysed concept' (all chemical reaction being at a standstill).

Water, on the other hand, is the opposite reaction of hydrogen and oxygen, or 'fire's being unequal to itself'. Hegel puts himself firmly on the side of Cavendish against Lavoisier, by insisting that we should not think of water as 'composed' of hydrogen and oxygen. These are just the forms of the chemical elements which appear in it.³

Hegel was, from the first, more interested in the chemical relation between air and water than he was in that between water and fire. This was because the weather-process involves, in his view, a chemical transformation of water into air, and the converse. Fire exhibits the whole chemical process. It is kindled and extinguished. Water only disappears into the invisible atmosphere, and air only appears (on the way back to water, as clouds, mist, etc.).⁴ Yet both of them, as elements, are processes of appearing *and* disappearing. There is a hidden process involving the disappearance of hydrogen in nitrogen (water to air) and of nitrogen in water itself (carbon

¹ Ibid., 266, 16–22 (cf. 267, 7).

² NKA, vii. 269, 2. In the lectures of 1803 Hegel moves from fire to water, through the simple notion of extinction (vi. 68, 8). This reflects the more primitive state of his theory of the chemical elements in 1803. In 1803 he speaks often of *carbon* as one of chemical elements—rather than of 'carbonic-acid (gas)' or 'air-acid'.

³ For a clear declaration that water is not composed of hydrogen and oxygen see NKA, vi. 69, 1–70, 8. One can see there too how Hegel struggled toward the positive doctrine that is clearly formulated at vii. 269, 6–21. (He maintained his view that it is wrong to think either of water or air as composites in maturity—see the *Philosophy of Nature*, sect. 328Z, Petry, ii. 187.)

⁴ NKA, vii. 270, 14–22. (The first sign of Hegel's interest in the *tension* between air and water is in the Triangle fragment—see *Hegel-Studien*, x. 1975, 135, trans. p. 188, above.)

dioxide being chemically submerged, as it were, in both air and water).

Because air and water are thus complementary, fire (as the whole process) is drawn out into a 'tension' between them. But why their 'true middle' or 'mingled unity' is earth as an element, I cannot quite fathom. I think the truth is that Hegel is only now taking advantage of his step from the chemical to the physical level. It is because 'the Earth' is the substrate of the physical process that earth is the true middle of the elements.¹ But even if this is right, every new sentence generates a fresh problem. 'Earth is the transparent nothing that lets [the other elements] shine through . . . as the nothing of the elements it is equally their being'.² All this seems to mean that the process of the physical elements is the Earth's *life*-process (its self-sustaining energetic cycle, we might say, to eliminate all the inappropriate undertones of birth, maturation, degeneration, and death). Earth as an element has the passive role of providing a stage, an inertial background, for the cycle. But 'the Earth' is not just a background; it is the process.³ The physical process of fire, air, water, and earth, can now be recognized as the real expression of this energetic cycle. Mechanism and chemism are the ideal moments, the moments by which the Earth's outward shape, and the resolution of that shape into climatic fluidity, are determined. In other words these are the aspects of its being and the conditions of its energetic process that are determined from outside by its place in the Solar System.⁴

In this *real* context, it is no longer the element of fire, but the Earth itself, that plays the main role. Fire exhibits the whole process but earth sustains it. Earth as an element is no more self-subsistent than the others. 'The Earth' is a concept

¹ *NKA*, vii. 271, 18-272, 3.

² *Ibid.*, 272, 15-18.

³ *Ibid.*, 272, 31-273, 4.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 273, 5-27. (This is where the discussion of magnetism, tides, etc. would now fit in; but in relation to the linear development that Hegel wants to achieve, these things have become side issues. Once the 'resolution of shape' is defined as 'the tension of earth against air and water, its coming to be air' (vii. 275, 5-6) it is evident that some slight interaction, at least, must be occurring even at the Poles. (However inert they may seem, the elements, as substantial, are *real* processes.)

realized in intellectual intuition. As an Idea, the Idea of the elemental process, the Earth is 'absolute cognition'.¹

It makes sense to say this if we think of natural philosophy as a transcendental theory of science. Hegel has moved from the 'intuition' of absolute motion in the heavens to the energetic-cycle of the physical elements as the necessary frame of all our physical and chemical knowledge. In so doing he has shown that the Idea of 'the World' has a constitutive role in our cognitive organization of experience. It is not a dialectical 'Idea of Reason', as Kant maintained, but an 'absolute cognition', a concept that has an *a priori* intuition as its content. Hegel speaks of the Earth itself as 'cognition' in this peculiar way, because we have now reached a turning point. The absolute motion has now become an absolute, self-sustaining (or 'living') substance. The biological organism will be the individuation of this life-principle. The rational consciousness will then finally be the *self*-cognition of this same universal self-maintaining equilibrium which now exists as 'objective cognition'. We now understand what the interpretive frame of all our finite cognition is; when we have *comprehended* what cognizing is, the manner of speech adopted here will cease to appear peculiar.

Hegel now *describes* the physical manifestation of the chemical process of sunlight, heat, and weather which he previously constructed so painfully in theory. He calls the action of light 'solicitation'—a terminology which we shall meet again in the *Phenomenology*, and one which clearly implies that the effect is not a mechanical continuation of the causal action, but a 'response' which expresses the independent nature of the 'force' solicited.² The separation of the elements at the surface of the Earth, he characterizes less usefully, in terms of the elementary motions of the Solar process.³

¹ *NKA*, vii. 274, 13–27.

² *Ibid.*, 276, 15. (Cf. *Phenomenology*, *NKA*, ix. 85–7; Miller, §§ 138–40.)

³ When Hegel attacks the use of chemical analogies in the explanation of organic processes (e.g. *NKA*, vi. 59, 13–62, 16) we can understand and sympathize with the continuing polemic against Schelling's philosophy of Nature, that begins here for the first time. But this makes it hard for us to grasp how he can cheerfully employ analogies of his own that seem even wilder—e.g. that water goes 'cometary' and earth 'lunar' when the air takes up moisture (*NKA*, vii. 276, 28–277, 2). The explanation is,

This finite expression of infinite gravity, the distribution of continents and seas, desert and icecap, is the Earth's mechanical totality or 'shape'; and the outer envelope of all of it is *air*, which is shapeless or 'cometary'. By this envelope the free process of the Earth is protected; not even the worst desert is the 'waterless moon' which simple gravity would make of it. The shape of the Earth is merely the gravitational setting of the stage for its self-shaping process. The fluid elements (air and water) are the vehicle of this process. The infinitely dynamic element of fire is localized within the Earth and makes only momentary appearances at the volcanic and atmospheric extremes of the meteorological process itself.

What that process does, is make the earth itself into fertile soil. As far as I can make out, Hegel calls the Earth-process 'cognition', because the Earth produces life on its surface, and so makes its infinite self-shaping visible, makes it a matter of experience for the rational life so produced. He distinguishes between the way the process exists 'for us', and the way that it exists 'for the Earth itself'. This distinction looks forward to the great division between what are obviously two modes of cognition in the *Phenomenology*. 'For us' the whole process is *what the Earth is*; it is what must be expressed in the *definition* of the Earth, the scientific cognition to which Hegel now proceeds. 'For the Earth', however, what falls apart into the process of the other elements with the sunlight is earth itself (as an element). The two senses of the word 'earth' thus offer a model of the cognitive process of the *Phenomenology*. The Earth is an unconscious cognitive process. To put it another way, our conscious cognitive process depends on the identification of a set of intellectual terms or elements, which would be impossible for us if we did not have the light-process of the physical elements before us—and we do not have that process 'before us', in the relevant sense, until we have developed the 'concept of Earth' with the element of earth as its starting-point and terminus. Our ability to conceptualize our own conceptual activity adequately, depends upon our prior comprehension of 'the Earth'.¹

I think, that Hegel draws analogies between *parallel moments* (from one 'totality' to another, more especially). Chemism is not a totality, while organic processes are.

¹ Hegel would prefer (in this *transcendental* phase) to insist that our concept of the

The meteorological process is discussed and illustrated in much greater detail in the lecture manuscripts of 1803. From the detail we can often get a clue for the right interpretation of the condensed systematic exposition of the textbook, but there is no need to discuss it in what must, perforce, be an even more condensed exposition here.¹ But what is gone through earlier in the 1803 discussion, appears in 1804 as part of the 'definition of the Earth' to which Hegel now proceeds.² He speaks of this definition as having arisen immediately from 'the motion of its self-cognition'. So we might be tempted to think that he believed in a sort of Earth-mind, if he had not at

Earth-process is a necessary *projection* of our concept of cognitive consciousness. When he underlines the fact that light becomes the internal, fiery principle of the Earth-process (vii. 218, 23–5) we can see the analogy with Kant's 'Copernican Revolution'. But his general view puts the whole tradition of the intellect as 'intellectual light' into a most interesting (and illuminating) perspective, whether we think of it naturally or transcendently; it also helps us to see why the development of 'thinking machines' is bound to go hand in hand with new concepts of intelligence. It is only Hegel's transcendental version of the 'intellectual light' that can enable us to see the continuity here; and if we insist on expressing the new concepts naturalistically as 'models of the brain' we are still likely to overlook it.

¹ See esp. *NKA*, vi. 86–109. The free unity of fire as *flame* is an escape from the finite level (85–6). The theory of colour is worth noticing here as Hegel's first attempt to develop grounds for his adherence to Goethe's theory against Newton. We should note that the natural form of water is sea-water (salt, neutral); fresh water is a phase in the meteorological transformation process (86–7). The blanketing role of the formless air is made explicit. Air is only a tension toward the cometary condition (meteorites and aerolites as well as hail, snow, etc. are part of this tension—they do not come from outside (89–90, 101–2, 103–4, 108–9). Lightning is the fiery turning-point of the process at which water emerges again (103). The stress of the Earth towards lunar fixity is what causes volcanic activity and earthquakes (104–5, 108–9). In the process as a unity, the aether breaks through (106, 1–2); and we may perhaps, infer that this breakthrough is the life-bearing fertility that results (106–7, 109).

The reader should also note how much of the discussion of 'cohesion' in the earliest strata of the MSS is eliminated in revisions. But even in what is presumably one of the latest fragments (*allgemeine Infection*, vi. 109, 3) 'cohesion' is still there as the force that keeps the opposite extremes of the tension (lunar death and cometary independence) in check. The evidences of repeated revision support the view that the final state of the MS evolved through more than one series of lectures—i.e. its earliest stratum is the lecture commentary for the *Delineatio* of Summer 1803. (I assume that the summary of natural philosophy whose existence is implied by the *System of Ethical Life* served as a dictation basis in that course.)

² In the 1804 textbook 'Physics' is developed from a theoretical 'deduction' to a more concrete 'display' (*Darstellung*); in the 1803 lectures the progression is from concrete detail (presented under 'chemism') to theoretical concepts (from which the physical *Idee* of the Earth begins). Some of the concrete detail of the earlier 'chemism' reappears in the later physical 'definition of the Earth'. But the abstract concepts do not.

this very moment told us that the Earth-process as a whole and the ordering of its moments exists only 'for us'.¹ It is human consciousness that is the 'self-cognition of the Earth'. We have to think of man as the 'child of Earth', and of the transcendental structure of consciousness as an expression first of our embodied existence on this planet, instead of accepting either the reflective formalism of the 'transcendental unity of apperception' or the abstractly rational formalism of Fichte's Ego theory. The next phase of our conceptual progress is the move from the conceptual context of geography to that of biology. The 'definition of the Earth' shows us how the 'infinite process' defines itself in a ladder of forms that culminates with the rational organism, for which the whole Earth-process exists as an environment (an 'inorganic nature') in just the way that the process of the other elements is here said to exist initially 'for the Earth itself'.²

This way of talking about the Earth-process as 'self-cognitive' is new in the textbook of 1804. But the course of the argument is not noticeably changed when this new way of speaking is added to the more traditional, pre-critical terminology in which the 'real physical Earth' is the substance, 'for which the [individual] elements are accidents, properties, ideal moments'.³

¹ *NKA*, vii. 278, 12–15, the same point is reiterated at 280, 26–7.

² In the cycle thus far the Earth is said to have 'cognized itself as cognition'. In the cycle that now opens it will 'cognize itself as absolute cognition' (*NKA*, vii. 280, 22–5). As we follow the display of the Earth's life which now succeeds its 'deduction' we shall see how the Earth generates the rational organism that is its 'absolute cognition'.

³ *NKA*, vi. 110, 12–13 (cf. vii. 280, 2–3, 11. The intended identity of the two modes of speech is made clear by the marginal note to 280, 25—see 280, 31–2). The whole system of 1803/4 seems to be founded on the concept of substance until we reach the final triad of Absolute Spirit, where Substance must give place to Subject (cf. the present passage with the review of the Logic on the one hand, vi. 268; Harris and Knox, p. 205, and the characterization of the *Volk* on the other, vi. 315; Harris and Knox, p. 242). But the establishment of 'consciousness' as the starting-point both of the Logic and of the Philosophy of Spirit, conflicts with this emphasis. We can see the tension, not only in the fact that the ultimate problem of the philosophy of spirit is the union of finite and infinite consciousness, but even in the present passage where the elements are said to be 'accidents, etc.' not of the Earth but for the Earth. The switch to 'cognition' terminology in 1804 belongs to Hegel's effort to state his philosophy consistently as a transcendental theory of consciousness. The strained and unnatural modes of expression that this effort necessitated may be why he gave up the attempt—not that his language ever ceased to be strained and unnatural by ordinary standards, but here the unnaturalness carried certain 'natural' implications that were

Even in 1804 the *Darstellung* of the Earth must inevitably repeat the deduction. But now that we properly know what is going on, what was implicit before, becomes explicit. The role of fire as the 'concept' (i.e. moving force) of the whole process is made clear.¹ The 'cometary' tension of the air is revealed as its power to form clouds, and the opposite extreme or lunar tension presents itself in the spontaneous formation of dead earthy bodies (meteorites, aerolites) in the atmosphere.²

Fire is now said to be the *Sinn* of the Earth. This sensation however is only its ideality (or inward essence). In other words it *signifies*, or outwardly represents the productive imagination. Its intuitive reality is as a moment of tension at the opposite extremes of the meteorological process of the elements: as volcanic activity in the Earth, and as shooting star in the atmosphere. It is the source of 'cometary' tension at both extremes. As lightning it stands also at the limit, and turning-point of the rain-cycle between air and water.³

Crystallization takes place in a watery medium and leaves a liquid residue. Hegel uses this analogy for the formation of mountains, rivers, and springs.⁴ The fresh water formed in this process between the Earth and its atmosphere is essentially unstable. As a stable element water has the chemical neutrality of the sea.

Atmospheric air differs from any of the chemically distinguishable forms of air in virtue of all the 'tensions' that we have previously discussed. The whole range of water-forms emerge quite misleading. (To express what he meant—without the misleading implication that the Earth is itself conscious—Hegel required a new-minted term like Whitehead's 'prehension'. But it was just at this juncture that he forsook even the artificial terminology of tradition and became the apostle of philosophy in the native vernacular.)

¹ NKA, vii. 281, 3–282, 28. Nothing is said yet about its 'finite' manifestation as colour and temperature. That will come later when we reach the evolution of particular bodies within the Earth-process.

² NKA, vii. 282, 28–32. (Cf. vi. 89, 7–90, 10; 101, 20–102, 5.)

³ NKA, vii. 283, 15–284, 7. The 'cometary' origin of aerolites and meteoric remnants, suggests to Hegel the hypothesis that planetary satellites are like comet cores which have the tides on their planets as a kind of tail. Through this analogy he finally manages to reconcile the important gravitational influence of the Moon on the Earth-process with his view that a completely neutral mechanical body cannot have a living influence. The Heraclitean fire embraces even the lunar limit of the Earth-process.

⁴ NKA, vii. 284, 8–285, 2 (this passage also contains the even more fantastic analogy of organic sweating). Cf. vi. 86, 5–87, 2.

from it, and so do forms of earth and fire. But it is the Earth itself that is the active substance to which this whole process belongs. This is the totality from which the motion of fire through the two fluid media starts and to which it finally returns.

Having come back again to fire, Hegel can now begin on the ideal evolution of particular bodies. Here fire, as the driving energy of the infinite cycle, must primarily appear as a negative, destructive, consuming agency. But the 'consuming' activity of fire is only chemical resolution. The first particular bodies Hegel considers, are the *real* chemical elements isolated by the work of men like Cavendish and Priestley. He repeats his view that 'mephitic air' (*Stickstoff*, nitrogen) is the original being of 'inflammable air' (hydrogen), while 'fixed air' (carbon dioxide) is what oxygen passes into as a result of combustion.¹ Oxidation and deoxidation are now discussed as processes in the laboratory and in finite natural contexts. What matters here is not the details of Hegel's chemistry, but his view that this is the most elementary form of ordinary combustion or finite fire-process.

Chemical fire has no apparent shape. The distinguishable components of finite fire as an apparent shape (the flame) are light and heat. Light breaks up in finite experience into the colours (or it 'synthesizes' with an opaque surface as its colour).² Heat permeates bodies and is communicated from one to another. Every body has some definite temperature at any time; but different bodies have different heat-capacities, which is their capacity to 'subsume' fire in this fluid form.³

The transition from temperature to the concept of a singular finite body can only be called *magical*. Hegel simply asserts that a singular body is an 'extinguished' fire because in it a visible process has come to a standstill.⁴ Whereas his

¹ NKA, vii. 289, 3-4. (Hegel uses at first only the *Stoff* terminology: *Stickstoff*, *Wasserstoff*, *Sauerstoff*, *gesauereten*. But he soon moves on to *oxidation* as a real process.)

² NKA, vii. 290, 15-291, 2. Transparency in a body is its ideal resolution into its opposite (fluidity). More detail—including an explicit commitment to Goethe's views as against Newton's—will be found in vi. 80, 13-83, 13.

³ NKA, vii. 291, 3-20. Cf. vi. 84, 3-85, 15. The universal Earth-process is characterized in terms of these same general concepts at vi. 111, 9-112, 11. (The survival of the 'subsumption' terminology in the 1804 text should be noted.)

⁴ NKA, vii. 291, 31-292, 22.

definition of the mechanical concept of body in terms of the lever is prophetic, the transition to mineralogy from the Heracleitean fire-process looks back to alchemy certainly, but anticipates no modern development visible to me. The fact that colour and melting-point are identifying marks for metals does, however, show Hegel's genuine concern to construct a conceptual framework for empirical inquiry.

The 'positing of air and water' in solid bodies is equally symbolic. Air is the moment of rigidity, and water of neutrality.¹ Now, since metals do melt, there is an analogy between this 'neutrality' and water; what analogy there can be between rigidity (*Sprödigkeit*) and any quality of air is harder to see. Apparently it is the supposed capacity of the air to produce metallic bodies—meteorites—that forms the link; water, on the other hand, is the medium of crystallization, and in its elemental state—as sea-water—it is indeed, neutral.

At this stage, now that we are dealing with solid bodies, the atomic hypothesis appears. Hegel concedes that the Earth as a finite body (i.e. not as an energetic cycle of the elements but as one of the moments isolated from that process) can be analysed into *absolute* bits. This analysis, however, is for the purpose of *cognition* only. Earth is an abstract universal here (*formale Allgemeinheit*) and its ideality is not a living potential but a fixed reflection (*formelle Idealität*).² Thus the reason why the Earth must fall into atoms is that knowledge itself must have simple elements that are not further analysable. The atoms here are not necessarily physically indivisible. They are not like the atoms of Newton and Dalton. It would simply be self-defeating to divide them further. Everything that can be learned from a small piece of pure gold, can be learned equally well from a larger piece. The physical atom here would be a minimum perceptible piece (since to attempt to divide that would be to lose sight of it). But we have reached the 'conceptual atom' of Earth as a formal community

¹ NKA, vii. 292, 23–4.

² Ibid., 296, 18. (I take the parallel of *formal/formell* here as an index that we are discussing the *a priori* synthesis of cognition. Of course we are doing so from the side of the object. But it is we who are now 'the Earth cognizing itself' because we have the *Idea* of the Earth as the explicit context for all of the *a priori* conceptual structures that we apply to our experience within it.)

of simple natures, once we have isolated gold as an 'element' (in the sense of the chemistry textbook). The Earth must be constituted of such simples, because its self-cognition takes place through a community of individuals, whose experience embraces only finite segments of it.¹ Ultimately it is we, the finite thinkers, who are the real 'atoms'. When we come to deal with cognition from the subjective side there will be no serious difficulty about the proposition that 'the Earth cognizes itself as the absolute multiplicity of these mid-points.' But Hegel wants us to see that singularity has a long sequence of applications before we come to the indissoluble unity and privacy of the individual consciousness.

First of all, absolute motion requires indissoluble gravitational units. The parts of the Earth itself have a single gravitational centre (and the Solar System depends on the singularity of its Solar body). These bodies are 'uncuttable' in the sense that the whole system would be affected if they were cut. Thus the system of absolute motion falls apart into 'atoms'. The Earth as an atom of that system falls apart first into motions (the elementary processes). But now the substantial unity of the elementary processes must fall apart into elementary substances: and to *be a substance is to contain the process*. This kind of 'process constituting substance, and containing substances constituted by process' is what reality is, because it is what cognition is ('or vice versa', Hegel would have said earlier, but now he has recognized the transcendental standpoint as primary). Hegel claims that the proper parts of the Earth must contain a process within themselves that is analogous to the cyclic process of fire, water, air, and earth.²

¹ In some senses of 'absolute' it is not absolutely necessary for the world to be constituted this way for this reason. The sense in which it is necessary depends on the sense in which intelligible language must be analysable into bits that are ultimate. It is clear, however, that the self-cognition of a unique world-mind in solitude would not absolutely require ultimate elements (any more than musical sound needs to be generated by an orchestra of distinct instruments). What is doubtful is whether we really conceive such an experience at all—except by turning it into something other than what we mean by 'cognition' (by drawing an analogy with music, for example). I take it that everyone will agree that Hegel is talking about what *we* mean by cognition. So when he claims that 'the Earth's self-cognition' requires its falling into 'absolute singularity' this is fairly strong evidence that he is not talking about the putative experience of a unique Earth-mind. (We shall have further proof that he cannot mean to refer to any such thing when we reach the Philosophy of Spirit.)

² *NKA*, vii. 297, 28–31.

In his description of the constituents of the Earth regarded as a universal container, however, all real process comes to a standstill. This is a stage where Hegel is content with a form of cognition that is far too static to satisfy us. Hence neither his mineralogy, nor his geology seem to be worth pursuing in detail.

In order to exhibit his frozen image of process (Earth-cognition at the level of immediate sense-impression) Hegel divides his elementary solids into metals, combustibles, neutrals, and earths. In his 1803 lectures this classification is brought into connection with the distinction drawn by Paracelsus between mercury, sulphur, and salt; and the use of 'earth' as a sub-classification is linked (less certainly) with Boehme.¹ Hegel insists that mercury, sulphur, and salt were class-names in the older tradition; hence in his own textbook he defines the categories that they symbolized.

'Metal' is the class of simple solids. Metals melt and change colour when heated; but they are not chemically changed as a result.² 'Combustibles' and 'salts' are the opposite aspects of the fire process, physically realized. The combustibles are simple elements that burn readily; the salts are decomposable compounds arising from a chemical process.³

'Earths' contain the totality of the conceptual process of simplicity and opposition. Thus they can, in their turn, be classified according to which moment of the process is dominant.

¹ *Ibid.*, vi. 114, 4-17. Hegel does not refer to Paracelsus by name—only to 'the elders'; and Paracelsus and his school did not put 'earth' in the same list with their three chemical elements. Nevertheless, it seems clear that Hegel meant Paracelsus here (see the editorial note in vi. 369). He refers to these 'elders' again in the plural, when he goes on to speak of 'virgin Earth'—which comes not from Paracelsus but from Boehme (see vi. 114, 16 and the editorial note at vi. 369). Paracelsus and Boehme together are 'the elders'—i.e. the alchemists.

² *NKA*, vii. 299, 5-25 (cf. vi. 114, 6-8; 115, 4-6 and 12-17; 120-6). The lectures of 1803 discuss the distinction between noble and base metals, and the hypothesis of a 'sequence of metals'. At this stage, Hegel still takes the former seriously, but he is already critical of the latter. (See vii. 331, 13-24, for noble/base in 1804) There is clear evidence of a critical attitude toward Schelling's followers throughout. But the complaint that the 'metal-series' is a 'quantitative' hypothesis where attention to quality is in place is a clear pointer to why we can find little of value in this stage of Hegel's theory. We are bound to side with Steffens here (vi. 126, 5-18).

³ *NKA*, vii. 299, 26-31. (Cf. vi. 114, 9-13; 115, 6-9; 126, 19-127, 18.) We can see from the treatment of salts that Hegel believes his conceptual process of antithesis is more important than any mere catalogue of elementary or simple substances.

Hegel himself was fascinated by the self-formation of the Earth; he treats rock formations at length, struggling continually to discover the principles governing the type-sequences.¹ But his assumption is that he is looking at a transformation process frozen into an image of spatial continuity. His view is in no way evolutionary;² but even if it were, he would still be on the wrong track, for he would then be asking how the earlier formation was modified or transformed into the later one. He is interested in sequence only as a function of deeper continuity. He was an enthusiastic and painstaking field geologist, as well as an industrious student of the textbooks. He could have accommodated to an evolutionary hypothesis easily enough; but precisely because he thinks of the Earth on the model of an organism, rather than as a great chemical laboratory—as a totality, rather than a *Gegen-satz* he would say—not even an evolutionary revision of any of his successive hypotheses would hold much interest for us.

Having completed his account of the elements, Hegel can proceed at last to his account of finite (or empirical) chemical process. Geology is for him, the static image of an infinite process—including even ‘petrifications’ (i.e. fossils) which are an anticipatory portrayal of the real infinite process (or organic life) for which the static image is a stage and a backdrop.³ (In 1803 Hegel actually considers the ecology of the Earth briefly as a prelude to finite chemistry. Like his consideration of the Earth as a mechanical *Gestalt* this is eliminated in 1804.)⁴

¹ NKA, vii. 300, 11–313, 7; cf. vi. 132, 4–137, 5.

² Hegel seems more sympathetic to evolutionary hypotheses about the ‘history of the earth’ in 1803 (NKA, vi. 137, 6–139, 6). But his rejection of them is stated very clearly at NKA, vii. 303, 10–11. We could say that in principle Hegel is a Vulcanist for he says ‘the might of the Earth, or the earthly time [i.e. cyclic driving principle] is fire.’ (vii. 303, 4). But the Vulcanist hypothesis is just as much a ‘false semblance’ (vii. 303, 27) as that of the Neptunists in so far as it suggests an ongoing process. The fire has ‘gone out’ (vii. 303, 11) in the same sense that the mock-coals which decorate some modern electric heaters are a fire which has ‘gone out’. Only in its fertile capacity to produce plant life is the Earth’s fire really kindled (vi. 130, 16–132, 3).

³ NKA, vii. 312, 17–27; cf. vi. 135, 13–15. (This sheet 42a is an insertion, and belongs to the later phases in the evolution of the MS. The earlier drafts are less positive, and some geological evolution appears to be conceded—see esp. vi. 134, 6–135, 3. But it is precisely the occurrence of the organic anticipations that inclines Hegel to reject the hypothesis of a ‘history of the earth’).

⁴ NKA, vi. 137, 6–139, 19. (We shall consider this discussion when we make our transition to the organism—which is presumably where it would have come in the MS of 1804, which was aborted precisely at that point.)

Finite chemical process is a reaction between two singular bodies that are complementary poles of a single cycle. In this process we learn what sort of energy-equilibrium is locked up within any neutral body that placidly maintains itself within the general environment, unaffected by anything except the wear and tear of the weather. Hence Hegel calls finite chemical process 'the displaying (*Darstellung*) of cognition'.¹ The three types of element that he distinguishes (metals, combustibles, and salts) reveal the process in ways analogous to the absolute process of fire, water, and air respectively; and the types of earth exhibit a process like that of earth itself as a universal element.²

Metals present the bare concept of the process. They change in form, by melting, glowing, etc., when heated; their specific gravity (also called here their 'cohesion')³ changes; they liquefy but they do not crystallize. Each metal has its distinctive melting-point and is in this way *defined* by the process.

In the galvanic process, with a watery medium, and 'fire' in the form of acid, on the other hand, metals go through real chemical change. But the synthetic products are not bodies, but only the chemically affected (oxidized or reduced) metals themselves.⁴ What is released by the process is a gas, and fire 'exists' as acid or caustic (base).⁵ As thus polarized, fire 'cognizes itself' (i.e. it reveals what it is for our cognition), for these are the poles of chemical neutrality. The formation of the metal-salt transforms the abstract metal into 'a form of the reality of the earth'; while its phlogiston (hydrogen) escapes into the air.⁶

¹ *NKA*, vii. 315, 27. The same doctrine is expounded in more detail and with concrete illustrations, but without the 'transcendental' terminology in vi. 141, 17-142, 16.

² *NKA*, vii. 317, 31-318, 4. Cf. vi. 114, 4-115, 17.

³ *Ibid.*, 318, 19-26. (This is one of the few places where the concept of cohesion—much discussed in the 1803 MSS—has survived in 1804. Hegel does not use the term in this connection in 1803—see vi. 120-2.)

⁴ *NKA*, vii. 320, 24-321, 15. Electricity, like magnetism, is almost ignored in the textbook of 1804, and it is not given any central importance even in 1803.

⁵ *NKA*, vii. 322, 21-3. Hegel also pays attention to the generation of gases through the action of acid on metal in the earlier MS (see vi. 152, 19-153, 14).

⁶ *NKA*, vii. 323, 7-22. The editorial note to vi. 153, 1-2 seems more relevant to the explanation of vii. 323, 18-19. But the reference to hydrogen or phlogiston as 'the

The theory that the hydrogen thus released is the phlogiston of metal provides Hegel's transition from the metals to the combustibles, especially sulphur. Sulphur, he says, is 'hydrogenated metal'. 'Free fire' or flame is 'fire posited in the form of air'; it requires a combustible material, but it is a chemical reaction in the atmosphere. To 'deduce' his thesis that acid is fire posited as a real body, Hegel interprets that reaction as the 'neutralization' of hydrogen (phlogiston) by nitrogen (phlogisticated air) to produce an acid (carbon dioxide).¹ Acid is fire realized in physical form.

Acid is active fire, sulphur is passive fire. But in the chemical neutrality of a salt, fire has become 'the other of itself'.² In earth itself we have that which is dry but incombustible (Hegel's paradigm is silica). But at the end of the chemical process we have an equilibrium in which the fire has 'gone out'. Hegel's assumption is that chemical neutrality gives us the clue to what 'earthiness' is. Chemistry is properly the analysis of what is static into its abstract, or dynamic components. The Earth as a divisible whole, is a totality of neutral elements. We find in chemistry that different reagents have different specific products. But every stably neutral thing must be conceived as having an acid/base polarity of its own distinct kind. Only in the 'noblest' of the metals do we find a simple element which really resists chemical polarization and neutralization.³

Neutrality is thus a systemic characteristic. If the different things that have settled into equilibrium are shaken up into a new pattern a new process toward chemical equilibrium must

difference of metal, posited in the air' (vi. 153, 1-2) is certainly a bow to Cavendish who called hydrogen 'inflammable air from metals' (Partington, iii. 813).

¹ NKA, vii. 325, 3-327, 13. (This is a 'deduction' in the sense that it is derived directly from the *theory* of phlogiston.)

² NKA, vii. 327, 14. For the 'incombustible' see 326, 25-8. Hegel's theory of simple combustion would be plainer had he chosen something like *phosphorus* which will ignite spontaneously upon exposure to the atmosphere. But he is interested more in the transition from combustion to acid action, and sulphur is both highly combustible and powerful as an acid. (The corrosive action of the acid has effects which resemble those of ordinary combustion in many ways; and I note from the van Nostrand, *Encyclopedia of Chemistry*, that 'Almost all the elements, excepting gold and platinum, and the inert gases, combine directly with sulphur'.)

³ NKA, vii. 328, 4-337, 8. (For the comment on noble and base metals see vii. 331, 13-24—cf. vi. 64, 10.)

occur. The elementary substances out of which our earth seems to be built up are only stable in their established chemical balance. Chemical process brings the ideal substances into real compounds, and breaks up compounds into ideal (physically unstable) substances again. Only the cyclic process is a true substance. But in chemistry there is no true cycle; there is only the swaying motion of a pendulum. The truly cyclic process of a self-maintaining substance is the *organism*.¹

The discussion of chemical process in the manuscript of 1803 is much easier to follow because it is more directly descriptive, and is illustrated by empirical data at every turn. We can see here how much Hegel owed to the theory of chemical affinity in Berthollet's *Chemical Statics*—and before that to the pioneer work of the Swedish chemist, Torbern Bergman, in this area. (It is really from Bergman, I think, that his chemical classification of minerals into metallic, inflammable, saline, and earthy comes, though he insists on finding an earlier pedigree for it in Paracelsus and Boehme.)²

What comes out most clearly in this more detailed discussion is Hegel's insistence that no chemical element, not even gold or platinum, remains stably in its pure form. The empirical difficulty of obtaining pure reagents for chemical work has, in his view, a foundation in physical necessity.³

When we compare the doctrine of 'chemical fire' in 1803 with the transcendental theory in the 1804 textbook, we get a clue as to why Hegel insisted on the emblematic significance of mercury, sulphur, and salt in the older tradition of Paracelsus.⁴ In 1803 the moments of the mineral 'organism' are

¹ NKA, vii. 337, 9–338, 30 (cf. vi. 170, 8–173, 5).

² I rely here on the summary account of Bergman's theory in Partington, iii. 185 (Hegel refers explicitly to the work of Bergman and Berthollet on affinity at vi. 151, 13–152, 4). Berthollet's *Chemical Statics* (Paris, 1803) was a very new book; and although Hegel refers to it explicitly, he probably knew Berthollet's work before this from the 'Recherches sur les lois de l'affinité' which appeared in *Memoires de l'Institut National des sciences et arts* for 1800/1. Berthollet gives accounts of Bergman's earlier work. I cannot show that Hegel had any direct access to it, but the coincidence of doctrine regarding the elements seems to me to make the question worth investigating.

³ See NKA, vi. 160, 6–13 for the point about reagents; and vi. 167, 3–168, 2 for a general survey of 'abstract' chemical elements which ends with expressed doubt about the possibility of *pure* gold and silver.

⁴ The most prominent empirical critic of this doctrine was Robert Boyle. But

metal (simple concept), salinity—combustibility (antithesis), and earthiness (totality). But in 1804 when the conception of the Earth as a 'mineral organism' has fallen by the wayside (like the conception of it as a mechanical *Gestalt*), the pattern is triadic. Earthiness is now interpreted in terms of 'neutrality', which thus ceases to be half of the antithesis and becomes the *a priori* synthesis through which the nature of the Earth as a chemical system (but not as an organism) is revealed. There ought now to be no room for such crudely material emblems of chemical process as mercury, sulphur, and salt.¹ Yet, in fact, sulphur occupies a crucial place in the evolution of the three logical moments of chemical process: metal, acid, neutrality. In 1803 Hegel surveys the forms of fire, starting from free flame and moving through the array of its 'otherness' (galvanism, static electricity, chemical affinity, and the atmospheric process) to the purely theoretical concept of phlogiston. This array vanishes in 1804. Instead, Hegel tried to 'deduce' the first big step, from free flame to the inwardly fiery character of acid. For this step the natural combustibility of some minerals is crucial (sulphur being important because it provides a powerful acid). What is 'deduced' is a theory of the transformations of phlogiston. Since Hegel sided with the phlogiston chemists, he had to be able to 'deduce' their assumptions from his transcendental theory. What matters to us in all this is only the recognition that Hegel's theory is a transcendental one, and that it developed through an increasing tendency to focus attention upon the *triad* of Paracelsus.

5. *The Theory of Organism*

We have now reached the point where Hegel abandoned the project of his 1804 textbook. So we must turn, perforce, to the manuscripts of 1803 as our primary authority. This transition creates difficulty because, although the developments of

Hegel may well have derived his knowledge both of the doctrine and of the empiricist critique from Erleben's *Anfangsgründe der Naturlehre*. (See the editorial note to vi. 114, 17–20 and the quotation in *NKA*, vi. 369–70.)

¹ However, the account of the 'process' of metal shows why Hegel approved the choice of mercury as an emblem. Mercury is the metal that is quite normally 'in process' in terrestrial conditions. It is a fluid, and its variable 'specific gravity' is the basis of its thermometric employment.

doctrine between 1803 and 1804 are not very radical, the change of perspective is considerable. In 1803 the protagonist of the drama is the Earth itself; in 1804 the logical evolution of human cognition dictates the order of presentation. But, since the textbook has arrived at the 'Idea of the Earth' and has begun to speak of science as the Earth's 'self-cognition' the shift of perspective probably makes less difference than it would have done earlier. Still the shift is there; and since we must deal with Hegel's theory of the organism in the earlier conceptual context, it seems advisable to sketch the outline of that earlier context at this point.

The lectures of 1803 treat the Earth as an 'organism' from the start. Mechanical and chemical theory have not the capacity to present its organic wholeness, which reveals itself rather by breaking the bounds of these finite disciplines. Thus the Earth has a 'shape' which is mechanically self-determining. But it is a living shape, which can only be mechanically expressed as the disruption of the dead fixity of the lunar landscape; and we can only understand this disruption by advancing to the chemical level, and recognizing the creative response of the Earth to the varying solicitation of the Sun as it follows its spinning ellipse of subordinate motion through space. Thus in 'chemism' we have the life-cycle of the Earth as the context of our efforts of interpretation. Chemism as a universal category frames our theory of the hidden cycle in which the chemical elements—themselves, invisible and hence theoretical entities—are transformed.

But we can only formulate the concept of the chemical process through our experience with the physical elements. The life of the Earth is the meteorological cycle of these real elements. The concept of this cycle reaches its intuitive totality in the physical 'Idea of the Earth'. Hence instead of passing to 'Physics' as soon as he has set forth the abstract concept of 'chemical process' (as he does in 1804) Hegel has to deal with the physical reality of the chemical process in the Earth's climate before he can make the transition to 'physics' proper. The discussion of 'chemism' ends—like the discussion of 'mechanism'—with the Earth breaking the bounds of the chemical process because it is an organism—it emerges as *fertile* for life.

'Physics' begins, in 1803, with the theory of the mineral elements and of geology (which form the substance of the 'definition of the Earth' in 1804). We start from the conception of the Earth as a 'cohesive' system of different 'specific gravities' which is the terminus of the 1804 textbook (where the language of 'cohesion' is dropped altogether). Even in 1803, Hegel does not use the concept of 'mineral organism' for this, and because his geology is not evolutionary Hoffmeister's interpolation is inappropriate.¹ The life of the organism is hidden within the Earth's 'cohesion', not reflected out of it for the observer to see. But the fertility of this enormous chemical amalgam is thrust into prominence as the sure sign of what is hidden.

Thus we move from the Earth as a physical body made up of land, sea, air, and fire, to the theory of the finite types of physical body that make it up; and from there to the physical description of how they do so. Then at last we can deal with the chemical process through which we can comprehend how all the constituents lie beside one another in stable indifference.

The procedure of 1804 is governed not by the structure of the Earth but by that of scientific cognition. But at the point where the manuscript ends, the two paths very nearly converge. For in the 'definition of the Earth' we have finally arrived at the conception of the Earth as an organic whole. We only need to pick up Hegel's earlier comments about terrestrial fertility and ecology at this point in order to be fairly sure that we have all the content of his doctrine when we pass directly to the theory of the organism in the manuscripts of 1803.²

There can be no certainty that Hegel would have incorporated all of his earlier comments about the Earth's flora and fauna into his 1804 'definition of the Earth' since some of them

¹ See *Jenenser Real philosophie*, i. (1932), p. 88. (Hoffmeister inserts the heading before *NKA*, vi. 129, 8.) The point that the mineral array is not an organism is made by Hegel himself. But in his first draft he wrote (and then cancelled): 'We treat the Earth as organizing itself in this way as Earth, and spreading itself out in the multiplication [of mineral constituents].' (vi. 130, 20-1.)

² We must never forget, of course, that the discussion would have been different if Hegel had finished the 1804 textbook. This is the lesson that is driven home by the very different articulation of 'chemism' and 'physics' in the two complexes of MS.

are based on the magnetic theory that he has pushed into the background, if not abandoned. But here, surely, is where the general topic belongs.

It is the living force of the Earth we may recall, that takes over the radiant light of the Sun and transforms it into the heat energy upon which the meteorological cycle depends. Through this cycle the soil is made fruitful (except at the poles where the Earth has a 'shape' as fixed as that of the moon).¹ The two motions of the Earth in the Solar System set up a mechanical (gravitational) determinism which the Earth resists through its own 'absolute chemism'. Hegel acknowledges in 1803 that this 'battle' has a genuine history; that animal species have been extinguished in some areas which still exist in others, seas have dried up, and lands have been engulfed or cut off from one another. He speaks of all this as evidence of a different 'relation of the Earth to the Sun' than that which now exists.² What sort of difference he means, he does not say; but by placing 'free motion' at the foundation of his philosophy of Nature, he made even a spatial evolution of the Solar System more easily conceivable than it ever could be in the Newtonian theory. It is important to underline his recognition that climatic evolution is possible at least, since he was himself an adherent of the Aristotelian ideal of an eternal world. Geology—even if it does have a historical evolution behind it—should not in his view be studied historically. Nevertheless he takes note that the geological formation of the New World has only a North/South tension (i.e. it is more mechanically dominated, less subject to the chemism that operates from an equatorial axis).³ Its flora are more varied

¹ NKA, vi. 105, 15–107, 8 and 108, 12–109, 15. The exact character of the Solar contribution to the Earth's 'absolute chemism' is not perfectly clear (probably Hegel was uncertain about it, and in any case the MSS are fragmentary). How much of his theory of the Earth's 'shape' or of its magnetic and electrical properties he would have included in his 'definition' is likewise uncertain (see vi. 31–42). But the phenomena of finite magnetism and electricity receive little notice in 1804. (Cf. further pp. 253–5 and pp. 261 n., 263 n. 1, 265 n. 4, 276 n. 4, above.)

² NKA, vi. 137, 6–12. (Note that none of this was in the first draft.)

³ NKA, vi. 138, 6–11. (The mechanical tension also determines the distribution of land and sea, and this too affects the development of flora and fauna, vi. 139, 3–12.) But the cancellations from the earlier draft show that Hegel's belief in climatic determinism is on the wane. Nothing left standing in this MS suggests that climatic conditions explain cultural variations as completely as the *Difference* essay seems to suggest (NKA, iv. 14, 15–21; 80, 2–15; Harris and Cerf, pp. 91, 177).

than its fauna but even here it does not rival the Old World. The human population is culturally less advanced, still childish: 'they lacked what *strengthens man most in his mastery of nature*, iron and the beast of burden'.¹

Here we can pick up the thread of the continuous argument again. Hegel first states the general concept of life (intuited as the aether) then develops it through the vegetable and animal levels. Spirit itself is the totality of the organic process.

The Earth as an organism, is a 'universal individual'. Everything about it is cyclic. Its chemical constituents have each a certain range of variability in different situations but they have no self-transforming power. The Earth itself is determinate and singular as the universal complex of these constituents, but each of them is determined by its place in the complex.² 'In order to be what it is' (in 1804 Hegel would say 'to know itself [i.e. to be known] as what it is') the Earth must have elements or constituents that are themselves self-maintaining totalities.³ The direct reference here is to the growth of plants, but the way Hegel presents his concept of the Earth's fertility (its 'absolute life-power')⁴ helps us to understand the peculiar way that he talks of cognition. In the living organism, what was merely our theoretical construct to explain how the meteorological process works ('our reflexion') actually exists.⁵

Looking at the problem from the other side (as he prefers to look at it in 1803) the concept of organism has *evolved*—or

¹ NKA, vi. 139, 1-3. This is an interesting sample of Hegel's own 'historical materialism'. He was even less guilty of the 'determinism of the Idea' of which Marx and Engels accused him, than he was of the naturalistic determinism which Popper miscalls 'historicism'. (The climatic theory of culture implicit in the *Difference* essay does have a slight smack of *that*. But see the preceding note.)

² NKA, vi. 173, 13-174, 4.

³ Ibid., 177, 15-178, 5. As yet Hegel is speaking only of the fertility that sustains plant life. Cf. the passage—cancelled only because the time for it has not quite come yet—in the first draft, vi. 178, 20-1. Hegel only *says* this in the text that he let stand at vi. 193, 8.

⁴ NKA, vi. 189, 8.

⁵ Ibid., 184, 6-8. Hence in 1805 the plant will be called an 'existing syllogism'—NKA, viii. 132, 20-4. At present however, it is the human soul-body relation that is the schema for this theory of the 'absolute life-power'; probably that is why Hegel cancelled the early reference to the plant as 'the immediately existing Idea of the organic'. It is not the *immediate* existence of the organic, but its existence in *totality* that he needs as the 'Idea' of life in 1803 and 1804. In 1805 where he wants to move from the 'Concept' to its 'reality' the situation is different.

has logically unfolded itself at least—at every major turning-point, every advance to a higher *Potenz*. The bodies involved in the exposition of 'free motion' differ in their periodic motions, but the system is in perfect equilibrium. The periodicities that this sets up are the frame of the meteorological process; and in that process the Earth itself becomes the central focus in which all of its simple elements are inextricably fused. When we study the meteorological process we observe that the emergence of organic life is an integral continuation of it.¹ Plant life emerges directly from the earth, and is a cycle of the elements within the great meteorological cycle, dying in the winter when the earth lies fallow, and reborn again in the spring.²

For the transient cyclic process of the living (and dying) organism the great environing cycle of the Earth's own life becomes a stable, unchanging background of simple being. This greater cycle (of which the organism is really a single moment) becomes its inert or 'inorganic' environment. Thus the real unity of organism and environment becomes a relation of opposition.³ But the organism is bound to set itself in opposition in this way only because there is a tension within it that resembles the chemical tension of the elements. It strives against *death* (its own submergence in the elemental cycle). But its own death is part of its concept; to escape total submergence, it must be capable of *self*-reproduction; and for that purpose it must be divided in such a way that its recombination will produce the new organism. '*The Idea of organic individuality is the kind (Gattung).*' 'Individuality' is something which does not belong to plants because they can only subsist while they remain rooted in the Earth. They are thus parasitic upon the life-giving fertility of the soil. Properly individual organisms must be self-fertilizing. The true 'indivi-

¹ This is an attempt to interpret the flow of the argument from *NKA*, vi. 179, 8–180, 8.

² This is the 'cycle of Both cycles' (at *NKA*, vi. 179, 7) since the organic body passes back into the absolute cycle of terrestrial chemism at death—and if it is a plant it grows directly out of the earth in which that cycle is stabilized.

³ *NKA*, vi. 182, 11–184, 6. Hegel does not yet call the elemental environment 'inorganic'. But he does say it is the '*seyende indifferente träge Allgemeinheit*' (184, 1–2) which is a fair characterization of the inorganic moment in his dialectical opposition of 'organic' and 'inorganic'.

dual' is the mated pair. When Hegel says that each of the two sexes 'is the whole Idea' he means first, that they cannot be defined independently. His theory of what happens in sexual generation is inspired by Aristotle's theory of intellectual conception, rather than taken over from his physical theory. The male is 'the agent of the form'; the female physically conceives it. No definite genetic theory seems to be intended. All that matters to Hegel is that an individual as sexed is both equal to the Idea and different from it. This sets up the tension of the sexual *drive* (*Trieb*).¹

Whereas plant life is a cycle within the meteorological cycle of the elements, the animal organism contains the two cycles (of self-maintenance against the elements, and of self-fertilization) within itself.² But we can only say that it contains this second process as *Gattung*. What happens empirically is that two individuals are brought together by a *Trieb*, and a new individual is born as a result.

Hegel compares these two cycles to the motions of the Earth. Self-maintenance is analogous to axial rotation; and in the reproductive cycle the *Gattung* operates as the 'Sun' of the individual. The natural environment, on the other hand—which Hegel is now prepared to call 'inorganic'—becomes a satellite of the cycle of self-maintenance. This analogy is helpful in two ways, at least. First it shows clearly where the centre of Hegel's own conceptual universe is (viz. in *mankind* as *Gattung*); and secondly it throws light on the strange locution 'self-cognition of the Earth' which we encountered earlier. For, on the basis of this analogy Hegel asserts that 'the essence of the Earth is completely realized' in organic individuality—or that 'in it the Earth comes to itself'.³

¹ NKA, vi. 185, 4–186, 10. *Gatte* means 'mate' or 'spouse'. I have the impression that *Gattung* has always an echo of 'mating' in Hegel's use. Certainly his use is better understood by remembering Luther's translation of Genesis 1 than by thinking of its technical use as 'genus' in biology; so I have deliberately borrowed 'kind' from the Authorized Version of 1611. (Although the text is at least a year later, and a new phase in Hegel's system building has begun, the relation of biological *Trieb* to physical *Gattung* in this passage is probably a sound basis for the analogical interpretation of the relation of moral *Trieb* to the substance of ethical life in the *Natural Law* essay, NKA, iv. 460, 35–461, 27; Knox and Acton, pp. 107–8.)

² NKA, vi. 186, 11–187, 9. Now that he has reached the free individuated organism Hegel does begin to speak of the terrestrial environment as 'inorganic'.

³ NKA, vi. 187, 12–13; the analogy is developed from 187, 14 to 189, 6.

The 'absolute life-force' which exists in the Earth, but which has thus achieved independent existence, is the *aether* which is the ultimate source of things. Life is in Hegel's view the primitive concept. It is not to be thought of as a result or product arising from factors or components that are themselves inorganic. Nor is it a mystery, since its essence is awareness or cognition. The philosopher who aims to know and to say 'what really is' must recognize that it is precisely this effort to know that he is concerned with, and he must frame his fundamental questions and concepts accordingly. If one thinks of life as a response to the challenge of the non-living environment, or of cognition as the response to an external stimulus, the philosophical comprehension of what is becomes impossible, because the relative character of the interaction is accepted from the start. For this reason the polar oppositions (magnetism, electricity, irritability, etc.), to which Schelling and his pupils attached so much importance in the philosophy of nature, were as misleading in Hegel's view as the mechanical models of Newton and Kant.¹

The immediate existence of this terrestrial life-force is the Earth's vegetation. At the level of plant life there is no proper individuation. Every 'kind' is a self-perpetuating continuum. There is multiplication and there is reproduction, but no true sexual division. Even when Hegel explicitly admitted (in 1805) that his botany was not empirically correct on this point, he did not move from this conceptual ideal of plant life.² Every individual is the whole Kind. Sexual pairing, the

¹ *NKA*, vi. 189, 7-190, 11. (The reference to the aether connects this passage with vi. 105, 15-106, 5 discussed above.) Of course, Schelling himself had insisted on the ontological primacy of life from his earliest essays in *Naturphilosophie* onwards (see, for instance, *Von der Weltseele*, 1798, *Werke*, iv. 500). This insistence on the primacy of organism was, I think, common to all of the *Naturphilosophen*, and can be taken as one of their distinctive characteristics as a group. Nevertheless, the analysis of life into 'factors' was taken up by Schelling's followers from Brown's medical theory (for the evolution of Schelling's own attitude see p. 296 n. 3, below). The thesis that the essence of life is unknowable is Kant's—see the *Critique of Judgement*, §§ 71-5.

² There is a considerable difference in Hegel's statement of the facts regarding plant sexuality between *NKA*, vi. 200, 6-201, 3 and his position in 1805 (see below, Ch. 10, pp. 456-7). But even in his mature discussions in the *Encyclopaedia* he maintained the view that the whole reproductive process is superfluous for plant propagation. Cuttings, division, grafting, etc. all prove that the Kind is self-maintaining without it.

complementarity of distinct individuals is not essential for plant reproduction (as it is for animals). Plant life, as 'the first *Potenz* of the organic process' is a 'bad infinite', an endless chain of processes which are cyclic, but have no proper beginning or end, no moment of completion. 'The Idea as such ceases to exist in this portioning.' The Kind exists, not as an individuated reality but as an implicit multitude of singular manifestations.

In general Hegel's theory of plant growth does not change in 1805, so we shall deal with the details—as far as is necessary—there. But it is worth pausing to reflect on the implications of his insistence that generic incompleteness is essential to individuality. This means that a true individual must both be incomplete, and be capable of recognizing what is necessary for its completion outside itself. That is what it is to 'be', or to 'contain', a concept. Plants are all *identical* with their concept; as manifest, apparently individuated phenomena, they are contained within it, rather than containing it. An entity can contain its concept in the first instance as an ideal toward which it actively strives. But even plants strive toward maturity. For proper individuality, the completion striven for must actually exist elsewhere, so that the striving is a *quest* ending in the recognition of the self that is desired in another being like oneself. Sexual incompleteness, and consequent need, is the beginning of this questing relation with the world which is the condition of individuality as the self-moving production of the knower's own Idea. The plant does not call its own mate. It produces nectar which calls on an intermediary (which is a being of 'nobler nature' precisely because it can be called).¹

Animal sensation is the primitive form of organic independence of the environment. We can now speak of the great organism of the Earth-process as inorganic, because even for the animal-senses it is reflected, broken up into parts which exist for the organism. Only in its own reproduction cycle is

¹ *NKA*, vi. 202, 1–203, 11. But basically the plant needs nothing but itself, and even its essential parts are each the whole plant (vi. 197, 13–15). Thus—as Hegel first remarked in 1798—*Reines Leben zu denken*, *TW-A*, i. 376–7 (Knox, p. 261)—the perfect plant can be dug up and replanted upside down; all its parts will then adapt to their reversed roles (vi. 204, 10–17).

the single animal involved in a process of which it is merely a subordinate moment. It is then aware of its Kind as a controlling urge (*Begierde*).

I have the impression that Hegel generally uses *Thier*, *thierisch*, and so on, for what belongs to the beasts, while *Animal*, *animalisch* refers to the common nature of all animals, rational and irrational alike. If so, then it is significant that he speaks of *Begierde* as *thierisch*, and of the theoretical and cognitive aspects of sensation as *animalisch*. This means, I think, that he is not directly concerned with the cognitive capacities of beasts (even of the mammalian quadrupeds); he only wants to examine how the animal senses become cognitive in man. Thus he does not hold, I think, that the brutes discriminate colours *as colours* but only (for instance) as attractive or aversive signs.¹ All the way through Hegel's development of the 'system of the absolute character of the animal nature (*des animalischen*) that forms itself outwardly (*ausbildet*) on its own account'² he speaks of the physical development of a subconscious organism; but the *Individuum* he is thinking of is the human animal.

The discussion of the animal organism is articulated in our manuscript by the use of Greek letters. Section *alpha*, as we have it, is probably incomplete.³ It introduces the concept of

¹ If my—highly debatable—distinction between *Thier* and *Animal* is set aside, then we can read *NKA*, vi. 207, 13–208, 5 (at least) as a theory of the sense-cognition of the beasts. (Hegel would not, of course, be at all averse to admitting that the beasts have cognitive powers, and that it is interesting to study them. But, as I see it, this was not his philosophical concern.)

² *NKA*, vi. 208, 6. The 'process of organic shaping' that begins here is Hegel's theory of the human body and its capacities. This is the climax of the philosophy of Nature, which is thus directly continuous with the philosophy of Spirit. Both together form 'real philosophy'; and this is unaffected by the absorption of the philosophy of absolute Spirit into 'real spirit'.

³ There is a lacuna in our MS sequence here, but it does not seem likely that more than one sheet is missing. The sequence runs from *alpha* to *psi*. Since the sheet on which *alpha* begins, ends with death, the section could be complete (but in that case the first sheet of section *beta* is certainly lacking). It is altogether more probable, however, that we have only the opening paragraph of *alpha*, and that Hegel went on to develop a bird's eye view of the mature organism as a *sensible* and *irritable* system, ending with its *reproduction*-process. This last would lead naturally to the topic of section *beta*: its embryological beginnings in the seminal fluid.

The heading 'A. Process of Organic Shaping, or of the Individual that forms itself outwardly to Totality' was added later in the margin and between the lines, but the *alpha* that marks the first section belongs to the first draft (*NKA*, vi. 208, 19 and

organic shape (*Gestalt*) very generally. The brute power of voluntary motion and the temporal transience of the brute life-cycle are briefly characterized.

In section *beta* (and continuing through to section *zeta*) we find a discussion of the 'jelly' (*Gallerte*) from which the body is formed. Since we know that Hegel's embryology was Aristotelian, the seminal fluid must provide the 'seed of life' that is present in this jelly. It is precisely this self-fertilized medium of life which plant life cannot generate for itself. Hegel specifically puts the egg-laying animals of sea and sky in the border-line category between animals and plants; this shows that he regards pre-natal development in the womb as the distinctive mark of animal life. Even before the young animal is born, the whole fluid process of its self-maintenance goes on within its skin. Hegel takes skin-formation to be primitive (as the *limit* between inner and outer) and differentiates this primary process in the opposite directions of bone and muscle formation. Bone and muscle operating together against one another give the developed animal its capacity to move and react to stimuli—the 'system of irritability'.² Of course, the primitive jelly from which skin-formation proceeds—which Hegel begins to call the 'lymphatic system' as soon as the 'outer organism' is formed—is self-moving, as well as self-reproductive. The lymph is the energy-source of the animal organism—the 'universal reproduction of animal fluidity'.³

Digestion is the primitive system of organic self-maintenance in which the organism takes part of its environment into itself, and draws from it the raw material that it needs. The

apparatus to lines 6–7). The editors say that this *alpha* is 'in all probability not identical' with the *alpha* presupposed by the *beta* with which their fragment 11 begins (vi. 347 note on fragment 11). They are certainly right that something is missing. But 'in all probability' what is lost is a sheet which connects our *alpha* section with our *beta* section (for although our next sheet begins with '*β*' it is by no means absolutely clear that this is the beginning of a section).

¹ *NKA*, vi. 211, 11–212, 2.

² *Ibid.*, 215, 15–216, 5.

³ *Ibid.*, 217, 4–5. (The 'lymphatic system' is first mentioned at 216, 5.) The 'seed of life' needs an animal-fluid medium for its 'germination' and nourishment. In 1805—when Hegel starts from the mature organism—we hardly hear of the *Gallerte* at all, but we do find several references to the stage when life is 'swimming in the lymph'.

focus of Hegel's concern shows, clearly, when he insists that this raw material must be vegetable matter at least, and that the best vegetable foods are fruit. The complex digestive arrangements of herbivores do not interest him.¹ Nor do the chemistry and mechanics of digestion, for he is primarily concerned to insist that when the plant material is 'infected' by the animal process, and the animal jelly is generated, an absolute transformation—not reducible to any chemical or mechanical process—takes place.²

The self-maintaining organic process relates itself to the great cycle of nature outside its skin through its sensory powers. The nervous system is the foundation of sensation. Hegel regards it as a further differentiation of the bone structure. He distinguishes the sympathetic nervous system from the voluntary system, but his knowledge is very incomplete, and his revisions are mainly evidence of the continuing increase of his stock of factual information.³

The arterial system Hegel treats as a development of the musculature. The heart, on which it all depends, is a muscle with no nerves (so we have no direct sense-awareness of it). The blood which it pumps is the bearer of the inward life that makes the body one, while the nerves externalize everything for intuition within a single field of sensation. Hence Hegel says that the nerve is the 'absolute concept in the form of universality' while the blood-system is 'the absolute concept in the form of difference'. As the 'side of difference of the inner system the blood makes the absolute *Zusammenhang* (the point of infinity) of the outer and inner systems'.⁴ The

¹ *NKA*, vi. 218, 6–8; 219, 18–220, 2. Anyone who compares the two sections marked *theta* will agree, I think, that the second is not intended to replace the first—except very partially. Hegel uses the Greek letters to classify and organize his material. He is assembling more of it under different headings, and the letter shows where it goes. (He does rewrite the earlier discussion so far as his new ideas and information make it necessary, but that is not his primary concern.)

² *NKA*, vi. 220, 3–221, 24. (Hegel changes his tune about this in 1805, having by then evolved a theory of his own, with a mechanical phase—chewing—a chemical phase—gastric and pancreatic juice—and a final enlivening phase—the 'fire of the bile'.)

³ Sect. *lambda*, *NKA*, vi. 225, 20–228, 9. (There is not much about the brain or the nervous system directly in the MS of 1805, but what references there are agree with what we find here. Hegel probably continued to rely on the 1803/4 notes as a system of stored information and theories.)

⁴ *NKA*, vi. 229, 3, 6 and 9–11. (In 1805, Hegel makes a sharp distinction between

nerves translate physical reality into mental awareness, while the blood is the life-force in a physical form. The blood is a more complete expression of vitality than the lymph (which arises directly from the transformation of the raw material that the body takes over).¹ It receives the lymph, keeps it alive, and carries it to different parts of the body for further transformation in the body-building process. Hegel recognizes that there is a reverse process, but he does not deal with the breakdown and removal of waste-products. His conception of the organism is a closed one, but he is interested in the organism's dependence on 'earth' and 'air'; so probably the absence of any reference to our 'water', merely reflects a gap in his empirical knowledge. Even his theory of the function of lungs and liver is very sketchy.²

The circulation of the blood is the life-principle of both the inner and the outer organism. 'The individual is complete in this reciprocity of the two organisms, it must become universal.' This it does in the sexual-reproductive process. Through the nervous system the inner organism has sense-awareness of the whole body.³ In order to complete its existence as a Kind it must have sensory awareness of what concerns it in the outer world.⁴ The specific sensory

the 'outer organism' (skin, bone, muscle, and alimentary canal) and the 'inner organism' (circulatory system and organs). Hence he no longer treats the heart as a mere muscle.)

¹ Hegel wrote a separate short discussion of this relationship on a sheet marked (like his main section on the blood) with the letter *nu*—vi. 230, 2–18. This illustrates how he used the Greek letters for classification purposes. It is easy in this instance to identify the cancelled passage that he was replacing, so the editors have inserted it at that point.

² The lungs are included under the circulation of the blood (*NKA*, vi. 231, 13–232, 2). The liver is the seat of our 'earthly fire'; it has its own Greek letter, *omicron*, but Hegel cannot find much to say about it, and his positive theory remains very vague in 1805. In the 1803/4 MSS a chemical theory of its function is cancelled and abandoned, vi. 232, 13–16 (cf. 22–6). There is no theory of the kidneys and urinary system in any of the Jena MSS. Hegel offers no account of waste-elimination at all; but in the case of anal evacuation this is not important, since he sees this as a mechanical relation with the outside world rather than as an internal moment of the life-process. Purgas count as 'external remedies' at *NKA*, viii. 180, 10–11 (Petry, *Nature*, iii. 31–2, 34).

³ This general sensation becomes instrumentally the sense of touch (which is general sensibility turned outwards)—cf. *NKA*, vi. 233, 5–8 and 235, 4–14. (See also the earlier discussion at 226, 3–18 where the centre of interest is voluntary motion. None of this is taken up in the lectures of 1805.)

⁴ It seems to me that at *NKA*, vi. 234, 15–18 Hegel is on the verge of formulating

apparatus is its means for this. The sensors must be modifications of the skin process, and of the nervous system.

Awareness of the outside world is the specific function of the *brain*; and the primary sense organ is the skin itself, the seat of the sense of touch. At the opposite extreme from touch, stands the specialized sense of sight which is an 'ideal' form of awareness in that it involves no bodily contact. 'In sight the brute is pressed to the ultimate abstraction of nature that is possible for it.'¹

Smell is a sort of synthesis of the real communication that typifies touch and the ideal awareness that typifies sight. There is real contact but only through an ideal (i.e. imperceptible) form of pure fluidity (the scent). Smell is the 'sense of the combustible',² for what volatilizes from an organism as its distinctive scent is the 'fiery' principle of its life.

Taste is the chemical sense (and the one that is crucial to assimilation and digestion). Touch and sight are the two sides of primitive sensibility, or common sense. Smell and taste are special modifications of touch for the general media of air and water respectively. But hearing and voicing are the true climax, the totality of sensibility, for together they make ideal communication possible. Calling cries may be almost involuntary, or quite non-deliberate and spontaneous, but they are still radically different from the rustles and clangs that sub-animate things produce only in response to direct contact; and responses are radically different from physical echoes.

Hegel has still no inkling of the enormous variety of animal communication. But in this first systematic philosophy of organism that has come down to us, the significance of mating calls, at least, is clearly established. 'In voice Kind and individual, universality and infinity coincide; and in this absolutely reflected unity of individuality, it [the singular organism] has become itself an outward [being] as whole individual.'³ The cry expresses the universal Kind—a

his dictum that 'sense is the simple immediate unity of being and of belonging (*des Seins und des Seinen*)' (NKA, viii. 166, 20). The context, in both places, shows that for Hegel sense-awareness is fundamentally appetitive, and that *sexual* belonging is the totality of *tierische Begierde*.

¹ NKA, vi. 236, 16–17.

² Ibid., 237, 7.

³ vi. 239, 18–240, 2. It is virtually certain that this point was established in the

knowledgeable human hearer can say instantly what animal it is. But it also expresses outwardly the inward life and feeling, the absolute need of the singular organism; and it closes the cycle of 'infinity' by making that single organism a whole individual when it brings the two sexes together.

Hegel rewrote his discussion of the 'theoretical process' of sensation so as to include an account of how it constitutes the organism's dominance (or subsuming) of the environment in its quest for food, etc., as well as the more important subsumption of the single organism in the process of the Kind, which we have just considered.¹ Here he shows explicitly that the organic/inorganic distinction arises from the ideal sublation of the greater organic process in sensory consciousness, which breaks the Earth-process itself into finite bits. The movement of the whole is now dominant as desire or need—the field of sensory awareness is full of attractive or aversive stimuli. (Hegel considers only the need for nourishment, but it is easy to generalize the analysis.)

very first form of Hegel's philosophy of nature, since the brute's 'demand to be recognized' (referred to in the *Difference* essay) is clearly a mating call—see *NKA*, iv, 73, 27–74, 9 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 168–9). The fact that Hegel considers only death-cries in the *System of Ethical Life* (*Schriften* (1913), pp. 435–6; Harris and Knox, pp. 115–16) arises from the *spiritual* context of that discussion. (The same holds true for the Real Philosophy of 1805—see *NKA*, viii, 170, 8–9). In the theoretical process of the Philosophy of Nature—the realization of the Kind—the individual organism is subordinated or 'subsumed'; it becomes an instrumental moment in the 'motion of the concept'. In the practical process of the Philosophy of Spirit, language is the medium of theoretical consciousness, the free expression of individuality. The 'swan song', mythical as it certainly is, is the symbolic expression of an intimation of the promised land that lies beyond the biological cycle by which animal life is bounded. (The mating call of the male for the female, is also a fighting challenge to another male. We have here one root for the 'life-and-death struggle' in natural life. But precisely because it is natural, and is naturally resolved by the establishment of a dominant/submissive relation it does not ultimately concern us in the Philosophy of Spirit.)

¹ Fragment 14, *NKA*, vi, 241–4. The sheet begins with an indented line (as if for a paragraph) but with a small letter; and at the end the sheet is crammed full (to avoid starting another). It belongs to this period, and hence somehow to this complex, but there is no classifying letter on it. All of these indications are more consistent with the hypothesis that it was written to be *inserted* into an already existing MS, than with the view that it is the second (or later) sheet of an independent discussion marked *sigma* at the beginning. But in that case either the larger revision into which it was inserted has been lost, or Hegel did not mark where it is to be inserted in our MS, or cross out any of the material that it would replace (the transition between sheet 108b and sheet 71a—vi, 247, 1–15—deserves closer examination in this connection).

What he seems to have added to his discussion of the Kind-process is an account of the impulse to nurse and protect the young: 'in [re]cognizing the young the brute has become Kind [for] itself . . . This becoming external of universality [i.e. of its Kind] is the highest form of rationality of which the brute is capable.'¹ Hegel also mentions the herding-instinct for the first time in this connection, though he does not rate its rationality very highly: It is 'the displaying of a higher relation with the Kind, but this universal is here itself nothing but a multitude of singulars.'² Herding in animals is like sex in plants—an anticipation of higher developments, but superfluous for the proper comprehension of the stage we have reached.

The organism is thus completed. There is a life-cycle (of the Kind) for which the physical self-preservation of the single bodily organism is an external, and dispensable, means. The bodily organism is a 'middle' between the Kind as a life form, and the great outward organism of the Earth-process. In sense-cognition, the middle breaks free from its servitude to the immortal powers which it connects. The animal-cry, though it is an essential practical moment in the infinite cycle of the life of the Kind, is also a critical moment of self-assertion for the individual organism. The whole realm of spirit turns upon this fulcrum. Hegel has expounded reproduction, as the context of irritability, and that in turn as the context of

¹ NKA, vi. 243, 12–17. (Of course this point is not new. We can see from the *System of Ethical Life* that it was probably argued in the first form of the philosophy of Nature. Hegel's only problem—which he does not seem to have solved to his own satisfaction yet—concerns where and how he is going to incorporate it in his new synthesis. The pattern of individual development, beginning from the male sperm and ending with disease and death is what leads me to suggest that he is considering a cancellation and insertion between sheets 108b and 71a. (Cf. *System of Ethical Life, Schriften* (1913), pp. 429, 431; Harris and Knox, pp. 110, 112—only the first passage definitely refers to the subhuman level but it is certainly natural to think of the animal-mother defending her young in connection with the second one.)

² NKA, vi. 243, 21–2. Hegel simply did not know how much structure there is in the social interactions of animal groups. But greater knowledge would not have affected his estimate of the conceptual issues, any more than it did in the matter of plant sexuality. On the other hand, he simply ignores the enormous complexity of insect societies (which made the beehive a powerful symbol for so many social thinkers before him). There is a natural continuum between human behaviour and the behaviour of the brutes. There is no such natural continuum between man and the insects.

organic sensation.¹ The natural goal of the whole process is the mature individual whose sensory apparatus is focused upon calling, and coupling with, its mate. Disease and death now follows as the logical revelation that the *Gestaltung* of the single organism is only a means for the continued propagation of the Kind. But the emergence of sense-consciousness is the beginning of a new cycle altogether.

Our concern at the moment, however, is with the completion of the life-cycle itself. The natural degeneration and death of the organism (as distinct from its succumbing to some accident of the Earth-process, or to the attack of some enemy) occurs because the harmonious functioning of the organism is constituted by a hostile tension between its sub-systems. Every distinct type of bodily tissue—bone, muscle, nerve, blood, etc.—is a particular tension of the primary jelly. This tension can be broken or overcome by one of the others. Thus the body can begin to digest itself so to speak (using 'digestion' as the name for any return to the 'primary fluidity').

Hegel interprets *fever* as the general symptom of the disturbance and restoration of the proper organic equilibrium. His insistence on organic tensing and slackening as 'the

¹ I have here interpreted the 'trinity of systems' through which the organism is said to be constituted at *NKA*, vi. 246, 10–11 in what seems the simplest way. This triad comes from Schelling—see *Von der Weltseele*, *Werke*, ii. 560–2. But Schelling does not treat 'sensibility' and 'irritability' as distinguishable systems, and it is by no means certain what 'trinity' Hegel means (only two members of any plausible trinity can be found in the text). He may mean to refer to the 'assimilation or digestion system' (which produces the 'lymph'), the 'nerve and blood system', and 'sense-awareness' rather than to reproduction, irritability, and sensation. (A deliberate revision on this point would account for the lacuna between his sections *alpha* and *beta* as they have come down to us.)

In 1805, he speaks of the 'outer organism' (bone, muscle, and gut) and the 'inner organism' (the circulation and reproductive system). But this simple opposition goes with the conception of 'animal process'. In 1803/4 he likes to speak of the circulation and nervous system as the 'middle' between 'outer' and 'inner'. This leaves 'inner' as an ambiguous term: it may refer to 'consciousness'; but the real 'inner' of animal life is the Kind. The 'identity of inner and outer' complicates the issue, for the 'inner' of sense awareness is also the 'outer world'; and hence the nervous system is the middle between the organism and the environment. But what the organism seeks in the outer world is (in turn) a mate—the other that is its own inner essence. Therefore it seems best—as far as the theory of the natural organism is concerned—to stick to 'sensibility, irritability, and reproduction' as the 'trinity of systems' that is meant here. But it might be better to say 'assimilative, irritable, and reproductive', since we must not think of 'sensibility' as 'sense-consciousness'. (The animal's sensory awareness of the world is part of its 'reproductive' cycle.)

essential theory of sickness'¹ represents a permanent debt to John Brown's theory of disease. The same view of fever is put forward in 1805; and even in the mature philosophy of nature the Brownian influence is still evident. But this first statement of Hegel's theory of disease might almost be described as the older Galenic theory adapted to accommodate Harvey, and restated in Brownian terminology.²

Brown's own theory—much in vogue among Schelling's students—comes in for some sharp criticism as a formalistic one. Hegel's own theory is a *transcendental* one in which focal concepts are identified, and the range of their possible application is illustrated. Brown confuses a logical theory with a method of treatment; as a result he forgets the living organism that his logic should articulate, and approaches the body as if it were a laboratory full of chemical retorts. Hegel's medicine would clearly be more holistic.³

'With sickness the brute oversteps the bounds of its nature; but the sickness of the brute is the coming into being of the Spirit.'⁴ The cycle from primitive fluidity to terminal fluidity identifies death with birth. Rational consciousness is the comprehension of this fluidity that articulates itself as a definite shape only in order to reassert itself and dissolve the shape again. The animal achieves its identity as the conscious Kind only as a sensible intuition. Hegel does not ascribe to it any conscious recognition of *self* in the mate or the young:

¹ *NKA*, vi. 254, 5.

² This is admittedly a rather impressionistic summing-up, since no one held by the theory of the humours any longer. Hegel himself comments that the 'pathology of the humours has sunk into a dead material view' (*NKA*, vi. 256, 11–12). I have not tried to trace any analogies between the macrocosm of the elements and the microcosm of bone, muscle, nerve, and blood in Hegel. But the matter would probably repay study.

³ See esp. his remarks about the 'dynamic view' and the pitfalls that it must avoid at *NKA*, vi. 258, 13–259, 12. (It seems clear that Schelling concurred with Hegel's critique of the Brownian system—cf. his 'farewell' to it in the first issue of the *Jahrbücher der Medizin als Wissenschaft* (1805), *Werke*, vii. 267, 276. It is especially significant that Schelling invited Hegel to collaborate with him in this new medical journal—see Letter 47, 14, vii, 1804. Schelling was evidently willing enough to accept Hegel's distinction between himself and his 'school'. On the other hand, the fact that Hegel ignored the invitation until the *Phenomenology* was in print—see Letter 82, 3, i, 1807—shows equally clearly that he was determined, for his part, not to go on being counted as part of the latter.

⁴ *NKA*, vi. 259, 13–14; cf. viii. 172, 20 (1805): 'Death of brute, coming to be of consciousness'.

'this whole that it is, it intuitively; its totality as the other sex and as *its offspring*; thus this [its sensing as organic whole] is likewise posited for it strictly under the form of singularity.'¹ Only in its natural death does the brute express what it is.

It cannot *know* what it is, because it cannot develop its sense-awareness into a universal cognition—as we do when we say 'blue is a colour' and so identify the *community* in which 'blue' is a member along with all the other colours that are sensibly opposed to it as different. The corresponding identity of the finite organism with the great community of natural life is what is shown by its death. But Hegel himself points the contrast between this natural transition, and the cognitive transition in which the finite elements of the higher community are preserved. At the natural level we have not the preservation of the single individual, but only the clear emergence of its universal meaning. It is the Kind that survives.² 'The brute is now the absolute trinity of organisms, of the outer, of the inner relating itself to that [i.e. circulation and nervous system], and of the absolute inner *free* organism.'³

The outward life of the embodied Kind can only rise to this freedom as a bad infinity of one generation succeeding another. The singular living organism preserves itself at all costs. But only the Kind is really preserved. 'The being of the individual on its own account . . . becomes *empty illusion* (*Täuschung*). While it means to produce itself, it is a product of the whole, and it produces the whole.'⁴

In his first draft Hegel was content to end his philosophy of nature by commenting that it is the destiny of spirit to repeat this cycle in consciousness. But he struck that out, and substituted a review of the whole progression from the natural aether to the aether of consciousness. The primordial aether is

¹ *NKA*, vi. 261, 10–14. This whole theory of the limit of animal consciousness is definitional for Hegel, not empirical. He is setting up the terms for the dialectic of freedom and self-preservation at the level of spirit. In this context the natural urge is defined as the instinct for survival.

² *NKA*, vi. 262, 9–263, 4.

³ *Ibid.*, 263, 13–14. This trinity of three organisms was anticipated within the organism at vi. 246, 12. (But, as we saw, it is uncertain what three 'systems' are there referred to. Here it seems that the 'free organism' of conscious spirit must be meant.)

⁴ *NKA*, vi. 264, 9–11.

'self-equivalent indifference' (universality) in contrast to the 'existing infinity' of the system of free motion in the heavens. In the Earth-process this opposition is mediated. The free motions all become aspects of the Earth's own life-cycle. But this identity of life and motion as embodied in the living Earth is only 'the absolute return of the aether into itself'. The infinite life is now embodied in a substance. It can now be conscious of itself. But it does not yet have any consciousness. *'In the spirit nature exists as that which its essence is.'*¹ *Existirt* has here the sense of 'stands forth'. The *essence* of Nature is what stands forth to be seen in the organism. 'Spirit' is simply the organism's becoming capable of seeing how it has stood forth.

¹ *NKA*, vi. 265, 4-5. This sentence stood in the first draft, but the original conclusion does not lead to it. It is merely a programmatic declaration. The revision may well have been prompted by the writing of the introduction for the philosophy of spirit (which repeats the last phase of the summing-up). The fact that, in the first version, the new topic was headed 'II. Philos des Geistes' and only became 'III. Philosophie des Geistes' in the revision may possibly reflect the fact that the older four-part division (Logic; Reality: I Nature, II Spirit; Resumption of the Whole) was still present in the *Delineatio*.

CHAPTER VII

The Philosophy of Spirit in 1804

1. *The concept of 'consciousness'*

In the lecture manuscripts, the beginning of the philosophy of spirit is directly continuous with the conclusion of the philosophy of nature. But the transition caused a great deal of trouble. Hegel rewrote his first discussion twice with additions; and he wrote several independent drafts. We cannot tell exactly which version or combination of versions he regarded as final. But it does not matter because he does not seem to be changing his views anywhere, but only looking for a way of expressing them more clearly. This is fortunate because for some of the cancelled passages, the revised versions are lost, and we must depend upon the cancelled version.¹ Some parts of the manuscript are lost altogether, and there are clear indications toward the end, that Hegel was forced to give a very condensed expression of his views because his time was running out.²

In the spirit the absolutely simple aether has returned to itself by way of the infinity of the Earth; in the Earth as such this union of the absolute simplicity of aether and infinity exists; it spreads into the universal fluidity, but its spreading fixates itself as singular things; and the numerical unit of singularity, which is the essential charac-

¹ I have arranged the drafts in what seems to me to be the clearest and most continuous way in my translation (which departs somewhat from the order of the Critical Edition). I shall follow the same order in my discussion here (but both here and in the translation, the reader should find that my references make the original texts easy to locate—see Harris and Knox, pp. 205–50).

² The condensation is evident in the *unmarked* transition to the *Volk* at *NKA*, vi. 315, 2. If the fragment *ist nur die Form* (vi. 330–1) does indeed belong to this same complex, then we can judge from it how condensed the statement of the theory of 'absolute consciousness' was (Harris and Knox, pp. 242, 251–3).

teristic (*Bestimmtheit*) for the brute becomes itself an ideal factor, a moment. The concept of Spirit, as thus determined, is *Consciousness*, the concept of the union of the simple with infinity; . . .¹

This opening echoes the revised conclusion of the philosophy of nature. But by the time he had got this far Hegel decided to begin with a brief review of the system as a whole. So he wrote the following for insertion at the beginning:

The first part of philosophy constructed the Spirit as Idea; and it arrived at the absolute self-identity, at absolute substance which in coming to be through the activity against the passivity within the infinite antithesis absolutely is just as it absolutely *comes to be*. This Idea fell absolutely apart in the philosophy of Nature; absolute being, the aether, sundered itself from its becoming or infinity, and the union of the two was the inner aspect, the buried [essence] which lifted itself out in the organism and exists in the form of singularity, that is as a numerical unit; in the philosophy of Spirit it exists as taking itself back into absolute universality, it is real as the absolute union, as absolute becoming.²

Putting the two pieces together, and considering them in the light of the revised ending of the philosophy of nature, we can see that the 'infinite life' (of God) is the topic at each of these major turning-points. The logic presents the divine life as an absolute Substance in which the essence (being, activity) is identical with the existence (becoming, passive product or expression). The substance is eternally as a process of coming-to-be. In the philosophy of nature this essence is manifested in time and space. What is there visibly is the process (as a temporal cycle). The divine life itself is the aetheric energy that sustains this process, but it cannot show itself directly, its presence is revealed only in the unfailing transience of the determinate moments of the manifestation.

¹ *NKA*, vi. 265, 7–266, 4 (Harris and Knox, p. 206). The first two clauses belong to the 1st draft; the 3rd was added in the margin; the 4th is on a separate sheet, with the new introductory paragraph quoted below (see next note).

² *NKA*, vi. 268, 3–12 (Harris and Knox, pp. 205–6). The editors have decided to treat this as a separate fragment, but it is on the same sheet as the final clause of the revised opening; and Hegel wrote this passage on the sheet *first* (beginning with 'III. Philos. des Geistes' which shows where he meant to insert it). Editorial caution is perhaps justified in the critical edition, but I hope my interpretation of how Hegel's mind worked will be found persuasive.

The finite organism brings the hidden unity to light because it is knowingly alive. But it is also consciously finite; and the infinite process against which it has emerged is broken up into a field and a sequence of finite parts by its awareness.¹ For brute perception there is *this* other living thing, its mate, *this* third which is its offspring, *this* fourth which is its prey (or its pursuer), and so on. This is the 'fixation into singularities' of which Hegel speaks in our present passage. Even this sense-awareness is a theoretical process which has 'subsumed' the 'infinity of the Earth' and reduced it to 'singular details' (*Einzelheiten*) defined in terms of their relevance to the self-maintenance of the organism. But the rational consciousness which has constructed this whole theory of the Earth-process and of the life-cycle of the organism, has now achieved the concept of the divine life itself as consciousness. This theoretical awareness is the 'concept of Spirit'.

As a real process in the world, spirit embraces all rational consciousness. We must insert the qualification 'rational', because although spirit already exists in the most rudimentary act of human sense-awareness, the term 'consciousness' (*Bewusstseyn*) designates in Hegel's usage only the forms of organic awareness that can be developed to the stage of comprehending the divine life. Only the divine life—the aether—simply is; so only that which is already the awareness of the divine life, and which is, furthermore, *capable of recognizing what it is*, satisfies Hegel's definition of 'conscious-being': 'the being-one of the simple and of infinity'. All 'life'—and this means everything that 'moves itself', from the heavenly bodies in Hegel's world-system, to the sub-atomic particles or wave-packets in ours—is a moment of the divine life. But only what can come to know that can be called spirit proper; every energy-cycle below that level is a form of 'spirit in bonds'—the *bond* being whatever limit defines that stage, and makes it knowable for us. The stage immediately below us, who have comprehended the whole, *must* be defined stipulatively, as whatever is or can be aware of itself as a finite being, but is strictly incapable of perceiving its finitude as a moment in a greater whole. Just which animate organisms are

¹ See esp. *NKA*, vi. 242, 4–8.

brutes, and which are conscious beings is an empirical question, and must for ever remain so.¹

How animate organisms become conscious beings, what structures of living interaction are necessary to bring about and sustain the clear recognition that we live and move and have our being in the 'absolute aether', is the logical problem of the philosophy of spirit. It is vitally important for us to see it as a *logical* problem, not a psychological or a religious one. The balance of social influence has shifted so drastically between Hegel's time and ours (in the West and the Marxist East at least) from the religious to the scientific establishment, that Hegel's own contribution to this shift has itself become an obstacle to the right understanding of what he said. *He* wanted to swing religious consciousness into full support of a scientific interpretation of human life; and by a scientific interpretation he meant one which identified that which absolutely *is* as 'spirit'. Hence he continually harps on the Christian teaching that 'God is a spirit'. His own choice of language was conditioned by the Christian teaching, but also by the knowledge that the Christian doctrine of spirit was derived from Stoic sources.

The crucial point is that it is *only* in human rational consciousness that spirit exists as spirit. The aether exists; and how it 'posits itself' represents the Fate against which the mightiest of the Gods is powerless. If Hegel were wrestling with contemporary cosmological theory he would identify his 'aether' either with the original 'big bang' or with whatever set the bang off (if it is conceptually legitimate to speak of its being 'set off', as I fancy it is not). In that guise it will hardly trouble anyone's scientific conscience; and it has no other. Hegel separates himself radically from the orthodox interpretation of Genesis (whether Judaic or Christian) when he declares that the *aether is not God*, that *it is rather absolute*

¹ This logical necessity is dictated by the evolutionary concept of animate life. But the evolutionary concept of animate life is practically dictated by the recognition that 'cognition' is an evolving continuum. Even if biological species appeared to us to be as fixed as the periodic table of the elements (which only exhibits instability toward the top) it would still be true that our treatment of dolphins *ought* to differ radically from our treatment of oysters. Anyone who claims that this is not apparent to him is himself evincing a brutal indifference (to use an ordinary term in an ordinary way which throws light on its Hegelian meaning).

matter. We should note that he twice explicitly identifies 'the Idea' as 'absolute matter'; and that he sharply distinguishes between the 'Idea of God' and 'the living God'.¹ Defining 'Spirit' gives Hegel trouble because everything else has to be defined in relation to it, so that the normal method of definition by direct contrast is not open to him. Spirit has to be defined by a sort of indirect contrast. It is opposed to matter, as that which exists in and through it. Thus the aether is 'absolute matter' (and the *obvious* contrast for spirit is 'matter' or 'body') but what the 'absoluteness' of matter means is that it is absolute spirit as the side of its 'self-equivalence' — or, in other words, the aether is absolutely conserved. It is what is independent of actual cognition precisely because *it must be there for cognition*. That what must be for actual cognition, cannot itself be anything but the potentiality of the cognizant, is the burden of Hegel's single enormous transcendental argument. There may be dispute about whether that argument is valid (or, more constructively in my view, about what it means supposing its validity is granted). There can be no disputing that with respect to what self-identically abides, Hegel is a materialist and not a theist. He could not avoid this; and of course the youthful admirer of Job's autonomy, and the trenchant critic of the Almighty Legislator of Abraham, Moses, and Kant, never wanted to avoid it. In his mature philosophy Hegel dropped all overt reference to the aether in the transition from Logic to Nature; we hear only about 'the Idea letting itself go'. But that later silence does not affect the logical grounds of the distinction between the 'Idea of God' (here called the aether or 'absolute matter') and the 'living God' 'who is self-cognitive from his Idea, and cognizes himself as himself in what is other than himself'. The mere Idea (as the aether) is 'absolute spirit, which relates itself to itself, does not cognize itself as absolute spirit'.²

Hegel calls this 'merely formal not self-cognitive life' 'the

¹ The aether is called 'absolute matter' at *NKA*, vii. 178, 1-2 and 188, 4-5; this shows what 'absolute matter' refers to at vii. 11, 5-9 (where it becomes 'dead mass' through its descent from heaven to earth). The distinction between the aether as 'Idea of God' and 'the living God' is made at vii. 188, 10-13.

² These quotations come from *NKA*, vii. 188, 7-13 (see Harris and Knox, p. 205 n. 3 for the context).

goodness of God'.¹ All that this means is that to be alive is a good, and everything that is, is a form of life. But only when the life-form cognizes itself as absolute spirit does it exist as God properly. Until then we can only say that it is part of God's 'goodness' in creation. But we are only led to say that by our religious perception of all lower forms of life as an outflow of the infinite life. Hegel uses this religious intuition as a stepping-stone to his own conception of infinite life. But the logic of his argument does not need it, being designed precisely with the object of rendering it superfluous. Infinite life is just the aether brought to self-consciousness; and this is what Hegel wants to prove that *human* consciousness is, when it arrives at the free rationality that is proper to it.

Hence we find him giving closely similar definitions of the aether, and of consciousness as such. The aether is 'the unity of the self-equivalent and the infinite'.² Consciousness as such is 'the concept of the oneness of the simple and infinity'³ or 'the simple-being of infinity';⁴ and the living God is 'the unity of the simple and the infinite'.⁵ Thus the aether is the 'Idea' of God and consciousness is the 'concept' of God. We have, as a result, two closely related problems. First to understand the relation of the 'self-equivalent' and 'the simple'; and secondly to understand the relation of the Idea and the concept.

'Self-equivalence' belongs to the aether as that which is absolutely conserved. The open manifestation of its absolute stability is the perfect conservation of motion in the Solar System. But it is everywhere conserved even in what seems to have a fugitive or accidental existence. Because of its essentially dynamic character, it is fair to equate Hegel's 'self-equivalence of the aether' with our principle of the conservation of energy.

'Simplicity', on the other hand, belongs to a singular body that conserves itself. The atoms of Newton (or of Dalton) would be 'simples'; but Hegel did not believe that the real world was constituted out of singular atomic entities of this

¹ *NKA*, vii. 181, 31 (cf. 181, 2-30).

² *NKA*, vii. 190, 3 (cf. 189, 15, 21).

³ *Ibid.*, vi. 266, 4-5 (Harris and Knox, p. 206).

⁴ *Ibid.*, vi. 274, 24 (Harris and Knox, p. 213).

⁵ *Ibid.*, vii. 188, 32.

kind (any more than we do). 'Simplicity' could belong to a thing, in his view, only because it was 'infinite'; that is to say it was a closed energetic cycle. Of all the cyclic energetic processes in our world, only the Earth is a closed cycle in which the energy can return to itself in a 'conceptual' cycle. For only the Earth contains conscious life as a moment within its cycle. Hegel's argument is that in order for an absolute living principle to know itself as such, it *must* take shape as an intuitable *whole* (the Earth-process within the Solar System) which contains consciousness as a *moment*. And in order to recognize itself as a *moment* consciousness must come to birth and perish again. This argument only spells out what cognition means *for us*. It is a 'transcendental' argument because it spells out what is presupposed in the claim that the human mode of experience can yield knowledge. It does so by showing what 'absolute' knowledge must mean for us. It defines what we can mean (and all that we can mean) by 'divine knowledge'. 'God's' knowledge can only refer (in any human usage that is cognitively meaningful) to the structure which we recognize as absolutely necessary in our own cognition. Any human assertion about God that transgresses this limit is not 'scientifically' interpretable—or, in other words, it does not have the theoretical meaning that it pretends to have. It may, of course, have practical significances that are objective enough (as is graphically illustrated by the experience of Galileo when his science brought him into conflict with the accepted interpretation of the book of Joshua). The practical assumption that any transcendental philosophy makes is that theoretical self-understanding (saying exactly what we mean, and knowing exactly and completely what we are saying) is the ultimate goal of conscious rationality—or that as Aristotle said 'all men naturally desire to know'.

Now we can come to the Idea and the Concept. The aether, as that which abides unchanged in all the changes which express its dynamic essence, is the 'Idea' of God. An Idea is a thought that is in perfect balance with its object, a concept that expresses perfectly the universal significance of its real (individual) content. This perfect equivalence can only be cognized through the process by which the moment of simple consciousness explicates all of its content and *forms itself into*

the adequate Idea of it. This process is the 'absolute movement of the concept'. Hegel formulates his philosophy of nature as 'the self-cognition of the Earth' because the Earth-process is the only true simple. Unless we interpret and explicate every 'psychologically simple' intuitive awareness that we have as an intuition of that process, we shall not cognize it properly. For practical purposes—even for the practical purposes of scientific cognition—a much smaller context may be sufficient. That is the point of maintaining controlled conditions in the laboratory. But the Earth is the only self-sustaining system of controlled conditions for rational existence. It is not as surely able to sustain itself in practice as Hegel thought, but that only underlines the importance of his theoretical insight. All our standardized laboratory conditions are established by reference to the terrestrial norm (except where, beginning from that empirical norm, we have been able to construct a theory which defines some absolute limit, as in the case of the Kelvin scale for temperature).

When we regard empirical consciousness as awareness of 'the Earth' it becomes objectively cognitive. But all consciousness is 'simple' in its intuitive aspect. Referring it to 'the Earth' gives it an abiding point of origin which will stand firm to be its conceptual terminus when its cognitive significance is fully explicated.

We might be tempted to think that Hegel's concept of the Earth-process was itself suggested by the sequential development of his own consciousness of the Earth, and that in calling *his* concept of the Earth-process 'the *self*-cognition of the earth' he is guilty of an obviously fallacious, wish-fulfilling, and self-deceptive, act of projection. This is a mistake, and it is exactly the mistake which he was trying to rectify. He may indeed have been influenced by psychological considerations, but what he saw was that they are logically irrelevant. The way my mind works does not guarantee the objectivity of any cognition to which I lay claim; and the fact that others seem to agree with me will not guarantee it either. There are generally some who do not agree, and even if at this moment we are all unanimous, we can still be wrong—as the author of Joshua was wrong about the Sun's needing to be commanded to stand

still. The author of Joshua, however, was not guilty of wish-fulfilment, or self-deception, in taking the solid stable Earth as the standpoint from which his God must utter commands. It is *always the structure of our world* of experience, not the structure of any one mind or group of minds, *that provides the context for intuition*; and this means that there must be some objective whole of which we are immediately conscious of being part, and in terms of which we can conceptualize our singular experience. Our Earth is that natural whole; and it is so for all of us who come to birth upon it, with a body and sense apparatus adapted for life upon it. If we are going to justify the claim of human cognition to be true cognition, we must see and say first that it has 'stepped forth from the Earth'.¹

Of course, this natural standpoint is *not* absolute—as Galileo triumphantly urged against the author of Joshua. But the moral to be drawn from this is not that cognitive experience must be interpreted as belonging to a disembodied mind (as if the human philosopher could adopt the standpoint of Joshua's God and lay down the laws of 'possible experience' from outside experience altogether). Disembodied minds cannot exist for us; and any 'pure form' we may construct will be conditioned by the natural Earth-process that we have stepped forth from, and the conscious world that we step forth into. The transcendental standpoint must rather comprehend the freedom that is essentially involved in natural embodiment and cultural conditioning. It must take freedom *for* embodiment (not freedom *from* embodiment) as its stable standpoint. That is what Hegel means by identifying spirit as the self-cognition of the aether. Embodiment is not a fixed point in cognition, but it is a necessary moment. The Earth moves. But the sense-experience, in and for which everything else moves, while Earth abides, is the inescapable natural foundation from which the conceptual evolution of embodied cognition starts; and the Earth itself is the embodied concept—the Idea in process—which drives this evolution onward till it achieves freedom. Freedom too has its cycle of development, which culminates in conscious identification with the 'living

¹ Cf. *NKA*, vi. 269, 20 (Harris and Knox, pp. 207–8 n. 8).

God';¹ and just as the rationally sentient consciousness of the natural individual—the 'self-cognition of the Earth'—is the regulative concept that enables us to organize the data of natural science into philosophical coherence, so the 'self-cognition of the aether'—the embodiment of absolute or divine consciousness in the community of free rational individuals (i.e. families)—is the regulative concept in terms of which human words and deeds must be interpreted.

This is the crucial point about Hegel's theory of consciousness as the 'concept of spirit'. It is essentially human, because it *must* be embodied; but the *embodiment is never* properly singular—for in singular embodiment there is no freedom. *Consciousness is a communal medium.* Like the aether, it posits itself phenomenally as singular 'points of light'; but there must be a plurality of them, and they must exist for one another as conscious, just as the stars must shine on one another. But the difference between 'on' and 'for' here is that each star could go on shining if all the others went out; consciousness is not like that. A singular consciousness could not generate or sustain itself. Consciousness is individual; but it is so in the way in which our sun is individual, by being the one common light in which all others are drowned. This is the consciousness of the *Volk* which must go on finally to become the consciousness of mankind as one folk, or the consciousness of Reason as such. But for any sentient 'consciousness of the Earth' to become a self-conscious singular person there must minimally be an existing conscious community large enough to maintain itself throughout the cycle of the seasons, and to develop a language, in which its communal world-consciousness is embodied.

2. *The evolution of consciousness*

The necessary structures of a naturally conscious community of this minimal kind are the topic of the first three *Potenzen* of

¹ Unfortunately the fragmentary state of the MS does not allow us to reconstruct the phase of spiritual freedom very adequately. But this identity with the living God is the stated goal of spiritual freedom (see the quotation below); and we shall see it realized in the *Volk*. What we do not have is the explicit identification of philosophical knowledge as the restoration of its perfect self-equivalence. But that can be securely inferred from the opening pages of the philosophy of nature in the textbook of 1804.

the philosophy of spirit of 1804. But just as the self-cognition of the Earth must be premissed as the organizing principle of the theory of nature, so the 'living God' must be premissed from the first in the theory of consciousness. In the first draft it appears thus:

The highest existence of consciousness is that for the individual its opposite itself should be as absolute consciousness, i.e. as unity of what is conscious with what it is conscious of, [that] the singularity of the individual should be a sublated [singularity]. The infinity of consciousness is the sublating of the opposite in its simplicity; the essence is always the middle, within which the superficial, self-sublating antithesis of the actively conscious and what it is conscious of exists (*ist*). This middle, or consciousness as absolute, must realize itself. It is not real insofar as it is consciousness of the individual, rather this is its ideality, its sublated determinacy.¹

This passage is deleted in the second draft; but the explanation that the 'realization of the middle' is the *Volk* is left intact. We do not have the final revision of this passage; but the second version as we have it resembles the *System of Ethical Life* in that the practical reality of the rational community forms the presupposition of the whole discussion.² The important difference is that in the first philosophy of spirit proper Hegel is consistently occupied with the theoretical evolution of individual consciousness into absolute consciousness by way of this real middle; whereas in the *System of Ethical Life* he is concerned with the practical discipline through which the natural bonds of feeling are transformed into the social commitments of the citizen.

This practical discipline is still the essential content of the educational transformation of consciousness in the 1804 Philosophy of Spirit. But consciousness itself is not produced by discipline. We learn to talk and to walk; but this learning is quite different from learning to march in step, or being drilled in the repetition of Homer, or the catechism. To speak intelligibly, to master our bodies, to understand and explore

¹ *NKA*, vi, 269, 13–20 (Harris and Knox, p. 207 n. 8).

² Cf. the *System of Ethical Life*, *Schriften* (1913), p. 420 (Harris and Knox, pp. 101–2) with the *First Philosophy of Spirit*, *NKA*, vi, 270, 12–271, 10 (Harris and Knox, p. 209).

our environment, these are desires that we spontaneously have, necessities that we directly feel. We want to be members of the conscious community, because we want to be ourselves; being understood by, and actively functioning in, the community is the only way that we can exist as the conscious selves that we are. In this aspect there is no sense of alienation between the single consciousness and the communal medium; but then, lo and behold, the placidly receptive or supportive medium of our self-expression reacts negatively, and we are made aware that it has a will of its own. We are not allowed to say just what we want to say or to do whatever we have spontaneously learned how to do. We are made to conform to the norms of the community, even when we do not want to, and even when the norms appear to us as impediments to our self-expression, not as facilitating our achievements and their more general appreciation.

This disciplinary aspect of the community causes it to appear as a great individual will opposed to ours; and so we lose sight of the original *identity*, the unbroken continuum of consciousness that makes human existence so radically different from the sense-world of the brutes. But it is the original continuum, the universal co-operative activity, which sustains the self-expressive efforts of every individual, and makes him visible to himself and others as a conscious-being, that we must begin from. The brutes are sensibly aware of a world of singular things; and because our consciousness takes over this world of brute-awareness as its raw material, we think of it as a developed function of that awareness. The community *appears* to us only when it becomes the power which will not suffer that awareness to develop spontaneously in the way that is natural to it. Thus the antithesis of self and other, which is indeed primitive to brute sensation, seems to be primitive to consciousness too. We do not see that the antitheses are different, and that between them there has intervened an identity which is the real foundation of consciousness. Before it can appear as an alien power, and in order that it may appear as a spiritual power, the community must first be there as the invisible aether of rational self-expression through which alone we become visible to ourselves and others as something quite other than particular organisms which must maintain

themselves in order to fulfil the biological function of self-reproduction. It is this invisible *continuum of meaningfulness* (which must be alienated from us if it is to become visible to us) which is what is really primitive to consciousness. While we are discovering ourselves, and exploring the world, learning to talk, and listening to stories, or to grandfather's reminiscences of long ago, we are simple consciousness. There is opposition here, for the exploring mind is opposed by a body that does not do what it is trying for; or later, by the world of things to be puzzled over and played with to see what they will do; or by grandfather's not quite familiar language, and his perhaps initially alarming appearance. But there is no alienation; for the mind is a simple urge for comprehension and the world is its simple object, a thing to be comprehended. They are the active and passive sides of the concept; and experience, as the motion of the concept, is their coalescence without stress. As an urge toward expression in the bodily form of particular words and deeds, the active concept is the direct opposite of itself; as a complex of meanings to be discovered, the world of sensible particular things is likewise the direct opposite of itself. But on both sides we have 'the singular taken up into universality without conflict'¹ because consciousness as a whole is likewise the immediate simple opposite of itself; the appearance of the opposition between active and passive is only part of the motion through which the underlying continuum of consciousness realizes and expresses itself, 'the oneness of the distinction in being and the distinction sublated'.²

Of course, if the child touches the hot stove while exploring; or falls over grandfather's feet and hits his head on the floor because of his excited participation in grandfather's story, this 'oneness' vanishes with melodramatic abruptness. We have now a small animal in strife with its sensible environment; consciousness proper returns only as the pain eases, and the lesson can be conceptually formulated and assimilated. What I mean by 'the lesson' here is something more than the reflex of avoidance, which most mammals can

¹ NKA, vi. 266, 9-10 (Harris and Knox, p. 207).

² Ibid., 267, 3 (Harris and Knox, p. 207).

acquire quite permanently if the experience is painful enough. For the child the lesson is mediated by the linguistic continuum of consciousness; others explain to him what has happened and why. Mother may very well slap him quite sharply, in order to discourage him from touching the hot stove. Here we have alienation *within* the spiritual realm; and the pain of the slap must be carefully distinguished from the pain of the burn (or the sting of his hands if he uses them to save his head from hitting the floor). However similar the sensations may be (and one could invent examples where the similarity would be perfect) they have quite a different significance in the continuum of conscious interpretation; but this difference can only be made apparent by conceptual expression. It is because we cannot easily establish how far an animal can appreciate the difference between an aversive stimulus and the intention behind it (which may, like the hasty slap to save the child's fingers from something much worse, be quite benevolent) that we must draw a line between *brute* sensation and *human* consciousness.¹

Practical interaction between organism and environment is, of course, a fundamental moment or driving force in the development of singular consciousness. In our 'private' life, we are first of all concerned with the interpretation of our own brute sensations. But the possibility of giving these sensations a universal (theoretical) interpretation, instead of just forming associative links between particulars, depends on our membership in a morally cognitive community. The qualification 'moral' is essential, because it is the distinction between

¹ Birds and mammals 'teach' their young in this way. But we are debarred from knowing how far animals have 'consciousness', i.e. how far they participate in a continuum of conscious interpretation, because they are mute—they cannot participate actively in *our* continuum. Sound common sense generally attributes feelings to them, and far more cognitions than we have found means to demonstrate scientifically. Hegel tends to fall in with common sense (see, e.g. his analysis of animal training in the *System of Ethical Life, Schriften* (1913), pp. 427–8 (Harris and Knox, pp. 108–9) or of their self-expression (*Schriften* (1913), pp. 435–6, Harris and Knox, pp. 115–16; *NKA*, vi. 279, 21–3, Harris and Knox, p. 217). But philosophically he draws a sharp line between brute sensation, and human consciousness because the conceptual continuum is the *foundation* of the latter. (Of course, scientific investigation has demonstrated a lot about animal communication of which educated common sense is still only very imperfectly aware. If Hegel were alive now he would certainly attend to that; but only the application, not the logical structure of his transcendental theory would be affected.)

interpreting the sting of a slap, and interpreting the sting of a fall, which marks the difference between the natural reading of experience, and the transcendental one. I have called the first practical, the second theoretical. But it is only when the theoretical viewpoint becomes practical and exercises authority over natural imperatives of enjoyment and self-preservation, that the difference between 'particular' and 'universal' interpretation is clearly visible. Universal interpretation involves the assumption of a 'public' point of view. The child does not draw the same lesson from the slap that he draws from his encounter with the floor because he knows that his mother is not hurtfully disposed towards him. He expects to have the paradox explained; and the explanation, though it will form part of his self-preservative system of particular expectations about the stove in future, lacks precisely the particular aspect (or sensational origin) of an actual burning experience. The practical reinforcement of the slap is necessary precisely because (or so far as) the original impulse to touch the stove was itself consciously theoretical. If mother explains *without* the slap the urge of curiosity may lead to the full embodiment of the theoretical explanation in an actual experiment. The child has to be made to accept a limit here. The nature of hot stoves has, in this respect, been publicly settled, and private explorations are not allowed (at least not by three-year-old fingers). In the whole experience we have an example of the 'organization of the spirit' at its simplest.¹ The spirit is preserving itself (as an organism typically does). For if a three-year-old does touch a hot stove, he falls altogether out

¹ The example is meant to explicate the whole paragraph which begins: 'In so far as we are cognizant of the *organization* of the Spirit, we do not regard consciousness as the merely inner aspect of the individuals, etc.' *NKA*, vi. 271, 11-272, 6; Harris and Knox, pp. 209-10). Here 'consciousness generally' is the union of mind and nature ('singularity' and the 'determinate concept') achieved by what I have called 'the continuum of consciousness'. The continuum must *organize itself* as social authority in order to organize 'the merely inner aspect' of individuals as one of its 'sides'. Consciousness exists *between* mother and child because the slap is an act to be explained. The child (like a Homeric hero) thinks the floor is acting, too. He is, in a sense, closer to the truth than Moses, who believes that another mind has written on the stone. But he is also further away, for it is only by taking nature as the instrument of communication for *another* mind, that we can finally discover what mind is (not 'mine', indeed, but 'ours').

of the spiritual realm, until he gets over the sensation and recovers conscious self-control.

Consciousness is thus the continuum of what is publicly known. 'Known' means here 'recognized and accepted'. Knowledge is itself a continuum that goes from the child's certainty that his mother is not hurtful, to the certainty of transcendental philosophy; and it is not free from error at any stage—in the sense that experience can always bring to light an aspect of misconception in the interpretation, or of incompleteness or misreading with respect to the content of the experience.

The 'first existence' of consciousness is the continuum of theoretical explanation and exchange of experience in which no authority is necessary because no threat to its integrity exists.¹ Grandfather reminisces, and *consciousness changes its form*: his memories of his life become little Peter's memories of grandfather's life too. What little Peter remembers is different from what grandfather remembers; he cannot have grandfather's memories, any more than grandfather can anticipate what Peter will tell his own grandchildren about the exchange. But it is grandfather's real experience which is thus transmitted; and the transmission can occur because the motion that changes the form of the memory in this way is itself the absolute form of intelligence. Something is truly transmitted because little Peter understands something from what grandfather says; and if grandfather's words are vivid for him, so that they remain in his memory, he will certainly understand more when he is older.² The memory of the

¹ NKA, vi. 280, 3–18. My translation (Harris and Knox, p. 210) is at fault here. For '... the concept of spirit as it makes itself into the totality, whether as this concept [i.e. ideally] or as consciousness [i.e. really]' we should read: 'the concept of spirit as it makes itself into totality as this concept, i.e. as consciousness'. There is not contrast of conceptual and real existence here. The 'real' existence of consciousness (as labour and tool) belongs to the next *Potenz*.

² *Exactly* what grandfather remembers, no one save grandfather at the moment of speech, will ever know; but since grandfather himself will not remember it in exactly the same way tomorrow, this is not the criterion for the true transmission of memory. What is transmitted through grandfather's words is the structure of his conscious world. If Peter remembers grandfather's words, he can put them into the right historical world-context when he is older. Most forms of historical scepticism spring from the mistaken analysis of 'consciousness' in which it is confused with immediate sensation. Once we accept the primacy of the continuum we can see why 'the first

words is the 'absolute matter' of consciousness, and the capacity to interpret (however childishly) the words remembered is its 'empty form'. The public standard for all efforts at interpretation is 'the determinate concept', i.e. the whole complex of ordinary meanings of words. Since the ordinary use of words is primarily to describe the world, the 'determinate concept' is the world as it is ordinarily understood; and in this sense (which is not at all ordinary) the understanding is 'the being of the determinate concept'.¹

Consciousness organizes itself as the 'determinate concept' (or publicly shared description) of the world, and particularly of the terrestrial environment of the given community. But the community also takes over the environment and reshapes it. The activity of this takeover is labour; and the product of the reshaping is tools. This is the real existence of consciousness, which involves secure possession and practical control of some parts of the environment. The real existence of the most elementary human community, the family, depends on this possession and control.²

form of the existence of the Spirit' (or *Bewusstseyn überhaupt*) is 'memory'. Hegel himself used my example—see *Encyclopaedia Logic* § 237z.

¹ *NKA*, vi. 280, 14–15 (Harris and Knox, p. 211); cf. vi. 277, 10–12 (Harris and Knox, p. 216) which shows that 'absolute matter' means the *aether* here too. The understanding reflects its world in language. Thus we could not have the sort of understanding that we do have, if our Earth did not appear to us as a simple conglomeration of elementary types of matter, or a mass of nameable things. What things there are to be named is an empirical problem. But our freedom to change our schemas and our ability to move back and forth between new and old schemas is logically necessary (as long as grandfather continues to talk to little Peter). Thus the 'aetheric identity' of consciousness, and the ideal of absolute knowledge as the 'self-cognition of the aether' are Hegel's ways of expressing the *transcendental* character of his theory. The aether is not a physical hypothesis but a categorical necessity.

² *NKA*, vi. 280, 18–281, 11 (Harris and Knox, pp. 210–11); cf. vi. 276, 23–279, 23 (Harris and Knox, pp. 215–17). The way that Hegel goes from theoretical consciousness, through the tool to the family is another evidence of his historical materialism. It is only within the family that little Peter learns to talk, and to do what mother tells him. Nevertheless, the family is not a necessary presupposition for the emergence of our theoretical capacities; for we might enter the spiritual world like the talking tiger-lilies in *Alice in Wonderland* (though we could never progress as far as Lewis Carroll allows them to, unless we could move about like John Wyndham's Triffids). The family is rather the necessary result of the application of our theoretical capacity to the cycle of animal reproduction imposed on us by nature; and possession of nature as a set of understood resources is the means which makes the spiritual institution of the family possible. (If we were like the Triffids, the real existence of consciousness would take quite a different form; but Alice could talk to us, as she does

The conceptual idealization of nature as a complex of meanings in a determinate language, and its real idealization as a complex of utilities for family life, are 'the ideal moments of the existence of the spirit'. The family is the immediate organization of spirit in opposition to nature. The 'opposition' is only minimal with respect to animal desire; for, in fact, many mammals pair more faithfully than man.¹ But the negative relation to nature is evident enough in the reduction of things to concepts and the reshaping of raw material into tools.

The immediate existence of spirit in language, natural utilities, and family goods, is only a *means* for its free existence. To the singular consciousness these things appear primarily as the means for its own free existence; but these are permanent social institutions, not consumables like this year's harvest or his own life. They have, in fact, more lordship over him, than he has over them, although mastery is the wrong word for the way the substantial reality of the *Volk* operates in its singular moments or organs. We shall begin to see, when we come to the account of domestic education, how complex self-realization in speech is; and enough of Hegel's analysis of the economic process survives to show clearly that 'lordship' is the only word for the rationalization of labour in the production of utilities.²

This glance ahead helps to confirm that, in spite of appearances, the transition to *Sittlichkeit*, and the intuition of the

to the tiger-lilies, once she had managed to learn our language. To do that, of course, would involve understanding and respecting whatever institutions did embody the real existence of our consciousness. For one does not waste breath *talking* to the barbarian horde.)

¹ The life-long fidelity of wolf-pairs etc., would presumably appear to Hegel as an 'anticipation' (like the sexuality of plants). But actually the abiding character of human family commitments (*NKA*, vi. 281, 7-8; Harris and Knox, p. 211) is not what is crucial to his theory. The preservation of continuity is crucial, but the difference is that rational recognition gives the ties of desire and of blood a new meaning, not that it makes them more permanent and reliable. Hegel would have avoided some of his more unfortunate aberrations about human sex-relations if he had distinguished between the natural and the transcendental perspective sharply, and more regularly than he does. His feelings overbore his reason here.

² See *NKA*, vi. 303, 2-306, 6 (Harris and Knox, pp. 232-5) for domestic education; and vi. 318, 4-319, 11 (Harris and Knox, pp. 244-5) for the transvaluation of values in the speech of the *Volk*. The economic process is discussed at the end of the MS (vi. 319, 12-326, 9; Harris and Knox, pp. 245-50).

Volk that Hegel speaks of in connection with it, is a transcendental not a natural one. The *Volk* that intuit itself is not Athens, but the Greeks generally; more precisely, the Athenians intuit themselves as *men*, and Athena belongs to the pantheon ruled by the 'father of Gods and men', Zeus. The 'higher mythology' of Olympus represents a decisive transcendence of the natural religion of the terrestrial Underworld.¹

This interpretation of religious consciousness is our contribution as philosophers. But whereas in the interpretation of sub-conscious nature, our reflection on the natural process was the only distinct existence that the spirit had, it does really exist on its own account in human relations; and it now becomes aware of its own natural bondage. Finally, through the religious awareness of its embodiment in the community it passes over into freedom. In sub-conscious nature, spirit is 'entombed' (and exists only in the disembodied form of philosophical reflection); in natural consciousness, it is 'in bondage'; and in the consciousness of the *Volk* it is free; but only in philosophical consciousness does it know how it is free. Ordinary consciousness (even in religion) always involves the antithesis of an active mind dominating its raw material—even if the raw material is provided by another mind which is not dominated, as in the case of grandfather's memories expressed in grandfather's own words. In practical discipline

¹ The intuition is characterized at *NKA*, vi. 274, 15–18 (Harris and Knox, p. 213). The resemblance to the intuition of the *Volk* as characterized in the *System of Ethical Life* is striking (*Schriften* (1913), pp. 466–71; Harris and Knox, pp. 144–9). In the *System of Ethical Life* the distinction of natural and transcendental standpoints appears to be identified with the distinction of body and soul. Embodiment gives the spirit its natural existence on this view. Athena is embodied in the City, Zeus is not. Thus Athena belongs to ethical life, but the Olympians generally belong to the higher *Potenz* of religion. Greek religion is thus the expression of both natural and transcendental consciousness; just as Greek political life is both natural and free. The need to distinguish clearly between natural and free *existence* was what caused the breakdown of the earlier quadripartite structure of Hegel's system. (The view of Olympian religion in the fragment *seiner Form*, 3a-b—see *NKA*, v.—is in full accord with the transcendental standpoint of 1804. So I have based my hypothesis about the transcendental intuition of the *Volk* upon it. The fact that it almost certainly belongs to the transitional stage in Hegel's conception of the relation between nature and spirit only strengthens my argument regarding the intuition of the *Volk* in the MSS of 1804.)

the active/passive roles are reversed but the antithesis is still there. For little Peter it is mother's word (reinforced by slaps) which is *law*; and for Moses it is 'the word of the Lord'. All the way from little Peter to Moses—and back again from Moses to the so aptly christened Immanuel Kant, who restored to little Peter the active, legislative, role which he was always determined (subjectively and objectively) to have—the antithetic conception of consciousness as an activity operating on raw material survives. But once the circle closes with Kant, the transcendental theory of consciousness can finally be stated properly. For now instead of any of the antitheses (Peter/stove, Peter/grandfather, Peter/mother, Moses/Lord, Reason/Thing in itself) we have a triad in which the third (Hegel) recognizes the first two as an 'aetheric identity'.

In the 'natural' consciousness which never suffers the alienation of absolute subjection to a noumenal Lord, the recognition of identity takes place as an 'intuition' of the divine life; the antithetic structure of consciousness has here the same merely formal character that we have already illustrated through the example of little Peter's participation in grandfather's reminiscences. But that free intuition which seems so perfectly in harmony with nature is destined to receive its conceptual development in the great cycle of human history from Augustus and Jesus, to Luther, Kant, and Napoleon. The Hellenic character of free *Sittlichkeit* as it is characterized here, arises from the fact that through Hegel's speculative comprehension the cycle has closed finally by a self-consciously transcendental return to the historic point of origin of transcendental consciousness. This is what the breakaway of consciousness into the 'absolute element of the aether' signifies.¹

¹ NKA, vi. 277, 10–12; cf. 279, 14–23 (Harris and Knox, pp. 216, 217). Justification for the essentially transcendental status I am ascribing to the aether will be found in p. 315 n. 1. (It is worthy of note that the elemental progression of Spirit's natural existence seems to look forward to the stages of its absolute existence: Olympian religion is 'spirit in the element of air'; with Jesus 'it sinks down from the air into the earth itself as a singular individuality'; with the universal triumph of the Gospel it 'comes forth as an earth which is posited like a *third* element, a universal earth out of its natural singularization'; and in Hegel's philosophical religion 'it tears itself away' into 'the absolute element of the *aether*', vi. 277, 1–12; Harris and Knox, pp. 215–16.)

3. *Language, tool, and patrimony*

Hegel now proceeds to discuss the three forms of the immediate, natural, external existence of the spirit in sequence, showing how each passes necessarily into the next one. He calls them *Potenzen*, but the character of this theoretical chain is very different from that of the practical chain in the *System of Ethical Life*.¹

The goal of the first phase is to show how the words grandfather uses (which are not *his* after all) come to have their objective, conceptual significance. First the immediate sensation (which would be so intensely his own for little Peter if he touched the stove) is projected into an outward space and time, and given a place in the pattern of the present world, and in the sequence of its changes. Space and time are intuited directly as full, not conceptualized. But grandfather fills that space and time of little Peter's consciousness with contents other than those provided by natural sensation. I can turn the space and time of the real world into *my* space and *my* time. I can empty it, and fill it with centaurs or angels, and with all the terrors of nightmare or delirium tremens. The fact that permanent mental derangement at the level of sensible hallucination can occur shows that our sense intuition is really the exercise of a free power of imagination. What fills my consciousness is not the real world, but only things which I use as *signs* to stand for what I can in no other way keep hold of. What natural imaginative signs I have is contingent, and they may be unique to me. An immense structure of personal memory is made to rest upon the taste of a little cake in Proust's *Remembrance of Things Past*. Only a great artist can

¹ Kimmerle was the first to clarify the *overlapping* of the evolution of 'consciousness' upon the earlier conception of a chain of self-contained *Potenzen* in this MS. The bridge that makes this possible is the logical concept of the 'middle'. Even in Schelling's usage the *Potenz* terminology was extremely plastic (cf. the comments of X. Tilliette, *Schelling*, i. 331, 377, 422). So I have concentrated on the 'development of consciousness' thread, and have not concerned myself with the relation of the *Potenz* terminology here with Hegel's *Potenz* theory in 1801-2. (Cf. H. Kimmerle, *Abgeschlossenheit des Denkens*, *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 8, 1970, 246-66; R.-P. Horstmann, 'Metaphysik und Philosophie der Subjektivität', *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 20, 1980, 190-4.)

evoke the past so vividly, but all of us know what the evocative power of a sensible sign is.'

In memory this evocative power comes under our control, being consciously attached to the names that exist only in memory. It is the community consciousness which preserves all the names of things. Otherwise the name would not exist, for its use by a speaker is a transient event. Hegel refers to the biblical story of Adam naming the animals; and it seems to me clear that 'Adam' here is a universal figure for *mankind*. A language is only intelligible to those who have learned to speak it; but any man can learn any language that men speak. The sounds are merely vibrations in the air which have no natural meaning. The meaning is behind and beyond the sound which is its outward existence in the world, in the way that the aether is behind and beyond the physical world. Because of its transience the sound does not obscure the real permanence of the meaning on the spiritual (or aetheric) plane.

The naming function of language presupposes (and is made possible by) the fact that we are conscious of the world as a conglomerate of identifiable things. Language as a stock of names depends on the cumulative ability of human perception to distinguish the static aspects of the Earth-process. The understanding turns names into 'determinate concepts' by classifying the intuitive contents that they refer to. The word 'colour' is not a name in the same way that 'Prussian blue' is. Even 'Prussian blue' is a class-name: we recognize a class-member—those of us who can do so intuitively—as musicians possessed of 'perfect pitch' recognize tones, because the colour (or tone) is held 'in formal ideality' in our imagination. That is to say the colour as we saw it before, has changed its *form* because it is our minds, not in the world—it is 'ideal' not 'real'—but it has suffered no other change, it has not become a *name* (as it has for most of us, who need a colour-chart to classify blues by). All of us (unless our eyesight is abnormal) can reliably distinguish between 'blue' and 'red' without a

¹ *NKA*, vi. 285, 26–287, 7 (Harris and Knox, pp. 220–1). This is one place where the line of argument seems about to converge with that of the *System of Ethical Life* (cf. *Schriften* (1913), pp. 434–5; Harris and Knox, pp. 114–15). But the appearance is misleading, since the *sign* here does not seem to be part of a language. We know what it means for the subject only if he tells us.

chart. And even if we are colour-blind we know the difference between 'colour' and 'musical tone', for that is more a conceptual distinction than a perceptual discrimination—and Locke's blind man who thought that 'scarlet was like the sound of a trumpet' understood this perfectly well.¹ What is sensed is some determinate blue (e.g. Prussian blue of a definite intensity); what is imagined (by most of us) is a blue range as distinct from a red one, etc.; what can *only* be named is the concept 'colour'. A blind man of intelligence can form the concept; and a complete colour-chart may be more of a hindrance than a help in getting a badly retarded child whose vision is good over the hurdle represented by 'Blue and brown are both colours'.

'Colour' is a *determinate concept*. 'Intelligence', or the concept of the understanding generally, is the capacity to form such concepts. It is not itself determinate, but is absolutely undetermined. This is the aspect of consciousness that cannot be objectified for contemplation (as even the determinate concept of colour can in the colour-chart). It is a free *activity*, and it must posit, express, assert, itself in action. It has its own way of interpreting things (*Eigensinn*) and it can go to death rather than give that up. But in that wilfulness it discovers only its own destruction since it is, after all, only the function of a particular living organism.²

We may be tempted to think that Hegel is anticipating, here. He will not reach the life and death struggle until he has developed natural consciousness to its fulfilment in family life. But then (as we shall see) there will be something worth dying for. At the moment, dying is only a lunatic extreme, which must be considered, like hallucinatory delusion earlier, in order that we may appreciate the absolute indeterminacy of free intelligence. It is Stoic suicide that is the ultimate freedom of *Eigensinn*. (The battle-consciousness is, in itself, much more paradoxical because the *Eigensinn* there means to survive; and far from resigning everything, it gets into the struggle because it will give up nothing.)

This freedom of consciousness must express itself objec-

¹ See the *Essay concerning Humane Understanding*, III, iv, ii (Everyman, ed. Yolton, ii, 30).

² *NKA*, vi, 294, 12–296, 21 (Harris and Knox, pp. 226–8).

tively because consciousness depends on the subject/object antithesis. All that has happened yet, is that the form of the opposition has changed. Theoretical consciousness faced with the living flux of sense-experience had to freeze it into the determinate concepts of the understanding. Practical consciousness must now express its own life, its self-will, in the inorganic raw material to which the understanding has reduced the world.

Just as it is the given content of natural sensation upon which theoretical consciousness must work, so it is natural need that provides the primitive orientation of practical freedom. But this is irrelevant to the analysis. The cycle of need, consumption, and satiety with which the *System of Ethical Life* begins does not come within the purview of the transcendental approach at all, because that cycle is part of the simple self-maintenance of the animal organism, and belongs to the philosophy of nature. Here labour is analysed as *artisanship*: i.e. as the realization of a form which is initially present to the mind as a goal of desire, in some external material. The desire is simply to see the intended form realized. Nothing is said now about 'taking possession' of the material as a presupposition of labour. This was essential to the practical satisfaction which was the concern of the *System of Ethical Life*; but a slave exercising his craft on someone else's material, or even Gulley Jimson creating a painting on a wall soon to be demolished, can achieve the rational satisfaction with which we are here concerned.¹

Permanence, however, is essential to the independent existence of Reason which is the terminus of this phase. The *tool* expresses the necessary existence of the labouring process as a human institution, independent of particular labourers. At this juncture, the argument does (as far as I can see) coincide exactly with that of the *System of Ethical Life*.²

The third *Potenz* ('Possession and the Family') is rather imperfectly preserved. We have the cancelled beginning of the

¹ NKA, vi. 299, 3-300, 7 (Harris and Knox, pp. 229-30); cf. *System of Ethical Life, Schriften* (1913), pp. 424-5 (Harris and Knox, pp. 106-7). (For Gulley Jimson's mural see Joyce Cary, *The Horse's Mouth*, Chs. 40-4.)

² NKA, vi. 300, 7-18 (Harris and Knox, pp. 230-1); cf. *System of Ethical Life, Schriften* (1913), pp. 431-2 (Harris and Knox, pp. 112-13).

first draft and a fragment of the revision. But the conclusion is altogether lacking; we have a fairly complete discussion of the family but no discussion of the family-holding at all. We must fill this gap by hypothesis in the light of the preliminary discussion, and the fragments that follow.

The nature of the transition from the *Potenz* of 'the tool' to the family is not very explicit. The tool is like the names in speech; it expresses a meaning intelligible to any human community developed enough to have the need that it serves. But it does not express *itself*; yet that is what the active consciousness desires—to see itself reflected in its expression. What is needed for this is a *tool which speaks*: a raw material which will take the impress of a mind, and then give it back actively. Then the active mind will see itself reflected in its work; and furthermore the continuum of consciousness, the 'determinate concept' of the world, will have achieved its independence, its basis for objective survival apart from any particular conscious being.

This self-recognition in one's own work is the achievement of *Bildung* as analysed in the *System of Ethical Life*. Natural or genetic dependence is not a transcendental presupposition of it. But there must be an institution of dependent recognition, and given that human reproduction works the way it does, this institution must be naturally rooted in sex-relations and blood-kinship. Animals must mate in order to have young. Human mating must therefore (in order to count as human) involve a joint recognition of the purpose of the congress. The reciprocal gratification through which animal desire becomes its own self-sufficient satisfaction, must be transformed into an absolute commitment which the parties regard as *sacred*. It is difficult to find a good empirical model for Hegel's theory of marriage (as human mating). It is not a contract—on that his position never changes; and it does not depend on any external recognition. Solemnization in the presence of a congregation as an act of worship is appropriate to its sacred character obviously; but it is not essential.¹ The

¹ For the constancy of Hegel's view about the *contract* theory of marriage, cf. *System of Ethical Life, Schriften* (1913), pp. 448–9; Harris and Knox, pp. 127–8; vi. 302–3 (Harris and Knox, p. 232); viii. 238, 7–240, 5; *Philosophy of Right*, §§ 75, 161–8. Not just the evident consistency of his ideal of 'love', but the primitive

bond that is sacred is the conscious intent to have children. This is not just a natural urge or function. To have a human child the parents must educate it. Human parents become one consciousness in the child, in that they teach it everything that they know (i.e. really believe). Animals realize the kind in their mating. They become the means for the self-maintenance of the species. But this permanence of the form is empirically just an endless chain of mutually external organic cycles. Human parents 'recognize themselves in the child as kind' in so far as they recognize the obligation to give it the best chance in life that they can, before death takes them. It is the consciousness of mortality that imposes this obligation upon them; and therefore it is not just the human species, but their own experience of life that survives their death. Humanity itself would not be maintained without this personal contribution. So the permanence of the form is not reducible to a chain of mutually external organisms. Others can, of course, assume the educational function for a potentially human animal; the transcendental requirement is that someone, or some group must do so. Thus the bond of *natural* marriage is sacred,¹ but it can be transcended. The institution of a spiritual community actually requires its transcendence. Marriage and child-rearing become a socially recognized and regulated function within this wider community. Hegel's claim is that because the animal process of reproduction is the

position that he accords to mating in his theory of recognition justifies my assuming that the thesis of 1797 regarding the unessential character of religious ceremony holds good (*welchem Zwecke*, TW-A, i. 245–50; Knox and Kroner, pp. 304–8). Hegel's own view of his relation with Johanna Burkhardt is also relevant—so far as it can be discovered—see esp. *Briefe*, i. 236 (Letter 125, to Frommann, 9, vii. 1808). R. J. Siebert's survey 'Hegel's concept of marriage and family' (in D. P. Verene, ed., *Hegel's Social and Political Thought*, New Jersey: Humanities, 1980, pp. 177–209) ignores both the *System of Ethical Life* and the second *Philosophy of Spirit* (1805/6). Otherwise it is admirably comprehensive, though not uniformly insightful.

¹ In animal species that pair for life (e.g. wolves) the mated pair must, of necessity, recognize one another, and that recognition must somehow involve a felt bond (and one that is stronger than the emotional ties and dispositions of most humans). The transcendental sacredness that Hegel ascribes to a human marriage, is something quite different because it is rationally appreciated. Human beings differ from animals that pair for life, not only in that their feelings are less constant, but also in that they will stay married in spite of that inconstancy 'for the sake of the children' (and even if they part 'for the sake of the children', as they well might, that is the very exception that proves the rule).

way it is, that community could not come into existence without the spontaneous transformation of the ties of natural drive and physical dependence into a community of recognized kinship obligations. A great array of communal substitutes for the nuclear family is conceivable. But it does seem to be the case that no complex, human culture with ideals of personal liberty and rational equality, has developed from any other base; and it is an evident fact that all systems of rational communism (even theoretical ideals like Plato's) depend heavily on the rhetoric of blood-kinship for the achievement of rational control over individual emotions.

The transcendental necessity of the family is hard to make clear, because it is so easily confused with the natural necessity. But it is sharply distinct. From the natural standpoint we can all sympathize with Aristotle's contention that 'it is better to be own cousin to a man than to be his son after the Platonic fashion'.¹ But from the transcendental point of view, we must agree with Plato that this ought not to be the case, that such natural ties are precisely what have to be willingly set aside. Men must lay down their lives for others who are their 'friends' only in a rational sense; and even for things that are not flesh and blood at all—for the ideals of personal liberty and rational equality, for beauty, for God, and even for science and truth. What seems therefore, to be transcendently necessary is that the family should be recognized as *not* rationally necessary, but as a merely natural necessity that is an impediment to properly human existence. This is true, but it is not the whole truth (that was Plato's mistake). Aristotle was right to insist that friendship is a more ultimate value than justice.² The family is nature's instrument of self-transcendence (and hence also of its self-preservation). The family is transcendently necessary because rationality ought not in the end to be a struggle against nature; the breach between them must never become absolute. Human, rational, existence should be an enrichment of natural existence. The ultimate practical imperative in Hegel's conception of rationality is that nature should be realized for all that it is rationally worth, that

¹ *Politics* II, iii. 7 (1262a); Barker, p. 45.

² *Nicomachean Ethics*, VIII, i. (1155a 22-28).

nothing natural should be absolutely sacrificed or wasted. The family is *transcendentally* necessary because the relation between Reason and nature should be one of *love*. The dialectical primacy of love as the absolute practical value is the real meaning of Hegel's doctrine of *Aufhebung*. The child must grow into a man who can at need sacrifice all his natural ties; and who sublates them automatically whenever social justice requires it. But if for this reason he is handed over to Platonic nurses (or Soviet 'upbringers') at birth, there is a great waste of natural feeling. The bonds of natural desire between the parents, and of natural identification between mother and child are 'nullified' (as Hegel would say); whereas they can be progressively sublated in such a way as to show the infant consciousness what life is all about.

In order to become part of the continuum of social consciousness the child must learn to discipline his natural feelings and desires, and to internalize the judgements and values of the group in the place of his spontaneous urges. He can only do this properly if he feels immediately that the disciplines and values imposed on him are imposed lovingly (i.e. that his upbringers are genuinely concerned for his personal self-realization). Platonic nurses or Soviet upbringers can love him (more rationally than many parents no doubt); but their love cannot be 'the absolute riches of the single being'.¹ He cannot feel that they live *for him* (and that he should, and eventually will, live for them). Hegel emphasizes the connection between love and death because he wants *education* to be seen as a balanced experience of sacrifice on both sides. The parents prepare the child to take their place; and he puts off his natural self and takes on their consciousness because he recognizes that this is what they want to give him.² This following in father's (or mother's) footsteps must (in principle, at least) be rationalized into free choice, when

¹ *NKA*, vi. 281, 14 (Harris and Knox, p. 211).

² This transcendental 'identity' of parents and children (*NKA*, vi. 303, 4-306, 2; Harris and Knox, pp. 232-4) should be compared with the natural equilibrium secured by the pendulum of vital energy and reciprocal dependence which is brought out in the *System of Ethical Life* (*Schriften* (1913), pp. 430, 449-50; Harris and Knox, pp. 111, 128-9). In nature the identity appears only when the two generations are passing one another on the see-saw; then for the moment they are equal participants in the exchange of *Bildung*.

the social continuum replaces the domestic one. But the permanent importance of domestic education in establishing the right relation between Reason and nature should by now be apparent.

We come now to the lacuna in our manuscript. It will be helpful, therefore, to quote Hegel's most explicit preliminary description of the transition that was to be elaborated at this point:

. . . [in the tool, consciousness] proves its real lordship [over nature] and thereby constitutes itself as spirit for itself withdrawn from nature and independently self-shaped; it has superseded the antithesis on the external side, so that it falls apart within itself and realizes itself in mutually differentiating moments, each of which is itself a consciousness, in the difference of the sexes, in which it likewise supersedes the singular desire of nature, and makes it an *abiding* inclination, having come to the totality of singularity in the family, and raised up inorganic nature into a family holding, as the singularly enduring outward means for the family (*Mitte derselben*); and from here it passes over to its absolute existence, to *ethical life*.¹

Here Hegel illustrates 'the supersession of the antithesis on the external side' by treating sexual desire as the organism's own internalization of it. But the education process is a much more explicit supersession of opposition between mind and external material (and at the same time of the merely instrumental relation between them). For as Hegel himself remarks:

. . . the previous relationship of consciousness [to the world] is reversed; previously, for active consciousness [as] one side of the antithesis the EXTERNAL as the other side, the single [system of things] inwardly determined in a manifold way, was not ideal. Here consciousness is the singular [term], and the other side of its antithesis is the ideal [term], a world as it is in consciousness. Thus the antithesis is superseded for the active consciousness, which has been in antithesis till now; for the other side, which was thus far posited as nonconscious, is itself a consciousness, and so here [the process] is the other way to realize the ideal world. This is how consciousness generates itself for itself as identity of inner and outer.²

On the one side, the consciousness of the parents expresses

¹ *NKA*, vi. 281, 2-11 (Harris and Knox, p. 211).

² *NKA*, vi. 305, 7-15 (Harris and Knox, p. 234, slightly revised).

itself directly as 'the determinate concept' of the world (in language); on the other side the consciousness of the child receives this 'determinate concept' but must give it a meaning in terms of its own conscious commerce with the real world. Parents (and educators generally) cannot reduce their pupils to passive raw material, because consciousness must always make its own interpretation of the world, even when it encounters the world in an ideal form.

This 'totality of consciousness' is achieved without any reference to a 'family-holding' in Hegel's text. Why then is the 'raising up of inorganic nature', as a family-holding which is its permanent outward means, necessary? The answer is not difficult. We have remarked that a slave could have the rational satisfaction of an artisan in exercising his own skill. But that *Eigensinn* which we reached at the end of the theoretical moment *must have a place of its own* upon which it stands. It was no accident, therefore, that I expressed Hegel's doctrine that the parents 'generate their death' as they educate the child, by saying in less paradoxical language, that they prepare him to take their *place*. The place involved is not theirs really, and it will not be his either. It is the family that must have a 'place'—otherwise the educational process cannot be an autonomous self-shaping of Reason that has withdrawn from the great hurly-burly of nature into the cycle of organic self-maintenance and self-reproduction. The family-holding is the necessary tool of family existence. Responsibility for the home-place is the controlling imperative of natural education. As Hegel pointed out in the *System of Ethical Life*, the 'lordship' of the family-head is here superficial: 'the whole property is directly, inherently, and explicitly common'.¹

¹ *Schriften* (1913), p. 448; Harris and Knox, p. 127. We are about to make the transition to *ethical life*. In that context we shall see that the only *place* that a rational individual must retain as his own is his own body. It is the free use of one's own capacities that is transcendently necessary for the self-realization of the spirit. The family's control of its own patrimony is only instrumental for the transition to ethical life; and the life-and-death struggle is transcendently necessary only in order to show that the institution of *property* (founded on universal recognition) is the necessary presupposition of rational freedom. Thus we can borrow the 'natural' necessities of the *System of Ethical Life* to fill the lacuna here without falsifying the transcendental point of view of the *Philosophy of Spirit*.

4. *The struggle for recognition, and life in the Volk.*

The next section of manuscript that we have was heavily revised, but there is nothing in the revision to suggest that Hegel changed his mind on any significant point of doctrine; it was the form and sequence of his argument that he was concerned to improve. It is important that we can be fairly sure of this, because our two fragmentary versions do not begin at the same point in the argument. In the cancelled version Hegel shows that a struggle for recognition is an inevitable consequence of the absolute arbitrariness of *Eigensinn*. A singular consciousness can react to the presence of another one in any way at all: by offering presents, or by taking what the other has no will to give, even its very life. Equally, there is no rationality in the response, no telling what will be perceived as a harmless snub, and what as an unforgivable outrage.

The 'singularity' here are 'wholes'; and in the revised version Hegel identifies this 'wholeness' as the 'totality of consciousness' which we discovered in the family at the end of the preceding fragment. It is the family (and its integral holding) which must obtain rational recognition from other families. The commitment of male adult family members to obtain this recognition for their place is the sense of *honour*; each defines this commitment for himself, and its exact boundaries are a matter of his private interpretation of the education he has received—'for this ideal being of the world is what consciousness is.'¹

In his first draft Hegel announces at once that infringements of honour are inevitable, and that honour is the will to go to the death in defence of the whole that is violated. This is true by definition; since we could never know that honour existed if it were not violated, or that it was really honour, unless men died for it. In the revision he holds this back, for it

¹ *NKA*, vi, 308, 1–2 (Harris and Knox, p. 236). ('This shows that the 'ideal world' that the parents present to the child is a definition of their *place* which he is to inherit. This explains both why they are 'preparing their death' in educating him, and why his interpretation of what he is taught is its 'realization'. To interpret the doctrine of one's place in the world is to recognize and accept one's obligations.)

is not how observers know there is such a thing as honour that matters, but how the meaning of his commitment becomes apparent to the committed consciousness.¹ The defender of hearth and home can tell the invader not to do what he is doing, and he can threaten reprisals, but the necessary response at the stage we have reached is 'Prove it!' The conflict is about *ownership*; and it is inevitable because exclusive ownership is irrational. Just as the understanding of a thing's utility belongs in principle to all intelligences as soon as it is discovered, so the right to exercise one's intelligence in practice belongs to all alike. Singular consciousness cannot take possession of part of the world, once and for all. That was what the parents recognized in their education of the child. But now the grown man discovers it in his defence of his place. The interloper can only be stopped (supposing he insists on his right) by being killed. But if the defender is openly prepared to kill him, then he is openly accepting the risk of being killed; and if he is killed he loses his place in the world. Thus the commitment into which he has been educated is a fraud. The reward for accepting discipline is denied by the discipline itself.

The fraud is in its way a fortunate one. The victor cannot be recognized as a rational totality with his goods, for once the struggle starts, the destiny of vanquished consciousness is simply to become part of the 'goods' of the victor. This deprives the victor of the recognition he is seeking. On the other hand, the one who accepts death as the price of recognition, does achieve recognition, not as an embodied consciousness, but as free or absolute consciousness. His will is transformed into something higher through its affirmation. The lesson of this transformation is that to be a man of honour is to belong to a higher community for which one's self-sacrifice

¹ In the first draft Hegel begins from the *concept* of honour and unfolds its consequences. In the second he lets the *experience* of honour unfold, and what is revealed is the contradiction implicit in the concept of 'possession'. Obviously he decided that this second order was more appropriate to his 'transcendental' approach. It is the institution of *property* that must be generally recognized at the end of the process. (The approach of the first draft is that of the philosophy of nature, where we are concerned with a 'cognition of ours'; but the emergence of spirit from its bondage must be a 'cognition of this consciousness itself' (NKA, vi. 312, 10-313, 20; Harris and Knox, pp. 240-1.)

can have meaning. Only the dead can achieve honourable status, and they must have that status for the living. Honour can only exist as an institution in a community or class of 'heroes'. Achilles counts the glory of his name as his real self. He 'is himself immediately for himself as another consciousness'.¹ Thus a new cycle of consciousness begins again here from the beginning; and all the meanings that consciousness had for itself in its natural embodiment will be transformed. For the spirit is now free; it has recognized itself as embodied in the community of free men—i.e. those whose highest goal is the recognition received by those who die for the *people*.

In his rigid concentration on the thread of his transcendental argument Hegel leaves much unsaid (for the time being at least) which we might expect him to say at once. His concern now is with the evolution of consciousness in its absolute (substantial, reconciled) form. For this reason, he does not point out that the family-goods become 'property', or even that the *homestead* becomes the *homeland*, the *patria*. He does not even follow the evolution of heroic or military consciousness. This may well be because he is now pressed for time (he certainly is hurrying at this stage); these things are detailed aspects of the main transition—details which he will expound in their place if he can. The first essential is to get the perspective right. The perspective, being that of a dead hero, or of what is called in the *System of Ethical Life* 'absolute life in the *Volk*', is a strange one. It is not just the continuum of consciousness that is primary now, but the substantial structure of the life that sustains that continuum. This life is embodied in institutions which are the work (*Werk*) produced by the community as a whole. Families must be genuinely and consciously committed to the maintenance of this structure. The *Volk* is a moral union (*ideales Einsseyn*) and hence the family community is sublated: 'posited as an *ideell* totality'.² The *Werk* of the *Volk* is the new 'middle', through which families can distinguish themselves from and relate themselves to the life of the community. It is the family now, which is the raw material, the 'inorganic nature' of the social organism.

¹ NKA, vi. 313, 10–11; Harris and Knox, p. 241. (The example is mine.)

² NKA, vi. 316, 16–22 (Harris and Knox, p. 243).

We are now ready to embark on the new cycle of free spirit. This begins, as we know, with language. Initially we dealt with speech as the means by which the infant begins to participate actively in the family community. But families do not—except in very marginal respects—have their own private language. Even the language that is peculiar to a tribal, pre-political group, is in Hegel's view, perverse. All the values are inverted in it, because it must express 'spirit in bonds' not free spirit. Thus the 'ideal world' that the parents impose on the child's mind in education is (or ought to be) the world as remade and redefined by the community in its life.

The transformation of labour in social life is much more dramatic. The *System of Ethical Life* has prepared us for it, because the same transformation occurs there between the level of 'feeling' and that of 'thought'.¹ The rationality of labour now comes from the communal need that it satisfies (not from the rational purpose of the individual labourer). The trade or skill of the artisan is now a function of the community; a human individual is apprenticed to a trade as his contribution to the community, and any advance that he may make in its practice becomes part of what is taught to the next generation of apprentices.

This is only a change of perspective. But the objective rationalization of the tool produces a revolution; this comes when the discovery of machinery leaves only the transcendental aspect of labour (designing what is to be produced) to human effort:

. . . this deceit that he practices against nature . . . takes its revenge upon him; what he gains from nature, the more he subdues it, the lower he sinks himself. When he lets nature be worked over by a variety of machines, he does not cancel the necessity for his own laboring but only postpones it, and makes it more distant from nature; and his living labor is not directed on nature as alive, but this negative vitality evaporates from it, and the laboring that remains to man becomes itself *more machinelike*; man *diminishes* labor only for the whole, not for the single [laborer]; for him it is increased

¹ It is true that the *System of Ethical Life* anticipates this development. But most readers will agree, I think, that it is this later discussion which enables us to understand the earlier one (cf. *Schriften* (1913), pp. 424–6, 437–8 (Harris and Knox, pp. 106–8, 117–18) with vi. 319, 12–324, 18 (Harris and Knox, pp. 245–9).

rather; for the more machinelike labor becomes, the less it is worth, and the more one must work in that mode.¹

I have referred to the 'historical materialism' of this manuscript several times, as a way of underlining the fact that the true embodiment and bearer of consciousness is an objective institutional structure. But in this passage Hegel develops the dialectic of economic materialism exactly as it was later understood by Marx. Thanks to the rational division of labour, the skill of the individual artisan becomes almost worthless, and he becomes a cog in the machine that relieves his muscles. His productivity vastly increases; but because he contributes nothing distinctive to the product he is not the one who benefits. Those who own the machines benefit. Hegel does not say this; but he does remark that 'the skill of the single labourer is infinitely limited, and the consciousness of the factory laborer is impoverished to the last extreme of dullness', so that 'the multitude of conveniences makes them just as absolutely inconvenient again'.²

But although the movement of this 'life of the dead body', this 'monstrous system of community' is grasped so precisely, and expounded so incisively, there is no development in Hegel's doctrine of how it is to be dealt with. It 'requires continual strict dominance and taming like a wild beast'.³ In other words, Hegel wants to treat the problem as a matter of practical politics, just as he did in the *System of Ethical Life*.⁴

With the transformation of the family-holding into publicly recognized and legally guaranteed property, our manuscript

¹ NKA, vi. 321, 6-16 (Harris and Knox, p. 247).

² NKA, vi. 323, 17-324, 8 (Harris and Knox, pp. 247-8). It is possible that this reflection on the degrading effect of factory labour was suggested by the reading of Garve's translation (1768) of Adam Ferguson's *Essay on the History of Civil Society* (1767). Cf. Cullen, p. 3 and the English text, ed. D. Forbes, Edinburgh, 1966, pp. 182-3. (But Cullen's claims regarding Hegel's schoolboy studies of Ferguson are a gross oversimplification—see *Toward the Sunlight*, pp. 50-1.)

³ NKA, vi. 324, 14-18 (Harris and Knox, p. 248).

⁴ See *Schriften* (1913), pp. 492-8 (Harris and Knox, pp. 167-73). Now that the fundamental significance of owning one's *means of existence* has been made clear, however, the earlier attack on the deification of Mammon in bourgeois existence coalesces with the analysis of wage-slavery in factory-capitalism in this MS, to produce some evident revolutionary lessons. The free *Volk* owns its means of existence as a community. The first step toward resolution of 'rational boredom' and 'luxury-producing-poverty' would seem clearly to be the establishment of a social system of co-operative ownership in place of wage-slavery.

comes to an end. Hegel repeats his point about the contradiction implicit in possession here; so we are reminded that the cycle has come round again to the struggle for recognition with which it began. *Property* is the institution in which recognition is realized; and whereas language and labour can be organized without explicit acknowledgement of communal authority, the maintenance of property rights strictly requires general recognition of the 'universal consciousness' as the source of justice and fair decisions.

5. *Absolute Spirit*

The distinction between property and personality (which was the conceptual advance produced by the struggle) is the last one to be recorded in our text. This *could* form the transition from free spirit to Absolute Spirit; and although we cannot be sure that Hegel made this transition immediately there seems no reason against it.¹

Since 'religion' was a transcendental level of development in Hegel's system from the first, there are no very striking developments in his treatment of it. The hypothesis of a 'natural' religion in Homer, is a striking illustration of the emphasis on the standpoint of 'natural philosophy' in the *System of Ethical Life*. But even that is used to underline the fact that the standpoint of 'absolute religion, and art, too' is a higher ethical one.² This moment of concurrence with Plato's critique of Homer, does not represent Hegel's stable view, in which the Olympians—with all their 'crime and weakness'—are regarded as creations of the 'higher mythology' which 'elevates itself to the ethical level'. It is the Titans of Hesiod, and the Furies of drama who represent the beginnings of mythology in natural consciousness. The higher

¹ Cf. the Introduction for the *Delineatio* (discussed in Ch. V, pp. 200–6, above). My hypothesis that Hegel 'intended to display the necessity of the class structure' (Harris and Knox, p. 199) seems to me gratuitous, now that I can see that the cycle of 'consciousness in bonds' is fully repeated in the MS that we have. No doubt the class-structure of the *System of Ethical Life* did have a transcendental foundation in Hegel's view. (We shall have occasion to examine this problem again in Ch. XI, below.) But it was a matter of detailed development which he could dispense with under pressure.

² *Schriften* (1913), p. 503; Harris and Knox, p. 177.

mythology 'elevates those nature-spirits to the consciousness of a *Volk*, and the ethical spirit of a *Volk* cognizes itself therein'.¹

Already in this fragment, *seine Form*—which I take to be part of the *Delineatio* of 1803—the consequence of adopting the 'transcendental standpoint' is the clear proclamation of the perfect identification of 'absolute consciousness' with its singular mouthpiece. But here the creative contribution of the poet as a singular consciousness is played down as much as possible. It is 'Mnemosyne or the absolute Muse' that is the 'speaking consciousness of the *Volk*', and the particular mouthpiece she employs is not important. 'What they produce is not their own discovery, but the discovery made by the whole people, or the *finding*, that the *Volk* has found its essence'.² The artist only uses the special skill which he has acquired within the community, and which the community maintains. 'Thus the work of art is the work of all; it is just one who brings it completed into the daylight, in that he is last to work on it, and he is the darling of Mnemosyne'.³

All this agrees perfectly with the conception of 'Memory or the Mnemosyne of the ancients' as the foundation of the social continuum of consciousness; and with the conception of social life as the *Werk* of the *Volk*, and of the artisan's skill as a communally maintained institution which we find in the 'Philosophy of Spirit' of spring 1804.⁴ But, just for that reason I do *not* think it comes from the theory of absolute consciousness required for the completion of that system. Wolf's conception of 'Homer' as the name for an extended group of anonymous bards accords perfectly with Hegel's doctrine of 'Memory or the Mnemosyne of the ancients' in 1804. But Mnemosyne is there the *beginning* of spiritual development. If the *Volk* as Substance is destined to become a Subject or *person* in the absolute consciousness of Art, Religion, and Philosophy, then the *impersonal* emphasis of the

¹ *seiner Form*, 3a (in *NKA*, v. 374).

² *seiner Form*, 4a (in *NKA*, v. 376); cited by Rosenkranz, p. 180 (Harris and Knox, pp. 254-5).

³ *seiner Form*, 4b (in *NKA*, v. 377); cited by Rosenkranz, p. 181 (Harris and Knox, p. 255).

⁴ See *NKA*, vi. 287, 13-289, 7 and 315, 2-320, 19 (Harris and Knox, pp. 221-2, 242-6).

1803 fragment is not appropriate for the absolute consciousness of 1804. In the perspective of 1804 it is right to call 'Homer' the 'darling of Mnemosyne'; but it is quite inappropriate to dismiss the personal and distinctive visions of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides in that way—and whatever we may think about the 'Homeric question', this criticism of the 1803 position is valid. In the four-part system, absolute consciousness was above the finite level altogether. Hence the impersonal emphasis was appropriate. This was the way in which 'speculation can rid itself of the preponderance that consciousness has in it' so that the 'self-shaping or objectively self-finding Absolute' can maintain its perfect equilibrium.¹ But in the three-part system, the concept of Spirit as the return of the cognitive subject to itself requires rather the opposite emphasis (in order that the obvious preponderance of the *Volk* at the culmination of finite development may be redressed).

The point becomes even clearer if we consider the concept of speculation directly. In the 'natural' perspective of the four-part system, philosophy is a 'need' of the community, and the commitment of the individual philosopher is a 'pursuit of death'. In this perspective, a systematic outline of philosophy begins with the Idea of Philosophy as 'absolute cognition', and ends with the philosopher overcoming the 'shame of being stillalive' and so justifying his claim to public honour. The philosophy that he produces is impersonal in its beginning, and purifies itself into impersonality at the end, by showing that the consciousness in which it exists is already beyond the

¹ *Difference* etc., NKA, iv. 75, 26–76, 8 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 171–2). This is exactly what Hegel stigmatizes as *Barbarei* in his Boehme myth. 'The shape of these intuitions annihilates the individual, or rather it [the individual] is here the rage against this Absolute that is come into being and itself subsists once more. For the individual is nothing in it. It does not perish but is perished [already], and that [barbaric] intuition must go through still another second process in order to be absolute.' (Rosenkranz, p. 547; trans. M. H. Hoffheimer in *Clio*, xi, no. 4, forthcoming). This 'second' process is the transcendental 'reconstruction' that succeeds the natural 'construction'. Even if this fragment was written as late as spring 1805, the 'phenomenological' character of the system of a year earlier virtually guarantees that Hegel already saw the need to *emphasize* the individual at the level of Absolute Spirit.

grave. What arises from the grave in the real world is not a person, but a world: 'the Universe of God'.¹

In philosophy, the personal point of view remains a weakness. Hegel never moved from the critical attitude that he expressed—with particular reference to Reinhold and Fichte—in 1801.² But his philosophical evaluation of the principle of personality changes dramatically. The first sign of this revolution is the approach to philosophy as a 'personal' need in the *Delineatio* of Summer 1803. If, as I think, that course outlined a four-part system, then the personal approach was adopted there for psychological reasons only. But in the three-part system it assumes a *logical* significance. Philosophy is not now the pursuit of death, simply, but the pursuit of personal resurrection. The extremely condensed ending of the first 'Philosophy of Spirit' confirms this by moving from the ethical Substance to 'personality' just as it breaks off. What was previously the *fourth* part of philosophy, the 'resumption of the whole into one', could easily follow here as the self-transcendence of a finite individuality that does not lose itself in the process. The personal individuality of the artist, which had previously been cried *down*, could now be cried *up*, for beauty is precisely the contribution of personal subjectivity to linguistic communication.

Religion proper, is the sphere in which this principle of personality is disciplined until it reaches the stage where it can comprehend itself. Just as Art is the sphere of absolute 'speech', so Religion is the sphere of absolute labour and education to make the singular consciousness into a rational world. We have what is probably part of the discussion of religion in the first 'Philosophy of Spirit'; and it fits this

¹ I believe that the fragment Rosenkranz gives as the conclusion of the *System of Ethical Life* (*Hegels Leben*, pp. 132–3; Harris and Knox, p. 178) was actually the conclusion of the *Delineatio* of 1803. But we cannot expect to establish this definitely because Hegel's position in the *Delineatio* was—if I am right about it!—extremely labile. It is important to realize that my argument about the logic of the natural and the transcendental standpoints does not depend on the hypothetical date of this (or any other objectively undated) fragment or report. The question of the precise date at which Hegel grasped all the systematic consequences of this shift in his speculative point of view is not vitally important (cf. pp. 338–9 nn. 65 below and pp. 239–40 n. 2 above).

² See esp. *Difference*, etc., *NKA*, iv. 10, 6–12, 20; 79, 26–81, 27 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 86–9, 176–8).

expectation perfectly. Greek art created *Gods* (shapes which expressed *communal* freedom),¹ whereas Catholic piety creates heroes.

These 'founders of religions' are historical agents; but the absolute consciousness has 'no presence (*Gegenwart*) in the singular consciousness as such'.² The Greek Gods were determinately present in the constitutions of their cities; and in the philosophical religion which Hegel looks forward to, the message of Paul that Christ rises *here and now* in every Christian, completes its 'conceptual movement' and becomes the absolute or free presence of God in the worshipper who recognizes his State and Church (the finite and infinite aspects of his community) as human creations. For this consciousness, the presence of God, the infinite or absolute reality, is not a historic fact in the past, remembered as the pledge for another life beyond the grave. It is the actual experience of speculative thought here and now. Philosophy teaches us that God is the real *place* of mankind. As a community of individual organisms we must 'keep house' in nature (and particularly on the surface of the Earth) as a whole; but for us as a community of consciousness, God is simply the 'aether' in which we all participate, and in which our human work retains its infinitely developing significance even when our singular cycle of organic natural existence is complete. This is not a lesson that can properly have a personal cast. For in its character as 'philosophy' it is rather the knowledge that

¹ *ist nur die Form*, NKA, vi. 330, 12 (Harris and Knox, p. 252; my interpretation of the 'free shapes' as 'gods and heroes' there is mistaken. Greek heroes were deified only after death, which makes them an *anticipation* of the Catholic 'saints' who achieve blessedness only in the 'beyond'.)

² *ist nur die Form*, NKA, vi. 331, 3-4 (Harris and Knox, p. 252). Since this is as far as our evidence about 'Absolute Spirit' goes for 1804 I have absorbed it into the perspective of 1803 and dealt with it in Ch. V (see pp. 216-22, above). My hypothesis regarding the emphasis on 'personal' salvation in the first triadic 'system' depends essentially on logical considerations. This one scrap of evidence is consistent with it, but does not directly support it in any clearly demonstrable way. (On the other hand, we can detect the same emphasis on personal salvation at the end of *Faith and Knowledge*, and we may well suspect its presence in other (lost) texts of 1802. Quite probably Hegel's accounts of the absolute religion were always somewhat at odds with the 'impersonal' doctrine of the intuition of the Absolute Identity laid down in the *Difference* and *Natural Law* essays. In that case, what my hypothesis claims is that the shift to the 'transcendental standpoint' gave this emphasis a completely legitimate standing for the first time—and further that the felt need for its legitimation was a motive for the shift.)

enables us to appreciate human achievement, and reconciles us to human errors and limitations, at all times and in all places. But philosophy needs to be thus impersonal, precisely because it is the *true doctrine of the absolute value of personality*—and the personal emphasis of Fichte's philosophy (for example) is a failing because it actively inhibits the appreciative reconciliation of the singular human consciousness with all its fellows which the true doctrine inculcates.¹

¹ It cannot be *proved* that Hegel had clearly developed this positive conception of speculative philosophy before 1805 (see *NKA*, viii. 286, 6–287, 27). I am only arguing here that his position at the beginning of 1804 is fully consistent with it. This insight is what leads to the substitution of a 'science of the experience of consciousness' in the place of critical logic. Logic itself, becomes constructively, rather than critically speculative. It is the science of thinking as the impersonal ground of the self-cognition of the Logos as personality.)

CHAPTER VIII

The Logic and Metaphysics of 1804/5

1. *The approach to Hegel's logic*

It is an advantage to approach the first version of Hegel's philosophical logic that has survived—or any later version for that matter—possessed already of the clearest and most comprehensive grasp that we can obtain, of the 'real philosophy' which it is designed to articulate. Since the theory of real existence (philosophy of nature and of spirit) is the application of the logical theory, it cannot be understood apart from some grasp of the logical principles and theoretical norms and goals by which it is articulated. But the presence of all the empirical models and details in the applied philosophy—and above all the fact that each of us is an exemplar of 'consciousness'—helps us to get a grip on the logical principles and structures in their actual working.

This is important because the standpoint of Hegel's philosophical logic is itself alien to the self-consciousness of our culture. One is tempted to say that it is alien to the natural standpoint of consciousness, but to say that is only confusing. For although it is natural to assume that the standpoint which we spontaneously and uncritically adopt is the 'natural' one, acquaintance with other times and other cultures soon teaches us that men have made this natural assumption about many different positions. All that is permanently natural is the tendency to make the assumption; and we obviously need to be alienated from that, if we mean to come to a critically rational decision either about what position is natural, or about what position is ultimately right.

The initial standpoint of Hegel's logic is 'critical' in this sense: it does not assume that what feels natural is natural

(still less that it is right). Rather it treats the feeling of naturalness as a problem. That is to say it makes the assumption that what is natural is a question for decision; and it takes this assumption (however 'unnatural') to be logically necessary (or right). The rational ground for this second-order claim is the empirical discovery that the primitive feeling of 'naturalness' or 'obviousness' is itself dialectical. That is to say, it changes from time to time and from place to place, so that putting any absolute reliance in it is irrational, and can only lead to trouble. It is not certain that trouble can be avoided; but it is certain that a critical attitude toward assumptions that cause trouble is rational.

This certainty itself, however, is belying. A critical attitude toward what causes trouble, may itself cause worse trouble unless the critical attitude itself contains criteria of what is logically trouble-free, and a method which shows clearly that those criteria can be met and lived up to in practice. There are examples—Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* seems to me to be one—of a logically critical attitude toward the 'irrationalities' of ordinary experience with its 'natural' assumptions, where the cure that we are offered is worse than the disease. It is axiomatic for philosophers that 'the unexamined life is not worth living'; but this should not blind us to the fact that the result of some examinations is to make life less worth living than it was before the examination began.¹ If this can happen

¹ The reader need not agree with me about *Appearance and Reality*, as long as he can think of some philosophical mind or work whose cultural impact has been in his view important, and on the whole bad. My own choice of Bradley is dictated by the consciousness that just this verdict can be plausibly defended in the case of Hegel himself. Hegel's cultural influence has been so many-sided, that I do not myself know how to estimate the final balance as it stands at present. I shall not quarrel with someone who judges that Hegel's cultural influence has been more bad than good, as long as he will concede that this *may* be because what Hegel was trying to do has been generally misunderstood. I am more interested in communicating with those who think that Hegel's influence has been bad, than with those who find salvation in what seems to me to be misunderstanding; and I expect to influence them more, because at least, we see danger (and 'badness') in the same places. Bradley is my exemplar because his concerns were as purely philosophical as Hegel's; and because—after an excellent beginning in *Ethical Studies*—he pursued those concerns by isolating philosophical logic from the 'real philosophy' of human inquiry about nature, and from human life, and thought as a *communal* activity. I take it to be the fundamental contention of Hegel that the human community is the only adequate embodiment of Reason.

then the axiom is, by itself, no axiom. It is worthless, and it will remain so until it is put into the context of an *axiomatic system* which will make the examination that it ordains fruitful. Mere critique is only destructive. We must know what we want to achieve by it.

Hegel's Logic (meaning the Logic and Metaphysics of 1804 as well as the later speculative Logic) is an attempt to exhibit the self-sufficiency of human rationality. 'Rationality' does not here mean a 'form' which some human or natural activities and products exhibit and others do not; it is both the form and the substance, both the process and the product of 'examining life'. Thus the absolute assumption is that rational procedure can always be fruitful—that it is always materially reasonable to be reasonable, there is always a point to it. This assumption is part of the meaning of 'Reason' as Hegel uses the term; if we do not make this assumption, then we are operating with a different, weaker, more formal, concept. Even so, what Hegel tries to do, does not lose its point for us, though we shall be obliged to describe it in terms that have a less purely 'logical' sound. I am doing that myself now; and I hold that it is absolutely (not just pedagogically or instrumentally) legitimate to do this. It is a mistake to think of the self-sufficiency of pure thought as the absolute goal of philosophy. *Human* life itself is the goal of Hegel's philosophy; from philosophy we must learn how to live. Logic is the definition of what makes natural *life* rational (and therefore human). This is not the end of existence, but only its beginning. It becomes an end for us, only because we begin at the real end; we are alive, and we are rational. Hence life, in all its evident irrationality, becomes a problem for us, and the rational understanding of it becomes a goal. But to reach *that* goal, is only to be half-way to the real goal, since the real goal was always where we began.

Thus, when I say that we should approach the interpretation of Hegel's philosophical logic with the clearest grasp we can attain of his 'real philosophy' I do not mean that we should forget that logic is, in Hegel's view, the beginning of philosophy. I mean rather that we should remember this, and bring with us to this beginning as much understanding as we can, of the goal toward which we are moving. A study of Hegel's Logic—and there have been many such—which

regards it as the 'thought of God', and hence as an 'end in itself' far above any 'finite', merely human purposes, is not merely worthless, it is actively pernicious. What we are studying is the logical structure embodied in human existence; the moment we forget that, we shall lose all hope of achieving a reliable interpretation of what the text asserts.

That is why I separated the incomplete philosophy of nature of 1804/5 from the Logic and Metaphysics and dealt with it first. I would have followed the same procedure with the philosophy of spirit (which remained unwritten) if Hegel had written it. As things are, my procedure has the added justification that, for everything except the Solar System and the theory of the Earth, we have in fact, followed the chronological order of Hegel's own manuscripts. But the order we have followed is also the best order of approach to Hegel's system in this still immature form. For Hegel himself is just now in the process of discovering the necessity of a *phenomenological* approach to Logic, i.e. an approach that starts from our actual situation in experience.

So much in explanation of my canons of interpretation, and in defence of my line of approach. But now a *caveat* must be entered about my method of treatment. According to my canons, the right interpretation of any part of Hegel's great 'transcendental argument'—for that is what his system, as a whole, is—can only be arrived at by the most copious discussion and illustration of the experience that went into its genesis, and of other experiences of our own to which it is relevant. I quite simply could not supply such a discussion and illustration for the philosophy of nature proper—and such illuminations as I have offered contain much guesswork. I may have made errors both about historical fact (regarding what influenced Hegel, or what exemplary data he had in mind) and about scientific fact (when I have tried to show the contemporary relevance of his views). The limit of my aspiration here was only to provide a few hints of how the basic project should be understood.

For the philosophy of spirit I have tried to do a little more than that; but there the worst difficulty is that the text is itself both fragmentary, and condensed to the most summary outline possible. With the Logic and Metaphysics I would

willingly try to do more likewise—even though the attempt would reveal many limitations in my detailed understanding. But here, where the manuscript has been long considered by Hegel, and the argument is developed to the degree that he considered appropriate, the requirements of my own present undertaking prevent me from doing everything that I could conceivably do to satisfy my own canons. A proper interpretation of the *Logic and Metaphysics* of 1804 by my standards, would require a book to itself; and since the book would be for an English-speaking audience, it would need to be accompanied by a translation of the text. The discussion here can offer no more than some preliminary spadework for that greater task.¹

The logic of 1804 is less misleading for the ordinary reader than the later speculative Logic precisely because of its critical starting-point. Hegel is discussing concepts that are in ordinary use, and—however extraordinary what *he* says may appear—he is visibly criticizing the more ordinary ways in which other philosophers have sought to employ them. At the same time, the *extraordinary* character of his treatment of them is an index that his discussion is conducted in a 'speculative' context; and the fact that he arrives very early at the concept of the 'true infinite' is an index that the days of his critical conception of logic are numbered. The categories of *Verhältnis*, which were made to disappear into the negative Infinite in the logic of 1801 are now made to emerge out of it. And even the categories of Quality, Quantity, and Quantum, the categories of 'simple connection' (*Beziehung*), those which do not form moments in a cyclic pattern of reciprocity, are not now subjected to critical dissolution, but are shown up as modes of the Infinite as soon as we reach it. In other words, the 'logic' is now part of a constructive process from the beginning.

¹ A task which I personally do not at present intend or expect to complete. The reader who has understood what I say here about the right method of approach to Hegel's Logic (and about its place in the system, and its significance in experience) will not need telling why I prefer to concentrate my own further efforts on the explication of the *Phenomenology*. (Beyond that it would be more appropriate, in my view, to concentrate our energies upon the interpretation of the *Science of Logic*. But, to that end, we do in any case need, at least, a translation of the *Logic and Metaphysics* of 1804.)

This claim must unfortunately remain a hypothesis. We do not know what Hegel said at the outset about the aim and method of philosophical logic because the beginning of our manuscript is lost. There are only a few fairly small lacunae in our text, and it is a great pity (from the point of view of one who is trying to piece Hegel's general development together) that the largest of them is the loss of three double sheets at the beginning.¹

2. *The logic of Understanding*

We do have an explicit confirmation of the non-speculative character of the logic of 'simple connection'; for Hegel remarks later on that 'the first part of logic was called the logic of understanding'.² The beginning of the manuscript as we have it, is a discussion of the concept of 'force' that is a bit reminiscent of the section of 'Force and Understanding' in the *Phenomenology*. Thus there is good reason to suppose that Hegel wanted to lay the logical foundations for the 'true infinite' of 'free motion' in the Solar System through an analysis of how the reflective operation of 'consciousness' becomes 'absolute reflection'. The development is entirely in terms of the categoreal determinations of pure thought however. The phenomenological categories of sensation, intuition, perception—and even 'understanding' itself—belong to the Philosophy of Spirit not to logic.³

¹ This is a pity because—whether he wrote a formal introduction or not—Hegel must have said something at the beginning about the relation of philosophical logic to ordinary reasoning on the one side, and to speculative metaphysics on the other. The MS contains no hint that there was an introductory preamble of any kind. But the balance of probability, even in the case of a writer like Hegel, who hated prefaces, must be in favour of an introductory statement at least as long as the 'Vorerinnerung' of the *Difference* essay. The first sheet that we have fills 101 lines of printed text. After that the material mass of the following 5½ sheets varies only between 108 and 112 lines per sheet. It seems reasonable to assume therefore that the missing 3 sheets at the beginning would fill 320 ± 16 lines; and that the total of 4½ sheets missing in the early part of the text would fill 480 ± 20 lines. So if we assume that the text in *NKA*, vii. 3, 3–21, 15 represents *half* of what Hegel had actually written when he reached that point, we are unlikely to be more than half a page out.

² *NKA*, vii. 175, 3–4; cf. vii. 3, 20 and 4, 1. But the name only applies to the logic of simple relation as applied by those who have not recognized its *infinite* context. The highest such use is the 'construction' of mind and matter in Kant and Fichte.

³ My own effort to explicate the argument by continuous illustration and modelling makes it 'impure'. But my object is precisely to show how and why the logical categories of pure thinking behave so differently 'in themselves' from the way they

The indications in the text as we have it suggest that the categoraeal sequence of the first part was as follows:

(Quality or) Simple Connection:

A: Quality

- a) Reality
- b) Negation (Ideality)
- c) Limit

B: Quantity

- a) Numerical One
- b) Multitude of Numerical One
- c) Allness

C: Quantum

- 1) Whole and parts (Degree)
- 2) Continuous and Discrete
Magnitude (Number)
- 3) Dialectic of Quantum (The
mathematical infinite)¹

The 'dialectic of quantum' brings us to the 'bad infinite' of the number series. This is the negative infinite in which all the

'appear'; and further to show that this 'in-itself' is just the inward structure of our attempt to rationalize experience.

¹ Only 'B: Quantity' and its subheads are given in our text by Hegel himself. It is safe to infer that he had main headings 'A' and 'C' with categoraeal titles; for we find 'D. Infinity' at the end of his footnotes on the aspects of Quantum. The discussion itself makes it certain that the missing titles are 'Quality' and 'Quantum'. We can also be fairly certain that under each main heading there were subsections a), b), c) or 1), 2), 3). But it is not so certain, by any means, that Hegel himself gave explicit titles to all of these subsections, since subsection 3) of 'Quantum' was initially marked in our text without a title. Hegel wrote '*Dialectic of Quantum*' in the margin here (NKA, vii. 14, 10 and 28). I have for the most part followed the articulation proposed by Horstmann and Trede (vii. 359–60). They have surveyed the proposals of previous students and editors of the MSS (vii. 356–60), and it is clear that theirs is the best. But it is not quite correct to say that 'it has at least the advantage of not contradicting the indications in the text.' No proposal can have that advantage decisively, since the indications in the text are at one point inconsistent (so that one *must* ignore, amend, or give special interpretation to at least one of them). Either the number '3' is wrong at vii. 14, 10; or else it is wrong or needs special interpretation at vii. 28, 21. In the former case Haering—Hegel, ii. 158 ff.—was logically correct in regarding 'D: Infinity' as the 'totality' of Quantum. But of course, the logical identity of subsection 3 with heading 'D' is no reason for cancelling, altering, or ignoring the heading. The headings do not have to be triadic just because the logic is. 'Infinity' could very well be both the negative terminus of 'Simple Connection' and the positive transition to speculative logic or the logic of Reason. My own solution, however, is to give to the second '3' the special interpretation 'section 3, *continued*'. (The unifying topic is not 'Number' but 'Mathematical Infinity'. 'Number' is 'realized Quantum', which is logically the *second* moment).

determinations of the Understanding are engulfed. The true 'totality' of Simple Connection is the category of Relation itself. This is the first form in which the Infinite is properly recognized.

The text as we have it begins in the middle of the discussion of 'limit'; and there are two smaller, but still important lacunae in the discussion of Quantum. The obvious targets of criticism in the discussion of 'force' are Newton's theory of gravitation (on the natural side) and Fichte's theory of the Ego, and the *Anstoss* (on the transcendental side). Just how the dialectic of Reality and Negation was developed (or who the main critical targets were) it is impossible to be sure. But Kant's table of the categories is the evident starting-point of Hegel's logical reflections. So we can be certain that Hegel has his 'Transcendental Deduction' in mind throughout.

Some hints of the argument of Quality can be derived from Hegel's review of 'the story so far' when he reaches 'Infinity'. Here he tells us that Quality and Quantity both involve the same 'infinite contradiction' that becomes explicit in Quantum; but that it appears in different guises. Infinity is the concept of 'the whole sphere of Quality or Simple Connection'. In the category of Quality proper it appears thus:

Infinity *in* Quality, i.e. in the simple concept of connection or of determinacy as relating purely to itself, is to let the quality subsist as such and at the same time to display in it its contrary, the connection to other, [i.e.,] the multiplicity; Infinity is therefore a multitude [*Menge*] of qualities and indeed a pure multitude one that absolutely does not relate to the qualities themselves, i.e. it is not a qualitative, but an indeterminate multitude of qualities, which is thus an infinite multitude because it is simultaneously pure determinacy as quality and pure indeterminacy; quality is posited as multiplicity, or compared with others, in the form of limit, as excluding, and therefore as numerical one, and the multitude is an infinite multitude of units, the which qualities are determinacies relating themselves to themselves.¹

¹ NKA, vii. 30, 3-12; (cf. also vii. 114, 10-12). It should be noted that all later summaries are distorted because in the initial positing 'the Infinite was not posited itself', vii. 35, 4. So the 'mass of qualities' was presumably *not* directly posited in its 'purity'. This 'pure mass that does not connect with the qualities themselves' seems to me to be plainly the Kantian *Ding-an-sich*. Thus the implicit context of the 'logic' of 1804 was not theological like the context at the beginning of the 'philosophy of Nature'.

From this summary it appears that the 'logic of Understanding' begins by positing 'Reality' as an indistinct *Menge* of 'qualities'—a 'pure being' which is a sort of night in which everything determinate is hidden. The dialectic of Quality arises because it is impossible for qualities to be simply a 'pure *Menge*'. Real experience always presents some definite qualitative face; the darkness of night is itself such a face. The crucial point is that *the face changes*; darkness vanishes and day comes. Then we can recognize that the indistinctness of darkness was itself a limit which contained the same mass of undistinguished quality that becomes a distinguishable multiplicity of qualities in the daylight. Thus the original darkness is both positive and negative. It is a positive face (determinate blackness); and it *negates* all the distinctions that daylight reveals.

At the beginning of the surviving text, the category of Limit has emerged from 'the so-called construction of the Idea out of the opposed activities, the *ideell* and the *reell* ones'.¹ This is evidently the Fichtean 'construction' of experience out of the self-positing and opposing of the Ego. But again the later resumé is helpful, for there we find that

bad Infinity is the third to bad Reality and bad Ideality . . . Bad Reality stays at the concept of Quality as a posited, solely self-referring determinacy; bad Ideality likewise stays at the concept of Quantity, the exclusion of the limit; and bad Infinity connects these concepts with each other in just this way, that it allows them both to subsist: Bad Reality remains in that [bad Infinity] had passed beyond it, i.e., in that Ideality is posited with respect to it; and Ideality is just this passing beyond, a negating outside which the negated still subsists, or what comes to the same thing, pure unity, for which the necessity of the limiting sets in as before.²

Thus 'Reality' is the *content* of experience (the mass of qualities arising from the *Anstoss*) and 'Negation' is the *form* (the Ego). Actual experience is just the 'Limit', the determinate quality that arises at the moment of impact. This is all that is produced by 'constructing' consciousness out of the opposed

¹ *NKA*, vii. 3, 8–9.

² *NKA*, vii. 31, 14–25. (This is actually the beginning of the 'Note', but it is another resumé.)

'forces' of the 'world' and the 'soul'. Genuine construction—the method of speculative metaphysics—is explained and illustrated later on, through the *adequate* definition of the subject as cognition. The 'construction' of the subject is there said to be 'the representation of the subject as divided with respect to itself, as an indifferent (*gleichgültiges*) being, which remains itself in multiplicity'. This kind of internal division is contrasted with an analysis into parts that have a distinct identity and subsistence of their own. The being that is defined must remain 'the ground, the sphere embracing the parts, and the parts must be just parts, or connected to one another . . . This bringing of the division of the construction back to the unity of the definition is the *proof*.'¹

'The *ideell* and *reell* activities' will be familiar to all students of the critique of Fichte in the *Difference* essay.² By criticizing at one and the same time Fichte's 'construction' of experience, and Newton's 'construction' of the world-system, Hegel shows the necessity for a conception of 'limit' that is 'constructive' in his speculative sense. The two '*so-called* constructions' rest upon a conceptual model in which the 'limit' of a thing is the boundary beyond which lie other things which in no way affect it, and which it does not affect. 'Construction' is to be done with parts that subsist quite independently and are simply added to one another. But the actual character of the 'forces' that are thus composed (whether into the self or the world-system) is not like that at all. The 'limit' achieved through their dynamic equilibrium, the one displayed by the visible heaven, or by productive imagination, is not that sort of boundary. Both the gravitational system of free motion, and the operation of human understanding must be understood as an *a priori* synthesis that cannot be decomposed into parts which are bounded in the way that we 'understand' a stone as an object very

¹ NKA, vii. 113, 8–21.

² *Difference*, NKA, iv. 37, 22–53, 2 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 123–42). The 'factors' are both called '*ideell*'; but the *reell* one is recognizable as 'empirical consciousness' and as the 'objective Ego'; also as the *Anstoss*. The whole critique is summarized in *Faith and Knowledge* (NKA, iv. 388, 9–404, 3; Cerf and Harris, pp. 154–76); here the language of 'ideal factors' is absent, but the relation of the critique to the argument of the 'logic' is easier to see because Hegel treats Fichte strictly as a reflective theorist, and does not seek to bring out, or to defend, the speculative foundations of his theory.

conveniently limited for holding in the hand and throwing. The transcendental logic which the operation of understanding *presupposes* is very different from the categories that it *uses*. As we shall soon see, 'force' is the fundamental category employed by the understanding to connect the noumenal with the phenomenal aspect of experience. But perceiving the 'limit' of the stone will not help us to understand the limit between self and world, or that between centripetal and centrifugal 'force' at all. 'Limits' of this latter (conceptual) kind must rather be conceived as the *totality* of the opposed forces and their process, through which the definite quality (of the world or of our consciousness) has come into being. The reality which comes to its 'limit' as a quality cannot be defined until we recognize it as the *ground* within which the division of opposites by the intellect takes place; the ground, the division, and the process through which the quality arises as the boundary drawn in the division, must all of them be comprehended in a true definition of the quality. To rest content with an 'explanation' of something (e.g. the self or the Solar System) as a 'product' of opposed forces, is to ignore the fact that we cannot understand the things mentioned in the explanation (or their actions and passions) in the way that we understand the things explained at all; yet the explanatory concepts are precisely what is philosophically interesting.

The transcendental theory of rational consciousness as an *a priori* synthesis, and the fundamental example of the gravitational theory of matter, are the basis of Hegel's universal argument that *all* conceptual explanation, even of the most elementary qualitative 'intuitions' has this *intellectual* concept of 'limit' as its logical form. 'As its concept Quality is the Reality out of which it has become the contrary of itself, Negation; and out of this it has become the contrary of the contrary of itself, and has so come to itself again as totality.'¹ The passively existing quality is understood to be the result of a dynamic activity of consciousness or of nature; but then that

¹ *NKA*, vii. 7, 1-3. This passage (with vii. 5, 13) is one of the clearest evidences that the moments of Quality are Reality, Negation, Limit. We should notice that the Kantian Thing-in-itself is an ultimate Reality which can only be comprehended in this way as a Limit. (I use capitals to mark the fact that the thus ennobled term is referred to as a logical or metaphysical category.)

activity can only be conceived as an equilibrium of opposed forces. Thus Quality 'comes to itself again' as a *conceptual motion*. The activity can be equilibrated as a *range* of qualitative expressions, since the forces which have limited and been limited by consciousness are not identical with any singular qualitative expression (that is its 'negative' aspect).

This 'construction' of Limit results from incorporating 'our necessary reflection upon the quality, namely, that the determinacy that is on its own account, which the quality is to be, is not' into our initial concept of quality as simple being. This remark about 'our necessary reflection' seems to indicate that logic begins from a critical reflection upon experience; it is the experience of transience that calls forth the explanatory effort in the first place. What we want to understand is motion and change. This is the objective manifestation of 'the concept', which is exactly what we 'construct' in the process of explanation. What is needed is to recognize that this process is a logical one, a complex of necessary connections; it cannot be consistently conceived as the mapping of an accidental heap of separable components.

The quest which began when qualitative variation forced us to admit, with Heracleitus, that 'nature loves to hide' (or in modern Kantian terms, that our sense experience is the phenomenal manifestation of an intellectual 'thing-in-itself') has thus led us to construct an intellectual entity, the concept of quality, of which all the singular qualities that manifest themselves in our experience are moments. How are we to conceive this intellectual construct that we have intuited behind the sensible flux? How can we explain to ourselves the connection between one moment and another? Minimally the distinguishable qualities are a great multitude of *different* things. In their separate identity (their 'relation to themselves') they are distinguishable entities—they 'relate themselves negatively to an other' which is beyond the limit that defines each one of them; every quality is one of a set of alternative 'limits'. Thus what we call the 'qualities' of the noumenal real must necessarily be subject to *quantitative* treatment. This is necessarily involved in our conceiving them as qualitative limits.

In the first place if we can distinguish them, we can count them; each of them is an identifiable unit. This unity of every identifiable quality as a limit, Hegel calls the 'return of the determinacy into itself', because the stable identity has already been understood as the *result* of a dynamic interaction of forces. Each is identifiable as the determinate limit that it is. But as a limit it only exists phenomenally (or 'returned into itself') because it is *not* other qualities lying on either side of it. This is the necessary contribution of our reflection (which continues to be necessary all through the phase of 'simple connection'). Hume's 'missing shade of blue' is a valuable illustration here. We miss it—we notice that it does not phenomenally exist—precisely because the shades between which it is missing, the shades which are phenomenally there, refer us to it for their own definition.¹

The ultimate field or ground of all qualities is the positive unity of the Heracleitean Logos (or the Kantian thing-in-itself),² and the determinate quality emerges as a negative unity by distinguishing itself against that indistinct mass of potentialities. But every different quality is equally a unit. In this respect they are not different. They are all elements in the same *field*. The 'missing shade' breaks the continuity, the 'positive unity', of the concept of 'blue'. This example involves already the distinction of continuous and discrete quantity. But that is because one cannot give examples that only illustrate the elementary dialectic of unity and multiplicity. Purely mathematical examples are not more primitive, but more advanced (according to Hegel's logical analysis) as we shall see.

Hegel's own argument achieves a self-contained form by referring back always to the logical terms that the construction has already evolved. This self-containment is appropriate to his 'logical' project, his concern with *transcendental* necessity. But it also gives his argument an absolutely unnatural

¹ For Hume's discussion of the problem see *Treatise*, Part I, sect. I (Selby-Bigge, pp. 5–6).

² I am coupling these two deliberately because we must have some starting-point, and we do not know what models of 'reality' or 'position' Hegel himself offered. I have chosen them because they are literally 'poles apart'. The second is obviously the irritant from which the pearl of his Logic evolved, and the first is (almost equally obviously) the 'absolute Muse' of his Philosophy of Nature.

character because this way of handling concepts, which are thus forced into cannibalism and incestuous copulation, is so far removed from their employment in ordinary experience. We can seek to mitigate our sense of repulsion (which I have rather tried both to characterize and to accentuate) by calling Hegel's *Logic* (as Bradley did) 'a ballet of bloodless categories'.¹ This suggests that it is, after all, legitimate for categories to play upon one another like this because they are 'bloodless'; and secondly that the ultimate justification of the play (and of *Logic* itself) is aesthetic—it is a 'ballet'. Bradley knew—and was himself playing upon the fact—that both of these implicit suggestions are false. Far from being 'bloodless', the categories of Hegelian logic, are the life-blood of human existence;² and the goals of Hegelian logic are far removed from the ideals of aesthetic economy and elegance that have such an important place in formal logic and mathematics. That is why we must not be content to repeat Hegel's argument (though we must certainly follow and understand its self-contained structure as well as we can).

In actual experience, at the stage we have reached, the qualities distinguish themselves as a multitude of units, by taking one another's place. They 'flee from one another'. This flight is itself a continuum, and for this reason the range of qualitative changes in a given field must constitute a continuum. The scale of temperature is a good example of this quantitative 'allness', because it is open-ended.³ The 'flight' of

¹ *Principles of Logic*, 2nd edn. Oxford, 1922, p. 591. It is not clear what historic adversaries Bradley had in mind, since he names no names. But he means to pair reductive materialism with abstract intellectualism, so I believe that I have pointed the correct moral regarding *his own* interpretation of Hegel—though I do not think that what Hegel found behind the 'sensuous curtain' (according to my interpretation) would have satisfied Bradley.

² In the *Phenomenology* Hegel himself describes the 'true infinite' of Understanding as 'the simple essence of life, the soul of the world, the universal *blood*' (*NKA*, ix, 99, 30–1; Miller, sect. 162, p. 100—my italics). Such concrete imagery is inappropriate in logic itself; but it shows us what sort of metaphors *are* aesthetically appropriate to his logical endeavours. 'Blood' is appropriate because it is the material *bearer of life*; and because it *circulates*.

³ That Hegel has temperature in mind is suggested not only by his own example later, but by the echoes of Socrates' discussion of the behaviour of fire, snow, 'the hot', and 'the cold' in the *Phaedo* (103a–106a). (Notice that no concept of *intensive* magnitude, or temperature, is involved in that discussion.) The resting medium of this 'flight' is empty space—the void in which the Epicurean atoms repel and fly from each other. But the atomic theory is an example of 'so-called construction'. It is rather

the hot and the cold from each other is conceptually overcome when we grasp them both as 'temperature'. The 'negative unity' of the hand in the cold bucket, 'becomes another' when we transfer it to the hot bucket; but it 'becomes itself again' as part of the continuum of temperature. But now quantity as an extended range has been grasped as a 'limited positive unity'. In order to define the determinate quality as a 'negative' unity (a limit) we had to place it in the range which fell on each side of it. Now we have to grasp the range (the positive unity or continuum) and define that. Thus the temperature range of water proper (between ice and steam) is a definite 'quantum'.

At the very point when Hegel seems to be about to proclaim this advance, two pages (half a sheet) of the manuscript are missing. Where our text recommences he is characterizing physical forces generally as quanta. Velocity, gravitational mass, weight, heat, are all open-ended scales, which can be thought of as 'graduated'. Each is a positive unity (a field or continuum) consisting of a range of diverse *degrees* (a 'diversity which is not a diversity of the force itself'). The atomic theorists with their 'so-called construction' conceive the degrees as larger and smaller multitudes of particles of the relevant sort (mass, heat, etc.). 'Dynamic physics on the other hand wants to cognize this diversity not as something external, but as something in and for itself in matter.'¹ Thus the logic of understanding itself requires the positing of 'one force in a diversity of degree'. The extensive magnitude of Quantity must become the intensive magnitude of Quantum; the whole terminology of *Potenzen*, which Hegel has not yet abandoned,

the temporal succession of states of a spatial field that is the genuine model in actual experience of the 'equilibrium of the nothing . . . in which even the distinction of positive and negative unity disappears' (vii. 10, 13-15).

¹ Here (NKA, vii. 12, 16-13, 12)—and often elsewhere—Hegel is rather unfair to his atomist opponents. They do not need many different sorts of atoms (though it is true that many of them—Lavoisier, for example, see Partington, iii. 421—believed that heat is a special kind of matter) because the programme of atomism was to explain other phenomena in terms of the different size, shape, and above all motion—of the atoms. He means to attack that programme (philosophically formulated in the distinction of the 'primary' qualities, which are directly quantifiable, from the 'secondary' ones which are not, and so must be explained by reduction to quantifiable terms); and in spite of its enormous success, which he sometimes ignores in his pursuit of its vagaries, Hegel's critique has been vindicated by the triumph of the dynamic conception of matter which he upheld.

testifies to the importance of this 'requirement of dynamic physics'.¹

This last page of sheet 6 seems to establish that 'intensive magnitude' or 'Degree' is the primitive form of Quantum. But the whole of sheet 7 (i.e. four pages) is lost so we do not know exactly how Quantum is developed. Sheet 8 begins with a reference to the contrast between the *continuous* range of magnitudes (for example the range between the melting-point of ice and the boiling-point of water) and the *discrete* magnitude (the actual temperature of this pail of water now). At this point Hegel has already passed on to Number as 'realized' Quantum. The hypothesis that the last page of sheet 6 was part of stage 1 of Quantum ('Degree'), while the first page of sheet 8 is the end of stage 2 ('Number') is a very plausible one. I believe that it is materially correct; but with respect to the first stage it is, almost certainly, formally incorrect. There are several very clear indications in our text that the first stage of Quantum should be called 'Whole and Parts', not 'Degree'.

The first such indication comes at the beginning of stage 3 (where Hegel himself wrote 'Dialectic of Quantum' in the margin and underlined it). In the 'dialectic of Quantum', says Hegel, Quantum sublates itself 'in so far as it is self-connected or is the unity of *a whole and its parts*'. He goes on to say that 'Concerning the relationship (*Verhältniss*) of the whole and the parts it has been shown that in truth the whole as one, and the parts as many ones fall asunder from one another and are not connected.'² Since the sub-categories of Quantity ('the One and the Many Ones') are here invoked, this demonstration ought to be found somewhere after they have been developed; and since it is not in our text it must have been in one of the lacunae.

Another very clear indication that the 'Allness' of Quantity becomes 'Whole and Parts' at the beginning of Quantum, comes in an incidental clarification much later on, in the

¹ We can see from the critique here that the *Potenz* theory was abandoned partly because of the prominence that it gives to quantitative and numerical distinctions which are external to the essence of real development (cf. *NKA*, vii. 16, 14-21; 17, 26-18, 12).

² *NKA*, vii. 14, 10-16 (my italics).

discussion of chemical affinity. At the climax of his argument about that, Hegel announces triumphantly that 'it thus comes once more back to an indifferent relationless connection, to quantum, the connection of the whole and the parts'.¹

We can understand how Quantum as a determinate range of intensive magnitudes is the model for 'Whole and parts' if we attend carefully to the resumé of the argument which Hegel gives when he reaches 'Infinity' and is ready to make the transition from 'Simple Connection' to 'Relation' proper.² Just as the visual model of a 'limit' as a line or surface cutting off one extended thing from its surroundings, is inadequate, so the visual model of a 'whole and parts' as an extended thing cut off from its environment and then divided in the same way (e.g., a 'whole' cake or pie cut up into slices) is conceptually inadequate likewise. The division itself demonstrates that what we are dealing with is not a 'whole'. The slices are completely independent once they are cut. Each is a new whole destined (let us suppose) for a different stomach.

The 'allness' of water between melting and boiling is not like this. Water cannot go from ice to steam (or vice versa) without passing through each 'part' of the whole range in their perfectly determinate and inviolable (hence enumerable) order. Every degree on the range 'contains' its predecessors in a sublated form; and what each one of them contains sublated, depends on which way the motion of temperature change is going. Every degree is a certain 'limit' on an upward progress or a downward regress of heat. It can only be defined by reference to the continuum on both sides. It may (for instance) be exactly half-way between the boiling- and freezing-point. If we are going up then it contains all the degrees below, and the higher ones are beyond it; if we are going down then the converse is true. Every degree is thus a limited quantum, an 'allness' or a whole of temperature; and it is also a proper part of the range of temperatures, one that fills its own essential, inescapably necessary place in the range. It is a 'whole' in itself, and a 'part' of every whole that lies beyond it in either direction.

¹ Ibid., 62, 6-7.

² Ibid., 29, 3-10.

The two *directions*, however, are in principle infinite. Water boils and freezes at definite points, but those points are only fixed on an indefinite continuum. Thus if we think about those points we must say that what they contain (or have beyond them) is infinite in both directions (so that it makes no difference which side we take to be 'contained' or achieved, and which to be a potential still to be achieved or a 'beyond' that has not yet been traversed. The definite Quantum of temperature as such, is the 'limit' of quantity which remains in principle unlimited in both directions. We say that 'the temperature of the water is 50°C (or 122°F)' but this seeming determinacy is a fake since the finite continuum from zero to 100°C (or 32° to 212°F) itself lies upon and contains 'sublated' a continuum that remains quite undetermined. This is the 'absolute contradiction': that every determinate degree on a scale of intensive magnitudes is a true whole, containing certain definite parts, and excluding others equally definite. Yet at the same time, it is not (cannot be) determinate as a whole because we have determined nothing about what lies beyond it, and we need to presuppose the 'allness' of that undetermined beyond as contained within any determination that we may make. We know where 50°C is relative to 0° and 100°. But we do not know where those determinate bounds are—except with respect to the quality of 'water'—a 'quality' which remains quite uncomprehended by all of our quantitative 'fixing'.

This is a review of how the 'absolute contradiction' arises when Quantum is looked at 'as a whole'. But sheet 8 shows that in his own lost discussion Hegel developed the 'absolute contradiction' from within the determinate range of intensive magnitude itself. Every part of the range can be given a number which uniquely belongs to it, precisely because it is a true 'part' having its necessary place, its one and only place, which only it can fill, and which must be filled, or the whole would not exist at all (whereas a pie is simply smaller and differently shaped if a piece is cut out, and we can still apply to it arbitrarily any ordering and numbering of parts that we like). Yet *no number scale is uniquely necessary as a whole* (for instance the Celsius and the Fahrenheit scales are quite different); and every part of the continuum, thus determined

or 'realized' as a number on the scale, remains itself a range—smaller, and hence harder to make discriminations within, but still divisible in principle. Every numerable degree is a dialectical union of positive unity (continuity) and negative unity (discrete determinateness or limit).

Because of the fragmentary character of the evidence, we have been forced to look at Quantum dialectically. But it is important to distinguish between the 'realization of Quantum' (stage 2) and the 'dialectic of Quantum' (stage 3) in Hegel's argument. When he reached stage 3 Hegel wrote *Dialectic of Quantum* in the margin and underlined it. And it is the dialectic of 'open-endedness' and of 'infinite divisibility' that he discusses in detail in a four-part Note which fills almost four of his sheets. Number itself is not dialectical; it is only the Quantum 'realized' in the number that refuses to stay where we have fixed it, and requires us to postulate vanishing quanta (or absolute limits).¹ The numerical expression chosen is external and arbitrary, but the numbers remain firm and very comfortably reliable. They never become infinite, and the only awkward member of the number series is zero (which does mark an absolute limit or vanishing point). It is wrong, therefore, to go against Hegel's clear indication and call the third section 'Number'. The 'realization of Quantum' in Number is the topic of stage 2. 'Dialectic' always has in Hegel's early usage strictly a destructive dissolving significance.² It must begin after the process of 'realization'. Up to this point there is a steady advance; but now that the quantitative—mathematical standpoint of the scientific Under-

¹ This is important because—as Hegel insists at length at the beginning of his first note (NKA, vii. 15, 20–17, 7)—it leads to the discovery of how quanta of one kind are transformed into quanta of another.

² This point is made and documented by Klaus Düsing (*Das Problem der Subjektivität*, pp. 102–8). Hegel speaks more than once as if 'critical logic' and 'dialectic' were identical, and Düsing follows this lead, (e.g., *Problem der Subjektivität*, pp. 25, 43–4, 93, 105). But M. Baum has rightly pointed out that 'dialectic' is not simply the name of the method of Hegel's critical logic, it is also the name of a process that can go on in metaphysical and real contexts ('Methode der Logik und Metaphysik beim Jenaer Hegel', *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 20, 1980, 133—sect. 4 of this essay contains a valuable census of the occurrences of the terms *dialektik*, *dialektisch* in the MS of 1804/5. Before this time it occurs only twice). It is correct, I think, to call *dialectic* both the 'culmination' of logical method, and a 'transitional phase' in speculative philosophy proper.

standing has been properly 'constructed', 'Reason presents itself as the force of the negative Absolute, and hence as a negating that is absolute'.¹ The whole project of Understanding depends on the perfect definition of *limits*; with Number this appears to have been achieved. But the achievement is belying for reasons that have already been indicated. The 'dialectic of Quantum' lets these reasons spell themselves out.

In the first place number is directly limitless. There is no highest number. The multiplicity of finite phenomena cannot be numbered; and the logical infinity of the number series, its essential endlessness, reflects the fact that there is always a new way to look at things, and a new way for them to be. The endlessness of a causal chain is the simplest empirical model of this. 'Reason makes the Understanding boundless, and in this infinite wealth, the Understanding and its objective world meet their downfall.'²

Secondly, every numbered degree is infinitely divisible. Here the 'absolute contradiction' of infinity becomes explicit as Hegel shows in the first part of his *Note*. This deals mainly with the 'infinitesimals' involved in mathematical calculus. Numerical expressions themselves are based on arbitrary conventions (units of time and distance, etc.). But where the arbitrary units vanish it is the dialectic of *die Sache selbst* (the speculative reincarnation of the *Ding-an-sich*) that is revealed. '*The Sache does not disappear in the absolutely small any more than it goes beyond itself in the absolutely large*'.³ Hegel's first concern is to draw the transcendental lesson that consciousness is not a quantum of force.⁴ As we shall

¹ *Difference*, NKA, iv. 17; 5-6 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 94-5).

² *Difference*, NKA, iv. 17, 14-16 (Harris and Cerf, p. 95). (This is the *empirical* aspect of vii. 14, 14-15, 19.)

³ NKA, vii. 17, 22-4. The emphasis is Hegel's.

⁴ On this basis Hegel rejects Kant's refutation of Mendelssohn's argument for immortality (NKA, vii. 17, 26-18, 12). The implication would seem to be that in Hegel's view consciousness is immortal. But empirical consciousness, we should notice, is an extensive continuum of degrees. It is a perfect model of 'Whole and Parts', and of the dialectic of the same. My present consciousness must contain, not just my past sublated, but *the* past generally, and it must refer not just to my future, but to *the* future generally. These necessities are the transcendental requirements of my existence as *rational* consciousness. Thus rational consciousness must be saved,

presently see, this is important for the understanding of his main argument. But the lesson for the philosophy of nature (that the vanishing of opposition is the appearance of aetheric transformation) is more interesting not just because it is a theoretical answer to Zeno, but because it draws after it a clear definition of the infinitesimal quantities of the calculus as *limits*. Hegel is justly contemptuous of the crudely practical view that every determination of quantity has a margin of negligibility (so to speak). The crucial point is that 'in spite of the small bit that is left out of account, the determination made in using the infinitesimal calculus is absolutely precise.' His own concern is to *defend* what he knows to be the position of all good mathematicians, precisely because an adequate conception of mathematical operations will lead us to appreciate the logical validity of those aspects of 'dynamic physics' that seem to conflict with common sense.² Determinate quantities are sublated altogether in the operations of the calculus (or in algebraic equations or geometric theorems generally) and we are concerned with *ratios*. But when the quantities become equal to zero, we must not speak as if the

somehow, from the bad infinite. Hence Hegel says that the first *true* consciousness is 'without degree'. Whether this 'salvation' of consciousness from the bad infinite really puts Hegel on Mendelssohn's side of the 'immortality' question remains to be seen. It is already apparent I think that Mendelssohn's argument falls under Hegel's ban along with Kant's refutation of it.

¹ vii. 18, 24-5. The guilty party here is the philosopher Christian Wolff.

² The impression (which McTaggart managed to impose on Russell) that Hegel is criticizing mathematical reasoning, and trying to show that it rests on contradictory foundations, is quite mistaken. Hegel was not (like Russell) a great mathematician. But he was a much better one than McTaggart (or than myself for that matter). Hegel, like Zeno, was concerned to *use* mathematical reasoning to criticize a certain conception of physical reality; unlike Zeno he recognized that he was criticizing the conception not the reality. His attack on the physical conception (and on bad mathematicians like Wolff who allowed it to influence their presentation of mathematics) would be deprived of validity if mathematical reasoning were itself somehow invalid. McTaggart thought that, like Zeno, Hegel was attacking the physical world as such, and that mathematics must collapse along with the 'forms of intuition' which were its field of application. But Hegel only wanted to put his dynamic physics in the place of sensationalist atomism. For that it was important to show that the operations of the differential calculus could not be interpreted in atomic—or even in Kantian intuitionist—terms. Far from believing that mathematical reasoning *depends* on the Kantian forms of intuition, Hegel saw the success of the calculus as a demonstration that this is not so. His own transition from Understanding to Reason depends heavily on the validity of this insight.

concepts therefore become equal to each other.¹ The physical reality (*das Ding*) is constituted by the constant ratios or proportions of these conceptual terms. When the ratios change the *Ding* itself changes. The *Lebenslauf* of the *Sache* is expressed in changes of this kind. Thus perceptible water is a *Ding* which changes dramatically at 32° and 212°F. It is also a *Sache* in whose *Lebenslauf* the melting- and boiling-point are fixed. The bare relations of numbers as ratios exhibit the same sort of dramatic transformation. The quantitative difference between 3² and 2³ is 1; nowhere else in the number series does the addition of one unit produce a like change.²

But the number series, or the temperature scale cannot express a proper *Lebenslauf* (and water, by the same token, is not a proper *Sache*);³ for the scale is open-ended. We fix points on the continuum, and establish units of measurement arbitrarily. There are no natural units or minimum degrees.⁴ The *Lebenslauf* represented by 'absolute motion', on the other hand, is a true unity in which time and space determinations become interchangeable.⁵ At this point the reason for Hegel's continuing concern with 'opposed forces' throughout his discussion of the logic of Understanding becomes clear. His own doctrine of 'the absolute motion' is the application of his logical concept of Infinity.

Having expounded the 'dialectical aspect of Quantum' in one long note on 'quantitative distinction' (with four subsections of which the first is marked '(aa)') Hegel marks his return to the main argument by repeating the number '3' at the beginning of the concluding paragraph of his discussion of Quantum. When we compare what he wrote here with what he

¹ Newton is found guilty of this absurdity (*NKA*, vii. 21, 25–22, 3).

² *NKA*, vii. 22, 10–24, 11. I assume that *das Ding* designates something perceptible and that *die Sache selbst* is a noumenal entity. 'Earth' is perceptible as an element, but 'the Earth' (the infinite chemical process, or life-cycle of the elements, is not). In terms of our chemical theory the elements are *Dinge*, and *die Sache selbst* is the energetic continuum upon which they form *stations*.

³ The 'aether' (or 'energy') is the pure concept of the negative (and self-positing) infinite; but the absolute chemistry of the Earth-cycle is the simplest model of the true infinite as a *Lebenslauf*.

⁴ *Velocity* seems to have absolute limits in our physics. Hegel did not anticipate this; but as far as I can see it sits well with the view of space-time as a conceptual continuum and of motion as an absolute or primitive reality that he wants to defend.

⁵ Cf. *NKA*, vii. 24, 13–17; 26, 8–12.

wrote under the same section number earlier, we can see that he is summing up, once more, finally, the position that he had reached, when he turned aside to write his lengthy *Note*. Thus his '3' is not in my view a mistake, but an indication that he is *resuming* the third phase of the logic of Quantum.¹ When he says that 'it has been shown about [extensive] magnitude that, because it displays in itself the connected multiplicity, it posits itself in truth as equal to the unconnected multiplicity, and instead of being limited, it is unlimited—what it excludes, it rather has in itself', he is echoing what he wrote at the beginning of the section; but he is *referring* (in both places) to the lost beginning of his discussion of Quantum.² Thus this final paragraph sums up the argument of Quantum as a whole. The fact that every determinate quantum contains of necessity the indeterminate infinity that is excluded by the fixed scale upon which it is defined is 'the absolute contradiction'.³

3. *The Infinite*

Hegel's account of the 'bad Infinite', which now follows, is a retrospective summary of which we have already taken full advantage, in our attempts to fill the lacunae in our manuscript. We only need to remember that in the transcendental application of the 'absolute contradiction' it is theoretical consciousness (the Ego), which is the 'pure unity' arrived at in Quantity; and the contradiction arises from its being the definite Quantum that contains just this empirical state of affairs as its Quality. 'Bad' Infinity resolves the contradiction, by moving on (carrying the thus sublated state of consciousness with it as the continuum for which the new one becomes the 'limit', and through which alone it can be what it is at all).

¹ My position would be much stronger if Hegel were not continually losing his way in the divisions and subdivisions of his arguments in the MSS composed for his own use. If we were dealing with a lecture MS I would agree that the number simply needs to be changed. But to change it to '5' (as Lasson did), is probably *not* right, since it is visibly co-ordinate with the earlier argument, not with the sequence of notes (or note sections). (Of course, if we take it all as a single note—and I think we should—we can say that Hegel is concluding it by bringing it round, finally, to the point that his main argument has reached.)

² *NKA*, vii. 28, 23–6; cf. 14, 14–19.

³ *NKA*, vii. 28, 27–30. The dialectic of sense-certainty in the *Phenomenology* begins with this same paradox (*NKA*, ix. 63; Miller, sect. 91).

Instead of being the real quality of present experience, the old quality becomes the quantitative 'stuff' of the world upon which the new qualitative experience rests. The restless pendulum of awareness between qualitative immediacy and quantitative context is 'the last step to which the incapacity to unify and sublate the antithesis in an absolute way proceeds, in that it merely sets up the requirement of this sublation, and contents itself with displaying the requirement instead of meeting it'.¹

The old polemic against Fichte's doctrine of rational consciousness as a perpetual progress needs no further commentary. What is remarkable is that this logical climax of the 'reflective philosophy of subjectivity' has now replaced Spinoza's *causa sui* and the '*universal* forms of finitude' ('universal' because they apply indifferently in the constitution of both subject and object) as the starting-point of logic.² In the earlier logic they were engulfed in it; now only the 'so-called construction' with Lockean elements is engulfed. The properly speculative construction begins with the sublation of this *negative* infinite which is now stigmatized as 'bad'.

This infinite is 'bad' because we let it bring Reason to a standstill. Kant's awe before the starry heavens is a moral error; and Albrecht von Haller's pious warning that no finite mind should aspire to penetrate into the inward essence of Nature is an even more serious theoretical one.³

We reach the true concept of infinity when we transform the alternation (and opposition) of a swinging pendulum into a cyclic balance. Hegel's expression for this is an equation ' $a - a = 0$ '. We should notice that the term for the Infinite is still *null*. But the negativity of the Infinite is not now active (that function is taken over by the minus sign); it is a result. Instead of rational consciousness being a simple alternation between 1 and 0 (like a computer switch) it is now a complete operation

¹ NKA, vii. 32, 10–13.

² *Dass die Philosophie*, 19a (in NKA, v. 273); cf. Rosenkranz, p. 191 (*Faith and Knowledge*, Cerf and Harris, p. 10). See also the discussion in Book I, Ch. I, above.

³ These are the obvious paradigms of 'unreasoning astonishment in the face of what is immeasurably countless, whether it be the stars, or any multifaceted organization [of living nature?]', NKA, vii. 32, 14–16. (All Hegel's discussions of the *theological* problem of evil—e.g. in the 'Triangle' MS and the Boehme 'Myth'—are relevant to his application of the adjective 'bad' to the mathematical infinite.)

in which zero, the universal, the all-creative Nothing, is grasped as the 'product'.

The 'a' here stands for the 'determinate quantum' of empirical consciousness. The puzzle is where does the capital 'A' come from and what does it stand for? Hegel's account of the '-A' is that it is the 'absolute reflection of the determined within itself'. Consciousness is the alternation in which immediate quality is conceptualized (quantified) and determined as a quantum. *This* being, the being of the process, does not pass away; on the contrary it requires the negating, the passing away, in order to be what it is. Grasped thus, the negation, the zero, the nothing, is an abiding reality, the stable subsistence of a process; rational consciousness is a *determinate* negation, which results from just this equation. But also, just this equation has achieved a logically universal (algebraic) form. It always holds. The immediate values change, but there is never any need to substitute 'b' for 'a'. That is how the transcendental force of the argument is expressed; and that is why we have arrived at it by a pure conceptual route. 'Nothingness or emptiness is identical with pure Being' because transcendental consciousness is the ground of all that is: or looking at it from the other side, determinate negation is the structure of what is, precisely because consciousness is its ground: 'the determinate has as such no other essence than this absolute unrest, not to be what it is'.¹

The 'true' Infinite is thus that identity of 'the simple and the Infinite' which was brought to light as the 'concept of consciousness' in the *Philosophy of Spirit* of spring 1804.² Because he is anxious that this should be rightly understood Hegel looks forward 'provisionally' to the 'true cognition of the Absolute'. He points out that 'this is not the mere demonstration that the one-and-many is one, [as if] this alone were absolute, but that in the one-and-many itself, the oneness of

¹ NKA, vii. 33, 25-8. (The context here seems to show that Spaventa's interpretation of the categorical motion of the 'first categories of Hegel's Logic' was correct at least for the first Hegelian *Logic* that has survived. Cf. Gentile, 'The Reform of the Hegelian Dialectic', *Idealistic Studies*, forthcoming.)

² Cf. NKA, vii. 34, 14-16 with vi. 265, 7-276, 12 (Harris and Knox, pp. 206-14). Cf. Ch. VII, pp. 301-8, above.

each with the other is posited.' This claim is immensely important for the proper interpretation of his social philosophy. It means that all the arguments about whether Hegel's philosophy is liberal or totalitarian are misguided. Hegel's logic makes it impossible to give priority to the *unity* (whichever way we take it).

The problem now is how to set up a 'relationship' which will guarantee that the simple moments of the Infinite stay securely within it. From this point onwards we must necessarily be conscious that we are dealing with simple moments (and not just with simples that have their own being). Instead of being a negative force, the Infinite must be present as a systematic structure in which consciousness is rationally aware of itself as a moment. The 'simple connection' must be duplicated; the mind-world connection of ordinary understanding must see itself in the mirror. 'The infinite must confront itself.' Consciousness must have consciousness as its conscious object. This is the logical situation that Hegel calls Relationship (*Verhältniss*).²

We can see here the significance of the fact that the 'true Infinite' is only introduced in a 'Note'. We need to have an over-all grasp of what is happening, but the logical evolution proceeds as a *phenomenology* of the true Infinite. In this way Hegel preserves the critical, introductory character of his Logic, yet makes its speculative or constructive aspect and sense visible. Metaphysics proper will begin when what is true for us is equally true for the consciousness that is our object, or when the Infinite is 'posited with respect to itself as infinite'. The logical movement itself, the movement of the Infinite as *concept*, continues with the moments of the 'bad' infinite as its 'weapons'—'the connected one-and-many, and

¹ NKA, vii. 35, 22–5.

² Ibid., 37, 9–29. This transition makes clear the 'necessity' of the transition from Understanding to Self-consciousness as it is presented in the *Phenomenology*—see NKA, ix. 107, 33–109, 23; Miller, sects. 175–9. J. Heinrich was right in claiming that the logic of 1804 is *Die Logik der Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Bonn, 1974); at least he is right in that one of the functions of the *Phenomenology* was to take the place of this critical logic. But we must beware of pressing the parallel too hard; and we must understand that it throws light on the structure of the later work rather than that of the earlier one. Hence any discussion of Heinrich's thesis in its details belongs in a commentary on the *Phenomenology* rather than here.

the unconnected one-and-many' of the graduated scale in Quantum.¹

4. *Substance, cause, and reciprocity*

When consciousness confronts itself (theoretically) as a reality, it is confronting a 'Relationship'. There is first of all its *being*; and secondly its reflecting of this being, or the *meaning* that it has for itself. We study first the 'Relationship of Being' (articulated through Kant's triads of Relation and Modality); and then the 'Relationship of Thinking' (articulated through the Kantian triad of Concept, Judgement, and Syllogism). Here 'Thinking' is what 'goes beyond' Being into Nothing. Only in the final stage of Logic ('Proportion') will Being and Thinking be properly equilibrated as the absolute equation of Cognition.

'The relation of Substantiality expresses the concept of Relation immediately.'² It is only as the concept of Substantiality develops that we discover, that Relationship itself can be specified in different ways, among which Substantiality is logically first. (Hegel takes very much the same view about Quality, which he sometimes equates with 'Simple Connection' in general; but we do not know whether he announced this identity at the outset.)

In Relationship generally we have become aware of the moments as moments which are sustained by an abiding reality that underlies them. Substance in its simplest form is the substrate of all real possibilities. But not all possibilities are compossible; their subsistence as equal possibilities is precisely their not being real, but being all of them *really possible*. Whereas Being as Quality was initially a mass of indistinct qualities, Being as Substance is initially a mass of mutually exclusive, yet mutually dependent, real possibilities (which are logically distinct as such). One colour is only possible because colour is generally possible, i.e. because all colours are possible including a shade of blue that might be

¹ NKA, vii. 37, 32-3. (Cf. the 'Ethics according to Relationship' of the *System of Ethical Life*—and esp. 'B. Second Level: of Infinity and Ideality in Form or in Relationship', *Schriften* (1913), pp. 436-50; Harris and Knox, pp. 116-29.)

² NKA, vii. 39, 3-4.

'missing' altogether in the actual order of things until we put the colours into a continuum, and are thus led to think of it at least.¹ Yet where one colour is, no other can be at the same time.

Thus the real possibility of any colour both logically involves and logically excludes the real possibility of all the others. The actuality of some colour both logically involves and really excludes (at the point where it is actual) the real possibility of any other one: and there cannot be any real possibilities unless there is *some* actuality. The actuality of substance as a negative unity of real possibilities is the conscious self. But like matter as the continuum of all real possibilities, thinking as the point of actuality, is only a moment in the necessary structure of the substantial relationship. There must be some actuality; but no particular actuality is necessary. The mind that first thought of the 'missing shade of blue' is a long gone 'accident' of human history. The *necessary* being is the *permanent transience* of actualities into the realization of their possibilities. Thus the necessary being is the being of the Infinite as 'absolute contradiction': 'the genuine substance is this contradiction, that what is actual is a possible, or that the possible is the actual.'² The moments of the substantiality-relationship are all accidental.

This is what is wrong with Substance. The relationship is not an equal one. The passing of the moments expresses the being of Substance; but the moments have no necessary being on their own account, and therefore the being that Substance derives from their passing is a sham: 'in that with respect to its being as sublating, it still lacks its nourishment, so to speak, the being of the moments, it is therefore not itself genuine.'³ The knowing mind that can become conscious of a genuine substance in its genuineness must cognize its cognitive

¹ I believe this example demonstrates that rational consciousness is the 'substance' in which real possibility inheres. Of course transcendental necessity only tells us that for real possibility to be defined, a rational consciousness must itself be *possible*.

² *NKA*, vii. 42, 2-4.

³ *NKA*, vii. 42, 27-8. (This is a logical complaint about the experience of 'Death as the absolute Lord' in the *Phenomenology*. The 'absolute Lord' is like the human survivor in the 'struggle for recognition'; he is the absolute loser.)

perception of substance as more than a transient moment. But the necessity of the concept of Substance only shows that the cognitive moment, being a moment, must be transient.

Thus the 'concept' of the infinite as substance shows us that substance can only be 'realized' in Relationship. In order to express its own self-sufficient permanence permanently, the substance itself (as permanent) must be recognized by another substance. Its own permanence as a set of possibilities, must be the necessary revealing of itself as actuality to another passively receptive substance. The *Sache* (self-contained Thing) must become an *Ursache*, a Basic Thing, a 'cause'. Its original being, must be the causal necessity of its manifestation; and if its manifestation is necessary, if substance means self-actualization (not just the permanence of a possibility, as in Mill's definition of matter), then the necessary actuality of substance entails the necessary actuality of rational consciousness as *another* substance for which the actual effect appears. This development begins with the concept of the real Thing as that which has necessary actuality in its 'effect'. The substance as a necessary possibility whose actual moments are accidents becomes an active 'force' whose essence is its manifestation to the passive receptacle. This necessary actuality is the totality of the necessary possibility contained within the abiding substance as such. There must be nothing left in the cause that is not in its effects. Substance is the 'cause of itself'; and the self thus caused is the actualization of the total range of possible effects. The situation here is quite different from that in Quality where we had opposed forces giving rise to a 'limit'. Now the manifestation reveals what the force actually is, instead of revealing the limit where it ceases to be. There are two ways in which this identity of cause and effect can be taken: as a simple tautology, or as an identity of opposites. But if we take it in the first way then 'explanation' becomes an imposing name for the unmasking of 'causality' as a mere togetherness of substances. In that case the only really intelligible causality is one that is no causality at all, but only the disguising or hiding of the supposed cause. 'Rain is the cause of wetness (of the soil)' because 'rain' and 'wetness' are simply the modes in which the substance 'water' appears or manifests itself in the company of the substances 'air' and

'earth'. This is not 'causal' explanation, and if this is the only form of explanation that is properly intelligible, then Hume is right to insist that causality is not intelligible. 'Rain is the cause of wetness' intelligibly enough. But it is a set of unintelligible *facts* that heat draws moisture into the air, that cold condenses it out, and that gravity causes it to fall and to penetrate the soil. Yet this is not unintelligible at all, as long as we do not identify rational necessity with a simple tautologous identity. 'The necessity is, in fact, just the substance as relationship.' That it is, indeed, the *same* water that we squeeze out of our trouser legs, which we saw falling past our noses is only guaranteed by our definitional assumption that water is a 'substance', something that maintains itself. Even Hume will allow the necessary connection of rain and wetness as a 'relation of ideas' arising from the definition of 'water'.

The concept of 'force' is an 'idea' (in Hume's sense) which relates opposites, or which identifies mutually incompatible possibilities as manifestations of a single self-identical substance. If the rain falls, then the water was somehow in the air, before it appeared, and rained down. In spite of the universal force of gravity, it must have gone up from where water naturally is, and in doing so it also became imperceptible as water; then something *caused* it to reappear as water, and its normal gravitational character reasserted itself. The causal agency was the same in both cases: it is the *force* of 'the hot-and-cold', or temperature.

Here we have the concept of 'force' as an independent agent which causes substance to manifest itself in its different possible modes. But substance as a *self*-actualizing possibility must be a force. Temperature, as the 'identity' of the opposites, hot and cold, is not a real force; rather some substantial force must produce whatever temperature is phenomenally manifest. But temperature, as a 'whole of parts' through which opposites are united, is the intellectual key to the concept of substance as a force which not only can have, but must have, a variety of differing, mutually incompatible, manifestations.

Many of the physicists of Hegel's own time thought of heat

¹ *NKA*, vii. 49, 32-3.

as a substance (and of cold as its absence or the presence of less of it). But they did not conceive of substance as self-actualizing force, but as a 'stuff' which can combine with other stuffs (as water combines with soil to make it wet). When we think in this way causality becomes incomprehensible. Hume's critique of the concept of causal necessity is not a demonstration that we have no causal knowledge, but a demonstration that we do not understand the logical or necessary structure of the knowledge that we have.

Heat is (in Hegel's view) wrongly identified as a force. He has treated it as a key example of manifestation, or as the perceptible phenomenon of the 'whole and its parts'. But there are a number of 'limited relationships' (or 'forces') about which we all agree, but which are not self-causing substances. It is the analogy of these forces (magnetism and electricity being the most obvious) that leads us astray. Thus magnetism can be induced (fairly permanently) in a whole class of 'substances' where it is not initially present; and many substances will conduct an electric current, although nothing is permanently electrified. Having rightly identified magnetism and electricity as forces, we wrongly conclude that even such permanent and constituent dispositions of particular substances as the mutual affinity of acid and base are only incidental to the substrate which manifests them; and that even the universal force of gravity is *infused* into a passive substrate. We ought rather to think of every substance as an identical force which manifests itself in a variety of phenomena. This sort of identity (not the identity of a phenomenon) is the identity that a *concept* has.

It should be noted that even Hume, who follows out the logic of the principle that 'ideas are derived from impressions' so perfectly—correct 'derivation' being taken to entail the preservation of at least the same *kind* of identity—even Hume is obliged to employ what Hegel would call a 'concept' of 'force or vivacity'. Hume's concept of 'force' as an intensive scale upon which different impressions and ideas can be ranged and compared, is not the one that Hegel calls 'force', but the one that he calls 'quantum'. A higher degree of 'vivacity' must contain the lower ones sublated. Thus Hume's impressions, since they are intensively comparable, are 'wholes' containing

parts that are not identical with but opposed to one another. Whether the relation of 'more' and 'less' in judgements about such intensive wholes is a logical one, on Hume's principles, I cannot say; I only want to show that Hume's reasoning involves Hegel's 'infinite', not that the necessity of the infinite is a logical necessity in Hume's terms.

Hegel's object is not to see whether knowledge is possible upon certain assumptions about what intelligible identity and necessity are, but rather to see what the assumption that knowledge is possible (that our actual experience can be truly cognitive) entails with respect to the identity of thought and thing, and with respect to the necessity of the relation between them. His question is 'what does it *mean* for a concept to express the way the world is?' And his critical position is that the 'truth' of a concept cannot be its identity with an impression, since it is of the essence of cognition (and hence of the concepts which are its tools) to connect impressions into intelligible wholes ('true infinities'). Thus we postulate 'forces' as the unitary causes of diverse phenomena, because our 'ideas' *must* have this explanatory relation to our 'impressions'; otherwise they cannot count as 'ideas'. They may be mistaken, but we cannot show that they are mistaken simply by showing that they are not identical copies of impressions, for if they were that, they would not be concepts at all.

The 'forces' that we postulate as the causes of phenomena in the world, are the identical realities corresponding to the concepts that we formulate to explain our conscious perceptions. It follows that we must postulate them as knowable, for if we postulate them in such a way that they become demonstrably unknowable then the question arises, of how we can rationally justify postulating them at all. The object of rational consciousness must be to understand what its experience *can* properly mean, not to prove that what it means can never be known.

Thus substance as 'cause of itself' is identical with the concept that explains all perceptions; the cause has a conceptual identity and the effect has an endless phenomenal variety. The cause is the inward identity of this outward variety, the unity through which it is all related and accounted for. Thus

what is called 'conceptual' identity is the identity of the opposites, the identity of the unitary cause with its multifarious effects. These appearances, however, are its appearances for, its effects upon *another* substance, or upon the rational consciousness for which it is actual (not just a real or permanent possibility); and it is only for and through that consciousness, that the conceptual unity exists as a concept at all. Hence Hegel says that 'Substance realizes itself only as going out of itself, and only going out of itself to itself, [or] as absolutely self-opposed.'¹ 'Natural law' is the cause of all the necessary connections that rational consciousness can discover in phenomena. If we think of consciousness as the place of phenomenal manifestation, then this unitary cause is the *real* concept of the *Sache selbst*; while if we think of it as active intelligence seeking to generate a real concept then *it* becomes the source of the unity, the rationality, of the inexhaustible variety of real existence. In the 'Relationship of Being' we are looking at things in the first way. The language of causality (especially the German *Ursache*) dictates this. Being is the cause of cognition rather than vice versa.

I am not here espousing (or ascribing to Hegel) a causal theory of perception, for that is a problem that arises at a different level—and I do not think that his doctrine of imagination can be characterized properly as a causal theory. Hegel's theory of substance as self-manifesting force is a theory of the transcendental relation of being and consciousness. Just as his analysis of 'the substantiality relation' is a logical justification of Descartes's doctrine that there are two kinds of substance, so his analysis of 'the causality-relation' is a demonstration of why we must move from the Cartesian position to Spinoza's definition of substance as 'cause-of-itself'. Since self-sufficiency is a mark of substance, and actual manifestation is its moment of self-completion, the other to which it is manifest must be itself. Its noumenal being as cause, and its phenomenal being as effect are necessary complements, as inseparable as the concepts of acid and base.

This justification of the great rationalists is offered against Kant. Far from it being the case that the categories cannot be applied to the *Ding-an-sich*, it is rather their transcendental

¹ Ibid., 62, 25–6.

application to *die Sache selbst* that provides the canon for their correct empirical use. The transcendental application of the cause-effect relation enables us to see that the *Ding-an-sich*, far from being an unknowable problem is rather the intellectual construct (the most knowable of all things, the very form of logical coherence or necessity) in terms of which all efforts to interpret the phenomenal world must be evaluated and reconciled. What is, is not a 'thing' that has no meaning, for *to be is to have meaning*; the *Real Thing* is rather the law through which all possible meanings, all possible manifestations, are related. The guarantee that they are so related is just the necessary logical structure of the consciousness for which they appear. This structure is the Real Thing again. So 'substance only goes out of itself to itself, as absolutely opposed to itself.' From this it follows that we must not talk of gravity as having an 'occult' cause, or think of it as a 'force' infused generally, along with a lot of others distributed less liberally, in an infinitely patient and quite unintelligible substrate 'matter'. It is only the 'bad infinity' of *die Sache selbst*, the endlessness of explanatory inquiry, that makes it appear 'unknowable'. If gravity has a cause then the cause is knowable, for it is the nature of causes (by definition) to be knowable. Causes are concepts. *Whether* gravity has a cause, we shall know when we have a general field theory in which all the 'forces' of nature are satisfactorily related—so that we are not tempted to think of any of them (however fugitive or however markedly distinct) as separately 'infused'. This is the rational ideal of causal explanation that Hegel's transcendental theory provides. That it represents an enormous advance over Kant's logical codification of the Newtonian metaphysics I take to be beyond argument.

But now in consequence of this rationalism which has shown the two Cartesian substances to be just the same thing looked at from opposite sides, we are faced with the problem of absolute logical determinism. The rational consciousness must now see itself as a perfectly determinate Quantum of the causal force that is manifesting itself to itself (one of the monads of Leibniz). The dialectic of Reciprocity is the dialectic of the rational monads, each interpreting his own world of experience rationally for himself in his own way, and

with his own degree of success. The rationality of the whole now appears as the pre-established harmony between their interpretations; conflict of interpretation arises only from the limitations of experience and interpretive capacity of the distinct consciousnesses. The appearance of conflict is removed when each is given his appropriate place on the quantum-scale of rational consciousness. This scale embodies the 'bad infinite' of mathematics, so that now the 'infinite contradiction' repeats itself as an internal relationship for rational consciousness. The rational monad is self-contained, windowless; but this self-containment is nothing but a window, a rational awareness of all the other points on the scale from just this point. 'Self-realizing infinity has in this way fallen back into Quantum again.'¹ This is the only way in which there can be reciprocity between self-causing substances. 'Instead of producing genuine motion, the mutual being of each in the other, Reciprocity posits them rather in the rest of equilibrium.'² The only real or active reciprocity is the establishment of the closed cycle of monadic rationality. Every monad as a substance acts and reacts upon itself. What appears as reciprocity between them is only their rational harmony. But this clockwork is not a *living* harmony. This logical continuum or 'great chain of being' is only the way in which the motion of the true Infinite is *paralysed* in the 'order of Nature'. 'Cognition must rend this unity absolutely';³ and it rends it by coming to be and passing away. Rational consciousness does not exist in immortal monads, each mirroring the eternal order in its own way. It comes to be in the transiently accidental moments of the substantial order, through a process of transmission. In becoming actual each substance perishes and gives rise to another.⁴ It is the reality

¹ Ibid., 67, 17-18; (cf. 62, 22-3).

² NKA, vii. 68, 7-8.

³ Ibid., 69, 12-18. It is evident enough that the 'great chain of Being' is the regulative ideal of Hegel's philosophy of nature. Here we have the logical ground for this. We should note that the concept of natural evolution (cosmic and/or biological) 'rends' it as absolutely as Hegel says spirit or absolute cognition must rend it. But the observable adaptation of life to its terrestrial habitat rends the ideal in any case (see the *Phenomenology*, NKA, ix. 159-66; Miller, sects. 284-97).

⁴ NKA, vii. 73, 32-3. It is noteworthy that *perishing* is the essential condition of being a 'substance'. Our rationality, I infer, is what subsists in those to whom we communicate it; and it cannot count as actual rationality unless it is successfully

of *Bildung*, of rational education, that 'rends' the Leibnizian naturalism. Finite intelligence does not come into existence through the 'fulmination' of the Infinite; we do not enter existence as full-fledged transcendental philosophers like Athena springing from the head of Zeus. Rather the true Infinite maintains itself through our necessarily phenomenal apprehension of it, and the distinguishing of its phenomenal from its conceptual aspect requires our perishing. Our own status as 'substances' requires it; we must die to achieve the objective immortality analysed in Spinoza's *Ethics* (but exemplified just as perfectly in the metaphysical errors of Newton's *Principia*). This perishing of substance for its reproduction in another is true reciprocity.

With this decisive shift of emphasis from the permanence of the natural order (substance) to the transience of natural awareness (its accidents) we pass from the Relationship of Being to that of Thinking: from the problem of equilibrating Substance and Accident (an equilibration achieved in the concept of self-causing force or law) to that of equilibrating Universal and Particular.

5. *Concept, judgement, and syllogism*

What abides substantially in being is the order of nature, the 'paralysed' Infinite of the 'chain of being'. The objective immortality of every finite substance (which is the transcendental presupposition of all *historical* inquiry) is a subsistence in thought, it is the subsistence of an 'essence' rather than that of a 'substance'. This is the way things are on the side of rational consciousness, and it is from that side that we now consider the Infinite as relationship. Here every tiny detail, once it is conceptually determined or defined, has the absolutely stable and unchanging subsistence that belongs only to the 'paralysed Infinite' of the total order or 'chain of being' (and not even to that, now that we have come to think of the order of nature itself as evolving). As Hegel says 'what is usually understood under the title "determinate being" is

communicated. (Only a family-consciousness can be a substance in the natural order, or 'Relationship of Being'.)

more properly the determinate concept."¹ It is Hume's 'ideas' not his 'impressions' that are made to produce the devastating results of his critical logic. These 'ideas' are 'concepts'—that is to say they are identical with the 'impressions' to which they refer, only conceptually or by opposition. (Otherwise Hume could not have produced a general theory about 'impressions'.)²

Reference to Hume's 'impressions' and 'ideas' is appropriate here, because the 'multitude' of Quality is revealed in rational consciousness ('reflected being') as a sequence of determinate concepts. The great order of Nature is conceived in a flow of conscious activity. Not the 'impression' but the consciousness that conceives the impression as an 'idea' is the *Bestimmtheit* of which Hegel now speaks;³ it is only if we take it this way that we can see how the whole 'Relationship of Being' is presupposed and sublated in the 'Relationship of Thinking'. This reflective consciousness exists in a doubled way: it is the passive receiver of the impression, and the active conceiver of the idea. This latter existence is its being as Universal. Through it every impression is raised from its singularity to the status of a 'particular', it becomes a specific type of some more general Kind (e.g. 'this' impression is identified as Prussian BLUE).⁴

But the Universal itself is only a single aspect of the whole. 'Blue' is only one property of my visual field, a property which is set beside others.⁵ 'Properties' are what 'things' have;

¹ NKA, vii. 77, 3-4. ('determinate' and 'definite' are both 'bestimmt'; my shift in translation is an attempt to exhibit the shift in context.)

² I am not trying to criticize or to overthrow Hume's achievement here, but only to explain how, on Hegel's view, it was possible. To attack it (as Green and Bradley did) is in my view, stupid. The proper thing to do is to appreciate it for the enormous critical achievement that it was. (I believe Hegel's text shows that he is on my side here.) Those who have been most sympathetic to Hume, however, are, in general, just as stupid as his idealist enemies; for they have generally tried to mend what he so effectively demolished, instead of revising the assumptions that made the demolition possible.

³ The dialectic of 'Bestimmter Begriff' (NKA, vii. 76, 25-79) should be read and interpreted in the context of the account of 'language' in the 1804 *Philosophy of Spirit* (vi. 282, 4-295, 18; Harris and Knox, pp. 218-27).

⁴ The determinate concept is the self-comprehending determinacy, or the determinacy reflected into itself' (NKA, vii. 79, 10-11).

⁵ It is at *this* level of Hegel's Logic that the empirical schematism of the concepts of Quality, Quantity, and Quantum is legitimately applicable. Thus 'limit' can now (for instance) be identified in a visual field.

hence, it is necessary now to move from the thought-world of Hume to that of Thomas Reid. The consciousness that exists as determinate concepts is defining its world as a complex of particular substances. The advance here illustrates the method of progression by reciprocal subsumption used in the *System of Ethical Life*. First the 'particular' (shade) is subsumed under the 'universal' (blue); now the universal blue is subsumed under the particular object for it is a property of *this* thing (if we say 'of Peter's coat' we are carrying the progressive subsumption a stage further and swinging over to the dominance of the universal again). The 'bad infinity' of 'particular conceiving' is that there is no end to this process; this is the 'contradiction of the determinate concept within itself'.¹ The equilibration of particular and universal is 'judgement'. The blueness and 'this' must be separated in consciousness and put into an equilibrium. (Without this equilibration one cannot talk at all. I have had to write about conceiving in terms of examples that are all judgements.)

The first moment of Simple Connection was 'bad' Reality.² The Determinate Concept is, by contrast, the 'bad Ideality' of Reflection. Here 'bad Reality' comes second, when the concept is used assertively in a judgement. At the climax of the Relationship of Being, Substance (the self-manifesting force of Nature) came to reciprocal equality with the singular rational consciousness that comprehends it as Law. That singular consciousness is the transcendental 'Subject' of the Relationship of Thinking. It is not 'This qualitative moment in the order of Nature' that is 'blue', or 'a coat'; it is rather 'This determinate conceiving of mine' to which these predicates are attached. We arrive at judgement proper, when we get the reflected substance into its proper position as subject, and say 'The coat is blue'; but we must never forget that 'the coat' is a determinate *concept*, not a simple thing.

My blue coat has other properties; and many other things are blue. So the equilibration of judgement into a necessary relationship is a complex process involving the transformation of both terms. First Hegel deals with the 'self-subsistence'

¹ NKA, vii. 79, 23-6.

² NKA, vii. 31, 14-25.

(*Fürsichseyn*) of the Universal (the Predicate) and the 'intro-reflection' of the Particular (the Subject); then with the 'realization' of the Predicate and 'self-subsistence' of the Subject. (The Subject, we may notice, does not have to 'realize itself' since it is real already; it only has to realize, reflectively, *what* it is.)

The first process involves a progression from a universal categorical statement ('all crows are black') to a hypothetical inference ('if x is a crow then it is black').¹ Hegel wants to exhibit what a necessary connection of Particular and Universal is. 'All crows are black' does not do this because both terms are universally posited so that the proposition is formally indistinguishable from 'All bodies are heavy' which Hegel regards as a convertible tautology. 'Being a crow' is more than 'being black', and there are more black things than crows. But if we say 'Some black things are crows' we have only presented the *problem* of which subjects we mean to refer to; and if we say 'This crow is black' (or 'This black thing is a crow') we have eliminated the problem, but also the necessity of the judgement. We have fallen out of the sphere of Judgement proper, and are back in that of determinate conceiving. We are relating the singular with its species, not the species with the genus. The proper form is 'If x is a crow then it is black'. (By implication this is not the proper way to express conceptual identities; identity is what the categorical universal expresses when taken absolutely; 'all bodies are heavy' is a necessary truth because it is a conceptual identity and hence convertible; 'all crows are black' is not.)

It becomes evident at this stage, that the object of the logical theory of judgement is to express causal relationship (just as the theory of the concept expressed the vanishing of substance). For the move to the next stage (self-subsistence of subject, realization of predicate) is motivated by the problematic, postulational status to which the reality of the subject

¹ The example is mine. But Hegel himself uses 'B is not green' as a model of negative judgement, so the 'universe of discourse' (colour) is his. Also the *conversion* of the particular judgement 'Some black things are crows' to preserve the content of the universal 'all crows are black' is not stipulated by Hegel, but it makes explicit a continuity of argument which I believe to be implicit (cf. the role of A as 'universal' at *NKA*, vii. 84, 1).

has now been reduced. We need a determinate subject (as in the singular judgement) but we want to say something necessary about it as a species. If we say 'this crow is not white' we have said something that necessarily follows from its blackness; but we have not said anything determinate. Moving to a higher level of generality we can say that what follows about crows as a species is that they must have *some* colour; and that can finally be expressed at the level of the determinate concept by the necessary truth that 'crows are (black) or (not black but some other colour)'.

That Hegel should find this application of the law of excluded middle more interesting than the hypothetical 'If x is a crow then it is black' (which does express the comprehension of a causal necessity) may seem surprising. But we should remember that his discussion of empirical causality was similarly a side-issue in the discussion of the Relationship of Being. He was concerned then with the general relation of being with thinking; now he is concerned with the evolution of thinking from one level of generality to a higher one; the introduction of negation was what necessitated the advance, and it had to be introduced in a determinate context generated in the preceding steps in order to have the significance of a determinate alternative.

With the uniting of hypothetical and disjunctive judgement we arrive at syllogism. In syllogism the determinate concepts, Universal and Particular move to produce cycles in the sphere defined by the higher level of generality (the universe of discourse).¹ In this way the endless chain of subsumptions becomes a 'true infinite'. The purely singular subject is united with a purely universal predicate (e.g. 'colour') through a determinately conceptual middle (e.g. 'blue'). It is now the middle term that contains the 'infinite contradiction' for the singular subject and the universal predicate are both grasped by it, and opposed to it in different ways.²

¹ It should be obvious, I hope, that Hegel's use of the triad: concept, judgement, syllogism, in no way binds his transcendental theory of thinking to the 'traditional logic' that is miscalled 'Aristotelian'. 'Syllogism' means any form of reasoning that generates a universe of discourse involving more than one determinate level of generality (one cannot have 'determinate negation' without that). The traditional syllogism is only a convenient model of this.

² See esp. *NKA*, vii. 96, 14–97, 19.

The singular this, now emerges as a logical individual, or an individuated universal. Our crow is a logical substance with all its properties—not the perceptual this ‘which dissolves immediately into the Nothing . . . but *reflection into itself*, determinacy as totality’;¹ but these properties are still an unconnected multitude. The logical problem now is to discover the real essence of the thing so that its unity and its multiplicity will not remain mere observed facts. Hegel seems to recognize the exploratory importance of hypothetical syllogism (at least of *modus ponens*),² but it is not the theory of inquiry or discovery which is his primary concern. His aim is to lay out the logical implications of actual cognition. So his theory of syllogism is a theory of definition and argument, in which the middle term serves to subsume the particular concept under the more general one (as in Plato’s theory of Division, which seems plainly to be Hegel’s model). He insists that the predicate concept must be more general than the middle, but this follows directly from his exclusion of material identities in the theory of judgement.³ This is one restriction that can be formally observed. But the range of subsumptions that are formally possible remains a bad infinite. Even the deduction of formal contradictions must be possible because the subject is a real unity of opposites.⁴

The procedure of formal classification and division runs into this bad infinity (and gives rise to contradictions) because it depends on the determinate (phenomenal) aspect of the middle term; but the real connection is a conceptual one. The logical subject in cognition is its own definition (the logical concept of the self-actualizing force or monad). *For true cognition the subject must become its own middle.*⁵

¹ Ibid., 99, 2–4.

² NKA, vii. 98, 15–19.

³ Ibid., 101, 20–4.

⁴ Ibid., 101, 30–102, 3. The clearest example of what Hegel means is the paradoxes of Zeno. (His view is that such paradoxes are formally unavoidable, but they point towards the necessity to comprehend the distinction within identity of the phenomenal and the noumenal. We need transcendental logic precisely because formal logic cannot dictate the rules for its own application to experience. Contradictions are acceptable to Hegel only when their necessity has been comprehended. But then they are no longer formal contradictions, for we shall have learned to avoid them in all applications of formal logic.)

⁵ NKA, vii. 102, 25 and 32; cf. 103, 9.

Having 'realized' the Subject as a definition Hegel can now characterize the whole process of syllogistic argument, as the 'realization of the Universal'. The logical subject is a singular essence of a definite species. Thus inferences about it have universal inductive validity for all subjects of that species. But what the extensive range of such inferences is—what, if anything, they are valid for—is quite indeterminate.¹

6. *Logical and Metaphysical Cognition*

The problem now is to bring together the formal theory of reality and the formal theory of science. This is the task of the third phase of Logic, which Hegel calls 'Proportion'. This is where he deals with what he refers to in 1801 as 'the *speculative* meaning of the syllogism',² for he now gives us a transcendental theory of definition and argument. According to his view natural species define themselves in their struggle to maintain themselves. We should notice the implicit assumption that natural death completes the definition of the individual, for natural death is what comes to the organism that is successful in the struggle against peers and natural enemies. Plants exist only as species because plant propagation is properly a continuum: and inorganic matters exist only as moments in the general life-process of the Earth.³ Thus the concept of 'life'—general, specific, and individual—provides the *a priori* structure for Hegel's philosophy of nature. The application of the formal processes of reasoning begins from the levels of Reciprocity that the necessary conceptual structure of the world-order as self-manifestation logically guarantees. But this 'proportion' of reality to concept, holds only between the definition and the species. The individual passes away, and logical definition does not capture anything necessary about his being or his passing. This was just the gulf that we discovered in the analysis of formal syllogism.

¹ NKA, vii. 105, 7–11. Hegel says it is 'absolutely many'. Induction, as he sees it, starts from one real case and makes no sense unless there are others to which it extends.

² *Dass die Philosophie*, 19b (in NKA, v. 273–4); cf. Rosenkranz, p. 191 (Cerf and Harris, p. 10).

³ NKA, vii. 106, 19–107, 3.

Only the theory of cognition as the goal of being can bridge this gulf. But first we must consider the speculative significance of argument. Logical division and subsumption show us how conceptual unity involves multiplicity and vice versa. The self-maintenance of each species involves the whole. It can maintain itself only within the context of that *against* which it maintains itself. Organism and environment require two opposite, complementary definitions. This is the speculative foundation *in re* of the formal procedure of 'division.'

In accordance with the fundamental principle that logic must be self-generative, Hegel regards the opposition of concept and particular itself as the ultimate logical ground of division. This means that in what Plato called 'division at the joints' one of the terms must have the unqualified structure of the higher universal that is divided, while the other must have some limiting qualification. The genus thus becomes (as it is in Plato's *Timaeus*) the perfect species; it is a regulative ideal in relation to which the other species in the division can be arrayed as a logical sequence of limitations. Thus the logic of classification itself gives rise to the ordering of nature as a 'great chain of being'. This is the 'way down'.

But the method can also be applied to abstract concepts, in such a way that division becomes a process of enrichment by specification. This is the way up, the way that we must follow in logic. It culminates in the 'concrete universal', the necessary existence of the rational consciousness that can justify the mortal finitude of its individuality. The rational community of human consciousness is the concrete universal where both ways meet. This continuum or positive unity of cognition achieves its moment of necessary actuality in the rational individual. Here at last the 'proportion' of the two relations is perfect.

Hegel's fairly lengthy discussion of cognition is largely a

¹ Hegel's concern when he says that 'in division the Universal sunders itself into opposed definitions' (*NKA*, vii. 109, 31-2, cf. 25-6) is already with the transcendental division between 'being' and 'thinking'. But I have deliberately followed out the empirical application of the argument suggested by his discussion of definition. The reader should take warning however that it is only what I call the 'way up' that appears in Hegel's own discussion of division. (Nature exemplifies the concept *at rest*; so the theory of *definition* suffices for it.)

recapitulation of his whole argument, now that we can see where it was going. In place of definition and division (the mode of argument that leads to definitions) we now have the triad of definition, construction, and proof. Definition is now explicitly directed at the self-definition of the cognitive activity that has come this far reflectively. We had to come this far, to develop simple connection into the parallel relationships of being and thinking, nature and reasoning, in order to have the whole structure of consciousness before us. 'Construction' is the projection of the *sphere*—the living universe of discourse where all the concepts have their meanings, both noumenal and phenomenal; and 'proof' is the bringing of all this multiplicity back into the conceptual unity of the definition. Thus transcendental logic can be characterized as the demonstration that we are rational by showing that our world-concept matches our self-concept. Actual experience is the middle term in this process but it has to be viewed as a thoughtful interpretation of perception which like the 'constructions' of geometry is shown to be necessary by the proof even though the lines drawn have no real existence.¹

Cognition is called 'deductive' by Hegel because it must in the end lead us back to the point from which we began. Logic is only introductory because it leads us upwards to the point where the circle of absolute science opens and closes. This circle from the definition and back to it, is not formally vicious because it is not a formal circle at all. But it not only demonstrates to us why we define 'truth' the way we do: it 'deduces' the necessity of our definition. It does not show that the definition is 'correct', but that it is what we do and we must mean by 'correctness'. As absolute reflection of the structure of consciousness, it is independent of the particular content of any empirical consciousness. It is inductively valid because the rational consciousness can comprehend its own

¹ We can see why Hegel calls this 3rd section of his Logic 'Proportion' when he compares his own procedure to the proof of the Pythagorean theorem—*NKA*, vii. 114, 19–115, 28; 116, 16–28 and 118, 31–119, 7—for this is the climax of Euclid's treatise on 'Proportion'; I do not find the comparison very illuminating, but it is reminiscent of the construction of a second triangle over the first in the 'holy Triangle of triangles'; so it must be noticed because it is relevant to the controversial problem of the dating of that fragment.

essence and can prove by this circular deduction that what it comprehends is indeed its essence. What is thus comprehended is not a mark, or a property, but the motion of a structure to its own self-completion.

Half a sheet is missing near the end of the discussion. In it Hegel distinguished 'three ways of treating or three determinacies of cognition posited as neutrally valid against each other'. It is not clear from the rest of the conclusion what these three modes of treatment were, but it seems more probable that they were (or were cognate with) the three moments of Proportion, than that they were (or were cognate with) Simple Connection, Relation, and Proportion, for Hegel finally contrasts Cognition with Relation by claiming that whereas the moments of Relation were abstractions, the moments of Cognition are themselves infinite. Cognition is thus 'realized Infinity . . . the moments of cognition are themselves infinite, they are Relations.' Logic has 'constructed the *form* [of cognition] to its absolute concretion'. To give content to this form is the task of Metaphysics. This further 'realization' is not yet part of 'real philosophy'. What it means will emerge as we proceed. But we should be prepared to find more continuity than difference between 'logic' and 'Metaphysics', since Hegel is on the verge of abolishing the distinction.

In fact, the distinction between logic and Metaphysics is like the successor-distinction between the 'phenomenology' and the 'system'. Logic arrives at its completion with the overcoming of Relation, with the recognition of absolute Cognition as the necessary unity of Being and Thinking, the decisive transcendence of the *Gegensatz* of consciousness. The Infinite is now present *to itself*, not just present for the philosophic observer (as the Substance that was evolving all through Relationship).

But the continuity is just as important as the distinction. Cognition comes to itself, in Proportion, by reaching back and comprehending the identity of the formal theory of Syllogism and the material theory of Reciprocity. Metaphysics develops

¹ *NKA*, vii. 124, 25-7. If I have understood Relation rightly, this means that the moments themselves are rational consciousnesses of the order of Nature. In that case Cognition is realized in the scientific community, not in the individual.

this identity, by carrying on the process of repossession. The first stage, 'Cognition as System of Principles' is the speculative re-possessing of the formal theory of Judgement—and we have remarked already that that is designed to express Hegel's theory of transcendental Causality. Then, in the 'Metaphysics of Objectivity', we shall regain possession of Substance as a Concept. And finally in the 'Metaphysics of Subjectivity' we shall find ourselves able to cope with the 'construction' of consciousness as Simple Connection in such a way that it 'produces' not 'limit' but the comprehension of limitation.

This essential continuity between logic and Metaphysics—which was prefigured by the early appearance of Infinity in the argument, and by the way every moment of the dialectic of Quality was given its infinite reinterpretation as soon as the Infinite arrived on the scene—is more important to us than the transition from the one to the other, because once we grasp the continuity we can readily see how the transition could be dispensed with. If a non-logical way of arriving at the Infinite as the conscious Concept of Absolute Cognition can be found, then Logic can be developed *metaphysically* from the beginning; and if this procedure is followed, it will be much plainer what is going on at every stage. Much of the repetitive re-cycling will collapse into union, and the 'mirroring' with the confusing inversions that it produces will be eliminated.

Even for the understanding of this manuscript—without regard to the wider problem of its embryonic relation to the nascent *Phenomenology*—it is vitally important to recognize the mirroring and inversion, because Hegel himself emphasizes the repetition.¹ The 'System of Principles' is a recurrence of 'Simple Connection'; 'Objectivity' repeats 'Relationship'; and 'Subjectivity' repeats 'Proportion'. But if Hegel underlines the identity, it is because he wants us to concentrate on the difference as we go along.

The 'multitude' of Quality is now an infinite realm of true propositions; the organizing principles merely form the

¹ NKA, vii. 126, 20–127, 15. The suggested parallels for Objectivity and Subjectivity are my *interpretive summary* of what Hegel says. For the 'reflection' of Logic in Metaphysics see vii. 128, 13–15. Hegel does not point out the inversion of order involved in the re-possessive procedure. But this is what is involved in the fact that Metaphysics is *logic bent back upon itself*. Beginning again with the 'Simple Connection' of *Cognition* involves proceeding from both ends at once.

necessary connections between them in their neutrally independent subsistence. This subsistence gives us the logical principle of identity as our starting-point. Essences fixed in propositions do not pass out of being as fast as they come in. 'Associations of ideas' are not transient like 'impressions'. Yet the simple principle of tautology on which this permanence rests is not a real act of thinking, but rather the stopping of thought, it is the limit where we cannot argue any more. 'Tree is Tree' is not a proposition, like 'tree is leafy (or bare, or woody, branched, etc.)' or 'tree is not leaf (or trunk, or branch etc.)'.

These alternative enumerations, positive and negative, show how the principle of excluded middle relates the unity and multiplicity of the tree as a concept. The 'absolute contradiction' of the bad infinite is posited in the two indefinitely extensible series of judgements; but the contradiction has nothing logically vicious in it because it is precisely what is organized through the law of excluded middle. The tree is *either* leafy *or* (determinately) not-leafy (i.e. bare), because it *is* leafy (in season) but *not* leaf, bare (out of season) but not wood, and so on. The unity of all these 'contradictions' is the Real Thing as the *ground* of all the exhaustively complete cycles of exclusive alternatives. We have to grasp the cycles in order to apply the laws of Identity and Excluded Middle to the tree determinately (i.e. in such a way that a negative judgement is concretely informative). But when we grasp the cycles we know what the conceptual identity of the tree is: the ground which sustains all the 'contradictions' of phenomenal existence as a tree. The principle of Ground (or Law of Sufficient Reason) must have application if we are to have any conceptual identities to which the laws of Identity and Excluded Middle can be determinately applied.

7. *Self, World, and Supreme Essence*

It is easy to see why, when Hegel wanted to begin Philosophy 'deductively' (in his sense) from a single germ-notion, he was bound to focus upon the principle of Ground. 'Ground shows itself as the reflection of Cognition itself.'¹ It corresponds to

¹ *NKA*, vii. 135, 18.

'Infinity' in the Logic; and as such it is the 'first *Potenz*' of Cognition.¹ Because of the methodological continuity of logic and Metaphysics we cannot pass directly from one unitary concept to the other. There must be an intervening moment where Cognition is 'reflected out of itself' into a multiplicity. The impossibility of beginning Metaphysics where Philosophy ought to begin as long as there is a genuinely independent (self-completing) logic attached to it, is one of the forces driving Hegel toward the complete unification of logic and Metaphysics. 'Ground' will not then be where the metaphysical logic begins—for the starting-point of 'logic' remains fixed in Hegel's mind—but the system of philosophy will be the logical evolution of an initial 'identity' (not of a 'system of principles' in which 'Identity' is only the limit); and that Identity will be grounded (in Cognition) by another kind of critically systematic science altogether (the *Phenomenology*). It is because the cognitive principle of Ground (or Sufficient Reason) remains the foundation of Hegel's system that the *Phenomenology* is an essential 'first part' of it; and as soon as we begin to think of the new ontological Logic apart from the 'ground' that the *Phenomenology* provides we shall tend to misinterpret the self-grounding procedure and results of the new Logic.²

The 'ground' of metaphysical thinking is what is known in and by rational cognition. Thus it is the *object* of thought, and the evolution of this object must recapitulate the 'Relationship of Being'. But whereas we began unreflectively with Substance as the ground of Being, we must now begin with *intelligent* Substance as the ground of Thinking and of its laws

¹ Ibid., 138, 13–18. (The 'correspondence' with *true* Infinity is a parallel drawn by me.)

² The question of whether such independent interpretations are materially valid (given that they are formally self-consistent) can be left aside for the present. It is sufficient for my present scholarly purpose that they are not valid interpretations of Hegel. But I will not hide my own opinion, which is that interpretations of Hegel's system which do not give the *Phenomenology* its proper place, must inevitably distort the significance of Kant's 'Copernican Revolution' for philosophy; and to interpret Hegel's 'system' in the context of Graeco-Christian speculative theology (as if Kant had never been) is tantamount to playing chess without the queen.

or principles. The 'ground' of all cognitive activity is the rational Soul.¹

But all the accidents of this 'Substance', all the empirical content of its rational operation, are very evidently mere possibilities. Thinking does not make anything so (except that it makes the thinking exist). So this 'one of substantiality and subjectivity'² is neither a genuine substance nor a genuine subject, for it is a transience without any law. True substantiality it will gain through the concept of the World, and absolute grounding as subjective rationality through that of God (or the Supreme Essence). What it needs is expressed in the postulate of an immortal life in a noumenal realm where its understanding is perfected. 'But [its] determinacy is only to be sublated, in so far as Cognition or the Ground as posited under this determinacy, that one is opposed to the other, gets sublated, or in other words so far as it gets sublated as Soul.'³ Far from it being the case that in Heaven 'I shall know even as also I am known'⁴ I shall not then know anything at all. God, like the World, exists for Cognition now and here: and the World, certainly, exists now and here. The Soul as passive yet truly cognitive, is immediately a plurality of monads, a 'chain of syntheses'.⁵ In order to posit myself as the ground of my own cognition I must posit myself as a rational window on the world.

The world 'would be the Reciprocity of the synthetic series sinking together into perfect rest';⁶ but now there is a formal freedom involved in this Reciprocity. Unlike the planets the selves know where their conceptual movement is going, for the movement is their knowing. This *formell* freedom is the comprehension on the part of each that his cognition of the world is *himself* (not just the world), so that his rational consciousness, being self-definition, is the suspension of the *formell* antithesis (of cognitive consciousness and its object).

¹ NKA, vii. 139, 3. (At this point the earlier outline of 'Metaphysik'—vii. 341–2 discussed in Ch. V, above—should be studied alongside the fully developed text.)

² NKA, vii. 140, 24–5.

³ NKA, vii. 141, 31–3.

⁴ I Cor. 13; 12.

⁵ NKA, vii. 142, 3. Notice that Hegel regards the *Monadology* as an exact logical analysis of what it is to be a soul-substance.

⁶ Ibid., 142, 18–19.

This Leibnizian doctrine that the self is the active mirroring of the activity of all other selves (not the communal awareness by the selves of a *Sache* that is not a self) forms for Hegel the crucial mediation between freedom and necessity. The rational necessity of cognition can only be reconciled with its freedom, if the world we are aware of, the given content of our cognition, is the *self as other for itself*. Leibniz' Monadology was the reflectively formal (*formell*) statement of this view. Every monad keeps its absolute identity (its otherness-relation with the world) and only the Monad of monads exercises real freedom in virtue of its higher status as Creator (choosing the 'best of all possible worlds'). In Hegel's theory the relation of self and other becomes a *real* dialectic, because our self-definition is a real self-making, we are not 'fulgurated' into immortality like Athena, we do not simply 'mirror' the other consciousness, we have to take it over, conquer it for ourselves. But the Leibnizian analysis of how necessity and autonomy can coexist conceptually is the foundation stone of Hegel's 'idealism'. He takes from Leibniz the Idea of the *Sache selbst* as the sum of all real possibilities, and instead of making it the object of the Supreme Monad's intelligence he democratizes it. *For each of us 'the world' is a complex of possible worlds*; we are aware of it as such because our upbringing and education protects us from it as a system of necessities, and offers it to us in this idealized form. But we could not come to this awareness if it were not the case that substantial being (Necessity) is in principle real Possibility.

What the self knows is that the world was there before it, and will be there after it. It must contribute its specific cognition to the process of the Genus.¹ (The process of Reason as Genus is thus *Bildung*, and the natural process of the empirical Kind (sexual reproduction and family life) must be comprehended in this transcendental background. If

¹ The word translated 'Genus' in Hegel's logical-Metaphysical texts is *Gattung*. This is translated 'Kind' in real-philosophical contexts. It is the biological *species* which instantiates the Hegelian logical *genus*. Since this is the crucially important fact, it seems best to reinforce it by a systematic use of the *two* terms according to context. By adopting the biblical expression (Kind), I have at least avoided the appalling ambiguities that would arise from any attempt to employ the terminology of 'genus' and 'species' in biological as well as logical contexts.

lions—or tiger-lilies—could talk, Alice would, indeed, *not* understand them; but she could learn, and learn she would have to. So Lewis Carroll was closer to the whole truth than Wittgenstein. But the inevitability of *Bildung* rests (reciprocally) on the fact that rational consciousness is born and dies (the lions would need to understand us, but if the tiger-lilies' talk expressed the general consciousness of a permanently necessary element in the order of nature, they did not need to speak to Alice at all.) If rational consciousness is necessarily individuated, and has real freedom of self-determination, then Rationality as genus, necessarily exists as the process and the medium of Communication (Reciprocity) between the self-defining individuals.

This communal medium, therefore, is what appears to rational consciousness as the substantial 'Ground' of its cognitive activity. The Soul 'lives and moves and has its being' in the Divine Mind. Hegel is careful to point out that 'Cognition and Ground are one; but for us' (not for the Soul).¹ The upshot of his reinterpretation of Leibniz in terms of the transcendental theory of rational consciousness as an *a priori* synthesis of concept and intuition is this: We can, indeed we must, say that *God exists*, and that 'It is He that hath made us and not we ourselves.' But this is only *because in the process of making ourselves* (as we know that we do) *we generate Him*. 'He' is just the necessary and self-sustaining continuity of the process.

He appears, however, as its Creator and Sustainer; and because of its objectivity and permanence, he must appear so. For every moment in the general process of *Bildung* is mortal and contingent; whereas in the process, it is not just the order of Nature but the rational cognition of it that is permanent. God is the Substance that subsists as a Subject in which all the finite subjects can recognize themselves and be recognized. In his logic Hegel passed from Spinozist Causality to Leibnizian Reciprocity; in the Metaphysics he goes from the World of Leibniz to the God of Spinoza. The first transition makes freedom conceptually possible; the second takes it from God (who is not an individual but the most universal of essences,

¹ NKA, vii. 148, 9.

and so can be said to *be* freedom, but not to *have* it) and gives it to us.

What Hegel calls 'the supreme Essence' becomes recognizable as Spinoza's God, when he remarks that it 'has the antithesis of the self-maintaining or Thought, and of Being, or extension . . . as an attribute'.¹ But the antithesis is attributed to an essence. Thought and extension are not attributes of a Substance: they are the *media* of Rationality. Here we have reached the real Ground of intelligibility, and we can now characterize the process of intelligence upon this ground. This is the 'Metaphysics of Subjectivity'.

The rational self is a necessary connection of being and thought which articulates itself as a syllogistic motion. It forms the linking middle term in the uniting of Being with Thinking that is the existence of consciousness as Cognition. The Ego as theoretical awareness is the awareness of this particular identity of singular experience and universal concept. That either the self, or its empirical content, may appear unessential (as against the permanence of Being or the necessity of Thinking respectively) is a dialectical illusion. The antithesis that arises from the apparent inequality conceals the real equivalence. Consciousness is an antithesis, thus permanently maintained in order that it may be transcended. The structure of Subjectivity is set forth by Fichte, just as the structure of Objectivity was by Leibniz; but again the crucial need is that what they set forth must be properly interpreted in the light of the insight that rational experience is a necessary synthesis *a priori*. The 'otherness' which is the perpetual problem of the self, must be comprehended as a necessary moment of self-hood, not projected into an unknowable *Ding-an-sich*. To accept our own nature as ours (and the whole order of nature with it) instead of identifying rationality with our own autonomous moral legislation: that is the real task of practical Reason. Thus Fichte's theory of the Ego (and of the unending struggle to moralize a non-moral consciousness) serves to set up the last antithesis, the antithesis of Theory and Practice within consciousness itself.

The moral Ego is Leibniz' God personified; in laying down

¹ Ibid., 153, 10-11.

the law for the whole moral world-order it makes its own determinacy absolute. This assertion of the absolute significance of personality is the birth of Spirit: 'The Ego is, *qua* theoretical, Spirit in general; *qua* realized, practical Ego, for which determinacy itself is absolute determinacy, infinity, it is absolute Spirit.'

When this reinterpretation of the morality of Kant and Fichte has been comprehended, Metaphysics will have reached its goal; then the 'proof' of the Metaphysics, through its application in 'Real Philosophy' will begin. The one thing necessary is to show the necessary identity of Soul and Body, the necessity of God's Incarnation, of Spirit's embodiment: 'the whole which thus moves itself within itself, is itself still a determinate content against Cognition.'² A lengthy summary analysis of the development of Cognition from the final phase of the Logic to this culminating moment of the Metaphysics, leads to a more rapid recall of the logic of 'Simple Connection' from which we began.³ The focal place allotted Cognition as the 'true Infinite' and hence as the middle term between logic and Metaphysics shows us why Hegel was moved to abolish the distinction between them. But the new development that arises from the closing of this circle is the ultimate identity of opposition. Cognition as the spiritual continuum is identical with the aether, the ultimate ground of bodily continuity and interaction. Metaphysics is the emergence of this identity for us as philosophic observers. In the 'Real Philosophy' of Nature and Spirit the identity becomes self-conscious. Logic and Metaphysics together formulate the ideal goal of Life. It is only an Ideal which is thus formulated; and it is *practical*

¹ Ibid., 165, 4-6.

² NKA, vii. 167, 28-9. This is part of a long review of the argument during which Hegel remarks that 'The theoretical Ego finds itself as the Supreme Essence . . . it finds itself, it is Spirit or rational. The yearning for immortality and for the Beyond of the Supreme Essence is a regression of the Spirit into a lower sphere, for the Spirit is in itself immortal and Supreme Essence' (vii. 171, 16-24). The 'Supreme Essence' is the unbreaking continuity of consciousness; 'immortality' is the persistence of content in that continuity. It is the absolute significance that makes respect for individual conscience an inviolable right.

³ NKA, vii. 165, 13-174, 13 contains the review of Cognition. The identity of Spirit with the true Infinite takes us back to the beginning of the Logic (vii. 174, 13-175, 24). Thus Cognition becomes the middle term of Logic and Metaphysics as wholes (vii. 175, 24-176, 25).

Reason for which the Ideal is formulated. Thus the transcendental Logic and Metaphysics which Hegel puts in the place of Kant's demonstration of Reason's Newtonian limits, is designed to make practical Reason self-sufficient, and to obviate all postulates, all reference to a noumenal Beyond. The identity of Cognition and Aether is an interpretive programme. The Philosophy of Nature is a *task* for practical Reason, a task which it must complete in order to be able to justify and defend the rationality of practical decisions without appeal to a 'faith' that is beyond Reason. 'The principle of moral science is the reverence to be observed towards fate'¹ declared Hegel in his Doctoral Disputation in 1801. That is what the ultimate identity of the Metaphysics, the identity of absolute spirit with absolute matter, asserts too. When we read that 'the simple absolute self-to-self connecting Spirit is the *Aether*, or absolute Matter',² we have only to remember that 'absolute Spirit' was first identified as Fichte's practical Ego, in order to see this.³

This is the fulcrum on which Hegel's system is balanced, the real meaning that he found in the ultimate identity of the opposites Being and Thinking. It was disastrously unfortunate that the unification of Logic and Metaphysics, which brought so many advantages, and so much more clarity to the argument of the Logic, was also the occasion for the exportation of theological metaphors out of the preamble to the Philosophy of Nature—where they do little harm—and into the metaphysical conclusion of the Logic, where they created immense intellectual havoc. But, although Hegel deserves the blame for producing mystification about his own deepest insight, it remains true that there was nothing mystical in his meaning. Those who were mystified—whether enthusiastically or critically—were simply mistaken.

¹ Thesis X, *Erste Druckschriften*, p. 404.

² *NKA*, vii. 178, 1–2.

³ *Ibid.*, 165, 5–6 (cf. p. 392, above).

BOOK III

THE DAYLIGHT OF THE PRESENT

CHAPTER IX

'To Teach Philosophy to Speak German'

1. *The polemic against mysticism and formalism*

Rosenkranz has relayed to us a summary, with copious quotations, of Hegel's introductory lecture for what was almost certainly the systematic survey course, that he gave in Winter 1804/5.¹

In this introduction Hegel attacked several enemies at once: the mystical naturalism of Boehme, the scholastic Latinity of Kant, and most particularly the 'formalism' of Schelling's philosophy of nature. The connecting thread of his polemic is his claim that the philosopher must concern himself with the conceptual interpretation of the ordinary natural language of everyday life, and that he should *use* the language which he

¹ *Das Leben Hegels*, pp. 181–5 (Harris and Knox, pp. 256–9). In this term Hegel definitely gave a course on 'the whole science of philosophy' to an audience of 30 students. For this course we have the enrolment list (*Hegel-Studien*, iv. 61). Hegel lectured *ex dictatis*, but he was actively writing up his dictation-outline as a textbook. For the next term he announced the course again, promising to lecture *ex libro per aetatem prodituro* (*Hegel-Studien*, iv. 54). But the book did *not* 'appear during the summer'. The MS (NKA, vii.) shows that it was abandoned when Hegel reached the theory of organism—i.e. rather more than half-written. We can safely infer that he reached this point only *after* he sent in his announcement for the University's printed calendar. We cannot absolutely *prove* that Hegel did not lecture on 'the whole system', but we *can* prove that he gave an unannounced course on 'Logic' (simply so called); and in the next term his only systematic course was on 'Real Philosophy'. The inference that he divided the system and offered the 2 parts in sequence because he needed to reorganize the material in accordance with a new method of approach and presentation is highly plausible, if not conclusively certain. It is confirmed by the character of the 'Real Philosophy' of Winter 1805/6 (which we have, and which is securely dated from the internal evidence). My whole reconstruction of events is guided by this hypothesis (and it will be seen that a plausible account of all the variations in Hegel's successive announcements and performances can be given on this basis. Thus the logic of my whole argument leads to the conclusion that there was only one 'lecture course on the whole system' in which the attack on Schelling's

clarifies. The contrast from which he begins is that between the religious and the rational use of the mother-tongue. Rosenkranz summarizes as follows:

The truth should display itself to us in religion, of course, but for our culture faith is altogether a thing of the past; Reason, with its demand that we should not believe, but know what the truth is, has grown strong, that we should not merely have intuitive consciousness of the truth, but should comprehend it. The truth of his individuality, which the path of his existence traces precisely for him, the single individual is well aware of, but the consciousness of the universal life he expects from philosophy. Here his hope seems to be disappointed when instead of the fullness of life there appear concepts, and in contrast to the riches contained in the world of immediate experience the poorest abstractions are offered. But the concept is itself the *mediator between itself and life*, in that it teaches us how to find life in it and the concept in life. But, of course, only science itself can convince us of this.¹

The need for a rational interpretation of our communal religious tradition is a basic theme of *Faith and Knowledge*.² But now Hegel wants to insist at the outset that the conceptual comprehension of the most ordinary expressions of everyday life contains all the riches of religious experience; and it does not refer us to a beyond, but shows us how our present life can be understood as self-sufficient. The basis of his demand that philosophy must use an ordinary vocabulary, not a strange one, is his claim that 'the concept is itself the *mediator between itself and life*.'³

Religion uses ordinary language too, but it does so in a dangerous way. Hegel takes Boehme's speculation as a paradigm case here, and couples it with 'the Oriental attempt to present the Idea'.⁴ These are both 'a *dark half-way-house*

'formalism' and the defence of the 'mother-tongue' could have coincided (for the dating of the latter see n. 39, below).

¹ Op. cit., p. 182; Harris and Knox, pp. 256-7.

² Compare *NKA*, iv. 315, 5-316, 21; Cerf and Harris, pp. 55-6.

³ I take it that Rosenkranz uses spread type (as so often elsewhere) to indicate direct quotation—and probably direct quotation of what Hegel himself underlined.

⁴ It is hard to be sure what this refers to. The characterization of *modern* mysticism (i.e. Boehme) is said to be 'more sorrowful'; and the inadequacy of phenomenal language to express noumenal truth is plainly identified as the root of the 'Unhappy Consciousness'. But whether the intended contrast is between Christianity and Judaism (between Boehme and the Psalmist, say) or between the whole

between feeling and *scientific knowledge*, a speculative feeling or the Idea, which cannot free itself from imagination and feeling and yet is no longer just imagination and feeling'.¹ But Boehme's mysticism is 'more sorrowful' because it recognizes the inevitability of its own failure to be scientific:

It steps into the depths of the essence with common *sensuous ideas* (*Vorstellungen*) and fights to make itself master of it and bring it before its consciousness. But the essence will not let itself be grasped in the form of a common sensuous idea. Any representation of this kind that it is grasped in is *inadequate*. It is only made to fit the essence by *violence*, and must equally violently be torn [away from it?]; it presents only the battle of an inward [essence], that is fermenting within itself, and cannot advance into the clear light of day, feels its incapacity with sorrow, and rolls about in fits and convulsions that can come to no proper issue.²

The attack on Boehme's language (and on the language of religion generally) should be read in the light of the contention that 'the truth *should* display itself to us in religion.' Hegel's criticism is thus quite consistent with his evident desire to show that the older alchemical tradition of Paracelsus (and probably Boehme himself) contained symbolic expressions of important speculative truths.³ The language is attacked as a *veil*. Boehme is at least half-way to the truth. Philosophy ('the concept') as its own mediator, will remove the veil. The first reason for distrusting philosophical terminology that derives from the Latin culture of the universal Church is that such

Judaean-Christian tradition and the naturalism of India and Egypt is not clear. On the whole I think the latter contrast is more probable. The Old Testament is rich and various, and much of its religious content is a 'splendid rhetoric' that is far from sorrowful. But the fate of the Jews was sorrowful from the bondage in Egypt to the destruction of AD 70. Hegel's reference to the Oriental world-view should be taken as a glancing hit at another group of enemies—the Romantics. He expects his hearers to think of the 'orientalism' of the Schlegels—and perhaps of the Egyptian fantasies of Novalis (and Goethe's *Das Märchen*). (The way the Jewish spirit is characterized as a type of the Oriental in the fragment *Geist der Orientalen* would tell against this view if it could be shown that the fragment belongs to the Jena period. But Pöggeler's discussion of the 'historical fragments' has convinced me that it is safest and best to take them all as stemming from the Frankfurt period or earlier—see Rosenkranz, pp. 515–18, or *Dok.* pp. 257–9 (*Clio*, vii. 1977, 115–18); Pöggeler, 'Hegels praktische Philosophie in Frankfurt', *Hegel-Studien*, ix. 1974, 73–107.)

¹ Rosenkranz, p. 182 (Harris and Knox, p. 257). Here and in the following passages the words are Hegel's own.

² Rosenkranz, pp. 182–3 (Harris and Knox, p. 257).

³ See *NKA*, vi. 114, 4–17 (and cf. the discussion in Ch. VI, pp. 274, 278–9, above).

language has an other-worldly aura about it. The language of philosophy ought to be ordinary and homely because the move from phenomenal to conceptual interpretation ought not to carry any implicit suggestion of a *separation* between the noumenal and the phenomenal. It is the *identity* of these opposites that is important. So we must not speak or think of them as separate worlds (like Heaven and Earth in the religious tradition). 'That which is *in itself* must just not have this foreignness *for us*, and we must *not give it this foreign look by using a foreign terminology*.'

Use of an alien-seeming terminology has the subsidiary disadvantage of making the conceptual employment of language seem like an intellectual game with verbal counters. This defect (which Hegel calls 'formalism') must be distinguished from the more dangerously misleading use of conceptual language to express a mystery. Kant, who defended the science of Newton against the supposed superstition of the alchemical tradition, was guilty of this absolute sundering of the noumenal from the phenomenal in his practical philosophy. But his followers turned his theoretical philosophy into a 'formalism'. In the work of men like Reinhold and Schulze 'very ordinary thoughts' were dressed up in the mystic garments of the 'synthetic unity of apperception', 'transcendental deduction', and so on. This brings philosophy into disrepute because it becomes no more than a way of making platitudes look like esoteric wisdom. Where the serious intellectual expects to find 'the consciousness of the universal life' he meets only a fraudulent way of making a living.²

What happened earlier to the transcendental theory of consciousness is now happening to Schelling's speculative philosophy of Nature at the hands of *his* students. Hegel

¹ Rosenkranz, p. 183 (Harris and Knox, p. 258). Whether the *emphasis* stems from Hegel we cannot be certain.

² We should not make the mistake of thinking that Kant is accused of dressing up 'very ordinary thoughts' in 'bogeyman masks'. He offered the 'consciousness of the universal life' but only as an *absent* consciousness. What his followers did with the transcendental theory of consciousness is compared with what Schelling's followers are doing with the speculative philosophy of nature. Hegel's system makes the 'consciousness of universal life' *present* and saves both transcendental philosophy and natural philosophy from becoming formal. His insistence on ordinariness is meant to achieve both goals simultaneously (because what he *does* with ordinary concepts is so extraordinary).

explicitly exonerated Schelling himself of the sin of 'formalism', by pointing to a different fault in his work. The reduction of philosophy to 'formalism' presupposes a certain fixity in the linguistic counters with which the game is played. *Fichte's* philosophy of Nature is a formalism.¹ Schelling avoids formalism, simply by his restless quest for a better terminology. This quest is a form of failure too (and one for which Hegel's linguistic doctrine claims to have found the cure); but it is a flight from 'formalism' even if it only leads into the 'bad infinite'.

I know well enough that *Schelling's Ideas* must be very clearly distinguished from the use *that his school makes of them*, and I honor *Schelling's genuine service to philosophy just as much as I despise this formalism*; and since *I am well acquainted with Schelling's philosophy*, I know that its genuine Idea, as it has again awakened in our time, is independent of this formalism.²

Hegel took the same line in his correspondence with Schelling about the attack on 'formalism' in the Preface to the *Phenomenology*; and we must raise the question whether he was being politic or sincere in both instances. For, years later, at Heidelberg and Berlin, he found Schelling guilty of everything charged against his 'School' here and of other faults besides. Now this present polemic occurs in the preamble to a course based on a textbook that contains very little polemic once the field of philosophy proper has been reached. Hegel is anxious to tell us, to begin with, what his text will not give him a proper occasion for, once he starts. He wants to give us a critical background for his text. That critical context was very much present in the earlier lecture manuscript from which the textbook had been distilled; and when we go back to the running criticism of Schelling's philosophy of Nature in the earlier manuscript we find that it is indeed mainly the work of the 'school' at which Hegel's barbs are aimed.³ Sometimes the critical acid touches views and concepts

¹ See *Difference*, NKA, iv. 51, 4-24 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 139-40) *Faith and Knowledge*, iv. 388, 9-407, 15 (Cerf and Harris, pp. 154-80).

² Rosenkranz, p. 185 (Harris and Knox, p. 259).

³ Cf. the discussion in Ch. VI above (esp. pp. 261 n., 263 n. 1, 266 n. 3, 274 n. 2, 286, 296 n. 3).

maintained by Schelling himself.¹ But even then, it is generally the case that these are earlier views which Schelling's restless dissatisfaction has caused him to abandon. So I conclude that Hegel was quite sincere.

Everything combines to suggest that all the main targets of Hegel's criticism in this Introduction are intellectual benefactors to whom he is genuinely grateful, and whose work he wants to save from misunderstanding. His new gospel of the mother-tongue will save Boehme's vision from its sorrow, Kant both from his relapse into faith and from his followers, and Schelling from his followers. The crucial thing about the everyday concepts of our mother-tongue is their presence. They are *gegenwärtig*; and the religious goal of Hegel's speculation is to make the presence (*Gegenwart*) of absolute consciousness evident to all.² The cultural ideal of 'saying everything in one's own language' makes philosophic experience directly continuous with ordinary life; the *bouleversement* of all ordinary consciousness has to be faced by the philosopher, without any withdrawal from ordinary life into the study. The 'unity of opposites' becomes present for him in the commonest of ordinary experiences—for instance when he thinks about the tree being in leaf.³

2. *The polemic against romanticism*

This continuity between ordinary experience, or ordinary reflective thought, and the contradictory absolute experience and absolute reflection of the philosopher, puts Hegel on the side of the Enlighteners against the Romantic cult of the

¹ Especially, I think, with respect to 'cohesion', 'magnetism', and 'electricity' (cf. pp. 240 n. 1, 244 n. 1, 253 n. 2, 254-5, 259-60, 263 n. 1, 268 n. 1, 276, nn. 3, 4, 280-2, 286, above).

² Rosenkranz, p. 182 (Harris and Knox, pp. 257-8) should be compared with *ist nur die Form* (NKA, vi. 331; Harris and Knox, p. 252) which probably belongs to the previous term's course (early 1804). There what 'only exists as concept' is said to have no '*Gegenwart* in the singular consciousness'. We must not exaggerate the difference between that position and the present one. The presence of the truth in a religious *Vorstellung* continues to be necessary, and it is only for the would-be philosopher that faith is altogether a thing of the past and the concept is 'the mediator between itself and life'. It is only for philosophers that the pure concept can have 'presence'. But there is a democratic, anti-authoritarian tendency implicit in the cultural ideal of 'saying everything in our own language'.

³ Rosenkranz, pp. 183-4; Harris and Knox, p. 258.

privileged genius. The attack on Romanticism which Rosenkranz goes on to describe' may not come from the same manuscript—though the flow of the argument, and the fact that Rosenkranz does not begin a new paragraph for it, suggest that it does—but here the date does not matter since the polemical theme is already of long standing in Hegel's work, and the democratic tendency of his claim that adequacy for philosophy is the final perfection of the language of the *Volk* must be comprehended within this standing context. *Philosophy is for everyone*, and if not everyone manages to become a philosopher, this is not to be explained by suggesting that 'not everyone becomes a prince'. The intellectual *élite* are not singled out by nature or by fortune, they elect themselves; and they cannot do this by claiming to have special revelations. The concept is the 'mediator between itself and life'. So the message of philosophy must be universally intelligible—and when it is universally understood it must not be found to be commonplace truth masquerading as esoteric wisdom. We have seen already how Hegel sought to reduce the poetic genius to a sort of teamworker, the craftsman who knows how to put the last touch on *popular* wisdom by giving it visible expression.² His attack on the Romantic image of the poet as prophet, whenever it was made, marks his dissent from one of Schelling's fundamental positions, the view that 'art is the organon of philosophy'. The implication of his appeal to the *Timaeus* 71d-e (where Plato's Demiurge 'laid up the power of prophecy in the liver, so that *our bad side might in some way be in contact with the truth*')³ is that philosophic Reason is the canon of all poetic and religious *Vorstellungen* (which belong to the phenomenal, 'bad infinite' side of our experience).

This belief in the ultimate authority and the universal

¹ pp. 185–6 (Harris and Knox, p. 260).

² NKA, v. 376 (Rosenkranz, p. 180; Harris and Knox, pp. 254–5). This passage probably comes from the *Delineatio* of Summer 1803.

³ Rosenkranz, p. 186 (Harris and Knox, p. 260). The critique of 'enthusiasm' is to be found everywhere in Hegel's Jena papers, from the last pages of the *Difference* essay in 1801 to the Preface of the *Phenomenology* in 1807. So if Rosenkranz is not still summarizing the argument of the same lecture his text could come from any year. But once we grasp the essential continuity of Hegel's *critical* concept of Reason—his concept of it as the standard by which all truth-claims are determined—we can see that the dating of this passage is not crucial for the connection that I want to make between it and the ideal of vernacular philosophy.

accessibility of Reason is the root of the ambiguous common cause that Hegel made from the beginning between Kant and the Greeks. In order to grasp the novelty of the new doctrine that philosophy must use and perfect the vernacular for its own expression, we must recur briefly to the Tübingen fragment and follow the evolution of Reason's authority from there.

In the Tübingen fragment the first canon of a healthy folk-religion is that 'its doctrines must be grounded on universal Reason.'¹ In the popular mind the authority of the doctrines may rest on a divine revelation, but 'they are authorized really by the universal Reason of mankind, so that every man sees and feels their obligatory force when it is drawn to his attention.'² On this view there is no real need for professional philosophers. But it is appropriate for the educated class, the class who know that the authority of religious teaching really comes from 'universal Reason' to share a learned language, distinct from the language of the people, a language that is cross-cultural. The figure of the wise man here is Lessing's Nathan, the Jew who reconciles Saracen and Christian in the universal brotherhood of rational mankind.

But Beauty is a regulative ideal for Reason itself. Reason ought not to be invisible because it needs to be *enjoyed*. The young Hegel is a follower of Schiller rather than of Kant; for he holds that the Ideas of Reason *can* be adequately embodied in *ideals*. This must occur if the authority of Reason itself is not to become an ascetic, inhuman discipline. Thus we find Hegel coupling the achievement of Kant with that of the Greeks early in 1796. He knew perfectly well that the Greeks had not clearly recognized the universal brotherhood of mankind—that they had enslaved one another, and had offered intellectual justifications for slavery. But he credits them with a 'correct feeling' for the human rational autonomy that Kant defined 'for science', because they did not make the mistake of establishing a Church *authority*.³ Philosophy does now have a distinctive function, we may notice—for the Greeks did not define their 'feeling' rightly 'for science'. It may take 'centuries' for the active life and legislation of the Europeans to apply Kant's insight. But 'making wholesome separations for science' is an important cultural advance.

¹ TW-A, i. 33 *Toward the Sunlight*, p. 499.

² Loc. cit.

³ Nohl, p. 211 (Apr. 1796); Knox and Kroner, p. 143.

Later the same year, in the 'First System Programme' Hegel is more optimistic about the prospects for an early abolition of irrational authority; and also intensely conscious that the direct authority of pure Reason can be mechanical and inhumane. Now the 'correct feeling' of the Greeks becomes a requirement for the philosopher himself: 'the philosopher must possess just as much aesthetic power as the poet . . . Poetry becomes at the end once more what she was at the beginning—the *teacher of mankind*.'¹ But poetry cannot have an instituted social authority (like the authority of Scripture in the Church). It 'teaches' by catching at our hearts; and the philosopher must have the poet's gift because he must have control of this method of teaching. For the only authority that Reason can have is the democratic, pre-philosophical one that it enjoys in 1793—everyone 'sees and feels its obligatory force', when his attention is drawn to it: 'in the end enlightened and unenlightened must clasp hands, mythology must become philosophical in order to make the people rational, and philosophy must become mythological in order to make the philosophers sensible.'²

This 'joining of hands' eliminates the sort of rational authoritarianism exemplified by Plato's critique of Homer and his total expulsion of the dramatists from his Republic. Authority belongs neither to the poet nor to the philosopher, but only to the people whom they teach; and a free people will not establish a teaching authority. Hegel's *Volk* will have neither authorized idols nor authorized iconoclasts.

In spite of the extremely polemical stance of the *Critical Journal* toward 'unphilosophy'—which mirrors the critique of the empiricist philosophy of nature in the 'First System-Programme' itself—this anti-authoritarian reconciliatory purpose is the dominant theme of Hegel's meditations about 'speculation' throughout the next decade. *Speculation is perennial*; 'there is, and always has been, only one philosophy', and the history of philosophy is the 'story of the one eternal Reason'.³

¹ *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 9, 1973, p. 264 (*Toward the Sunlight*, p. 511).

² *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 9, 1973, p. 265 (*Toward the Sunlight*, pp. 511–12).

³ See *Dass die Philosophie*, 20a (in *NKA*, v. 274) or Rosenkranz, p. 192 (Cerf and Harris, p. 10); *Difference*, *NKA*, iv. 31 (Harris and Cerf, p. 114); and the *Critical Journal*, *NKA*, iv. 118.

Hence it is the mark of true philosophy, and of the philosopher, that it (and he) can recognize itself (himself) even in views and opponents that are outwardly its (his) polar opposite or contrary.¹ Self-recognition in the other is the conceptual form in which the ideal of 'love' is realized in speculation. The concept of 'recognition' becomes fundamental for philosophy because it makes the *Aufhebung* of antithesis possible—Reason is the mediator, the shared 'self' that each side recognizes in the other. Where the one philosophy can recognize itself, perfect fraternity can exist among the many pens that the Spirit uses. But for the philosopher to join hand with the ordinary man, the bridge of recognition must be built not merely between materialism and idealism, but between *Vorstellung* and *Begriff*. This is the bridge by which the concept 'mediates between itself and life'. Hegel's work as a philosophical journalist is concerned with the first task; in his systematic labours he is concerned more with the second.

The 'first System Programme' had already defined the ideal that Hegel is still trying to achieve through his vernacular philosophy. Pure philosophy must be made *sinnlich*, because the moment of sensible presence is the opposite which is its means of expression. The philosopher must choose the mythic images in which his speculative truth is to be expressed. One must not, for example, emphasize the myth of the Fall (as Schelling did, and Boehme before him). 'There can be no talk of a going forth of the Absolute out of itself, for only this [truth] can appear as a going-forth—that the antithesis is.'² But one cannot simply ignore it, or eliminate it. One must *interpret* it: 'one can only bring what is correct in these verbal pictures to the light of present awareness (*vergegenwärtigen*) if one *already knows* what it is.' In the Holy Triangle of

¹ Cf. *Difference*, NKA, iv. 12, 31, 79–80 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 88–9, 114, 177); and the 'Introduction' for the *Critical Journal*, NKA, iv. 119, 33–120, 18 and 127, 22–128, 4 (*LJP*, iii. 1979, 39–40, 45).

² NKA, vii. 34, 16–18; cf. Rosenkranz, p. 188 (Harris and Knox, p. 262). Rosenkranz reports that Hegel mentioned Schelling and the *Gnostics* together in this connection; so it is unlikely that Rosenkranz is summarizing from any MS prior to Summer 1803 (which is also the moment when Nature becomes for Hegel the 'other-being' of the Idea, so that he would naturally be led to consider the Gnostic metaphor of the Logos 'going out of itself' and thus 'falling'). The comment could have been made at any time after that date (but the coincidence of doctrine with that of the 1804 *Logic* is suggestive).

triangles Hegel himself employed something very close to the Gnostic or Schellingian image of the Fall to express the going-forth of Spirit into Nature.¹ In *Faith and Knowledge* the same concept of evil appears, but not the image; for now it is the 'death of God', the *departure* of Spirit from Nature, that marks the human loss of Paradise² and contains the promise of its regaining. This concept of the 'infinite grief' is maintained steadily thereafter. But it is not the 'fall' of the Logos, but the 'goodness of God' that we are invited to see in the 'appearing' of nature in 1804.³ Religion (as *Faith and Knowledge* puts it) 'expounds evil . . . as a necessity of finite nature, as one with the concept of finite nature'.⁴ But philosophy is concerned with the realization of the Infinite, and it shows us that that necessity of evil is the condition of a self-cognitive infinite. Thus philosophy sees the metaphysical Fall only in its fortunate aspect, and never alludes to evil as such at all.⁵

We have already discussed the meditation on the fall of Lucifer that Hegel included in his *Wastebook*, because it fairly evidently reflects his earlier attitude towards Boehme, and it fits so neatly into the Trinitarian theology of the final 'resumption of the whole' in the four-part system.⁶ We must now consider the commentary that Hegel added; for every indication suggests that it was written about this same time (late 1804).⁷ Hegel's complaint against such 'intuitions' now is

¹ See *Hegel-Studien*, x, 1975, 133–5; trans. in Appendix to Ch. IV, above. Here 'the Earth' is the principle of 'evil'.

² *NKA*, iv, 413, 34–414, 13; Cerf and Harris, 190–1.

³ *NKA*, vii, 181, 22–182, 9.

⁴ *Ibid.*, iv, 407, 28–9; Cerf and Harris, p. 180.

⁵ That considerations of this sort were in Hegel's mind in this period is shown by entry 13 in the excerpts from the *Wastebook* (Rosenkranz, p. 540).

⁶ Entry 48, Rosenkranz, pp. 547–8; trans. M. H. Hoffheimer, in *Clio* (forthcoming). See above, Ch. IV, pp. 161 n. 1, 167 n.

⁷ The coincidence of Hegel's *critical* interest in Boehme, with his adoption of the transcendental standpoint and his image of the natural standpoint as barbaric points to this year. Even the claim (in the last sentence of the fragment) that 'Science turns every moment of intuition (which is, on its own account, an impenetrable determinate shape . . .) into a process in itself' points to a whole system that is conceived as phenomenology—as in the first 'Philosophy of Spirit' of 1803/1804—rather than to the subsequent conception of a phenomenological introduction to the system. In any case the critical meditation cannot be earlier than Summer 1803 (when Hegel first recognized the need for the intuition of 'nature' to undergo a 'second process' of cognition) nor much later than Summer 1805 (when he formulated the project of the introductory phenomenology in which Boehme's Lucifer myth has once more a

that in them 'the individual is annihilated.' There must be a 'second process' of cognition in which its transcendental character is recognized.

This second process is Science or the cognition that that inward-going imagining of the self within itself, that life-career of God, proceeds from cognition itself; that Nature in its essence is not the other-being over which the spirit is wroth that it has thus lost itself, but rather the intuition of Nature, Nature as Nature, is the Spirit. The individual is as such, itself Nature, and the intuition of the divine essence is a natural one, though its content is at the same time the Spirit.

We must raise our religious consciousness to the level of Science, and comprehend that the whole development of our 'nature' takes place at the level of, and in the context of, the spirit. In that way, we can finally overcome the negative conception of our *natural* condition as *fallen*.

This illustrates how the critical lordship of philosophy over poetry, and hence over the whole of life, works. Hegel speaks of this lordship in another passage from the *Wastebook*: 'Philosophy rules *Vorstellungen* and these rule the world.'¹ The *Herrschaft* of the Idea does not confer any special authority on the individual philosopher. Spirit comes to itself first in the form of *Vorstellungen*. Homer, the general consciousness of the *Volk* endowed with the technical skill of a craft-guild, is the voice of the Spirit itself: 'An *Iliad* does not get thrown together, just as a great social achievement [*Werk*] does not come from bayonets and cannon, but the composer is the Spirit.'

positive place). The *Wastebook* contains another passage in which the return of Boehme to honour is visible (Rosenkranz, p. 546; *IJP*, iii. 1979, p. 3, no. 4). Here Hegel repeats 'To stick fast at the intuition, e.g. of Jakob Boehme, is barbarism'; but then he goes on to insist that 'the development of Science (*Wissen*) is not a setting aside of those intuitions, but a building up of their meaning (*Ausbilden derselben*) from the inside outwards or from the outside inwards. Boehme's intuition is a deeper thing than Jacobi's faith reveals.' (The first definitely datable sign of Boehme's comeback is the designation of the *diamond* as 'the first born son of light and gravity' in the *Realphilosophie* of 1805 (NKA, viii. 75, 20-1). The echo both of the 'Triangle fragment' and of the Boehme myth seems too clear to be accidental, even though there is no place for any explicit reference to moral problems. See further Ch. X, pp. 432-3, below.

¹ See *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 14 for both passages. They come from the twelfth of the aphorisms that Rosenkranz failed to reprint in his biography; *IJP*, iii. 1979, 4 (bottom).

This brings us to the point where we can fully appreciate the significance of the letter (of April 1805) to J. H. Voss (the translator of Homer) in which Hegel says that

Luther has made the Bible speak German; you, Homer—the greatest present that can be given to a people; for a people is barbarous and does not consider the excellent things it knows as its own property until it gets to know them in its own language;—if you would forget these two examples, I should like to say of my aspirations that I shall try to teach philosophy to speak German. Once that is accomplished, it will be infinitely more difficult to give shallowness the appearance of profound speech.¹

The triad of Homer, Luther, and philosophy here is not accidental. Philosophy cannot expel the poets (as Plato believed). Poetry was the original teacher of mankind; and for the culture of a people to arrive at the stage where a thought-craftsman like Hegel can make its language adequate for philosophical self-expression, that culture must contain the whole *Lebenslauf* of the divine Spirit. In other words, the Germans must have Homer for themselves, if philosophy is to speak German intelligibly. If the public has only Luther's German Bible, then the philosopher must speak in a reflectively barbaric way, like the Gnostics, Boehme and Schelling. He can defend 'individuality' only by claiming the privilege of 'genius' (and the nemesis of true prophecy is to be lost in the clamour of its false rivals).² The original intuitive shape of natural consciousness must be available too, in order that the structure of consciousness as 'Relationship' may be made plain, and 'absolutely reflected' by philosophy. The Greek consciousness is, for Hegel in 1805, no longer an ideal to be recovered. But it is the important half of the speculative truth about nature, the moment when spirit sees itself reflected, and has not yet rejected the image as a mere image. Homer is barbaric too, in the sense that there is an inversion of values in his poetry. It is there only the Universal that matters, and the individual (Hector, Achilles) must sacrifice itself. In the

¹ *Briefe*, i. 99; Kaufmann (Anchor, p. 316). I quote from the third of the surviving drafts. The actual letter sent to Voss seems not to have survived.

² Cf. *Wastebook* entry 9, where the glut of 'formalism' in natural philosophy is characterized as a 'philosophical genius-period' (Rosenkranz, p. 539). (There is no translation.)

'absolute reflection' of philosophy this will be the other way up. The salvation of the individual will be revealed as the realization of the Universal. But in Homer the Universal is not just a destroyer, an angel of death, but a real presence. The German Bible needs the Greek Bible beside it, before it can be interpreted in the vulgar tongue, without the arrogance of genius—either the real genius of Boehme's mysticism, or the pretended genius of esoteric formalism.

3. *The revolution in Hegel's Logic*

The letter to Voss shows, incidentally, that the revolutionary development of Logic (the transcendental theory of cognition) into 'speculative philosophy' in general, was a phase in the evolution of this ambition to make philosophy speak German. For the letter was written during the Summer Term for which Hegel initially covenanted to lecture on '*the whole science of philosophy*, i.e. *speculative* philosophy (logic and metaphysics), philosophy of *nature* and of *spirit* from his book to appear during the summer'.¹ Then in actual fact he taught a class on 'Logic' simply; no textbook went to the printer, for he stopped writing. Yet, after some hesitation, he committed to paper for Voss's eyes the statement that his 'system of philosophy' would be published in the autumn;² so he must have believed that concentration on the revision of the Logic would soon put him in a position to complete his unfinished manuscript.

In actual fact it did no such thing; and we can see from the new shape eventually assumed by the 'Real Philosophy' that the full incorporation of Metaphysics into Logic, finally required the adoption of a new methodic structure throughout the system. But the evident continuity of development is important, because with all the scattered evidences about 'teaching philosophy to speak German'—some of which may be later than the letter to Voss, while none are much

¹ *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 54.

² Letter 55, *Briefe*, i. 99; Kaufmann, *Anchor*, p. 316; cf. the first draft for the letter, *Briefe*, i. 96. But this confidence is partly a front, necessitated by Hegel's hope that Voss may be able to help him obtain the properly paid academic position that he so desperately needs. The more self-deprecatory comment in the intermediate draft 'I

earlier—it constitutes a proof that the adoption of a new method did not mean the abandonment of the transcendental standpoint, the standpoint according to which Nature is implicit cognition, and Spirit is the making *explicit* of that implicit structure.

It is vital to be sure of this, because we are now about to encounter Hegel's 'system' in its mature form. The outline of the *Encyclopaedia* is clearly discernible for the first time in the 'Real Philosophy' of 1805/6. We do not have any version of Logic redesigned to go with it; but that too, assumes its mature shape in the outlines for the Nuremberg schoolboys. The whole system, in future, is developed from an 'infinite' or 'absolute' standpoint. We return, seemingly, to the standpoint of speculative theology from Descartes to Schelling: *a Deo principium*. But in Hegel's vision this Infinite, this Absolute that knows its own knowing as the end and purpose of all being, is just the universal brotherhood of man that comes to consciousness when we can, at last, make Philosophy speak in the vulgar tongue; it is the 'invisible Church' of the 'one universal Reason' made visible as the great series of spiritual *Gestalten*, the mouthpieces of the *Volk* from Homer to Hegel.

Hegel always taught that Logic was the proper name for 'the extended science of the Idea' or for 'speculative philosophy' as a whole. That is why it is not possible to decide definitely whether the passage about the vital importance of Logic which Rosenkranz quoted, should be assigned to his first appearance at the lectern in 1801 or to the revolutionary course of Summer 1805 when 'Logic' stood alone as the title.¹

It does not matter much, because that fragment tells us nothing specific about the standpoint of Logic except that it should not be one-sidedly subjective. If it told us more we could probably decide which year it belonged to, but that much was as true for Hegel in 1801 as it was in 1805.² We can

can appeal only to works still unfinished (*unfertige*)' (*Briefe*, i. 97) may reflect his honest estimate of his position more accurately.

¹ Rosenkranz, pp. 188–9; Harris and Knox, p. 262. (The passage is cited in full in Ch. I, pp. 28–9, above.)

² It is not likely that the fragment comes from the lost beginning of our 1804 MS (unless Rosenkranz had only a fragment of that). For Rosenkranz assigned that MS as a whole to the supposed 'system' of 1800. But the 1804 MS is relevant, nevertheless because the declared opinion of Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre* fits so much better with

see far more of what is involved in the move to a strictly speculative or metaphysical logic by examining the relation of Metaphysics to logic in the 1804 text.

In that text we can see that 'Metaphysics' proper begins when 'Relationship' is finally overcome. Pure cognition is the awareness that the real world of forces and the ideal world of laws do not merely have a necessary relation with one another; they are the same thing. The phenomenal world is not a limit between the opposed forces of being and thinking, but the displaying of 'what is' to and for itself. Cognition is thus the self-awareness of the 'true Infinite'. If this culmination of logic could become its beginning then the whole evolution of logic from Quality onwards would be metaphysical. We would not then be able to use words like 'connection' and 'relation', which imply the existence of independent, self-subsistent entities or worlds that are connected or related. What comes together gradually in 'Relationship', 'Proportion', and the 'System of Principles' would be all together from the beginning; and there would be no need for the 'construction' of consciousness in 'Simple Connection'. Just how soon Hegel arrived at the unitary concept of Being, to replace 'connection', and at that of Essence to replace Relationship we cannot say. But the first of these moves seems to me to be only one step away in 1804, when he looks back from the vantage point of the Infinite as soon as he reaches it, and remarks that the dialectic of Quality and Quantity already contained it implicitly.¹ The concept of Essence is what the Metaphysics of 1804 begins with. That it must reach back and absorb the 'Relationship of Thought' (the formal theory of Concept, Judgement, and Syllogism) is obvious enough. The problem

the *Differenzschrift* than it does with the treatment of Fichte in 1804 or in the Preface to the *Phenomenology* that contemplation of this contrast drives us back to October 1801 as the likeliest date.

Rosenkranz does tell us (*Hegels Leben*, p. 202) that Hegel 'developed the concept of the experience that consciousness creates upon itself [*von sich selbst macht*] especially in his *introductions to Logic and Metaphysics*'. The fragment *ist auf das Allgemeine* is the earliest 'introduction' to which he can be referring. He would not count the lost exordium of the Winter 1804 textbook (unless he had only a sundered fragment of it) since he assigned that MS as a whole to the supposed 'system' of 1800. So we can safely infer that he had at least one other introductory lecture from the 1805/6 period (or someone's—e.g. Gabler's—notes therefrom).

¹ NKA, vii. 29, 10–30, 25.

here is how to integrate the 'Relationship of Being' into the new scheme of things.

I may perhaps be accused of depending quite illegitimately upon the advantage of hindsight when I say these things are obvious. 'Being' and 'Essence' were what emerged, so they must be there; and when we recognize them, their presence becomes 'obvious'. Probably it is a great deal simpler for me than it was for Hegel; but in distinguishing the first steps (which I claim were 'obvious' in the objective sense of being close at hand) from the difficulties which begin when those steps are taken, I am at least trying to be guided by the *visible* course of evolution from the 'logic outline' of 1801 to the Logic and Metaphysics of 1804. The distinction between the formal and the speculative theory of judgement and syllogism, is already a point of contrast between reflection and speculation in 1801. That it must be resolved is therefore 'obvious' as soon as the project of a purely speculative logic is formulated. That project is formulated in principle (and is therefore obvious for us to fall upon or pick up) as soon as Hegel looks back to his critical beginning and declares that 'Simple Connection is in truth Infinity itself'; and he was bound to want to say that—to justify the pathway to the Infinite as soon as he arrived there—since he had laid it down as a requirement three years earlier that 'the objective concern of a true logic is . . . to set up the *forms of finitude* not just bundled together empirically, but just as they come forth from Reason."

It is very obvious, I think, that the transition from logic to Metaphysics is awkward and unsatisfactory in the manuscript of 1804. Metaphysics needs to begin from a unity. We know that Hegel had tried the experiment of deriving his 'system of principles' from the 'principle of Ground'² (which is their 'totality' in 1804). But this only creates an insoluble problem about the transition from logic to Metaphysics. Metaphysics really begins with the concept of the Infinite as cognition, which is constructed in logic. But that can be taken over into

¹ *Dass die Philosophie*, 18a, in *NKA*, v. 272 (Rosenkranz, p. 191; Cerf and Harris, p. 9).

² See the discussion of the 'Zwei Anmerkungen' (*NKA*, vii. 343–7) in Ch. V, pp. 231–6, above.

Metaphysics *properly* only if much more is taken over with it; at the very least, the whole theory of 'Proportion' must be treated as metaphysical.

If we ask why Hegel did not want to take that route, we come up against the crux of the problem. Hegel was committed to a definite concept of Logic as a unitary science. Logic was 'the extended science of the Idea'; its task was to lay 'the foundations of scientific cognition in general'.¹ Metaphysics was a branch of Logic; it could not be made complete at the expense of its genus; so 'cognition' could only be taken over into Metaphysics, by being made to swallow its own tail, its beginning in finite reflection. Where cognition went, Logic as a whole must go; and wherever Logic went it took its general status and logical priority with it. If it all went over into Metaphysics, then Metaphysics itself must vanish into the general identity of Logic.

None of that is difficult. What is difficult, is that if critical logic is swallowed by metaphysical Logic, and becomes ontology, Logic as a whole must lose its finite connection, its starting-point in empirical consciousness, its critical relation to finite reflection. It cannot both be developed logically from the concept of absolute cognition and be the critical road to that concept. Logic can be a speculative science beginning from absolute cognition; but then the path to its starting-point must be charted by a different critical science.

When Hegel saw that the very logic of his own logical procedure, his attempt to make pure concepts generate one another by self-fertilization required the circular closure of the concept of 'absolute cognition' which it made possible (because only that closure would make the legitimacy of the procedure evident) this was the problem he was left with: How was the critical role of logic to be re-conceived? How was the initial standpoint of the purely speculative, self-sufficient Logic to be established? How was the essential function of 'critical' logic to be performed?

We have little evidence of his initial reaction to this problem. We know that at the very period when he was

¹ *Dass die Philosophie*, 19b, and *Die Idee des absoluten Wesens*, 1b, in *NKA*, v. 263, 274 (Rosenkranz, pp. 191, 179; Cerf and Harris, p. 10, and Harris and Knox, p. 6). Cf. Ch. I, pp. 31-5, above.

writing to Voss, Hegel's mind was focused on what eventually becomes the turning point between the logical 'phenomenology of Reason' and the 'phenomenology of Spirit' proper. For on one of the surviving drafts of his letter to Voss he began sketching how 'absolute knowledge' emerges as 'legislative Reason' when the *Volk* reaches the *natural* perfection of its development as 'ethical substance'.¹ In the mature *Phenomenology* this is the moment where the conflict between Antigone and Creon becomes inevitable. There is no sign of these two *Gestalten* in our brief fragment. Hegel is thinking rather in terms of the Judaeo-Christian myth of the Fall of Man. But the contrast between 'divine' and 'human' knowledge is explicit: and since the 'thinking of pure thinking' has to be both a substance and the cognitive consciousness of it, the *Gegensatz* is logically necessary. The 'ethical substance' itself—i.e. the *Volk*—has a 'divine right' in the differentiated consciousness of its citizens. Each is directly aware of his duty. But in the very fact that laws must be *given*, the possibility of disobedience is given.

Here the fragment breaks off. But it is clear that Hegel saw the necessity for a real foundation of our claim to have 'absolute knowledge', the need for a demonstration of the identity of human knowledge with divine knowledge, and hence of human and divine right.

On the other hand, the schematic evidence of the lecture announcements shows that he continued to think of the problem as involving the logical criticism of our 'natural' conception of human cognitive experience. After suddenly abandoning his commitment to give a systematic survey course, and giving a course on 'Logic' instead, Hegel began regularly to divide his system in half, and to lecture on 'speculative' and on 'real' philosophy in separate courses. The course of Summer 1805 on 'Logic' certainly embraced all the topics of the older 'Logic and Metaphysics' (along with whatever introduction to 'speculative philosophy' Hegel had then decided on). It was followed in the next term by a course on 'real philosophy' (from which the manuscript survives). Then in Summer 1806 he gave the 'speculative' and the 'real'

¹ *Das absolute Wissen, Dok.*, p. 353.

philosophy concurrently. This time the title of the former is given as 'Speculative philosophy or Logic'. But the crucial point is that a text book was announced for it: 'the *System of Science*, to appear shortly'.¹ The first part of this 'System of Science' did begin to appear; and Hegel's students used it in this course. His course on 'Speculative philosophy or Logic' began with the 'Introduction' to the *Phenomenology*, and traversed at least the chapters on 'Consciousness'.²

Only in the announcement for the next term (Winter 1806/7) is *Phaenomenologia mentis* distinguished from 'Logic and Metaphysics',³ as a preamble. The restoration of the earlier distinction between 'Logic and Metaphysics', as soon as Logic has finally been disentangled from the 'critical introduction to philosophy' which takes us from the natural standpoint of finite consciousness to the standpoint of absolute or infinite cognition, is significant. The course was almost certainly not given; but the announcement was penned while the previous course was in progress. Thus it bears witness to the structure that the 'system' came to have in Hegel's mind, while he was writing the *Phenomenology*. He began writing it as 'critical logic', but decided that it was not properly Logic at all, while he was writing, and possibly even after some of it was in print.

If we ask ourselves how much of the *Phenomenology* is really necessary to perform the function of the Logic of 1804, we can see why Hegel changed his mind. I have said above that his course of Summer 1806 must have traversed at least the chapters on 'Consciousness'. For these chapters present a reworking of the dialectic of 'Simple Connection', and end with our arrival at 'absolute reflection', the 'true Infinite' in which the Understanding is sublated. Then 'Self-Conscious-

¹ *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 55.

² We know this from the testimony of Gabler (*Hegel-Studien*, iv. 71 or Nicolin, report 92, p. 66; cf. Rosenkranz, pp. 214-15). In addition, there is the fragment 'C. Die Wissenschaft' (NKA, ix. 438-43) which shows that a first draft of the final transition from 'absolute religion' to 'science' existed at this time—and possibly slightly earlier. The retrospective references in this fragment provide strong evidence that a complete draft of the *Phenomenology* (more or less as we know it) existed by that time (for the dating see NKA, ix. 467-8, and Bonsiepen's discussion in *Hegel-Studien*, xii. 1977, 179-90).

³ In the Latin announcement 'Phenomenology' is distinguished from 'Speculative philosophy'—and we might think that the non-speculative preamble is conceived as

ness' and 'Reason' deal with what *could* be called the Relationship of Being and the Relationship of Thinking. But how far from critical logic the actual topics are! 'Self-consciousness' comes from the earlier Philosophy of Spirit; and much of the content of 'Reason' is a phenomenological preamble to the Philosophy of Nature. After that the 'phenomenology of Spirit proper' (Chapters VI and VII) is a preamble not to 'speculative philosophy' but to the 'philosophy of spirit'. Only the last chapter (VIII: Absolute Knowledge) brings us back to the problem of the starting-point of Logic.

We were ready to start speculative Logic, when we reached the identity of thinking with reality generally (in the 'Category'). This 'phenomenology of Reason' (*not* the full 'Phenomenology of Spirit') obtains a necessary place in the Philosophy of Spirit itself—which Hegel always accorded it once he recognized that Phenomenology itself was a distinct philosophic science—because of its 'logical' function. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* as a whole is not just an introduction to speculative Logic; it is an introduction to the system of philosophy generally. It shows us what the function of philosophy is, and how the ideal of systematic philosophy has come to be what it is. It gives us the critical context, within which the systematic effort of the philosopher is to be understood. The system in its turn justifies the conceptual structure that frames this critical context.

The way that 'phenomenology' reappears as a phase in the system is the final testimony of its origin as 'logic'; and the phenomenology of the *real* Spirit—which does not reappear in the system itself—is the resolution of the problem of how logic can be critical and preliminary, and yet at the same time be the self-justifying science with which philosophy starts. Hegel recognized the independence of 'Phenomenology' because he saw that this question about critical and speculative Reason must be asked about 'Spirit' and 'Reason' (the phenomenal and the eternal aspects of the Logos respectively) and not about 'Logic' proper (as the science of the *eternal* Logos).

We can get some idea of how Hegel at first conceived of part of 'Logic'. But in the German we read '*Speculative philosophy* or *Logic* and *Metaphysics* with preliminary *Phenomenology* of spirit' (*Hegel-Studien*, iv. 55–6).

'phenomenology' and 'speculative logic' as two species of one genus from his later effort to expound *Bewusstseynslehre* and *Logik* as a single continuous topic for his 'middle' classes at Nuremberg.¹ We know that Phenomenology was independent of Logic proper for Hegel when he did that. But the pedagogical experiment shows how the evolution of consciousness to self-possessed rationality is indeed that part of 'phenomenology' that the understanding of speculative Logic necessarily presupposes.

The problem of how this 'phenomenological logic' outgrew the bounds of a mere introduction to speculative thought and became the 'first part' of science must be left until we have studied the 'Real Philosophy' which we still have. We shall go on now to examine that manuscript. But as we examine it, we shall find that we possess the wherewithal for a plausible interpretation of the comment of Gabler: 'the Logic which Hegel gave us in the following Summer Semester only in outline, and in affiliation (*Anschluss*) with the Phenomenology, still contained no more than the seed and the provisional foundations of his later fully worked out Logic.'² For as we shall see the Real Philosophy of 1805/6 corresponds very well with the first outline of Logic that Hegel gave for the 'upper class' at Nuremberg in 1808.³

¹ *TW-A*, iv. 70-110.

² *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 71 (or Nicolin, report 92, p. 66).

³ *TW-A*, iv. 11-33. (Of course we must keep an eye on the 'Wissenschaft der Natur' and 'Wissenschaft des Geistes' too (*ibid.*, 33-69). But even if the great divergence in the last makes us sceptical, the fact remains that the Nuremberg *Logic* of 1808 is the best guide we have to the *Logic* that the *Phenomenology* of 1807 is designed to lead into.)

CHAPTER X

The Natural Philosophy of 1805/6

1. *Mechanics or the Theory of Matter*

The physical model of the logic of Understanding is the Newtonian theory of the Solar System. We know that Hegel identified his logic of 'Simple Connection' as the 'logic of understanding'.¹ He also called the first part of Logic 'the science of pure understanding' in 1808—though the formal title is 'Ontological Logic'. Which title he used for it in 1805 we cannot know for certain.² But the direct transformation of the aether into space at the beginning of the Philosophy of Nature reflects the 'simplicity' of the connection between understanding and its object. The aether is the immediate conceptual unity of being and non-being. It is 'determinate being gone back into its concept'—which is just what 'absolute cognition' is in its *formal* aspect at the end of the Metaphysics of 1804.³ In the Metaphysics the return of the Infinite into its beginning is emphasized. That beginning is the *whole* of Simple Connection. Here the beginning has to be taken more radically as the return to the identity of being and nothing (the existence of the determinate rational consciousness).⁴

¹ Compare *NKA*, vii. 3, 15-4, 6 and 175, 3-4.

² *TW-A*, iv. 11-12 (sect. 12). Of course he may have adopted the title 'Ontological Logic' (*ibid.*, p. 12, sect. 15) at once. What he *called* the first part of Logic is less important than the fact that it supplied a speculative theory of the operation of Understanding. (The multitude of Hegel interpreters who never tire of insisting on the fundamental significance of the *antithesis* between *Vernunft* and *Verstand* should ponder Hegel's comment in the *Wastebook* (46): 'The barbarian . . . is frightened of understanding and stays with intuition. Reason without understanding is nothing, while understanding is still something even without Reason. One cannot make a gift of it.' (Rosenkranz, p. 546; *LPP*, iii. 1979, p. 3, no. 5).)

³ *NKA*, viii. 3, 3-4; cf. vii. 177, 7-11.

⁴ Cf. *NKA*, vii. 161, 25-173, 30.

The aether is characterized objectively as 'absolute elasticity' and further as 'uncloudable transparency'. Unlike Aristotle's prime matter, it is an active potentiality. It is the unity of intellect and thing, not 'prime' but 'absolute' matter, matter that can *give itself form*. The concept is the same as that which we met in 1804, but all the theological language is gone. If we can trust Rosenkranz—and I believe we can—the metaphors have gone over into the 'Metaphysics'.¹ They are appropriate to the fullness of logical development, but now that the aether realizes the immediacy of 'Pure Being = Nothing' (not the self-conscious Infinite of Cognition) they would be quite misleading at the beginning of natural philosophy.² This stripped down treatment of the aether is exactly paralleled by the abstractly conceptual beginning of the Logic (both in 1808 and in 1812) with the identity of 'Pure Being and Nothing'.³ I think we can take it as conclusive evidence that the speculative development of Quality in Hegel's new Logic of 1805 began with this identity. The *aether* is the 'reality' of *Werden*; the equilibrium of this unity of opposites is the rational awareness of *space*.

'The *existing* aether is immediately *space*'.⁴ But the Concept which will mediate itself as the singular unity of genus and species is not space, but 'space and time'; and when we reach the transition from space to time, Hegel says that 'space is *immediately existing* Quantity'.⁵ The categories of Quality and Quantity evolve together in their experiential application. Real existence has two sides: it is for itself and it is for another. But the existence of space for its other (the intuitive Ego) does not here concern us. We are considering it separately or as existing for itself. That is how the understanding operates; and that is why the quantitative continuity of space is the first 'reality' of nature. (Things would be different if we turned our understanding gaze first upon the intuitive activity of conscious

¹ Rosenkranz, pp. 192–3 (Harris and Knox, pp. 264–5).

² The aether has vanished altogether in the 'Wissenschaft der Natur' of 1808. But this may well be because the audience knows nothing of it. But Space and Time are explicitly called '*daseienden* Abstraktionen' (sect. 99) and '*ideelle Dasein*' (sect. 98) so the logical gap that the aether fills is left open. See *TW-A*, iv. 33–4.

³ Cf. *TW-A*, iv. 13 (sect. 16–17) and *NKA*, xi. 43–4 (Miller, pp. 82–3).

⁴ *NKA*, viii. 4, 14.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 10, 19 (cf. 5, 7).

understanding itself: that is what we do in the new critical logic, or 'phenomenology'. Then qualitative variety becomes the primitive form of otherness or multiplicity.)¹

Space is that which, precisely because it is the immediate object of understanding, has no inside. It is essentially 'outside', and the consciousness that is aware of it, is aware of a system of potential external relations. Space *is*, in itself, *nothing*. But also as continuous quantity it can be determined. Determination begins with the fixing of a point, which both is and is not 'in space'.² But a point can only be fixed in connection with another. Its existence is as the beginning of a line (a 'beginning' which is also logically one 'end' of it). But not only is the point either beginning or end (depending how we choose to regard it); it is both at once since the line it terminates defines a linear direction on the other side of it as the finite terminus. Thus the straight line of geometry is the simplest model of the bad infinite.³

The necessary *context* of the line is a plane; and the context of a plane is a volume. Why the context of external relations should have *three* dimensions and need the fourth dimension of time in order for its 'concept' to be 'realized', Hegel explains in terms of the dialectical moments of self-othering and return to self. The concept of 'dimension' itself necessarily involves a planar surface. The line is the first negative (through which the non-spatial point gets *position*); the surface is the negative of that negative or the 'return of space to itself'. The surface is a 'determinate space'. This means, I think, that a surface can be intuited, whereas lines and points can only be intuited *on it*.

¹ I have arrived at this view by putting together the logical analysis of *Dasein* and *Fürsichsein* in *TW-A*, iv. 13, 15 (sect. 18, 24–7) with the distinction Hegel makes between the existence of the aether as Space, and its positing as intuition in *NKA*, viii. 4, 14–5, 17. (We should notice that hitherto the aether has always been posited as self-intuitive—cf. *NKA*, iv. 463, 17–464, 31 (Knox and Acton, pp. 110–12) and *NKA*, vii. 177, 31–178, 5 and 188, 1–18; it could only be presented in this integrated, and hence contradictory, way as long as the 'logic of understanding' had no speculative status. We can indeed, be grateful that the new logic enables Hegel to say clearly how the 'Idea of God' can be 'absolute Matter'.)

² *NKA*, viii. 7, 5–9. We should remember here the 'dialectic of Quantum' in the *Logic* of 1804 (*NKA*, vii. 15, 20–22, 3).

³ *NKA*, viii. 8, 6 and 26. (Taken together the meaning of text and marginal note seems to me to be clear.) As a model of bad infinity the line is also a model of 'extensive Quantum'—cf. *TW-A*, iv. 16 (sect. 29–30).

Determinate space itself, thus defined is only the 'limit' of a volume. It requires a context in turn for its definition. It is a 'realized' limit (and from it we derive the capacity to return and define line and point as ideal limits). But now this negative must have its negation in order to be determinate. Volume by itself is only the complex of all possible external relations. Everything is determinable, nothing is determinate. The determining comes from the negative which has withdrawn out of space, (i.e. from the intuitive activity which is in time). When that point posits itself in space, it posits itself in space *and* time.¹

With the positing of time we have moved from the logical category of *Dasein* to that of *Veränderung* (Change).² Existence in time is a determinate process of *self-negation*. We are immediately conscious in the present. But this 'present' is a moving limit. The self-identity of any real thing is the identity of what is there now with what was there before. But also with what will be there, since the permanence of the present as the past, requires its absolute impermanence, its non-being or future aspect. The argument is the same as in 1804 (I think), but now it is urged in the terms of ordinary understanding. 'The future will *be*, we *represent* it as something, we carry the very *being* of the present over to it, we do not represent it as something merely negative; but this imparted being falls outside it, it is a represented [being].—Its true being is to be Now.'³ The past simply is. It is completed time, the truth of time; but that truth is

¹ I take this to be the right interpretation for *NKA*, viii. 10, 11–12 (in connection with viii. 11, 4–9). The key is given in the marginal note at viii. 11, 22–3 where several 'movers' are identified: 'in the *spirit* the *first*'. Notice that Hegel tried to insert this note into the text (see apparatus for 11, 3). Cf. further viii. 13, 28–9.

² Cf. *TW-A*, iv. 14 (sects. 22–3). In sect. 23 Hegel calls *Veränderung*: 'the negating of the negative'. So in an ideal sense the logical evolution of space involves *Veränderung*. But the reality of *Veränderung* involves time. (The analysis of space in terms of 'the negating of the negative' is powerful evidence that the logic of Quality was developed in 1805 in something like the way that it is developed in 1808.)

³ *NKA*, viii. 12, 8–11. The development of the theory of time in *NKA*, viii. 11, 14–14, 14 closely resembles that given in vii. 194, 5–197, 9. With time we arrive at a speculative whole. But the transitions are different when we approach it from the side of Understanding. Previously we moved from time to space (with a leap which for the understanding is a mere analogy from *Vergangenheit* to *Raum*). Now we go from space to time by a path which has a certain matter-of-fact necessity; and we arrive at

possessed in the present. 'The present is neither more nor less than the future and past.'¹ This absolute or eternal present is time itself. The permanent subsistence of future, present, and past (as a structure) is 'the space that is in it', i.e. it is the spatiality of time. But time itself is motion, the real existence of negation and transition. In the permanence of the past as its totality, it 'goes under'. This is *endurance*, the model of which is the stars in their courses. Enduring, i.e. perfectly periodic, motion is the reality of space and time as a conceptual whole. 'The simple substance has dimensions in it too, like space and time, but they are dimensions which immediately have the significance of being just as much space as time.'² It is within this substance that our space and time truly exist.

The concept of 'endurance' as the unity of space and time, involves the same dynamic concept of matter as an equilibrium of motion that Hegel maintained in the textbook of 1804. But Hegel lets this come to light gradually. The unity of the here and the now, he continues, straightforwardly enough is 'place' (as changeable). But change of place involves all the paradoxes of Zeno: a moving thing has a place which is no place. 'This dialectic is just the infinite Concept that the Here is, in that time is posited in it.'³ Duration is the *path* of motion, the correlation of places and times. But simple motion in space and time is only the concept of duration, not its reality. 'Free fall' is not free at all, but only derivative and causally subordinate motion. The motion that defines a place (and a duration) is motion in a circle. When the circle spins on its axis, a volume is defined and 'mass is posited'.⁴

If the perfect periodic equilibrium of a spherical motion of this kind is 'immediately posited' then we have a perceptible or

Dauer (which seems to me to be the *integral* concept of the 'aether' from which the development started in 1804—cf. *NKA*, vii. 203, 27–204, 1).

¹ *NKA*, viii. 13, 8–9.

² *Ibid.*, 15, 12–14.

³ *NKA*, viii. 16, 12–13.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 22, 4. Just what Hegel's point is, in his argument from viii. 20, 10 to this point, I am not sure. But it seems that he wants us to regard gravity (and hence the *mass* of each body involved) as a *field* generated by 'free motions'. The motions have to be thought of as perpetual (as in Newton's laws). He does not want to use the concept of 'force' (which can only be analysed in the logic of essence). But it seems to me that he is trying to 'construct' it, by describing how a 'mass' must be conceived by

stable mass, whose self-sustaining motion resists disruption from outside. This is how it appears as a mass in relation with other masses. It is the resting equilibrium of self-sustaining motion that constitutes its *inertia*. Further motion can be imparted to the inertial system as a whole, but the mass is already a pattern of motions. The seeming inert 'thing' of sense-perception is an abstraction.¹ Thus mass involves both rest and motion, just as duration involves both space and time.

Matter becomes inertial when it is subordinated (as in 'free fall', or projectile motion); but the substantial nature of mass is what is revealed in the balanced pattern of the celestial sphere. The Newtonian method of reasoning from the inertial character of the parts of the Earth to the inertial character of the Earth as part of the Solar System is wrong, since the Solar System is not that kind of whole. The heavenly spheres endure; these motions are not to be compared with those of falling apples or colliding billiard balls. Rather they *teach us what mass is*, they show us how we should think about such experiential phenomena as stability and inertia.

This sort of lesson about theory construction is what Hegel was always seeking in the heavens. He appears now to have given up the belief that Kepler's laws contain an easily recognizable lesson of this kind.² But he thinks (for example) that we must study to see what comets can teach us about the necessities of the natural order, and the limits of physical possibility instead of looking for theories which will explain 'where they came from' (as if they need never have been there at all).³ The lessons that he finds in comets, moon, and planets are not new relative to 1804, but most of the speculative

pure understanding. (The passage was excerpted by Michelet for the *Werke* edition of 1842; so a translation can be found in Petry, *Nature*, i. 239-40.)

¹ NKA, viii. 22, 21-23, 10 and 23, 27-24, 4. These two passages are (rather imperfectly) translated in Petry, *Nature*, i. 245.

² At least he does not include the lesson in his text. But his continuing belief that there is some sort of lesson to be found here, is evidenced by the marginal note at viii. 21, 24-7.

³ Cf. viii. 28, 15-29, 18. We can see in this example that although Hegel's conception of natural philosophy is not incompatible with an evolutionary theory of the cosmos, it does not tend to encourage its development. The eternal world of Aristotle is the appropriate model of the logical necessity and possibility which is his primary focus of interest. (In the sphere of *mortal* experience it is a different story. There the evolution of the order that our generation inherits is a vitally important topic for our comprehension.)

romantic atmosphere of the previous year has evaporated. Being a moving image of eternity, the sky is for the most part full of illustrations of the theory of dynamic geometry. Romance has not vanished, entirely, however, for Hegel is willing to call the Sun the 'mother' of Earth, and the Moon its 'regent'.¹ But much has no significance, except to illustrate the range of possibility. No longer does Hegel find deep significance in the orbits of Saturn's moons, or even in the ratios of the planetary orbits.² But the cycle of day and night, and of the seasons, is the context of all higher development.³

2. *Shape and Chemism*

All Nature falls within the category of determinate being (*Dasein*). The 'celestial system' is the determinate model of the 'true infinite'. With the next phase—Shaping and Chemism—we pass on to the determinate illustration of Essence.⁴

The transition from Heaven to Earth, is made in 1805 (as it was in 1804) through the concept of *Light*. Light is the determinate existence of the inward force that holds the whole together, or the manifestation of simple force. Its relation to gravity is hard to state, but it appears that Hegel regards light as the showing forth of 'free force'. It is the 'totality' of the aether (which is polarized into the existing bodily units of the system).⁵ Thus it has its proper focus in the Sun. We have

¹ *NKA*, viii. 31, 20. What these names signify in the context of an *understanding* appreciation of the heavens is not yet clear (see below, pp. 433–4 and nn.). For the 'lessons' cf. the discussion above, Ch. VI, pp. 248–9, with Petry, i. 277, 31–279, 5. (Most of this is from the Jena MS. But anyone who reads Michelet's continuous text in Petry's translation, where the earlier and later strata are distinguished by the typeface, will see how little difference there is from this time forward, in the aims and methods of Hegel's discussion.)

² That the planetary orbit is eccentric, that its centre moves, shows forth the ontologically primitive status of motion, and foreshadows the ultimate significance of individual freedom—viii. 32, 10–24. But the number of satellites is accidental, viii. 32, 3–6. The Bode series is simply not referred to.

³ *NKA*, viii. 33, 16–34, 12 (Petry, i. 279, 39–280, 24).

⁴ Cf. *TW-A*, iv. 17–21 (sects. 33–53). The one seeming difficulty with my hypothetical parallel—the clear reference to 'force' at *NKA*, viii. 23—is actually a confirmation of it. For the force alluded to is that of 'attraction and repulsion' (viii. 21); and 'attraction and repulsion' belong to the Logic of Being (*TW-A*, iv. 15, sect. 26) even though the concept of force proper belongs to Essence (*TW-A*, iv. 19, sects. 43–5). 'Force proper' involves a *manifestation* that depends on polarized complementarity. Thus it is essentially 'chemical'.

⁵ *NKA*, viii. 34, 17–36, 2. (Most of this passage is translated in Petry, ii. 12, 1–13, 8. Michelet cut out a few clauses, particularly the remark that light is 'not the

here the final explication of the claim in the *Dissertation* that the true physics would show that the centre of the system of motion was necessarily the light source.¹

As against this ideal manifestation, gravity itself is the reality of force exerted upon an opposed centre. Gravity is the medium in which inert bodies exist. It is force as conceived by the understanding, (whereas light is force as conceived by Reason). Strictly speaking gravity brings everything to rest, whereas their life is motion. Light is the 'source of life but not life itself'; and it is 'absolute velocity'.²

Thus, when we pass to the phenomena of finite mechanics we are in the proper sphere of the Understanding. The principle of motion is now an external one: the gravitational force of the Earth; and the goal of all such finite motion is to come to rest. In 'free fall', the law of acceleration is the same for all bodies, because it is only their being subordinate that counts. In this logical respect all are equal, whether big or small, heavy or light.³ But in projectile motion, which goes against this general subordination, the magnitude of the motion is a product of the force of the throw and the weight of the mass thrown. Gravity operates with its indifferent *general* force on all projectiles, causing them to fall while they are also moving with this *specific* acceleration.⁴

In Hegel's mature Philosophy of Nature this straightforward recital of the facts of finite mechanics becomes the prelude to celestial mechanics; and one cannot help feeling that it does properly belong to the 'logic of understanding'

immediate purity of the aether, but the aether as *totality* and as *being within itself* as against itself as determinately existing'.)

¹ *Erste Druckschriften*, p. 386; cf. *NKA*, vii. 218, 10–30 and the discussion in Ch. VI, p. 248, above.

² *NKA*, viii. 35, 19–20; 36, 13–14; and 37, 7. Hegel says 'gravity is the understanding' (37, 2). This is just a way of saying that it is the medium in which finite bodies exist; also that it stills or freezes motion.

³ *NKA*, viii. 38, 24–39, 22.

⁴ *NKA*, viii. 40, 12–17 (Petry, i. 253, 6–12). Petry classifies this as one of Hegel's relatively few empirical mistakes (i. 49.) But I think it is Petry who has mistaken what Hegel means. The return to the universal, is the return to Earth. All projectile motion 'becomes mere fall' in that the projectile *lands* somewhere. Hegel's expression is clumsy in the eyes of one who thinks in terms of the Newtonian composition of forces. But Hegel is refusing to do that; and in any case, whether his expression is clumsy or not, there is nothing mistaken about his empirical beliefs. (Cf. the last sentence of the next paragraph, viii. 41, 5–10; Petry, i. 253, 22–6.)

But in 1805/6 Hegel treats finite gravity as the manifestation of an *occult* force, and hence as the first appearance (a mere *Schein* in the language of the 1812 *Logic*) of force proper, or of the concept as an inward essence—the noumenal unity which explains the diverse phenomena of falling, throwing, pendulum swinging, etc.¹

Fall ends in rest through impact; and impact reveals the differential elasticity of bodies. Elasticity is the continuum of the most directly solicited aspect of essence. This is the scale of 'absolute gravity or absolute force' because the compression of the yielding body makes it more dense, and with its elastic rebound it becomes momentarily less dense.² This specific response of bodies in their universal mechanical relationships is their *Tone*. Now that he has a hidden essence to deal with, Hegel's metaphors and analogies begin to fly. A thing's tone is the 'seed of its life', it is 'axial rotation or restless light'.³ Phenomenal elasticity, reveals the essential inward 'fluidity' of matter. This inward fluidity expressed as a conceptual continuum is specific gravity. Every different kind of matter has a gravity that can be fixed on the scale. Hegel has now decided that this concept of the real fluidity of matter is what was referred to as 'universal cohesion' in Schelling's *Darstellung*.⁴ The degree of inward fluidity of a substance is its 'inner *Gestalt*'. (Thus water, to take the model case of explicit fluidity, gains a proper *tone* when it becomes ice.) Brittleness and malleability are different degrees of 'fluidity', and will give different ranges of 'tone'.

Water is itself fluid—and hence 'shapeless': air and fire represent higher degrees on the scale of free fluidity. In the scale of fixed or 'shaped' fluidity we must do things—such as pounding—in order to discriminate different degrees.⁵

¹ Cf. (in support of this claim) *NKA*, viii. 41, 22–4.

² *NKA*, viii. 43, 15–44, 14. (The crucial sentences—except for the phrase 'absolute gravity, absolute force'—were excerpted by Michelet, see Petry, i. 247, 22–8.)

³ *NKA*, viii. 46, 5–7. (Note the difference between these metaphors and the earlier comment that 'time is the simple soul of the world'—viii. 18, 6–7; Petry, i. 239, 17. The whole meaning of that earlier metaphor can be cashed out in terms of our direct experience of time. The way everything that can happen is in time is there offered to us as a clue to the less obvious truth that 'the concept is the true soul of the world'.)

⁴ *NKA*, viii. 47, 23–48, 14. (Michelet lifted a sentence from this paragraph—Petry, ii. 62, 20–2—and inserted it into quite a different theoretical context. For the context of the present discussion cf. Ch. VI, pp. 255–7.)

⁵ *NKA*, viii. 49, 3–23. The context for which Michelet borrowed two sentences of this—Petry, ii. 65, 30–6—is fully concordant with Hegel's Jena views.

Hegel regards magnetism as a manifestation of how fluidity moves down the scale towards shape; as a self-organizing power of matter, magnetism is its 'subject-being'.¹ Magnetism is the first (linear) dimension of subjectivity. The Earth is a magnet with a variable axis. It does not behave like a finite magnet, in that its force is felt everywhere equally, but it is axially oriented.² 'Force', in Hegel's understanding of it, is a *theoretical* concept not an observable datum. This is well illustrated when he remarks that it is 'the business of the physicist to discover and display the identity of the *Begriff* as identity of phenomena'.³ His general conception of gravity becoming 'fluid' in specific gravity and 'self-shaping' in magnetism is an attempt to fulfil this duty.⁴ At the base of his interpretation of the phenomena is 'the still life-principle peculiar to nature which expounds itself without deeds, and from whose formations one can only say that it is there'.⁵ This concept of the Earth's gravity as 'fluid' and 'self-shaping' comes to its final fruition in Hegel's geology. But magnetism is not yet purposive, as Hegel takes the formation of crystals to be.⁶ The formation of crystals and of fossils is the highest manifestation of the Earth's self-shaping power. (But to fossils we must return later. They are not explicable in terms of 'specific gravity'.)⁷

From magnetism, Hegel passes to static electricity. This represents a conceptual advance, because now the poles of force are separate 'shapes', and the phenomenon transcends 'shape' altogether. Here light is born again from the dark opacity of solid matter.⁸ Static electricity (along with acoustic

¹ *NKA*, viii. 52, 25 (cf. Petry, ii. 100, 20-1. This may be an unnoted use of the Jena MS by Michelet). This attempt to deal with magnetism is something new, in relation to the theory of 1804. But it represents a return to the shared concerns of Hegel and Schelling in the earlier Jena years.

² *NKA*, viii. 53, 2-23. (Excerpted by Michelet, see Petry, ii. 103, 20-9 and 104, 21-4.)

³ *NKA*, viii. 54, 9-10.

⁴ The variations of pendular behaviour seem to Hegel to confirm his 'fluid' approach and militate against the 'composition of forces' approach. (*NKA*, viii. 54, 19-55, 15; Petry, ii. 106, 1-18).

⁵ *NKA*, viii. 56, 16-18 (Petry, ii. 113, 24-5).

⁶ *NKA*, viii. 56, 22-57, 10 (Petry, ii. 114, 6-10, 12-20).

⁷ *NKA*, viii. 57, 16-23 (Petry, ii. 115, 39-116, 5).

⁸ *NKA*, viii. 57, 25-59, 12 (viii. 58, 3-59, 7 is in Petry, ii. 166, 12-26 and 176, 34-177, 4).

phenomena) fits neatly into the framework of Hegel's theory of gravity as an inward tension (or tone) of matter.

With friction and the electric spark we have not only light, however, but heat also. Light, heat, and the chemical elements are all of them, in Hegel's theoretical construction, aspects or moments of the one substance, *Fire*. The living force of this substance reveals itself, first, in the way that the 'tone' of things is affected by heat. Heat is the 'forceful *Daseyn*' of this Heracleitean fire, 'or purely material force'.¹ By calling it 'material' Hegel means, I think, to insist on its *identity* with the matter that it is in. He takes heat to be not a 'stuff' in itself but a force that flows through the matter that it operates on (and all matter is always in tension, so that heat is an *increasing* tension).

If we compare the definition of heat given in 1804: 'The concept of the fluid which has realized itself, i.e. [realized] the way in which it is against shape and frees its moments, giving them subsistence, is heat, so that heat-stuff has rightly been [re]cognized as the imponderable base, the immaterial matter of the determinacies',² with the approach in 1805, it is evident that Hegel was here making another attempt to isolate what was correct in the widely accepted hypothesis of 'heat-stuff'. In the Berlin *Encyclopaedia* he says roundly that 'the experiments of Rumford on the heating of bodies by friction (in the boring of cannon for example) could long ago have completely banished the *Vorstellung* of the specific independent existence of heat; here it is demonstrated beyond all dispute, purely in its origin and nature as a *modal condition* (*Zustandsweise*).'³ This was his view on the ontological or substantial question all along, but in the *Encyclopaedia* he found almost *no* virtue in the 'heat-stuff' theory, except that 'the abstract *Vorstellung* of matter contains explicitly (*für sich*) the determination of *continuity*, which is the possibility of transmission, and *qua* activity the actuality of the same'.⁴

¹ NKA, viii. 59, 18–19.

² Ibid., vii. 257, 29–258, 2. (This definition is offered in the course of Hegel's discussion of the atmospheric process. The 'determinacies' are the modes of existence of air—mephitic, superphlogisticated, dephlogisticated, and fixed; cf. Ch. VI, p. 258, above.

³ *Encyclopädie*, ii. 304, Anmerkung (cf. Petry, ii. 85).

⁴ Loc. cit. (cf. Miller's translation, p. 150. Miller's translation is at this point much closer, and the continuity with the doctrine of 1804 is more evident).

Finally he reaffirms the definition of 1804: 'this implicit (*ansichseiende*) continuity becomes activity as negation against form,—specific gravity and cohesion, as [these exist] from now on, against shape.'¹

Because the 1805 manuscript represents a tentative step further in the appreciation of an opposed view, an exposed position from which Hegel subsequently withdrew, nothing from this discussion of heat was taken over into Michelet's edition of the *Encyclopaedia* text and lectures.² But much of the detail of the mature theory was, in fact, first worked out here—for instance the theory of 'specific heat'. Hegel's theory of heat as 'material force' was designed to reconcile the general truth that heat flows from one body to another until an equilibrium is established, with the particular truths that every body has a specific heat capacity, some get hot much more slowly than others, some absorb radiant heat readily, while others reflect it, and so on.³

The burning glass 'condenses' light into heat—while remaining itself relatively cool.⁴ But the communication of heat between bodies is marked by expansion (which is indeed, a reliable index of temperature). The 'condensation' is the *materialization* of the force, while the expansion is the incipient dissolution of the 'shape' without which matter is not fully actual. Heat is not properly material, because it cannot maintain its concentration, it shares itself out. Thus compression can give rise to heat emission, and the striking together of different elasticities produces a *spark*.

¹ Loc. cit. Both of the translations are at fault here (because neither translator has studied the evolution of the doctrine).

² Hoffmeister lists no identified quotations (*Jenaer Realphilosophie*, p. 280). But see n. 4, below.

³ We can see from *Encyclopaedia*, 305, Remark, that in Hegel's view, this was what made the 'heat-stuff' hypothesis attractive. Anyone who reads the Addition containing his discussion of the data in the Berlin years carefully after studying the 1805 'Mechanics of Heat' (*NKA*, viii. 61–70) will agree with my claim about the continuity of doctrine. The transition to the mature view is clearly marked in the marginal note added at the beginning (*NKA*, viii. 60, 23–4: 'Temperature is no *matter*. . . Shape is *actual* matter, that *distinguishes itself*; heat, temperature not like that'). I assume that this note was made in 1806 or later.

⁴ Petry prints the sentence 'heat may therefore be concentrated by means of burning glass and concave mirrors' (*Nature*, ii. 85, 33–4) as coming from the Jena MS. But I cannot find it there. I believe, however, that it is legitimate to take the

All through these notes, Hegel is feeling his way. In the textbook of 1804 he stated a theory; now he is using that same theory to generate hypotheses. It is still the same theory, but he expresses it in 'materialist' terms (as far as possible) because he is now applying it to finite terrestrial phenomena, not just to the Earth's atmospheric process. He notices oddities (for example, the irregular behaviour of water which expands when it freezes).¹ But always the 1804 position, which he restated in his maturity, stood as a constant for his attempts at detailed application. Heat is the principle that negates shape. 'Specific heat' is the union of this negative principle with its own opposite to produce a definite shape.²

The 'chemical element' is the mere concept of *Shape*, the space-filling, airy potentiality for specific determinacy. 'Its *essence* is heat, heat-matter, its ponderable base, the chemists take it conversely as the imponderable.'³ The chemical elements have specific gravities and specific heat-capacities. But their existence is just their capacity to enter into the atmospheric process.

This process, which was the context and foundation of the constructive theory of 1804, is the climax of the theory of finite shaping now. Because the logic by which we move to consciousness of the Infinite is now recognized as the process through which the Infinite moves to consciousness of itself, the whole procedure of real comprehension is transformed. We move from the visible finite phenomena of heat as the material force transmitted differentially by contact, to the invisible process of radical chemical transformation in the atmosphere, and from there to the 'total' process of Sun and Earth acting and reacting at a distance, and of the terrestrial fire expressing itself in the weather-cycle.

phenomenon as an illustration of the rather obscure paragraph about the 'unity' of sunlight and heat (*NKA*, viii. 62, 18-63, 8).

¹ *NKA*, viii. 67, 14-15.

² Cf. *NKA*, viii. 66, 12-16 (where the expression 'heat-matter' is used twice and clearly identified as the negative, shapeless principle); and 68, 3-4 where the 'character' of the material is the principle of resistance in the theory of specific heat. Here temperature is *embodied*, it *imposes* shape by determining extension; but 'free heat' or 'temperature *für sich*' remains 'wholly negative'. Thus freezing is the negative of this negative, and so a shaping principle (69, 4). The whole theory is an application of sect. 43 of the *Logic* of 1808 (*TW-A*, iv. 19).

³ *NKA*, viii. 69, 20-1.

The atmospheric process is the process of the dissociated moments of fire. Hegel describes it in slightly more recognizable empirical terms, because he wants to pass directly to the phenomena of ordinary combustion as rapidly as possible.¹ But there is no change in the doctrine of 1804; and the advance of logic to speculative status legitimates the description of the transition from mechanics to chemism in terms of an analogy that we encountered in the 1804 logic: 'The immediate armaments [of the infinite cycle] are oxygen and hydrogen, whereby it individualizes nitrogen to carbon dioxide.'²

The real physical elements are the realization of this concept, or the 'mechanics' of chemism. Fire now *materializes*,³ it becomes phenomenally visible as one of the four physical elements. The chemical process itself is the real element of Air; and at this point Hegel acknowledges the chemical analysis of water into oxygen and hydrogen (insisting only that this is quite different from a mechanical composition of parts).⁴ Its chemical composition makes water the neutral element.⁵ Water 'becomes earth' in the process of crystallization (we must not forget that, for Hegel, the *physical* element is sea-water). The 'original' crystal is *diamond*, the crystalline form of the chemical element, carbon. In a surprising echo of the theological language of the Triangle fragment (and of Boehme) Hegel calls this 'the firstborn Son of Light and Gravity'—'firstborn Son of Light' is a title often given to the fallen angel opposed to God.⁶ Here it stands for the internal-

¹ NKA, viii. 71, 18-72, 17.

² Ibid., 71, 8-9. Hegel added marginally that the 'weapons of time [are] future and past' (thus identifying the corresponding transition in the primary mechanics of 'being'. In the logic of 1804 (NKA, vii. 37, 28-38, 2) 'the concept of the Infinite' has as its 'arms' the moments of the Quantum scale of 'whole and parts' (of which temperature is a paradigm case). (This survival of a basic logical structure from 1804 does not invalidate my thesis about the Logic of 1808, since that Logic is reduced to the barest schematism. 'Force and its Utterance' there follows directly upon 'Whole and Parts' in the culminating phase of Essence. Its place in the evolution of Quantum is taken by 'the bad infinite' (and the passage of time is certainly the paradigm for that).

³ NKA, viii. 73, 3.

⁴ Ibid., 74, 10-13. Hegel maintained this view in maturity (in very much the form in which Cavendish seems to have held it). Cf. Petry, ii. 46, 17-47, 15 and Ch. VI, p. 257 n. 2, above (for Cavendish's view).

⁵ NKA, viii. 74, 5-7; 75, 3.

⁶ NKA, viii. 75, 20-1. This paragraph was partially excerpted by Michelet—see

ized light which is the life-principle of Earth itself; and I assume that the recourse to theological language signalizes the fact that the argument has now reached the extreme of purely symbolic significance. (In that case, the most significant point is that the *Lebenslauf* of Nature now pictures the 'fall' of Spirit again—not just the 'goodness of God' as in 1804.)

This characterization of the elements is a logical 'process' only; a 'process brought to rest' as Hegel noted in the margin. The speculative goal is to understand the way in which the light-principle is embodied within opaque matter, or to structure our experience of the physical world as a reflected image of the self.¹ Hegel's theological metaphor appears to me to be the acknowledgement of an intuitive leap, an interpretive step which can only appear, at this stage to be gratuitous. The process of comprehension has reached a turning-point that can only be validated by the coherent pattern of the argument as a whole. As Hegel says of the title 'Substance' at the beginning of his theory of Relationship in the logic of 1804: 'for now it has only the significance of a sign.'² But in this case the sign-status is eternal. The elements are the brute raw material with which the marks that carry the meaning of the Logos are made.

The 'total process' involves the activity of the Sun against the self-shaping Earth (called on that account a crystal but one that is in solution).³ 'The sun is pure force' and 'its actuality is the Earth-process'.⁴ But in the process, the elements become

Petry, ii. 123, 34–7; but Michelet inserted it into quite a different context. (The description of the inner fire of the Earth-crystal as 'der sich in sich hineinbildende Zorn' is another echo of the *barbaric* myth—*NKA*, viii. 80, 21.)

¹ That 'the process that runs through itself' is a speculative theory of the 'divine light' is evident enough at several points in the text (esp. viii. 75, 1–2 and 75, 25–76, 2). But the point of calling light the 'soul of this being-within itself' (or of the Heraclitean identification of the living fire with the Logos) is only made fully explicit by the marginal note in which the 'mechanics of light' is coupled with 'Ego, pure self' (viii. 7, 22–3).

² *NKA*, vii. 39, 7–8.

³ *Ibid.*, viii. 76, 5–11. This is a return almost to the position of Summer 1803 (cf. *NKA*, vi. 31, 6–11) from the more restrained language of the 1804 textbook (cf. Ch. VI, p. 254–5, above). In the textbook Hegel largely avoids the topics of magnetism and electricity—and the 'self-shaping' of the Earth is treated only at the geological level.

⁴ *NKA*, viii. 77, 8–10. This is a model of 'soliciting activity' (Logic of 1808, sect. 45, *TW-A*, iv. 19) although the Sun radiates light spontaneously, and does not have to be 'solicited' to do so.

chemical abstractions—matter itself is in process of transformation; and the real element that provides the substrate for this is water. What is powered by the sunlight is the rain-cycle. The Earth is dried and its moisture disappears in the free fluidity of the air. The moments presented directly in the simple being of space and time, as moon and comet are here realized in the physics or essence of the Earth.¹ But at the 'lunar' core of the dry Earth, there is its own living fire; while the 'cometary' atmosphere is electrically charged, and discharges itself in the lightning flash.² The Earth's atmosphere actually produces both moons (aerolites) and comets (meteors) according to the terrestrially self-sufficient meteorology that Hegel inherited from Aristotle.³

3. *Physics*

Hegel does not break his account of the 'total process' at this point. But this much of his discussion is required for the understanding of the Earth's shaping and chemism. Now, in 'physics', we advance to a higher level of conceptual complexity, and descend to a more immediate level of phenomenal observation. 'The concept of the physical' is 'the absolute unity of the mechanical and the chemical . . . absolute unity of light with matter'.⁴ In this unity light is 'the pure self', and matter has no self, it is 'darkness, the unity of gravity and heat'.⁵ The two principles must come together if there is to be 'something'—for 'darkness is nothing, but likewise light is not something'. This meditation on the nature of cognitive consciousness leads to an impressive elaboration of what Hegel first said about 'Night' in the *Difference* essay:

[Darkness] is the positive, the substantial side, as light is the side of the Concept. Night contains the self-dissolving ferment and the uprooting

¹ NKA, viii. 79, 8–80, 20. This is a constant feature of Hegel's philosophy of nature from first to last. But here the logical foundation of it is very clear. The 'regency' of the Moon is explained here, too; the Moon *represents* the Earth as dry land; and the whole process is for the sake of the fertility of the dry land (81, 19–82, 4, compare Petry, *Nature*, ii. 53, 34–40). So it is right that the Moon should be 'regent' of the sea, the *particular* element of the rain-cycle (viii. 80, 3). (The beginning of this passage is in Petry, ii. 27, 10–20.)

² NKA, viii. 80, 20–81, 12 (excerpts in Petry, ii. 51, 12–14 and 50, 31–51, 3).

³ NKA, viii. 81, 13–18 (excerpt in Petry, ii. 53, 22–4). Petry's note to 53, 19 (ii. 178) gives a conspectus of the theories about aerolites and meteorites that were current at this period. Hegel was not eccentric in his attachment to Aristotle here.

⁴ NKA, viii. 82, 5–7.

⁵ NKA, viii. 82, 8–12 (partly in Petry, ii. 21, 27–8).

struggle [*Kampf*] of all forces, [it is] the absolute *possibility* of all, the chaos that does not contain a single matter in being, but even in its annihilating contains everything. Night is the mother, the subsistence, the nourishing of all, and Light the pure form, which for the first time is, has being, in its unity with Night. The trembling awe of Night is the still living and stirring of all the forces of substance; the brightness of Day is its self-externality, which holds no inwardness, but is shucked off and abandoned as [an] actuality without spirit or force. But the truth is (as it shows itself) the unity of both, the light that does not shine in the darkness, but being penetrated with it as the essence, becomes substantial, is materialized, precisely therein; it does not shine in it, it does not brighten it, it is not broken within it, but it is the Concept that is broken within itself, which as the unity of both in this substance, displays its own self, [i.e.] the distinctions of its moments.¹

The theory of the incarnation of light in a naturally dark, impervious body has little direct relevance to the theory of colour, which is Hegel's immediate topic; and so far as he finds relevance in this general conception of the relation of Being and Essence, it serves as the basis of what we can only call a completely mistaken decision in favour of Goethe's theory of colours and against the optics of Newton. (Hegel's insistence that 'light is not *broken* within darkness' is directed at Newton's interpretation of his work with prisms.)

But the speculative significance of the doctrine is enormous. We have here a clear example of how 'philosophy rules the *Vorstellungen* that rule the world'.² For Hegel is here advancing a very definite interpretation of the Incarnation as a 'fortunate fall' for God himself. All the tragic aspects of the Logos doctrine in the first chapter of John's Gospel are firmly rejected. The light *does not shine in the darkness* (and the darkness does not fail to 'comprehend' it). It is not 'broken' by the opposition of Adam's sin, but 'broken within itself' (by a double nature that is essential to it, a dark inwardness without which it deserves to perish, not like Jesus on the Cross, but

¹ NKA, viii. 83, 4-18. (Michelet's text was not word-perfect, and Petry's translation—ii. 142, 17-30—is somewhat free. He is not interested in the theological overtones, and probably not conscious at all of the revolutionary political reference implicit in the 'shucking off' of the actual outward form visible in daylight).

² *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 14, etc. (the 12th of the excerpts from the *Wastebook* that Rosenkranz failed to republish in his biography); cf. Ch. IX, p. 408, above.

like the *ancien régime* in the Revolution). Light must be thought of as determinate negation, a *higher* negative (*nicht etwas* instead of simple *nichts*). Nature is the 'night' of unconscious life that brings everything to birth at morning and death at the evening of its day; but that day is the consciousness that can comprehend its own birth and death, if it will only comprehend the night as its own substance.

Hegel is committed to the ontological simplicity of light (and hence to Goethe's theory of colours against Newton) for the same reason that he is committed to the ontological primacy of the Greek elements (as against the results of chemical analysis). He wants to conceive conscious life as a continuum of cognition; hence the abiding media of physical transformation, and still more the medium of perception, must be accorded the boundary status that they have for all phenomenal consciousness that can come to birth on this planet. Land, sea, and sky is the natural world that we have to comprehend; light and dark is the primary contrast in terms of which we have to think. These are natural boundary concepts from which comprehension—the effort to conceptualize the total context of our cognitive activity, and thus to raise it to the level of what Hegel calls Reason—must begin.

This phenomenological primacy does not give these things any necessary (logical) status in science. Light, like fire, simply does not have the character in our scientific understanding of it, that it has to have in order to fill the position allotted to it in Hegel's categoreal scheme. It is fortunate for Hegel, therefore, that he separated his logic of science from his phenomenological theory of consciousness. But we should not overlook the fact that the 'physics' of 1805 still has a phenomenological base. Hegel acknowledges that we are now passing from the realm of touch to that of sight; and we shall proceed in due course to smell and taste.¹ It seems safe to say that no philosophy of nature founded on *our* 'dynamic theory of matter' would proceed in this way.

The argument has here returned to the logical level of simple being. The immediate objects of sight simply are what they are. There is nothing implicit behind what is *there*.

¹ *NKA*, viii. 83, 24–84, 8 (Petty, ii. 160, 10–16).

Hegel's whole approach required him to say that immediate perception was a limit; but because he recognized it as the limit of a self-perceiving process, the qualitative limit became for him a simple being. Yet, because he insists that the body which must be coloured is already massive, singular, elastic, specifically heated, and so on, we must grant that there is room in his physics for a conceptual theory of colour.¹ All that stands in the way of it is Hegel's commitment to the ontological simplicity of light. His conceptual theory *could* have absorbed Newtonian optics as readily as it absorbed Newtonian mechanics.

Hegel's view, however, is that the prism does not break light up into parts. Being itself a solid body penetrated by light in the right way, the prism allows light to combine with darkness in differential degrees and so to display itself as colour. Hegel sees this not as a diminution or breaking of light, but as a revelation of its totality. The prism is not offering resistance, but soliciting the force of light to reveal itself.² That colour is a combination of light with darkness is shown by the fact that every body must have some colour if it is not completely translucent. That the physical range of colour should be conceived as a scale between opposites, is logical because it is the appearance of the 'tone' of the object, the tension of its specific gravity determined by its temperature.³

According to Hegel's theory, yellow is the primary colour that has white and black as its opposed moments. Red is at the extreme where light has penetrated darkness most completely. Blue is at the extreme that shades into black. Green is the

¹ *NKA*, viii. 84, 15–85, 4. Hegel actually says that 'Colour is *in itself* dissolved gravity etc.', which admits the possibility of a theory that would account for colour in terms of gravity, etc. But he immediately identifies the *an sich* here with the *für uns* (or with 'abstraction'). Wavelengths, etc. would never be primary realities for him as colours are. And he has a better case here, than he has against the 'chemical elements' certainly; if we nevertheless feel that he was wrong it is because we are more absolutely objective idealists than he was—our very sense of 'reality' is dominated and defined for us by the 'idealities' of our physical theory.

² *NKA*, viii. 85, 15–87, 3. (86, 10–87, 3 is translated in Petry, ii. 151, 16–35; one earlier sentence—86, 6–7—is at Petry, ii. 150, 26–7). Hegel does not use the term 'solicitation' but this appears to be a clear case of it.

³ This assertion is confirmed, in my view, by *NKA*, viii. 85, 10–14. (Cf. Petry, ii. 152, 2–6. cf. also *NKA*, viii. 88, 12–89, 9.)

neutral totality. The four terms in this theory of visibility make a standing parallel with the invisible chemical elements; but some obvious facts about the physical elements are of more importance. Blue is the colour of the sea, and green of the fertile earth. The air—the essentially fluid, or chemical element—turns from blue to black at twilight (while the sunset is red) and from black to rosy-red at dawn.¹

The parallel with the chemical elements is significant because the visible terms, like the invisible ones, are moments of the physical reality of fire. Terrestrial fire is the manifest force of physical mechanics: it determines the actual shape of all the finite material things on earth. In the weather-cycle, water is the instrument of the invisible fire-process in the atmosphere; and the most important aspect of the Earth's 'shape'—its fertility—is produced by that means. But it is the active agency of manifest fire that causes the different types of earthly matter to go through their paces. The simplest range is that of the 'noblest' metals where only colour and specific gravity are concomitantly affected. Melting is a 'physical' mechanism; no 'chemical' change occurs.

For the combustible matters, on the other hand, fire is their *actuality*. Sulphur still appears here as the model case (especially as an acid); but the place of mercury as the symbolic metal is taken by gold. Hegel again refers to the doctrine of the 'ancients', however, and explains his own interpretation of it fairly clearly.²

As heat was materialized force, so acid is materialized fire; acids are the agents of chemical change, and bring matter to its

¹ I have asserted above that Hegel is consciously opting for Goethe's theory of colours in preference to Newton's. Neither of them is mentioned by name, but the polemic against Newton's *Opticks* is easy to detect. Hegel declares his explicit adherence to Goethe's theory only in the lectures of his maturity, but his interest in Goethe's work dates from the Jena years.

² See *NKA*, viii. 92, 11–15 (Petty, ii. 206, 34–7) and 96, 1–2 (*ibid.*, 198, 25–6). The doctrine of 'die Alten' is discussed at 95, 8–16 (*cf.* Petty, ii. 32, 20–9; Hegel may have ascribed the whole doctrine to Paracelsus in the lectures of his maturity, since Michelet has interpolated the name here. Whether Hegel's sources misled him—as Petty thinks possible, (ii. 256)—or whether he just forgot that he had himself added 'virgin earth', from his reading in Boehme, or whether the confusion was Michelet's, we shall probably never know for certain. But see Ch. VI, pp. 274, 278–9, for a discussion of the actual origin and significance of the doctrine. (In order to avoid simple repetition I give only a minimal summary where the doctrine is unchanged from 1804.)

neutralized, salty, condition, which Hegel now says 'coincides with earthiness'.¹ The 'coincidence' only refers to the fact that 'fire is extinguished' in both. It is clear, that Hegel still means to maintain the fourfold division of 'the ancients' and to distinguish the 'earths' which are stably neutral, from the 'salts' which are neutral products.² But he is here concerned with the combustion process—and this terminates when we arrive where the 'earths' always have been. On the phenomenological side, chemical process provides the promised transition from real colours to smells and tastes. The four types of matter correspond in their process (or finally in the lack of it) to four senses: the real evolution of colour can be seen in metal smelting, acid reactions can be smelt, salts can be tasted, and earth textures (indeed the textures of all matters not in process) can be felt.³

Hegel discusses each process category briefly, showing an incidental awareness of the discovery of the metals osmium, iridium, and palladium, and revealing through his own comment, the *organic* basis of his geological theory. The new metals were discovered in platinum ore residues; so Hegel assumes that they are 'metallic moments' in the formation of platinum by the Earth.⁴ Phosphorescence naturally attracts his attention among the combustibles.⁵ Regarding acids and salts he remarks on the distinction (which is crucial for his fire-based theory) between chemical and physical acids (i.e. gases and solids, the first being conceptual 'abstractions', the second 'realities').⁶ Finally he categorizes the earths. (This is

¹ *NKA*, viii. 94, 14–15. (at 93, 4–6 Hegel seems to be taking note of the chemical theory of 'oxidation' which avoids the postulate of phlogiston. On that view *all* chemical process becomes 'abstract' like the atmospheric process.)

² This is shown by the enumerative procedure which follows the account of process (esp. *NKA*, viii. 97, 1–11).

³ *NKA*, viii. 95, 1–6, 21–3 (referring back to 84, 7–8—the 'return to self in audibility' has not been dealt with. Hegel added a note in the margin about the ringing tones of metals, 95, 24–6. The whole 'phenomenology of the senses' was much developed in the marginal notes—presumably added in 1806).

⁴ *NKA*, viii. 96, 4–5 (Petty, ii. 199, 16–17). This offers a *terminus a quo* for the composition of the MS, since the discovery of osmium and iridium was announced in the *Transactions of the Royal Society* in July 1804, and reported in the *Annalen der Physik*—which Hegel read—in the first quarter of 1805 (see the editorial report in *NKA*, viii. 317). For the details on the discovery of all three metals see Petty's note (ii. 411–12).

⁵ *NKA*, viii. 96, 19–24.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 97, 2–3.

important to him because the rationality of geology depends, for him, upon treating the Earth as a frozen display of organic formative processes.)¹

This completes the account of 'physical mechanics'. We should note that the directly observable aspects of chemical reactions and products belong to the '*mechanics* of earthly fire'. 'Chemical process' which is our next topic, embraces processes and aspects of process which are not directly observable, but which are conceptually inferred (or as Hegel would say 'constructed').²

The first such process in logical order is explosion.³ Spontaneous combustion is the transitional process, where everything is visible; but with explosion the manifest aspect has passed into the more hidden form of what is heard without being seen (we cannot put it on a scale as we might with the reverberation of a metal plate).

The properly chemical processes of combination, precipitation, etc. are quite imperceptible. They require a watery medium, and a heating agent. Then the perceptible substances dissolve, and become for perception just one homogeneous fluidity. 'The body goes through the moments of simple tension' and 'heat is the transition from shape to chemical difference'.⁴ 'Affinity' is Hegel's basic explanatory concept here, but there is nothing novel in his discussion of it. He regards galvanism as a specific mode of the chemical process,⁵ and even calls it 'the image (*Bild*) of the organic process . . . the fire that begets itself from independent physical bodies'.⁶ The opposed physical bodies which are conceptually essential to 'chemical process' here retain their

¹ Ibid., 97, 4-99, 3. (Excerpted by Michelet, see Petry, ii. 218, 2-29). A fourfold division replaces a triadic one in the 1804 textbook (*NKA*, vii. 300, 11-301, 17).

² *NKA*, viii. 99, 4-108, 2. (It is noteworthy that Michelet incorporated nothing from this section into the *Encyclopaedia* 'additions'.)

³ *NKA*, viii. 99, 15-100, 14.

⁴ *NKA*, viii. 102, 7 and 103, 15.

⁵ Ibid., 105, 3-5. (This was a view that he maintained in his maturity. So the interested reader can find his views, in developed form, in the *Encyclopaedia*, § 330. But in 1805 Hegel has not got the modes of the chemical process into the order that finally satisfied him. He goes from 'fire process' to 'water process' to 'galvanic process'. In the mature theory 'fire process' and 'water process' follow 'galvanic process' (see *Encyclopaedia*, §§ 331-2); and the reader who uses Petry's edition will see that quite a lot of the 1805 'mechanics of fire' is subsumed under 'galvanism' in the mature view.

⁶ *NKA*, viii. 107, 9-11.

independent identity and begin to behave almost like sexual partners.

4. *The Organism*

It would have been easy and natural for Hegel to divide his philosophy of nature into three great phases: Mechanism, Chemism, and Physics. His theory of the organism is the totality or reconciled unity of physical mechanism and physical chemism; and the great advantage of making a break at the beginning of the 'physics' is the clear separation of these higher modes of mechanism and chemism, from the elementary modes of these concepts. That is why we have adopted this articulation ourselves, in the present discussion; and we know that Hegel himself was sensible of its value, because we have a fragmentary outline of the philosophy of nature which is almost certainly a preparatory sketch for our lecture manuscript in which the heading 'III. Physik' occurs near the beginning of what survives.¹ That topic is then subdivided as follows:

- I: Mechanics of Fire or Shaping of the Physical Body
- II: Chemism of the Physical Body
- III: Organism
 - A: Mineralogical Organism
 - B: Vegetable Organism
 - C: Animal Organism²

In his developed manuscript Hegel articulated his theory quite differently. 'Mechanics' keeps its place, but Chemism becomes the second moment of 'Shaping and Chemism'. The third phase of that is called 'Total Process'. We arrive at Physics half-way through the first phase of 'total process', but the first phase has no name at all (and not even a numerical status). The *numbered* phases are the phases of

¹ The outline is in *NKA*, viii. 294–308. The heading comes at the top of p. 295. Hoffmeister's articulation of the main MS was much influenced by this outline. But there is no excuse for following it in this particular respect since Hegel was so anxious to avoid confusion about his conceptual structure that he eliminated 'physics' as a heading altogether (even though he retained the subheads).

² See *NKA*, viii. 296, 4–5; 297, 5; 299, 1–2 and 5; 300, 5–6; and 304, 1. (The editors seem to me to have made a consistent pattern inconsistent by exalting 'III. Organismus' to equal status with 'III. Physik'. Only the subheads (A,B,C.) under Organism were actually underlined by Hegel himself.)

'III. Physik' in the outline. Thus the heading 'III. Das Organische' *could* be regarded as the *third* phase of 'Total Process'.

That it should not be so regarded—at least not simply and exclusively so regarded—is made plain by the fact that 'Das Organische' in turn, has now only two subheads. Instead of being phased as three levels of organism (mineral, vegetable, animal) it is divided into 'I. Vegetable Organism' and '[II] Animal Process'. These headings come after a long discussion of the 'Mineralogical Organism' (the Earth as a geological system) which has no heading at all.

One can readily see why Hoffmeister decided to adopt the articulation of the earlier summary (but change 'III, Das Organische' into 'IV. Das Organische' so as to give the theory of organism a *consistent* equality with 'Physics').¹ And we must admit, in Hoffmeister's defence, that Hegel was extremely erratic about headings and numbers in his lecture notes and drafts. But in this case there is a definite pattern in his departures from the much simpler and clearer articulation of his initial plan. So we must assume that they are deliberate; and we must look for a method in the seeming madness that caused Hegel to leave one very important transition unmarked altogether, and another one without its obviously appropriate subheading.

We can see the answer most clearly if we begin from the end (which is why I have delayed discussion of the articulation problem until now). The theory of the organic is divided into *concept* (the vegetable) and *process* (the animal). On one side the original unity (the Earth as an organism) is silently filled in; on the other side the self-conscious organic totality (the community of the *Volk*) is left for development in the Philosophy of Spirit. There is an important sense in which the whole philosophy of Spirit provides the reconciled totality of 'the Organic'. In that perspective, 'the Organic' is the third moment of 'Real Philosophy' as a whole—its other phases being the Mechanics of the Solar System and the Chemism of the Earth-process. That is the logical or cosmic perspective (i.e. the eternal perspective in conceptual terms, the perpetual, unchanging one in real terms).

¹ See *Jenaer Realphilosophie* (1967), pp. 79, 103, 105 for the crucial changes.

But equally 'the Organic' is, indeed, the culminating phase of the Earth-process itself, the 'totality' that 'total process' produces as its result. In this perspective it is the *individual* organism, in its finitude (its mortality) that resolves into the 'process' of the genus, which closes the cycle. And the eternal concept of that cycle is the perfect 'reciprocity' of the Earth-process as a 'mineralogical organism'. In this perspective time is of the essence. This, therefore, I call the phenomenological perspective.

Hegel has managed to combine the two perspectives, while maintaining the visible priority of the logical viewpoint, by the simple expedient of not numbering some of the 'phenomenological' stages. In the structuring of 'Total Process', on the other hand, he has insisted on the cosmic perspective at a point where it would be natural for the phenomenological one to predominate. For it is the phenomenology of the senses—and hence of cognition itself—that begins when we arrive at 'the concept of the physical'.¹ This concept which is said to be the 'result' of the cosmic process, is actually the structural foundation for the display of the physical order that follows. That order includes organic life but not spirit. So the division in the outline is appropriate for the philosophy of nature as such, but not for 'real philosophy' as a whole.

The contrast between static concept and process is fundamental to both perspectives. But whereas we shall meet it as the opposition between 'concept' and 'experience' in the *Phenomenology* proper, its purely logical form is the opposition between universal and particular. In 'real philosophy' it appears primitively as the opposition between concept and 'reality'. Thus in cosmic mechanics the development of the *concept* of 'space and time' leads to its 'reality' in the celestial motion. In view of the way all that follows is articulated, we must ask ourselves why this temporal order of phenomena is not called 'process' rather than 'reality'. The reason is precisely that it is *all* phenomenal, all manifest. This is the logical level of simple Being, where the only opposition is between the ideal and the real, the concept and the phenomena. 'Process' is the realized concept of 'essence'; it necessar-

¹ NKA, viii. 82, 5.

ily involves a dialectical relation between the phenomenal and the noumenal, between what is manifest and what is implicit. This opposition of 'inner and outer' is essential to 'physics' (including 'organics'). In the organism we arrive at the culmination of the Logic of essence, where the opposition of inner and outer is reconciled in the categories of 'Actuality'.¹ But the reconciliation is only partial. The actuality realized is the *particular*—the species. The individual organism remains a transient moment. Only in the theory of the organic as a whole (for which the complete philosophy of spirit is the moment of reconciled totality) is the logical moment of *individuality* completely realized as the real totality of universal and particular (the *Volk*) and as the concept that mediates between itself and life (philosophy). It is because he wanted to 'realize' his speculative theory of the syllogism, that Hegel decided to articulate his 'real philosophy' as one whole (Celestial Mechanism, Earth-process, Rational Organism) and not as two distinct wholes (Nature as Mechanism, Chemism, and Physics; and Spirit as Subjective, Objective, and Absolute).

The need for a double perspective itself arises from the logical necessity that every new phase in the evolution of the *Begriff* must carry all previous phases sublated within it. The 'Begriff of the physical' is a real turning-point in the manuscript of 1805 because the displaying of it in its real existence requires a logical return to the level of immediate being, and a recycling of all the categories at the more developed level. Similarly the concept of the organic must begin again from immediate being.² In particular we must initially recognize the physical totality of the Earth-process as a static *image* of organism. Geology does not treat the Earth as an organism—chemical process and universal geography do that³—but as frozen organic *process*. It is an image of the

¹ See TW-A, iv. 20-1 (§§ 48-53 of the Logic of 1808—the structure of the 1805 MS should always be studied in the context of *this* Logic, not of any later one). Cf. NKA, viii. 108, 13-109, 4.

² Hegel's way of showing this is to describe how the cosmic process is internalized in the Earth-process. The summary was incorporated by Michelet almost without omissions (see Petry, iii. 34, 23-4; iii. 34, 37-5, 10—all of which should be in the Jena typeface; iii. 35, 14-33. For the proper sense of iii. 34, 39-35, 2 the reader should consult Miller, *Nature*, p. 294).

³ By 'universal geography' I mean the general theory of the Earth's climate and

variety of life, and even of the stages of formation and growth. It is not the life of the Earth itself; indeed, it has to be static and inert in order to fulfil its real function which is to provide the stable inorganic background for life, the stage upon which the great drama of the individual organism's self-realization and self-discovery takes place.

Hegel's summary of the universal chemical process proceeds this time as far as the spontaneous generation of life.¹ His account of universal geography is a developed version of the notes of 1803.² The evolutionary history of the Earth he regards as certainly quite real, but philosophically irrelevant.³ I think he regards it as certain that all attempts to put the Earth's history together, must remain dialectical in the Kantian sense, i.e. essentially controversial without the possibility of making recognizable progress through controversy. His scepticism here is certainly much influenced by the fact that the dark backward and abysm of time is a 'bad infinite'.

There are a number of detailed changes and developments in Hegel's geology between the textbook of 1804 and the lectures of 1805.⁴ But I shall not attempt to follow them up.⁵ Only the treatment of fossils appears to me to deserve particular notice. Hegel takes note of where fossils are found, but he regards their formation in the earth as an ongoing

fertility. See the passage referred to in the preceding note and read on. (NKA, viii. 110, 18-112, 13; virtually complete as far as 112, 8 in Petry, iii. 35, 10-36, 32; iii. 37, 14-25 gives a fair impression of the rest, though most of it is from some later lecture draft.)

¹ NKA, viii. 112, 4-13. (I think Hegel's treatment of protozoic life in the sea confirms my claim below that what makes him shy of evolutionary theories is the conviction that 'cosmic history' is *in principle* beyond the bounds of our secure cognition.)

² Cf. NKA, vi. 137, 6-139, 6 (discussed in Ch. VI, pp. 281-3) with NKA, viii. 112, 14-113, 17 (Petry, iii. 23, 11-19; iii. 23, 26-24, 2; iii. 24, 15-25).

³ NKA, viii. 113, 18-114, 8 (Petry, *Nature*, iii. 28, 37-29, 3).

⁴ Thus, for instance, granite retains its position as the core of rock development. But Hegel now gives flint (*Kiesel*) (instead of quartz) with mica and felspar as its 'moments'—cf. NKA, vii. 304, 32-305, 1 with viii. 114, 20-115, 3. (He must have remained uncertain on this point in maturity, since Michelet injected quartz as an alternative to flint when he incorporated the passage into the *Encyclopaedia*—see Petry, iii. 26, 12-16.)

⁵ The interested reader can find almost every word of the 1805 geology in Michelet. Hence it can be distinguished in Petry's translation, but the order is much

process (like the spontaneous generation of lichens, etc., on land or of protozoic life in the sea). Fossil 'formations are neither animal nor vegetable, but pass beyond the form of the crystal as essays and experiments in organic formation . . . they should not be regarded as having actually lived . . . and then died'.¹ They are the highest expressions of a plastic capacity in which nature itself anticipates the capacities of the human artist.

What is lacking in fossils, is what is lacking in the whole mineral formation process: an inner, *self-expressive* purpose. For this reason 'mineralogical organism' is not the first moment (the concept) of organism proper.² It is only an external reflection, or picture image, of that concept. The proper 'concept' of life is a *self-actualizing form*,³ which maintains itself against this inorganic environment (by feeding on it); but also as a universal kind it maintains itself (in sexual reproduction) against the singular organisms which are its actually visible moments.

These are 'the two cycles of its antithesis'. The 'Kind' is the resulting actuality—not the momentary one, which asserts itself only to perish when its day is done, but the cycle that repeats itself from generation to generation. The bare concept is realized in 'Vegetable organism'. The two 'cycles of the antithesis' are realized in 'Animal Process'. Only human spiritual existence fully realizes the *resulting* 'cycle of its reflection into itself'.

The bare concept of life is a 'completely fluid interpenetration of all parts of the same' where each 'part' is 'indifferent' to the whole. The 'parts' of life are not like the components of a chemical reaction. Each contains the whole of life within itself. But the whole to which the parts belong keeps them 'bound within it', assigning differentiated functions to them. This is the concept as an 'immediate unity of singularity and universality'; it is life before its *Entzweiung*, its sundering into sexually polarized opposites.

disturbed—see Hoffmeister's 'Verzeichnis' (*Jenaer Realphilosophie*, 1967, pp. 281–2) for the original order of the passages.

¹ NKA, viii. 118, 6–22 (Petry, iii. 32, 16–33, 27 gives the context of the passage as a whole).

² NKA, viii. 119, 14–24 (Petry, iii. 40, 23–34).

³ NKA, viii. 120, 12–16 (Petry, iii. 42, 7–8; iii. 41, 15–17).

The ideal plant is like this. The whole Kind exists immediately in every part, yet the plant has distinct parts.¹ Any part, once sundered from the whole, can grow into a whole plant; but that whole plant has parts which it keeps in their place. Thus plant life displays what Hegel calls 'the immediate relation of substantiality' in the *Logic* and *Metaphysics* of 1804.² There is indeed a 'relation' here: there are no 'individuals' because of the perfect transformative power of the parts, and because every particular manifestation is accidental to the substance as long as there is some singular actuality in which the whole possibility is immediately real. But that one single seed is a relating-process between the earth on which it falls, and the Kind which it displays as it grows. *Growth* is the 'making fluid' of the fixed soil, water, air of the environment; and that 'fluidity' must be conceived as essentially tension or conflict, held in check by the integrity of the living organism. Every 'part' of 'life' as the plant displays it for us, is a Satanic urge to be the whole kind 'for itself' or on its own account. We have to conceive of life as an absolute tension of imperialism and anarchy in order to comprehend what its most elementary form (any viable plant seed or slip) can do and will do, once planted in the Earth. The Earth becomes mere sustenance for this 'might of negativity' that has 'abandoned' it. The Earth too is the *Gattung*, it is a partner in the mating; but it is the 'abstract universal'.

The seed, 'the excluding one', or 'the moment of singularity' determines what shape Earth's abiding substance is to take on. But 'In the conclusion [of the syllogism] of the merely organically alive, there comes forth the Kind in general, the universal, not as its own free actuality.'³

The Earth itself is 'the Kind' in this immediate sense. It can, and does—according to Hegel's belief—generate the most primitive forms of vegetation spontaneously. But all higher forms of plant life, propagate themselves as this immediate unity of universal and singular whose 'process' or

¹ Cf. *NKA*, viii. 119, 25–120, 3 (Petry, iii. 40, 35–41, 8) with viii. 121, 3–10 (Petry, iii. 42, 9–15).

² *NKA*, vii. 38, 13–42, 28.

³ *NKA*, viii. 121, 3–10 (Petry, iii. 42, 9–15 gives all except the 'conclusion' here translated. In formulating the 'conclusion' Hegel hesitated between the terminology of 'syllogism' and that of *Verhältnis* (see the apparatus for line 9).

'syllogism' mediates only between 'two universal extremes, inorganic nature and Kind'.¹ Both the Earth as 'abstract universal' and the plant as 'absolute universal' are individual. But the Earth is an *Individuum*, while the plant is an *Einzelheit*. Hegel believes that the 'types' (*Arten*) of plant life are partly determined by the soil and climate, and partly express the freedom of life as singularity. The *substance* of the real Kind is the unity of these two 'abstractions'. The Kind sets itself free or is unbound from the 'individuality' of the Earth as its environment. Thus it is 'reflected into itself' in a fixed way. It has its own essence, but the environment conditions it necessarily, because it cannot move, it cannot go elsewhere.²

This whole system of self-maintenance, which nourishes itself upon the environment which it reduces to the status of inorganic material, becomes only one subordinate aspect of the free-moving animal organism. The animal organism creates its own *internal* environment, it realizes the whole syllogism of the Kind within itself. 'The concluding proposition is that the Kind is immediately unified with the inorganic'.³ This is because the animal organism feeds all its other functions—all the functions of its 'inner organism'—upon the energy produced by its nutritive system. 'The individual [*Individuum* now, not *Einzelheit*] consumes itself.' Certainly the animal needs to eat and drink. But 'eating and drinking makes inorganic things into what they are in themselves, in truth, it is the unconscious comprehending of them,—they become thus sublated thereby, because they are in themselves [this fire-essence]'.⁴

That is to say animal nutrition is 'the self-intro-reflection of the inorganic'; it establishes a supply of energy for the 'Kind' to feed on freely. The animal's capacity for motion gives it 'self-feeling'; and its motion begins already with the competition between its internal systems (vegetative and animal) for

¹ NKA, viii. 120, 21–2 (Petry, iii. 41, 19–22—Michelet shifted this passage into a new context).

² NKA, viii. 122, 7–123, 21 (almost complete in Petry, iii. 42, 20–43, 16).

³ NKA, viii. 121, 11–12. (This is where Hegel drew his big diagram.)

⁴ NKA, viii. 126, 6–8 (Michelet displaced this passage—Petry, iii. 157, 20–5 ought to follow iii. 159, 4. The preceding context is all in order from *Nature*, iii. 155, 32 onwards.)

the free energy that its vegetative function releases. When he says that in its 'process of individualizing . . . the organic . . . confronts itself within itself, as previously it confronted the outer'.¹ Hegel is thinking primarily of this intra-organic struggle, of the ever-incipient anarchy that powers life's imperialism. Even when he goes on to say that 'the individual (*das individuelle*) comes therein, through *the Kind*, to its *breakaway* from the Kind'² we can interpret this to mean that the animal, by internalizing the dialectic of organism escapes from the plant's dependence on (and determination by) the great Earth-organism.

But this contrast between animal and vegetable existence has higher applications which fit Hegel's language more readily. In the first place 'the organic confronts itself within itself' in the mating encounter;³ and in the second place the language of self-confrontation fits the human 'struggle for recognition' far better than it does any brute need or instinct.⁴ So we must ask whether from the very beginning Hegel is framing his definition of organism in terms of the 'natural' development of the rational organism.

Two sorts of evidence combine to suggest strongly that he is doing so. First, humanity in a 'state of nature', and the transition from natural to 'spiritual' society ought to be comprehended within the 'philosophy of nature' because Hegel explicitly declares later that the 'philosophy of spirit' does not deal with any of this, but only with man 'according to his concept'.⁵ Secondly, Hegel drew a diagram in the margin

¹ NKA, viii. 127, 3-4 (Michelet confused the text here, by changing *vorhin* to *nachher*, so the *Encyclopaedia* translations cannot be appealed to.)

² NKA, viii. 127, 13-14. (I agree with Miller, *Nature*, p. 301 against Petry, iii. 42, 2-3.)

³ This is the natural interpretation for 'thus the singular unites (*zusammenschliesst*) itself here through the kind,—its universality, with the particularized (*besonderen*) universal' (NKA, viii. 127, 5-6; Michelet garbled the text here again). The *whole* description can refer to the struggle within the body; but it is the mate which is fully *besondert*.

⁴ This is what the final clause 'this (the *besondert* universal) is the one extreme, which, being taken up into the absolute Kind, becomes absolute particularity, singularity' (viii. 127, 7-8) looks forward to. (The clue is that the Kind has here become 'the absolute Kind', i.e. the rational one.)

⁵ NKA, viii. 214, 24-7. The comment is in a marginal note—presumably added in 1806 or perhaps later—but it *refers* to Hegel's procedure and assumptions in the text of 1805.

of his text, in which, rough as it is, we can clearly see that the agent comprehended within a 'circle of circles' is a *human figure*.¹

I shall therefore sum up the three stages with the human 'state of nature' (as analysed in the *System of Ethical Life*) in mind. As functions of brute animal existence, the first stage, corresponding to what plants do, is simple self-maintenance in the environment, staying alive, ingesting food and drink. The second stage is staying healthy, maintaining the balance of the internal struggle in the organism (this is what all animals need sleep for²—and plants do not sleep). The third is sexual reproduction, and the rearing of young. But we should note that Hegel himself says in his summing up that 'in the first process' we have '*Vorstellen, Erkennen* of another'. Now plants are not capable of *Vorstellen*; and animals do not achieve it properly when they *eat*, but only when they *look for food*; finally only humans are properly capable of *Erkennen*. 'In the second', says Hegel, 'being-for-self'. For the animal this can go as far as sensed identity with mate and cub; but for man it is what makes the 'struggle for recognition' inevitable. Finally 'in the third, the unity of both; the other and itself; it is the true actualization of the concept; it is the complete independence of both, wherein each together knows itself in the other as itself.'³ This is the exclusively human or conscious level. The animal can get no further than the genuine '*für sich sein*' of the Kind (not of itself as a *self*). But human *self*-recognition *begins* here; and the 'carnal knowledge' of humans is radically different from the coupling of animals. It leads on to the self-recognition of the parents in the child, and from there to the equality of *Bildung*. Even the civic union of the free men who have to enter upon the life-and-death

¹ NKA, viii. 121, 15. In Hegel's other smaller diagrams the human figure only stands for the rational motion of the syllogism. But in this larger one a human figure at the centre becomes the nuclear family (parents and child) at the bottom, as well as being involved in other (hypothetically syllogistic) ways up above (i.e. spiritually?). See the Appendix to Ch. XI for a conjectural interpretation of this diagram.

² Cf. the remarks on sleep in the marginal note about *Fürsichseyn* at NKA, viii. 126, 21–2 and 127, 17–18.

³ NKA, viii. 128, 5–11 (Petty, iii. 43, 27–35. The whole passage from iii. 43, 27–44, 2 is the conclusion of Hegel's preliminary definition of organism. Michelet has arbitrarily attached it to a muddled patchwork of quotations from several pages earlier in the 1805 text.)

struggle does not complete it. For the 'other' that is cognized in the first process is the natural environment. To 'know *nature* as one's self' is the goal which only *Wissenschaft*, philosophic science, finally fulfils. The philosophy of *nature* will be completed when we have comprehended the organization and functions of the animal body: health, parenthood, degeneration, and death. But Hegel is defining the 'Real Philosophy' as an integral whole in his statement of this 'result'.¹

5. *Plants and Animals*

I shall not go into the details of Hegel's theory of 'vegetable organism' any further than seems really necessary. But we must pay some attention to the 'conceptual' and 'syllogistic' structures into which Hegel now puts the theory, which he had already developed in its main outlines in 1804. 'Organism' is the concrete universal, the identity of the logical moments of universality and particularity in the singular subject who is a true individual. I say 'who' not 'which', because it is only the human organism which properly realizes this identity; but in spite of that Hegel says that the 'vegetable organism', being the *concept* of organism as such, is 'the first Earth which is as subject'.² In vegetation the life of the Earth begins to break through toward self-consciousness: 'The Earth as organism in general posits itself in confrontation.'³ Since my assertion is nevertheless true, and only human consciousness is the proper 'cognition of the Earth', the individuality of plant-subjectivity is hard to characterize properly. Most of the time Hegel avoids *Individualität* (and cognate forms) because that is just what

¹ What Hegel is defining is the *Leben* which comes to *Wissen* in the *Ideenlehre* of 1808 (*Logic* §§ 84–95, esp. 90–3; *TW-A*, iv. 29–33).

² In 1804, by contrast, he treats plant life as the 'first *Potenz* of the *process*' of the *Idea* (not the *Concept*) of organism. Hence it is essentially a 'bad infinite' (see above, Ch. VI, p. 287). But he does follow the manifest cycle of plant life from seed-germination to seed-production there, just as he does here.

³ *NKA*, viii. 129, 4–11. (The 'subjectivity' is the organic unity of the elementary meteorological process, which is the Earth's internalization of the cosmic process of the Solar System. It becomes much easier to follow Hegel's argument here, if we remember the identity of the 'absolute Concept' with the 'absolute Aether' which is the 'absolute Life-force'. This identity is not asserted explicitly (as it was in 1803, see *NKA*, vi. 189, 7–13) but it is certainly implicit here. (Cf. also *NKA*, vi. 105, 15–106, 5.)

singular plants do not have. They are just accidents of one substance (the Earth-organism). But as the first stage of its advance from substance to subject, plant life must express 'individuality' somehow.

What Hegel says is: 'The plant is the immediate organic individuality, wherein the Kind has the predominance, and reflexion is not individual, the *individual* [*individuelle*] does not as such go back into itself, but is another, [and] no self-feeling.'¹ The most natural way to reconcile the positive and negative assertions here is to identify the *Gattung* with the universal life of the Earth. The growing plant is something 'other' than this cycle of fertility, the 'force' of which it manifests, the meaning of which it expresses. But it does individuate the *Gattung*; another 'type' of plant would be growing in this spot if it had got established there at the right moment. On this basis we can even interpret the nearly direct contradiction that soon follows: 'The plant has as its inorganic nature this universal one; it is the individual Kind; [but *qua*] opposed to itself it is likewise this not-individual; and it is the process of these elements of light, water and air.'²

Thus the 'determinacy' of vegetable organisms, since they have no sense of self—such as the lowest animal form displays when it withdraws from an aversive stimulus—is only singularity.³ The Earth's fertility is individuated in this Kind, but even the Kinds of vegetation are indifferent for the Earth. The Earth is the universal force, the plant seed is the individuated essence. But the seed does not even need *soil*. It will germinate and grow in water, as long as it has light and air. Even as he says this Hegel admits that the expression 'good soil' has meaning. The soil is 'real possibility—[but] light, air and water are likewise the possibility of the plant'.⁴ For his present logical purpose Hegel needs to identify minimal conditions: and he finds them in a watery medium,

¹ NKA, viii. 128, 17–129, 2 (Petry, iii. 52, 18–20).

² NKA, viii. 129, 12–14.

³ In 1804 Hegel spoke of the plant *Gattung* as a 'Mehrheit der Individualitäten' (or 'Individuen'), NKA, vi. 193, 19–194, 1; 194, 16.

⁴ NKA, viii. 130, 19–20. (Petry, iii. 68, 18–23 gives some of the preceding context; 68, 23–69, 4—all of which should be in Jena type—gives the following two paragraphs with only one brief omission. But Miller's *translation* is better—pp. 323–4.)

the presence of light and air, and a viable seed. The seed will then show itself to have the 'universal force' of the Earth in which we 'mystically' bury it.¹ (In a water glass, of course, we can spy on it.)

In connection with the way light causes life to 'stream in' to the elementary process through the plant Hegel drew another of his diagrams. He drew this one clearly (crossing out his first attempt) labelled its terms, and attached an explanation showing its application to the plant process. From this we can learn definitely that the man-figure connecting a small circle to a larger ellipse indicates a 'syllogism'. Arguably, the circle stands for the Universal (the Sun) and the ellipse for the Individual (the planet Earth). The interpretation Hegel gives for the three terms here is as follows: 'this *syllogism* exists (*ist da*)—shaping is its becoming, [its] bringing forth through itself a) *root, stem and leaf*—leaf is b) singularity as process, c) is living wood.'² Thus the leaf, which the plant produces as its *evanescent* life, is what enables the plant to stay alive, to be the living wood that survives through the leafless dormancy of winter. This mediation of a self-identical concept (for the first and last terms are really the same) through the transient actuality of a substantial essence which abides whole even without actual manifestation, is what finally develops into the substantial subjectivity of the *Volk* through the mediation of the mortal individual consciousness (which falls back to earth like the leaf).³

¹ NKA, viii. 131, 8–18 (Petty, iii. 68, 26–37; Miller, p. 323). In his 1803/4 lectures Hegel noted that the seed feeds first on its own albumen, that it consumes water, roots itself in earth, and strives up into the air (NKA, vi. 196, 10–12).

² NKA, viii. 132, 20–4. (Cf. NKA, vi. 184, 4–8 discussed in Ch. VI, pp. 283–4, above). My artist wife pointed out to me that a circle was here connected to an ellipse as soon as she saw the drawing—without any idea of its significance. She also suggested that the circle was the *Sun* as soon as she knew that the context was one of plant-growth. This, however, was only coincidental since in Hegel's interpretation the sun-term stands for the whole plant, (not for the light, which actually enters the process through the second term (b, the leaf). That the first symbol is actually the sun is not so easily proved. In the main the identification depends by inference on the less ambiguously interpretable ellipse—the 'living wood' which the *Earth* brings forth. But also we should, note that it is a 'general' symbol—whose 'specific' application here is represented by the *line* (of the tree-trunk) drawn beside it. Its origin and general significance is indicated by the continual appeal to the Solar System and its elements as the real model of 'free motion' which is so insisted on in the natural philosophy of 1803/4, and only slightly moderated in 1805. (See esp. NKA, vi. 186, 11–189, 6. Also in 1803/4 much more emphasis is placed on plant-growth as linear than in 1805—see esp. NKA, vi. 197–200.)

³ But nothing is said here about this. So we are obliged to take the human figure as

Seeking the light—growing toward it even when kept in the dark, like potatoes sprouting in a cellar¹—is the incipient subjectivity of the plant. Hegel's understanding of growth, (the outgoing 'water' process) remained very abstract; his grasp of the 'air' process of the leaf was more detailed but remained very confused all through the Jena period. He thought that plants transformed water into air, and vice versa (a process which involved the direct transformation of hydrogen into nitrogen and back again).² He never did get it quite clear; but what mattered to him was to insist that the process was not merely a chemical one. He could not accept the accounts which stated the process as a simple exchange of oxygen and carbon dioxide because a chemical explanation simply would not do for him.³

The function of the root Hegel understood not at all;⁴ how the soil can make a difference—except that some soils admit air more easily, and hold water better, etc.—remains a mystery in his account since he obstinately refused to admit that the soil had a nutrient function. Formation and growth in water, culminate in an interaction with the air and the light through which the plant stays alive. Thus the whole plant is a

as a conventional symbol for 'syllogism' only. Thus, Hegel's 'syllogism' diagrams do not support my claim that the larger diagram must have a spiritual interpretation. (What makes that certain is the appearance of the human family in it and the fact that most of the larger circles and ellipses have been given a head and legs.)

¹ *NKA*, viii. 132, 17–133, 2 (cf. Petry, iii. 48, 39–49, 3, but the form of the text there is Michelet's). The thesis that light is the 'self' of the plant belongs to 1805; there is nothing about it in the lectures of 1803/4.

² *NKA*, viii. 133, 3–134, 9. Michelet did Hegel's mature view no service by mingling some of the wilder statements from this passage into it (Petry, iii. 86, 36–88, 14 distinguishes the strata clearly and gives all the essentials of the Jena view).

³ He must have come upon a correct statement of the facts somewhere before 1805, because he mentions the account in order to ridicule it (*NKA*, viii. 133, 9–10); even in maturity when he admitted that the process 'brushes most nearly up against the chemical' (*Encyclopaedia*, § 347 Z; cf. Petry, iii. 86, 38–87, 1) he continued to insist that 'the process with the air must certainly not be understood as if the plant took up something already prepared into itself and augmented itself in this way only mechanically' (cf. Petry, iii. 88, 6–8). Petry remarks that 'Link was still able to mis-assess' the respiratory functions of leaves (iii. 287). The important point is rather that Hegel stood by this mis-assessment although he was familiar with simpler views.

⁴ *NKA*, viii. 136, 4, 11–17 (mainly in Petry, iii. 80, 21–7). For the way Hegel hung on to the view that the soil is only a standing-place cf. *Encyclopaedia*, § 347 Z (Petry, iii. 89, 2–27). He gave much more prominence to the root in 1803/4, but not because he had any better theory of its function (see *NKA*, vi. 196–9, 204, 10–17).

system of self-maintenance and self-augmentation, in which (as Goethe thought) the *leaf* is the essential link.¹

Plant propagation Hegel regards as the direct extension of this process. The growing plant is a 'whole individual' but not a 'universal individual'.² In its universal aspect the plant is a mass of singulars—buds, twigs, etc. all of which can become whole plants, if given the right environment. Hence flowering, sexual fertilization, and seeding are only an image of sexual process. Even in the dioecious (separately sexed) plants 'the plant is not penetrated right through by this character, but it is only a superficial peak.'³

The fruiting process does not in any case produce a formed individual; it is reproduction by *digestion*.⁴ But flowers (and even leaves) are important for the way the universal displays itself as light in them—i.e. as colour.⁵ This is the real 'recognition of self in the other' for the plant. 'For the pure self [of the plant-individual] is light, selfness [*Selbstigkeit*] as objective presence [*Gegenwart*].'⁶ Plant life is a would-be loving recognition of Earth and Sun so to speak. But the tiger-lilies cannot actually see one another (never mind talking!) any more than Earth and Sun can.

The ultimate function of plant life is to be food for animals.

¹ The influence of Goethe is acknowledged in the *Encyclopaedia* (see exp. § 345 Remark and Zusatz—Petry, iii, 54, 9–13 and 58, 30–60, 5, esp. 59, 30–1). Hegel himself comments there that the *Metamorphoses of Plants* was published in 1790. That he attended carefully to Goethe's theories during the Jena period can be taken as certain. Anyone who compares Petry, iii, 59, 7–13 with Knox and Kroner, p. 261 (and *NKA*, vi, 204, 15) will agree, I think, that Hegel had read Goethe's treatise by 1797. But in 1803/4 he merely insists that all the essential parts are equally the whole plant—see *NKA*, vi, 197, 13–15.

² *NKA*, viii, 138, 11–15 (Petry, iii, 84, 28–32—Michelet's context is largely different).

³ *NKA*, viii, 139, 25–6. (Cf. 143, 5–11, trans. Petry, iii, 93, 33–94, 2.)

⁴ *NKA*, viii, 143, 12–13, 17–20 (Petry, iii, 96, 15–20); also viii, 144, 1–2 (which Michelet read correctly, and Hoffmeister misread, so that Miller, *Nature*, p. 349 line 2 is correct and Petry, iii, 99, 1 is mistaken); and finally viii, 146, 3–4 (Petry, iii, 99, 14–15).

⁵ The passage in Petry, iii, 86, 17–22—which comes from *NKA*, viii, 141, 10–14 and the marginal note (141, 22–3)—contains the heart of Hegel's doctrine here (compare also the remark about flower-cultivation in the *System of Ethical Life*, Harris and Knox, p. 109).

⁶ *NKA*, viii, 141, 1–2 (the passage in Petry, iii, 85, 2–5 immediately follows at this point but Michelet recast this clause to fit in with the following negative limitation).

Animals can internalize the organic/inorganic relation, they can live and grow, yet be free to move about and to devote the energy released through their control of the inorganic to purposes other than growth and multiplication, because they do not have to depend directly on the meteorological process for their nourishment. That is why Hegel reduced the plant-process to 'digestion' in principle. The plant digests the elements for animal consumption.¹ The fruit is more important than the seed. This is the natural relevance of the plant's sexual process (which is a superfluous luxury for the plant itself).² But the gratification of human sight and smell, being the result of the plant's 'air-process' and of its struggle toward the light, is logically its highest product; and the instrumental relevance of that is a spiritual one.³

The substance of Hegel's theory of plant life changes very little between 1803/4 and 1805. So we might easily miss the significance of the completely novel mode of presentation, were it not for the more startling transformation that it produces in the theory of the animal organism. It is not just that the organization is clearer (for sometimes, in fact, it is not) but that the principles of selection and emphasis are quite different. In 1803/4 Hegel organized his discussion of both plants and animals by following the cycle of development, beginning—in the case of plants—from the seed, and coming round—in their case—to a final demonstration that seeds were an unnecessary luxury for plant propagation; then he proceeds to follow animal development from the seminal jelly through to the essential sexual organization that is necessary for its production. Old age, and the processes that make death 'natural' form an incidental pendant to that cycle.

In our manuscript this whole approach is abandoned; and from my summary of it we can see at least two reasons why.

¹ NKA, viii. 144, 11–18 (partially in Petry, iii. 101, 12–13).

² The parenthesis comes from a marginal note (NKA, viii. 143, 27) which Michelet picked up—or more probably Hegel incorporated it in the running text of a later lecture—see Petry, iii. 95, 11–13. But Hegel was already saying this in 1803/4 (see NKA, vi. 205, 4–5).

³ NKA, viii. 145 (all the Jena fragments in the *Encyclopaedia*, § 349, *Zusatz* come from this page, except for the first sentence—see Petry, iii. 101, 13–22). Hegel does not himself remark on these spiritual significances. His own discussion ends with edibility and potability—and with a note on the distinguishable *degrees of realization* of the concept in different forms of plant life (viii. 146–147, 9).

First, the whole burden of the argument about plants aims to show that for them the developmental cycle is not necessary. 'Reproduction' is properly just multiplication by division, when the ever-continuing growth process achieves sufficient mass. The concept is whole all the time. Its phenomenal manifestation from seed germination to seed formation is just one incidental aspect of its substantial permanence. To attach fundamental importance to it is to be mistaken, and when one follows out the mistake to its logical conclusion it reveals itself. From that lesson one ought to learn to proceed differently. The plant must be comprehended as the concept of organism in its permanent (or substantial) integrity. Instead of starting from the seed in which it is not manifest, therefore, we must start from the mature plant (root, stem, and leaf—but not such seasonal phenomena as flowers, etc.)¹ in which the concept is fully manifest. Its 'processes' are to be comprehended from the stable 'existing syllogism' as the foundation.

With animals, on the other hand, the developmental process of individuation is absolutely essential. Many animal kinds die promptly as soon as their reproductive cycle is completed. The animal is not a standing syllogism but a syllogism moving to the definite conclusion from which a new one can begin. But here we can see the weakness of the developmental approach even to animal life, which is essentially process, essentially development. If we take this approach then animal development is only multiplication in time (by repetition) in the way that plant-growth is only multiplication in space (by division). Neither is a proper syllogism, since both are tautological. When we set out to interpret life syllogistically, we find that the plant says everything that needs saying about its conceptual foundation. So 'animal process' must be viewed as *going somewhere*, not just as going round in circles. Once we look at it like this, the fact that in mammals successful reproduction is quite distinct from death becomes significant. The existence of a time interval here may be irrelevant to the process of animal life (as fertilization is to the permanent

¹ Hegel by no means agrees with Hamlet that 'ripeness is all' for men; that is exactly what he holds about the animals; but in the plant world from which the metaphor came, 'unripeness is all'. Hegel's model plant would really be an evergreen—except that evergreen growths are not usually edible!

growth of plants). But it creates room for life to go somewhere new; and just as the significance of the sexual luxury of plants becomes evident in the mobility of animals, so the significance of post-sexual luxury in animals becomes evident in the culture of man. We ought not therefore to adopt the developmental approach to animal life either—even though development here is essential—because life must be comprehended as a necessary whole including natural death.

Therefore Hegel now expounds 'animal process' too, from the vantage point of the concept. The process is itself only a concept. Like the Solar System, the animal process is a *real concept of motion*. We must begin from a sexually mature organism and comprehend the cycle (which is not a perfect circle from birth to new birth, but an ellipse with a long winter) from there.

So the generative jelly that gets so much attention in the spring of 1804, receives only passing notice now as the 'slime' which is the lowest form of animal *maturity*.¹ This 'vegetable process' is properly classified as an animal because it *moves* itself. Self-motion from place to place is the differentiating mark of animal life. 'This relationship to inorganic nature is the universal concept of the beast.'² Once we make it universal, the universality of death makes independent self-reproduction a necessary condition of being a beast: 'it exists as [an] end that brings itself forth—as a motion that goes back into *this* individual.'³

The 'moments' of this self-moving concept are more clearly

¹ NKA, viii. 150, 5–10. The crucial sentence is in Petry, iii. 110, 26–7. It seems to me likely that this is Hegel's development of his view rather than Michelet's injection of a half-sentence into an alien context. To say that 'there are animals which are nothing but *reproduction*' (whereas plants which grow and divide are said to be nothing but *nutrition*) is only making explicit the doctrine of 1805; and to say that 'in them there is as yet no distinction between sensibility and irritability' (whereas in 1805 they are said to be 'Sensibility; like the plant') is only showing what the immediate concept of 'sensibility' involves—just as Hegel showed that 'Relationship' was *immediately* 'Substantiality' in the logic of 1804.

² NKA, viii. 148, 15–149, 3 (almost complete in Petry, iii. 106, 34–107, 1).

³ NKA, viii. 149, 5–6. (Petry, iii. 107, 9–14 gives some of the following context). We should note that Hegel has switched abruptly from the organism as 'singular' (*einzelnes*) to the organism as 'individual' (*Individuum*). The individual organism is the mated pair with a cub: Only of *this* individual can it be said that 'the motion goes back into it'. (The use of 'individual' in *Nature*, iii. 107, 1–2 is Michelet's fault not Petry's.)

identified than they were in 1804: they are sensibility, irritability, and reproduction.¹ The self-moving organism must, tautologically, be 'irritable'. That it 'has sense' is the presupposition of that irritability; that it 'is sex' is the result, the conclusion that involves both of the premisses.

Sensibility can exist without this development, for heliotropic plants exhibit it. Animals are properly speaking sensibly-irritable—according to the logic of Hegel's view.² More precisely, the beast is irritably-sensible or sensibly-irritable for the purpose of reproduction. This is the actualization of its essence.³

The theory of body-formation has not changed much in eighteen months. But the ordering of the argument is different. We begin now directly with the lymph (i.e. the internalized raw material for body-building and activity). This energy forms the (self-reproductive) skin, and the inward antithesis of (sensible) bone and (irritable) muscle. Bone is called 'sensible' in the minimal meaning of the word—it can feel pressure or weight.⁴ The skin 'which can be and become everything' is the 'organic activity' of both the sensible and the irritable system.⁵

¹ *NKA*, viii. 149, 30–151, 7; cf. *NKA*, vi. 206, 14–209, 7. The *Gegensatz* of sensibility and irritability is united in the single concept of *Empfindung* in 1804; and voluntary motion is seen as arising from that. That so much emphasis is placed on 'sensibility' as primitive (in 1805) is a direct legacy of this. But in 1805 'sensibility' is said to be 'like the plant', (viii. 150, 9–10) whereas in 1804 *Empfindung* is the presence of *Trennung* between organism and environment (vi. 206, 12–22). Hegel's position in 1805 is unstable. He must either return to the position of 1804 or move on to the one we find in Michelet's text. (On this option see the next note.)

² This is the only line of development that will save the new consciousness that plants find their self-hood in the 'otherness' of light—i.e. that they are genuinely sensitive to it, *sensible* of it. Hence I have suggested in p. 458 n. 1 that the passage in *Encyclopaedia* § 353 Z (Petry, iii. 110, 26–7) is Hegel's, not a conflation by Michelet. But it is necessary to emphasize that in 1805 Hegel says '*sensibility* is immediately reproduction' and it is only reproduction that is 'the unity of sensibility and irritability, i.e. sensibility is immediately irritability and vice versa' (*NKA*, viii. 151, 1–7). This is a relic of the developmental argument of 1804. Once we admit that plants are sensitive, it is *mobility* (i.e. a sensibility that is indistinguishable from irritability) that is distinctive of animals.

³ *NKA*, viii. 151, 1–5. (The crucial sentence is in Petry, iii. 110, 20–1.)

⁴ I assume this is what 'the sensibility belonging to shape as such' is (*NKA*, viii. 151, 22; Petry, iii. 113, 36–7). Also, of course, bones will break or bruise—like plant-stems—and this is felt as painful.

⁵ *NKA*, viii. 153, 20–154, 2. The theory of embryological formation is given a

Within this frame of bones, muscles, and skin is the real inner organism. This begins with the productive activity of the digestive system—fuelled through the mouth and inner skin. Through this ‘the animal heat’ ‘assaults’ the mouth’s pulped intake, first ‘infecting’ it with organic lymph (the saliva), then subjecting it to the organically chemical complements of acid and base (from stomach and pancreas) and finally to the ‘fire’ of the bile.¹ In this way the outer organism produces the *blood* whose circulation constitutes the inner organism.²

The circulation of the blood is the ‘Solar system reborn in the self’.³ In this rebirth the lungs are the ‘cometary or atmospheric’ moment, and the liver is the ‘volcanic or lunar’ one. Perhaps the most delightful of all Hegel’s fancies about the warring balance of the body (which is not such a fanciful notion after all!) is his claim that ‘the lung is in danger of going over to the liver.’⁴ Through the lungs we receive the universal life of the Earth-process in the atmosphere; in the liver we have our own living fire (hence it is called ‘being-for-self’); and the circulation of the blood is thus a

momentary airing here as an illustration of the identity of inner and outer—compare Petry, iii. 125, 22–6 (the preceding sentence there, is a marginal addition at this point).

¹ *NKA*, viii. 155, 9–11 and 22–6. The detail of the stages are in the marginal note. But since Hegel specifically corrects his 1804 statement in the text itself, when he says that ‘the individual . . . charges [the inorganic] not through immediate infection, but through infection as mediating motion’ (155, 7–8) it is not surprising to find that this note was a memorandum for the theory given later in the text (viii. 158, 11–18) (Petry, iii. 125, 33–6 and 125, 40–126, 7).

² *NKA*, viii. 155, 18–156, 5 (excerpted in Petry, iii. 119, 27–32. Michelet attached the passage directly to Hegel’s bird’s-eye view of the ‘irritable’ system—*NKA*, viii. 154, 16–21. So if we had only the results of his first editors’ labours to go on we should be forced to believe that Hegel maintained in his lectures that the blood was the ‘result’ of our breathing! It is a pity that Petry—who works so hard to defend Hegel in his notes, sometimes even relieving him of guilt that properly belongs to him—did not draw attention to this outrage, and others like it, perpetrated upon Hegel’s text by his supposed friends.

³ *NKA*, viii. 156, 1–2 (Michelet cut this out of his excerpt for the *Encyclopaedia*—but allowed its working out into a ‘cometary’ or ‘atmospheric’ and a ‘lunar’ or ‘volcanic’ process to stand—see Petry, iii. 119, 32–7).

⁴ *NKA*, viii. 156, 17–18 (Petry, iii. 120, 4–6). I suspect Hegel found a theory of tuberculosis along these lines in some respectable medical authority. But *my* authorities offer no help here. (The contrast of ‘atmospheric’ and ‘volcanic’ (i.e. earthy) process goes back to the lectures of 1803/4—see *NKA*, vi. 231, 8–232, 12.)

threefold one—its circulatory process, that of the lung (the arterial system) and that of the liver (the venous system).¹ The blood itself does not actually 'result' simply from the digestive process: 'it prepares itself out of the air, lymph and digestion'; and in its totality as 'the terrestrial course' it is the life-giving controller of all three processes in return (its own being the lymphatic process in which embryological development originates).²

Thus it is ultimately the blood that is hungry. 'The *Bildung* of [the individual's] blood is the begetting of desire.'³ The beast desires self-preservation; and is desired as the preservation of its enemy. Thus the *Begierde* of beasts is a Hobbesian *Angst*,⁴ at rest only in sleep. Sleep, says Hegel, in a memorable phrase is 'the night that is self'.⁵

Even the beast is therefore two selves; the one that is contained within the skin, and the one that is awareness of what is 'outside'. Hegel distinguishes sharply between the awareness that is for the sake of self-maintenance and that which is protective of another organism. 'The proposition of sense is: "the object is mine"; the converse: "I am the object" is the proposition of sex.'⁶

This is the 'totality' of sense. The purely organic or primitive sense is the feeling that 'I am'. Here there is no separation of subject and object, and hence no 'proposition' really. Hegel does, however, offer us an account of the object-consciousness that is merely sensual; and it is evident from the text that he

¹ NKA, viii. 156, 19–23. A line has fallen out of Petry's translation here (iii. 120, 6–10); see Miller, *Nature*, p. 367. Cf. viii. 157, 13–20 for the significance of the blood's circulation through the lungs. I assume that the liver governs the digestion process, viii. 158, 3–18. For the separation and characterization of arterial and venous systems see viii. 161, 16–23 (Petry, iii. 124, 18–27).

² NKA, viii. 157, 15–20 (Petry, iii. 120, 24–30). Thus in Hegel's new conceptual plan, pre-natal development belongs to the theory of the blood's total circulation. For the blood as the life-principle see NKA, viii. 159, 17–18 (Petry, iii. 122, 31–3); for its 'terrestrial course' see viii. 161, 25 (Petry, iii. 124, 29).

³ NKA, viii. 164, 13. Hegel is speaking of 'tierische Begierde'. There is a vague form of Lamarckism implicit in his theory of the consequent transformations of the skin into claws, etc. (In a marginal note he says '*Begierde* as such does not belong here' (viii. 164, 20)—i.e. it is a *spiritual* phenomenon.)

⁴ NKA, viii. 165, 7–13.

⁵ Ibid., 165, 14–166, 1.

⁶ Ibid., 166, 16–17. (Hegel is here articulating the *Gegensatz* of Platonic desire. Hunger and thirst are on one side; sex on the other.)

began by being concerned about how far the senses can be distinguished in terms of their proper objects, and from the margins that he went on to consider how far we can distinguish the parts of our own body in terms of their sensory capacity. He then incorporated the results of his marginal reflections into the text.¹

To characterize a *theoretical awareness* that is strictly sensory and natural is extremely difficult. The practical moment of desire is present all the time. Everything the senses tell us at this level touches on need and is 'mine'. Sense is 'the simple immediate, unity of being and ownership' (*des Seyns und des Seinen*).² Only in its self-expressive cries does the beast come to the boundary of really theoretical awareness (or so Hegel believes). The death-cry myth is trotted out again; and this time birdsong is ascribed to their conquest of the highest element, the air. But Hegel still insists, more soberly, on the desirous character of animal cries.³

Practical desire, or desire in action is easier to deal with. Nothing now has objective existence, everything is seen through. (Nervous system and brain are mentioned here for the first time, as the armoury of the inward organism for the conquest of the external world.)

Hegel does not say so explicitly, but this practical desire is endless. It is a 'bad infinite'. Desire is only 'satisfied' when the organism can satisfy itself. This is the true infinite of sexual satisfaction. Because of the tremendous importance of conscious complementarity ('self-recognition in the other') in his philosophy of spirit, Hegel is very much taken with the efforts

¹ NKA, viii. 166, 20–170, 17 (excerpts in Petry, iii. 138, 25–139, 7; and 140, 23–39). The text itself contains a number of reformulations and repetitions. Hegel obviously could not decide quite what he wanted to say and how he was going to put it. One reason for his uncertainty is the difficulty of characterizing the pre-conscious consciously.

² NKA, viii. 166, 20. (The seed of this emphasis on the essentially practical character of sense-perception is the abrupt interjection *Begierde* in the lecture notes of 1803/4—see NKA, vi. 208, 1 in the discussion that runs from vi. 207, 13 to vi. 208, 5. The sentence concerned was on an inserted slip.)

³ NKA, viii. 170, 5–14 (partially in Petry, iii. 140, 33–40, but Michelet eliminated the parenthesis about birdsong. Hegel says the animal facing violent death 'expresses itself as a sublated *Selbst*'. For the spiritual and the natural aspects of this topic see further p. 292 n. 3 in Ch. VI, above.

that physiologists were already making to trace what we now call the homology of the male and female sex-organs.¹ He takes a carefully literal view of what happens in conception, not offering any theory, and being concerned only to rule out 'chemical' explanations.²

'Thus the beast-organism has run through its cycle; it is now the sexless universal that is fertilized. The universal has arrived at being the absolute Kind. This is the death of *this* individual.³ What does this mean (setting aside the lower organisms for which it is literally true)? Hegel explicitly acknowledges that it is *not* true for higher organisms, whose 'death is the developed expiring of their shape' (*entwickelte Verlauff an ihrer Gestalt*). So why does he say it? Because something else exists now, and *this* organism is *dead for itself*. We have not an individual but a particularized universal. In what is clearly a preliminary outline for himself for the last stages of his 'animal process' argument Hegel notes: 'Death of beast, coming to be of consciousness'.⁴ Even for the mammals this is generally true. The pair defend one another and the young. Hegel has noticed and discussed this in 1804.⁵ But now he says nothing about it, leaving the separation of actual death from biological death quite unexplained. The only possible reason for this is that he wanted, especially as he got close to the borderline, to make the distinction between nature and spirit as sharp as possible. This is in accordance with the rigorously conceptual approach that he has here adopted, in place of the evolutionary continuum of the standpoint of 'consciousness' in 1804.

Hence, all that goes into the gap between the weaning of young and the natural death of the animal is the process of natural degeneration and breakdown. Hegel views *all* disease in this light. His theory can easily accommodate childhood

¹ NKA, viii. 172, 24-174, 4 (Michelet incorporated all of this discussion; see Petry, iii. 174, 16-175, 11).

² NKA, viii. 174, 4-11 and 17-26 (Petry, iii. 175, 13-15, 19-24 gives the text. Michelet ignored the not very conspicuous marginal notes). Hegel does not now refer to 'the form' as he did in 1804 (NKA, vi. 185, 9-12).

³ NKA, viii. 174, 12-175, 5 (Petry, iii. 176, 8-14 gives the context to this point).

⁴ NKA, viii. 172, 20.

⁵ Ibid., vi. 243, 10-17 and 261, 10-19; cf. Ch. VI, pp. 294, 296-7, above.

illnesses as arising from the instabilities incidental to growth, and epidemics as arising from the capacity of organic fluidity and heat to 'infect' whatever it touches. But he resolutely rejects the view that any disease of the Kind comes from outside the Kind. (He holds, for instance, that the organism generates its own internal parasites.)

This seems to me to be a clear instance of how he was influenced by the *wrong* side of Kant's critical doctrine, and by the intuitive rationalism of the whole Cartesian tradition. Instead of being content to leave open the question of what we can know, what can in the end be successfully 'explained', he chose to put weight on Kant's intuitive certainty about the limits of mechanical explanation. His whole attitude toward the 'spontaneity' of life rests on the twin convictions that there will, indeed, 'never be a Newton for the blade of grass', and that although as Heracleitus said, 'Nature loves to hide', she also reveals herself fully and directly. We can intuitively decide, as a matter of logic, what we do know and what we do not, within a given conceptual structure. Hegel made the mistake of thinking that it necessarily follows that when we have arrayed all our conceptual structures in a properly infinite continuum we must be able to decide what we can know and what we cannot. The fate of his assumptions about the spontaneity of life and the limits of the understanding, testify in my view, against this pretence; and if it is a pretence, then any belief Hegel may ever have entertained that the systematic standpoint of 1805 is *more* ultimate than the critical standpoint of 1804—that the standpoint of the *Science of Logic* is absolute in a way in which that of the *Phenomenology* is not—is mistaken.¹

The excesses of his theory of disease should not blind us to

¹ The reader should note that I am not asserting that Hegel's *Logic* is less important than the *Phenomenology*—or that the project was mistaken. The two projects were conceived together, and I have tried to show how they are connected. My own view is that they stand or fall together, and those who denigrate one in the name of the other must have a mistaken conception of what they are exalting. The Hegel of Berlin may himself have been in this position. I am only pointing to what I believe to be the root of any temptation to denigrate the *Phenomenology* that he was subject to. (That he actually surrendered to temptation has not, to my knowledge, been demonstrated, and I am very much inclined to doubt that it is a fact. But this is not the place to discuss that.)

the insights in Hegel's analysis of mature health and natural ageing.¹ Health is the dominance of 'fluidity' and ageing is a gradual loss of balance between the distinct structures that the fluidity has to keep in balance. Diseases therefore, must all be regarded as forms of this imbalance which the 'fluidity' of the organism can, for the time being, rectify. Death, in the end, is the triumph of *being* over self—of the internal environment over the life-force—and a consequent return of the whole to the status of elements in the great meteorological process outside the skin.² The outside environment is a causal factor in disease, because it can strain the organism beyond its strength. But natural ageing and death are the result of this continual strain between the internal environment and the 'inner organism'. The rational necessity of death can be seen in the very fact that sex is an outside stimulus which is internal to the Kind.³

Disease is the self-assertion of some part of the organic system against the whole, like a criminal asserting his own independence of the ethical organism of the State.⁴ Fever is a general symptom of the organism's measures of self-defence—and feverish sweating is the excretion of the 'morbid matter'⁵

¹ The account of ageing is what leads him to discuss health; and that in turn is a prelude to the general theory of disease (*NKA*, viii. 175, 15–184, 3 where the final sheet is lost; excerpts in Petry, iii. 208, 19–33 and 209, 1–4 (ageing); 194, 7–15 (health); 194, 18–38, 195, 1–9, 212, 7–10, 195, 8–12, 199, 5–7, 13–26 and 31–2, 200, 21–38, 201, 11–202, 6, 202, 10–15, 205, 3–9, 201, 4–10, 210, 1–6 (disease). There are some omissions but, when read in this order, Michelet's excerpts give a fairly complete view of Hegel's 1805 doctrine). The other Jena passages in Petry's text (iii. 194, 15–18, 199, 8–12, 200, 14–22, 201, 3, 207, 29–31) come from the marginal notes. The last of these is interesting because it gives Hegel's theory of *mesmerism*—which was not far from Mesmer's own view.

² The MS breaks off before Hegel gets to *death*; but what he said in the missing page can be inferred fairly reliably from *NKA*, viii. 177, 8–20 (see Petry, iii. 194, 22–9, but Michelet eliminated some sentences that are very helpful in this respect). At viii. 183, 3–4 Hegel says that death comes when the processes, disrupted from cyclic balance into a bad infinite sequence, run to 'the empty nothing' instead of returning to their cycle.

³ *NKA*, viii. 179, 1–6 (Petry, iii. 195, 8–12; 199, 5–6). The direct reference is to disease which is said to be the organism's 'mating with itself'.

⁴ In a passage which Michelet omitted (viii. 179, 6–16) Hegel compared organic disease with social crime. This seems a sounder analogy for disease than *mating*. But the equal independence of the partners in mating expresses the dialectical identity of life and death better.

⁵ *NKA*, viii. 181, 18–182, 8 (Petry, iii. 201, 31–202, 6). Hegel ascribes this view

Where our manuscript breaks off, Hegel is clearly on the verge of dealing with death. The extreme of disease comes when the organism is divided into two independent wholes, like the Kind in sexual differentiation. '*Individuality cannot thus portion itself*, because it is not a universal.'

There is an alternative theory of disease and death in the 1805 manuscript, according to which the living fluidity becomes a bad infinite sequence of processes because the cyclic *structure* breaks down.² I have followed the line which leads on from the sexual division of the Kind rather than the one that leads back to 'swimming in the lymph' before birth. The integrity of the philosophy of nature requires the second line of argument; the integrity of the 'real philosophy' as one continuously developing whole requires the first. Perhaps Hegel brought them together and reconciled them in the sheet that is lost. (Conciliation is quite possible because it is the 'animal process' of the 'inner organism' that gets progressively feebler in old age, and loses the control over the vegetable process of its 'inorganic nature' that it must retain if that vegetable process is not to degenerate into lower (though still organic) modes of putrefaction.)

to the 'ancients'. Petry (iii. 377) has found the nearest plausible approach to it in Aristotle's *Parts of Animals* iii. 5. But it is quite probable that Hegel depended on some contemporary medical writer whose report of Hippocratic medicine was badly garbled. (Hegel regarded even healthy sweating as an evidence of exhaustion rather than as a mechanism for temperature regulation.)

¹ NKA, viii. 183, 13-15 (Petry, iii. 210, 1-6).

² Cf. esp. NKA, viii. 183, 3-4, cited in p. 465, n. 2, above. This view of disease and death is the one advanced in 1803/4 (see NKA, vi. 259, 13-260, 4 and the discussion in Ch. VI, pp. 295-7, above; and it underlies the analysis of ageing at viii. 176, 9-15.

CHAPTER XI

The Philosophy of Spirit of 1805/6

1. *The Concept of Spirit*

'The sickness of the brute is the coming into being of the spirit' said Hegel in his lectures of 1803/4; and he repeated (in what was probably a preparatory note for himself) in 1805: 'Death of brute, coming into being of consciousness'.¹ In both cases he was thinking of the 'fluidity' of life triumphing over all fixed structures; and in 1803/4 he approached the philosophy of spirit by way of this higher fluidity as an evolving process. He abandoned this evolutionary gradualism in 1805, because it reflects the *critical* conception of logical method which he had decisively abandoned. Instead of 'coming to itself' in a process analogous to the advance from logic to Metaphysics, spirit must be presented as fully self-possessed from the beginning (like Athena). Its development must be strictly a logical one, the unfolding of a concept into a judgement, and the displaying of the concept's original identity with what has been thus unfolded in a syllogism.

But in 'Real Philosophy' this logical motion must at the same time be the demonstration that the concept is *real*. Thus the philosophy of nature began with a demonstration of how the 'concept' of space and time is 'realized' in the system of free celestial motion. There the contrast was the simple one of 'concept' and 'reality' and the outcome was the realized concept of matter as 'force'. In the next great phase the real concept of force showed that in its totality of syllogistic development it is the concept of the living organism. Shape, which moving bodies have to have, unfolded itself into the 'total' (or self-maintaining) process of the organism.

¹ NKA, vi. 259, 13-14; viii. 172, 20.

As we have already seen, the whole philosophy of spirit is logically just the final stage in the actualization of the concept of organism. This is the perspective in which we must see it in order to comprehend the 'Real Philosophy' as one whole. But Spirit is also a self-contained whole, and this perspective is ultimately more important than the comprehensive standpoint of 'reality'. Otherwise it would make no sense for the unity of 'Real Philosophy' to be broken at this point, and for the culminating phase in the self-realization of the logical concept to be given co-ordinate status with all that has gone before. So we must understand how, within the totality of the real, Nature and Spirit can be co-ordinate, even though spirit is only the last moment in the reality of the organism. How can the absolute fluidity of life, which the inevitability of death reveals, be a level of reality, not merely equal in scope with the whole range of natural existence, but more adequately realized?

The answer is obvious enough. *Spirit is the reality of the cognitive aspect of total process*; and cognition is the comprehending of the real in its universal significance. But this answer does not make plain what death has to do with the coming to be of spirit, or with the reality of cognition. Nor does it show us why all human life should be comprehended as spirit, and not simply treated (for the most part) as a higher form of determinate reality, a second order of nature. This was how Hegel articulated his 'real philosophy' until 1803, and we have not understood the 'real philosophy' of 1805 until we have grasped how it differs both from the consciousness-theory of 1804 and from the co-ordinate reality of nature and finite spirit in the quadripartite system that preceded that.

So let us look at the philosophy of nature of 1805 again, and ask now what is shown to be 'real' in it. In the first phase the answer is easy because the table of contents gives it to us. The system of free celestial motion is the reality of the *concept of space and time*. The concept gains its determinate existence in this perfect spatio-temporal equilibrium.

But what becomes real in the second phase? The answer is 'nothing'. Nothing in the terrestrial system abides like the celestial clockwork that filled the minds of Newton and Kant with religious awe. The *structures* are constant, but the

processes which maintain and fill them are perpetually novel; and as we advance toward the 'totality of process' the abiding structure becomes more and more diaphanous, it has less and less solidity and visibility. The meteorological cycle is for-ever novel, so that the weather has become a conventionally accepted starting-point for the reciprocity of conscious *Bildung* in our everyday conversation. But all the same, 'the earth abides'; and in spite of all our geological expertise our minds resonate sympathetically with the Psalmist's when he procclaims: 'I will lift up mine eyes unto the hills from whence cometh my help.' Our sympathy springs, however, from the consciousness which we also share with him, that 'we spend our years as a tale that is told.' This 'tale that is told' is all the structure that abides under the heavens. This is the 'reality' of Kind, the reality of mortality as a determinate negation. The concept which is a real being in the heavens, becomes a real negation of being in the 'total process' of life. 'Actuality' is very different from 'reality', since it is the direct negation of it.

Spirit is the positive reality arising from the negation of this negative infinite. The infinite concept of the self-actualizing Kind is a concept that can only have a reality that is not opposed to it but identical with it. The concept must now actualize itself in the real medium of concepts. The 'tale that is told' is ourselves in our mortality; but a tale is told, by and for a mind. If the mind to and for which the tale is told, can move from its existence as absolute process back to the comprehension of its structure as a being which is as substantially permanent in its restless motion as the stars in their courses, then an actuality will have been generated which possesses at its own higher level—the level of pure thought—the 'reality' which it *actually negates* in its immediate existence as process.

This is the concept of 'spirit'. If it is to be self-actualizing, then it must begin from the moment of pure intelligence that enables the Psalmist to assert that 'we spend our lives as a tale that is told.' It must be able to begin from the comprehension of *itself* as an absolutely negative process. This is different from the concept of 'what is' realizing itself as absolute

¹ Eccles. 1: 4; Ps. 121: 1; Ps. 91: 9.

motion. Now we have the concept of what *is not*, the concept of the activity that negates all simple being, realizing itself as absolute knowing. But in order for it to exist as knowingly capable of this self-display, what is and ever shall be in its infinite negative process, must already be for it what 'was'. Only on that condition can it exist and display itself as the negation of its own negation, and hence as an actuality that has positive reality.

For minds that are accustomed to adopt a critical and experimental approach toward reality, it must appear problematic whether the mind can comprehend itself in this eternal way. But there is nothing problematic about the Psalmist's insight. We do not know *when* we shall die; but we do organize and live our lives in the certain knowledge *that* we shall; and this quite ordinary commonsensical conviction has a validity and necessity more stable and absolute than that of our empirical science. Yet it does not affect the certainty with which we distinguish structures in our mortal experience, and make judgements about it, for which we claim logical (or eternal) validity and universal or objective generality. This is the rational capacity in virtue of which we agree with the Psalmist; and if Hegel is confident that he can specify its structure as the stable pattern of the world that its ever-novel processes presuppose and necessarily require, his confidence springs partly from a fairly extensive experience of the experimental construction of such structures, of their discovery by trial and error, and of the criticism of the attempts of his predecessors.

Because of the lacuna in the manuscript of the end of the 1805 Philosophy of Nature, and the beginning of the Philosophy of Spirit, we do not know exactly how Hegel made the transition, or even what heading he used for the first section. It is as good as certain that he called the first subsection 'Intelligence', since he drew up a summary parallel between the moments of 'Intelligence' and 'Will' in the margin at the point where he passed on to his second main section. He called that second section 'Wirklicher Geist'. There is an evident parallel with the structure of his celestial mechanics: Intelligence corresponds to space, 'Willing' to time, and 'Actual Spirit' to 'reality'. So the probability that the initial heading

was 'Begriff des Geistes' or 'Der Geist nach seinem Begriffe' is quite strong; but 'Abstracter Geist' or 'Formaler Geist' are also quite possible.¹

Sensible cognition is cognition of things being, or events happening in space. Space is the immediate mode of my intuition of determinate existence; as an existing being I am myself in space. But the space of my intuition is an ideal, or free, one. I can fill it as I please. Even the brute is free in space, it can go where it will. But intelligence can *imagine* what it will, determinately in its own space, and without reference to its own practical desires—which might cause the brute to imagine the prey it seeks or the peril that it must avoid. My imagined picture is really mine as a picture: it is not just the sensing of the world as mine (and hence it is not simply a set of desirable and aversive stimuli). *Sense* is the *world* as 'mine'; *spirit* is rather the *picturing* as 'mine'. If we want an immediate conscious model of this picture-possession that expresses the 'spirit according to its concept' we must look for a rather exalted poetic-philosophical one. It was natural for me to think of the Psalmist proclaiming that 'the days of our years are three score years and ten' and so on. Hegel avails himself of poetic-philosophical metaphor too; but his metaphor expresses the Psalmist's *capacity*, not his use of it. The Psalmist can speak as he does because he has the days of his own years, and the days of his people's dead and gone past, in the dark treasure-house, the 'night' of his memory. The brute, too, has a memory, but it is not master of it. Memory only fuels its desires or its *Angst*. For man things are different:

Man is this night, this empty nothing, that contains everything in its simplicity—a treasure of infinitely many *Vorstellungen*, of pictures, none of which precisely occurs to him, i.e. they are not there as presences. This is the night, the inner [side] of nature, that here exists—*pure self*.²

This 'night of the world' is a sort of counterpart of the Sun in celestial mechanics. The thinking self, the Ego, goes round

¹ The editors have chosen 'Der Geist nach seinem Begriffe'; but none of the passages that they refer to tells particularly strongly in its favour. (See *NKA*, viii. 316 at n. 3.) What is beyond question is that the heading 'Subjektiver Geist' supplied by Hoffmeister is a mistake.

² *NKA*, viii. 187, 1–5.

it like a planet. It is *my* world, though it does not exist in the light of my consciousness; I am aware, however, that I can do as I like, have things as I wish in it.¹

This imagination, the freedom of which Hegel insists upon, is the 'presentative' imagination. The treasure is there for recognition, whenever I intuit something that is already in my treasury. Then I remember consciously. Thus the being-for-me that the object has is of quite another higher kind, than its immediate being. It now has a meaning, it is a *sign*. The sign stands not for the singular thing, but for its essence. It is only synthetically attached to the external thing as a sign, but its meaning is part of my own self-constituting essence. It is my awareness of this that I express for myself, by giving the thing a name; but it is not I, as an individual self, who owns the stock of names. *Speech* is the 'name giving power' (*Kraft*); and hence speech is 'the true being of the Spirit as spirit in general—it exists as the unity of two free selves.'² I have to ask, in the first instance, 'What is that?' and be given its name. But the *name* 'lion' is something quite different from the animal. It is through naming, says Hegel, that 'things' come to exist outside myself for me. On the basis of this claim—which certainly cannot be literally justified—Hegel pushes his interpretation of Adam's naming of the animals to a further extreme than the one he reached in 1803/4. Adam was not merely claiming eminent domain over nature and taking possession of it: he was its spiritual creator:

This is the primordial *creator's* might [*erste Schöpferkraft*] that the spirit exercises; Adam gave all things a name, this is the right of majesty, and primordial taking possession of the whole of nature, or the creation [*Schaffen*] of it out of the spirit; λόγος Reason *essence* of the thing and talking, *Sache* and *Sage*, Category.³

¹ Hegel characterizes the empirical psychology of the 'association of ideas', but he does not give a verdict on it. Presumably the order here seems no more interesting to him than the freedom—which he calls 'empty'—*NKA*, viii. 187, 15–188, 2.

² *Ibid.*, 189, 13–14. (I have given '*der Geist*' a capital letter here, in order to bring out the echo of Gospel teaching concerning the Holy Ghost. My normal preference for a small 's' is meant to emphasize the primacy of the dogma of Incarnation. The *actuality* of spirit is always the finite consciousness embodied in our living human community.)

³ *Ibid.*, 190, 1–5. I have left Hegel's obviously incomplete punctuation alone. The untranslated words '*Sache*' and '*Sage*' were underlined by Hegel himself ('thing' renders *Ding*).

The way Hegel continues shows that his paradoxical language and badly strained metaphors are really intended to shift our attention from the immediate experience of natural things to the existence of our world as meaningful. Animals and human infants (in the exact technical sense of those who cannot talk) must experience themselves as bodies in the world of bodies, as afraid of the night, or of father. But this is not the objectivity of truth, or of the *logos*, it is not the 'outsideness' of the Moon (which the dog bays at, and the child proverbially cries for), still less that of Pythagoras' theorem, or of the impossibility of squaring the circle. It is precisely because we begin as little animals, interpreting our world in terms of our own desires, needs, and fears, that things can only begin to have true objectivity for us as we learn to use the common language. 'The object is born as being outside the Ego' when the *theoretical* standpoint is born, when I realize that the knowledge of what is, is a goal in itself, and one that is worth achieving.

Hegel has two connected purposes in his reference to Adam here. One is indicated by the occurrence of '*Schöpferkraft*' at the beginning of the sentence; the other by the occurrence of '*Kategorie*' at the end. In the first place, he wants to reconcile the two creation-myths in the Christian tradition, and to point out the proper interpretation of the reconciled version. Genesis opens with: 'In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. And the earth was without form and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters.' The Gospel of John, on the other hand, says: 'In the beginning was the Logos, and the Logos was with God, and the Logos was God . . . All things were made by it (him); and without it (him) was not anything made that was made.' Hegel identifies the 'moving Spirit' of God with Adam, the first man; and the first Adam with the second, who is the eternal Logos. He relies on the fundamental dogma that 'God is a spirit'; he insists that 'creative' capacity belongs to spirit alone. Nature as simple force is uncreated; it can only express itself, and it expresses its 'self' only in the Logos; nature *knows itself in man*.

Having put us right about Moses, and the meaning of the theological 'creation', Hegel can use that clarified doctrine to

interpret Kant, the philosophical Moses. The ontological priority of the Logos, the claim that is was 'with God in the beginning', and indeed that it 'was God', refers to the priority of the conceptual *a priori*. But if we speak of an *a priori synthesis*, we both betray the priority (since the content or matter is as necessary as the form to the 'synthesis') and misconceive the 'category' (since it is not the case that each of us brings the true categorial structure into the world, all complete, and that there is a pre-established harmony of all rational observers and agents). We must think of the *a priori* as creative; and we must think of it as a communal creativity. The only properly ontological use for the word 'creation' is in reference to the self-generation of the Logos, the *a priori category* of 'necessary truth' upon which the theoretical standpoint, the standpoint of scientific or objective inquiry and interpretation is founded. Thus, armed with Kant's first *Critique*, we can turn on Moses, and bring the unintelligible talk of a transcendent Creator, and his work, down within the proper range of linguistic meaningfulness. We make these words name the only thing that they can name, i.e. the conceptualization of experience. It is absurd to suppose that we can speak meaningfully of creating what is nameless, the *Ding-an-sich*, that which is 'without form and void'. But now, once we understand the *transcendental* limits on 'creation' we can turn round and purge Kant himself of the unintelligibly transcendent modes of speech, which imply that we can *know*, what the doctrine itself teaches us that we cannot even meaningfully *say*: e.g. that cognition is a 'synthesis' of the knowable and the unknowable.

We need to clarify the transcendental bounds of the category of 'creation', precisely because the priority of the category can be expressed only as its self-creation. Once we get that clear, we can see that the theological doctrine of creation refers to the moment when the *human* (theoretical, logically objective, not empirically objective) world comes into being for every 'man coming into it'. It refers to the moment when the light of the Logos, which is the 'life of men' shines in the darkness of our experience as animal process, and is comprehended. To say that it shone before that, and was not comprehended, is another piece of transcendent nonsense, unless we mean only that no one of us is Adam, the first man.

Even that involves a confusion of logical with temporal priority. For 'Adam' is not *a* man at all, he is the human capacity to communicate theoretically, he is 'the name giving power'. *Only* man is created; or at least, until he is created nothing else is ('without him was not anything made that was made').

Even this is not quite correct. For although we can truly say that our cognitive community creates the *humanity* of each of the animal processes born to human parents; that it is in the community that has begun to share *theoretical* canons of objectivity that the name-giving power truly resides; and that this community is (not the *Ding-an-sich* but) the *Sache selbst* and that its *Sage* is 'the Category'—although all this is true, the perspective is still empirical. We have not expressed the absolute priority of the Logos; and the index of this is that our concept will not enable us to comprehend how we came down from the trees, and began making pictures in the caves, in the first place. Hegel knew nothing of all that; but just as he knew that Kant was mistaken in supposing that the structure of Newton's consciousness was the essential structure of the human mind as such, so he also recognized that in *some* sense 'every man coming into the world' must have the light of rational life in him. The *a priori* is self-created in time, but it is also out of time, eternal and uncreated. So in the end, the reconciliation of Moses with John has to become a decision for John, and the mere purgation of the philosophical Moses, has to give way to the gospel of a new logic. We must not think of ourselves as God's 'creatures' but as his 'children'. The Logos is not created, but *generated*. Each of us incarnates in his 'animal process' the Logos that is 'born not made', from the moment when he perceives the world as embodying a truth which 'was, is and ever shall be', a truth that is as indifferent to his transient wishes, and his organic needs, as the hillside is both to the shepherd boy guarding his flock on it and to the wolf from which he guards it. Wolf and boy are by no means indifferent to one another; so if the Psalmist looks to the hills for help, it must be help of a very different kind from that which the boy seeks when he cries 'wolf'. It is the beginning of the quest for truth, the establishment of the theoretical standpoint, that Hegel now finds expressed in the myth of

Adam's naming the animals; and what he calls 'name-giving' is the germ of the Kantian conception of 'objectivity' which must be presupposed in any 'animal process' that other humans decide to treat as a cognitive being. So what Hegel says expresses not an empirical error but the exact statement of an *a priori* principle which defines the relevant sense of naming: 'Thus through the name the object is born as *being* (*seyend*) outside of the Ego.'

This simple 'naming' is as far from Kant's table of the categories, as the Psalmist's appeal to the hills is from Hegel's theory of the Incarnation. But it is our awakening from the 'dream' of sense-dominated existence. Here we must remember that older Logos—which passed down to the author of John through several different channels—which Heracleitus bade us hearken to, and cease living like the beasts, each isolated in the private dream-world of his own senses.² To hearken to it is to begin to link our store of names (with their purely conceptual meanings) into a world of common knowledge. This involves memory proper—(*Gedächtnis*)—the store of common names and meanings. To exercise the memory is the first *labour* of rationality.³ The effort to remember a name—as distinct from inventing one like Humpty Dumpty—is the overcoming of private arbitrariness. But in forming my memory, I discipline my own conscious fluidity into a fixed shape, I become a *thing*, invisible like the 'ideal body' of the Solar system, but a fixed pattern of motions in which the planets, comets, moons, etc. are *words* with fixed meanings. This free self-fixation—not an inner clockwork of twelve categories and other similar mental machinery already assembled—is the *Understanding*. 'Mechanical' it is, but the mechanism is home-made by individual effort. We learn masses of verbal formulas 'by heart'!⁴

This is only a crude caricature of the necessary structure of concept-formation and individual education. But Hegel's own educational theory and practice—the way he turned his own

¹ Ibid., 189, 24–190, 1.

² Heracleitus, D.K. 22B1.

³ NKA, viii. 193, 8–9. We should notice the deliberate interweaving of the theoretical and practical moments which were treated as separate *Potenzen* in 1803/4—cf. NKA, vi. 277, 13–300, 17 (Harris and Knox, pp. 210–11, 216–31).

⁴ NKA, viii. 193, 21–196, 6 and the marginal note (195, 4–28 and 196, 20–3).

Logic into a kind of catechism for his Nuremberg classes, and the way he voluntarily drilled his own 'tenacious memory' from his youth up, shows how seriously he took it; and the fact that his own self-imposed educational discipline sprang directly from the 'encyclopaedic' urge that we can detect in his earliest papers, probably accounts for his conviction that the mind must become as much like the 'free motion' in the heavens as possible. One who, like myself, shares Augustine's abhorrence of the 'hateful chanting' of the classical grammar school tradition, must wish that Hegel had thought less in terms of the clockwork in the sky, and more in terms of the marvellous adaptability of the vegetable organism. But his disciplinary excesses are not what matters. What matters is first that human rationality depends on a memory which (no matter how it is formed) should ideally be as reliable as clockwork; and secondly the contrast between this 'disciplinary' conception of mental mechanism, and the naturally given inner-clockwork which Kant, like Leibniz before him, assumed the intellect to be. Instead of being an enemy of the 'mechanical understanding', Hegel was so convinced of its importance that he was willing to adopt Draconian policies to achieve it. But he saw it clearly as an achievement; and what he abominated was the complacent conviction of those who had it, that it was given to them by God or fixed by nature, and hence must be all that they needed, or that men generally could ever hope to achieve.

The crucial point is that this mental thing is made of *meanings*, so that every part of this solar system of the mind is a universal. This is the thinghood of the self—the 'experience of consciousness'. It is not yet the understanding, consciously in action, aware of itself as opposed to its object.¹ The

¹ NKA, viii. 196, 9–18. Some of the most puzzling aspects of the *Phenomenology* have their explanation here. The *Phenomenology* is the 'science of the experience of consciousness'. It must take for granted that consciousness exists, it is *there* as the self-made thing containing all this meaning-stuff that is now to be scientifically ordered. But unfortunately this thing is also the spirit in its 'singularity'. To understand the *Phenomenology* therefore involves learning—often with immense labour and without the possibility of perfect certainty—just what was in Hegel's memory. From this point of view an older and wiser Hegel could rightly say that the book was the peculiar product of a certain earlier moment of history. Another source of difficulty is the fact that it was not followed by the system it was designed to introduce. That system would have shown why some of its idiosyncrasies were

understanding in action must unfold in judgements, and resolve its own antithesis of singularity and universality in a syllogism of self-understanding in which it recognizes itself in its object and vice versa.¹ Nothing as dramatic as the 'struggle for recognition' or the 'unhappy consciousness' is involved in the ordinary educational passage from Understanding to Reason; but the *structure* of the transition in the *Phenomenology* can be recognized here in the 'Philosophy of Spirit'. Nor is this remarkable since the *Phenomenology*, with its great drama of the *Bildung* of the World-Spirit, is an educational instrument designed to bring about just this transition, from Understanding to Reason in the singular rational consciousness.² Reason is the syllogism of the Understanding. The moment when the Understanding becomes the self-conscious 'category' is the moment when it becomes Reason. 'The understanding is *Reason*, and its object is *Ego itself*.'³

We can see, at this point, why Hegel incorporated *this* phenomenological transition from sense-certainty to understanding, and from understanding to Reason into his mature Philosophy of Spirit. The inclusion of the 'life-and-death struggle' in the 'real philosophy' of human educational experience underlines the *absolute significance of freedom* in the genesis of Reason. The making of the memory is the *Knechtschaft* of the spirit. In the more natural evolutionary account of education in the lectures of 1803/4, the dominating

inevitable. But in the end its enigmatic aspects partly reflect the conceptual immediacy of consciousness, and are partly disciplinary. Hegel could tell us what it is about (in an external commentary). But partly the content does not matter, and partly we ought to have these things in our memories anyway—if we belong to his cultural world and have been properly educated. The effort to remember them and to connect them with what the words on the page say, is an essential moment—the first *labour*—of the self-production of the spirit.

¹ The clearest statement to this effect is the marginal note of *NKA*, viii. 198, 19–23. But the text to which that note was appended should be carefully studied.

² The general situation of 'consciousness' in the *Phenomenology* is the situation described at *NKA*, viii. 198, 13–199, 14.

³ *NKA*, viii. 199, 21. This statement can go two ways. Thus Kant's 'pure Reason' performing its critical function is 'Reason acting as Understanding', or it is the Understanding which has recognized its own status as Reason (cf. *Difference*, *NKA*, iv. 16, 15–19, 36; Harris and Cerf, pp. 94–8). Hegel's critique of Kant, on the other hand, is the rational critique of this self-justification of the Understanding, which shows that we cannot stop at this point because the dialectic of pure Reason has *not* been ousted.

force involved here, comes from the parents' consciousness of their mortality. But once we insist that the concept of spirit must be considered from the inside as self-generative, only the emergence of the 'noble' consciousness in the phenomenology of the World-Spirit, can provide us with a real model. The theory of 'education' in the first philosophy of spirit tells only one half of the story anyway: the subjection of the spirit as understanding. Its self-assertion as Reason comes when the self-conscious Intelligence, the Category, becomes *Eigensinn*; here the universal 'thing', becomes a self-conscious 'force'. This transition from theoretical to practical Reason is what the life-and-death struggle displays at its conceptual minimum (just as 'name-giving' displays theoretical Reason at its minimum). Freedom does not necessarily involve a Kantian or Fichtean moral conscience, any more than rationality necessarily involves Newtonian science. But it does involve willingness to die for the right of self-definition.

2. *The concept of Volition*

The emergence of freedom from death is presented first only as a *logical* process in the 1805 lectures. The practical independence of the self as will, like the theoretical independence of the world for intelligence, is defined for us as a conceptual paradox. 'The intelligence is free, but its freedom is without content, for it is at the cost of the content, just by forfeiting it, that it has freed itself.'¹ To Hegel's first hearers this must have sounded like a transition from the 'category' to the 'categorical imperative'. Indeed, that is exactly what it is; but Hegel's Categorical Imperative cannot get its content by a 'synthesis'. It must begin as a *Trieb* that is arbitrarily given by the world of the self. The satisfaction of a practical drive is different from the gratification of natural *Begierde*, because it involves transforming the objective world, not consuming it.² Practical Reason creates its own content—or in other words it is the creative urge toward self-expression which results in a *Werk*.³ Labour was already a necessary moment in the

¹ *NKA*, viii, 201, 8–9.

² *Ibid.*, 203, 17–204, 6.

³ *Ibid.*, 204, 14–22.

self-making of intelligence. Willing begins with voluntary labour. In acting in accord with its own spontaneous drive the Ego utilizes the force which it has built into itself as a thing. This involves labour in so far as it has an instrumental end. The rational goal of willing is the minimization of involuntary labour. Hence willing is initially directed toward the production of *tools*. Labour itself is part of the order of nature; it is the condition of the satisfaction of desire. The first spiritual labour is the turning of the self into a 'thing', an efficient mechanism. Then this efficiency itself can go to work as the cunning that makes natural forces labour for human purposes. Here the human spirit assumes the role of fate or destiny for natural beings.¹

Reason as a practical force divides into two 'soliciting' forces which Hegel compares to the opposed male and female 'characters' in the story of Oedipus and the Sphinx.² The intelligence is the feminine power, dwelling in the dark depths of the Earth, but knowing what happens in the daylight, and manipulating the male strength of the manifest forces of Nature, so that in spite of its womanly weakness those forces produce the result that it predicts, although that result is quite the opposite of what the manifest forces produce spontaneously or by their own will.

This identification of the 'sides' of instrumental rationality as male and female is clearly dictated by the structure of both Greek and Judaeo-Christian religious myths about man's first knowledge of his fate. Hegel calls the cunning that makes an instrument of Nature, 'the Evil Being' (*das Böse*); and we are bound to think of the Serpent tempting Eve. We should also remember that even after Apollo became the daylight God of

¹ *NKA*, viii. 207, 9. (This remark, and the marginal note that there is nothing secretive or dishonest about the *List der Vernunft*, is important for the interpretation of the concept at the higher level of world history. No one is cheated by the *List der Vernunft*, just as there is nothing concealed about the way the *waterfall raises* water in a water wheel; and nothing but human Reason—the sort of Reason a human can perfectly comprehend—is at work in it.)

² *NKA*, viii. 207, 9–208, 12. To make the philosophical interpretation work, the feminine 'characters' in the myth must be rolled into one. The Sphinx must be thought of as identical with the Pythia (and ultimately with the Fates). Also that Olympian interloper, Pluto, must be ignored, in favour of the Mother and Daughter of Eleusis; and Apollo at Delphi must be thought of as an anticipatory presence (the philosophic comprehension in which the 'characters' are no longer divided).

Delphi, his priestess was called Pythia because she spoke for the Python, the great earth-snake. But the effect of Hegel's unmasking of the myths is like Apollo's arrival at Delphi: the snake is slain, and the 'evil' is recognized as the true good, the proper destiny of the forces that are turned against themselves through its agency. The *Wissen* that appears as a dark but inexorable destiny must become *Erkennen*, the understanding of everyday.

'Cunning' is just the self-positing conceptual form of practical Reason—its vegetable stage, so to speak, in which the moments are the Earth-process and the Kind. In its completely explicit form, in modern technology, this impersonal *concept* of Reason stands before us as a Fate which we are hardly tempted to think of as 'feminine'. Hegel saw the initial identification of Reason with the Earth-Mother as an intuitive recognition of the true destiny of Reason itself, which is to be embodied not in the 'invisible hand' of the economy, but in properly *human* cognition. Cognition, the genuine embodiment of Reason, begins with the 'carnal knowledge' of man and woman; for this, as Hegel insisted already in 1803/4, is something very different from the desirous coupling of the beasts.¹ But Hegel now wants to specify the difference as a concept simply.² In 1803/4 'desire' (*Begierde*) becomes 'love' (*Liebe*) in the consciousness of the sexual partners who recognize one another. In 1805 'love' is introduced generally as a more developed relation of the will with the world than 'cunning'. *Begierde* is not a relation of the will with the world at all, but of the animal organism with its environment. In 1803/4 Hegel is concerned with the real evolution of spirit out of nature; in 1805 it is the *logical* evolution of the concept of spirit (from 'naming' to 'absolute knowing') that is his topic. The bad infinite drives of hunger and thirst certainly lie behind the manifestation of spirit as *List*; and the good infinite drive of sex similarly lies behind its appearance as *Liebe*. But a craftsman may love his craft, or a mechanic his machines; and man, woman, or child may be as cunning as the Sphinx or the Oracle in their manipulation of family relationships. The advantage of Hegel's new approach is that he can now deal

¹ *NKA*, vi. 301–2 (both drafts; Harris and Knox, pp. 231–2).

² *Ibid.*, viii. 209, 5–13.

with the *a priori* possibility of these things. 'Love' is the *ethical element* as such. That is why *List* is in principle 'evil' as soon as it appears in spiritual relations.¹ In a properly political society this 'element' takes the general form of 'justice' (which itself has different forms in the different social classes). But that fulfilment we shall come to in its own place. What we must consider here is the generalized concept of love as it appears in the social world from which the ethical substance is absent. Before the *Volk* has come into being in the course of natural evolution, spiritual brotherhood appears as *friendship*: the heroic labour of the one Heracles, is shared by the friends Theseus and Pirithous, the awful responsibility of the ancestral feud is shared by Orestes and Pylades. After the natural *Volk* has been destroyed, on the other hand, the knight's service of an unseen lord in the spiritual world, finds a present focus in his chivalrous devotion to his 'lady'.² Love is the 'element' of ethical life, but it is not yet 'ethical life' itself (whose singularized reality is rather 'virtue'). Because love is a relation of person to person, it must have a personal focus. More precisely, it is the *unity* of one will with another, behind the masks of 'personality'. When the other 'person' involved is God himself as a 'spirit' we are on the pathway of the *Phenomenology*.³

The 'middle' of the 'syllogism' of tool and love, is family-property. Hegel calls this middle: *das Erzeugte*,⁴ but this 'begetting' is a conceptual one appropriate to the spirit. It is interesting to see how community of property, which began by being an insoluble problem for Hegel's early ideal of 'love'⁵

¹ The fate of Oedipus is portrayed as a degraded *spiritual* relation in the myth of his communications with Oracle and Sphinx. It *must* be so portrayed, indeed, since it is the story of his cunningly contrived contacts with those other humans with whom his naturally determined relation should be one of *Liebe*.

² *NKA*, viii. 210, 23–211, 5.

³ The objective focusing of the 'love of God' is much more varied than my simple example of knightly devotion suggests. But Hegel is interested primarily in what he calls 'ethical action' in the *Phenomenology*. In this perspective it is the crusading knight who carves out a fief, who is the proper analogue for the classical friends. (It is the marginal notes that show Hegel's philosophical concern with the general problem of expressing the love of God 'in the present'—*NKA*, viii. 210, 24–211, 24.)

⁴ *NKA*, viii. 211, 9–10; the expression must be interpreted in the context of the explanation in the following paragraph, viii. 211, 11–212, 9.

⁵ *welchem Zwecke denn alles Übrige dient*, *TW-A*, i. 249–50 (Knox and Kroner, p. 308).

has finally emerged as the spiritual meaning of the union of sexual recognition. The enigma has itself become the answer. Brute beasts may pair for life, but a human family-alliance or connection can extend far beyond the lives of those directly involved; and what distinguishes human begetting from that of the brutes, is the institution of *inheritance*. In the phenomenological perspective of 1803/4 the relation of parents and children is displayed as the overcoming of mortality through its acceptance. The parents prepare the child to take their place in the world. The logical perspective of 1805 is more radical. It is now precisely this 'world' in which the family has a 'place' that is the starting-point. This is what is objectively 'begotten' from the *concept* of 'love'. The gratification of *Begierde* may well produce an illegitimate child such as Ludwig Fischer (and the parents will have moral obligations towards it, which distinguish *self-conscious* love from *natural* love).¹ But it is the earning of a common living, a real stake in the world, that sanctifies desire.² The human pair are holders of the family patrimony in trust, they work together to maintain it, and they educate children to take over responsibility for it in turn. Every moment in the cycle—natural fertility; self-conscious feeling and speech; shared labour, inheritance and reciprocal responsibility first of parents for children, then vice versa; and finally education—every moment is necessary (and must be supplied by conventionally agreed means where the natural ones fail). But none of them is the whole goal—not even education, which appears as the phenomenological goal in 1803/4. For the goal is that love should 'have existence'; it must be there as part of the social structure, the stable maintenance of a station and its duties.³

¹ It is, I think, the fact that a human child can be begotten as mindlessly as an animal, but cannot be drowned like an unwanted kitten once it is here, that causes Hegel to distinguish 'natural love' and 'self-conscious love' and insist that *both* are necessary moments of 'the family' (NKA, viii. 213, 4–6).

² NKA, viii. 212, 1–4.

³ At NKA, viii. 213, 9–14. Hegel says 'Love has become the object for itself'; and this is no longer an encounter of 'characters'—i.e. of complementary opposites like the sexes. It is a recognition-system which now encounters another like itself. The Families are now 'complete, free individualities for one another; or there is here for the first time a genuine being for the spirit, in that it is a self-conscious being-for-self.' Antigone illustrates the self-conscious moment of this '*Daseyn* that love has' (viii. 222, 12) because when her brothers have killed one another fighting for the

In the course of natural evolution, these families must fight for survival because of the paradox involved in *possession*. For the occupier to maintain that some place in the world belongs exclusively to him and his is absurd, since whatever tool values he and his have found or made there can equally well be utilized by any intelligence capable of appreciating them. Hegel noted this paradox, marginally, where he insisted on the fundamental significance of earning a living.¹ This is the spiritual overcoming of the natural bar against permanence of possession. But the secure possession of what one has earned depends upon the general recognition of legal (or customary) right; in the absence of such recognition, communally maintained and enforced, we have a 'state of nature'—i.e. something which falls outside the concept of spirit altogether. The only rational relation that exists in such a state is the universal and absolute obligation to get out of it, by obtaining and guaranteeing recognition of one's rational status.² Hegel is immensely interested in this transition,³ but we have not yet reached the point in the logical evolution of the concept of spirit where it can be fully described. While we are dealing with spirit as concept, we can only lay down the formal requirement that the spiritual will has to be a universal or general one. Recognition is the element of spiritual being. Any identifiable 'being' can be accorded spiritual status through recognition. Caligula had his horse elected as Consul, a shapeless stone is the object of communal veneration at Mecca, the Holy of Holies in the Jewish temple was an empty space. 'What is recognized is recognized as *immediately* valid, through its *being*;—but just this being *is begotten from the*

family-place, she steps right out of her feminine *character* (insisted on by both Creon and her sister) to do the duty of family-piety. But the Sophoclean drama concerns the breakdown of the natural ethical substance. The proper context of the present discussion is the legal structure of a self-conscious bourgeois society (not one in which there is still an entailment of inheritance in the male line, for example, since that is a survival of the principle of 'character').

¹ NKA, viii. 212, 23–4. Hegel simply *describes* the implicit transformation of 'possession' into 'property' at viii. 214, 1–7. But the reference to the paradox, and to the resulting war of all against all, is clear enough there, so it does not matter when the earlier marginal note was added.

² NKA, viii. 214, 12–18 (and the marginal note, 22–7).

³ The first sign of this interest in the 1805 MS is the comment on the 'night one faces when one looks a man in the eyes—a night which becomes fearsome' (NKA, viii. 180, 7–8).

concept; it is recognized being; man necessarily gets recognized and is necessarily [a] recognizer."¹

Anything can be recognized, but only some things are capable of reciprocating. Something exists in the crib, that does not exist in the horse, the stone, or the empty room: here we must acknowledge the active potential for recognizing (of treating a lion picture, for instance, as the emblem of St. Mark, and hence of the Republic of Venice). Man *is* this active power of recognizing meanings and must (even as a slave) obtain recognition for that capacity at least. This is where we come full-circle back to the power of name-giving, and Hegel puts 'love has existence' as the answering moment in practice to 'speech, name' in theory,² because—in spite of Juliet's romantic protest which he echoed so sympathetically in 1797—the very foundation of human existence lies 'in a name'. The Lion of St. Mark is more important here, than 'mother' or 'father'—who may be unknown to a Renaissance foundling, as they were to Oedipus.

The paradox about possession now resolves into a problem of decision about ownership of property, and conventions about the meaning of signs (such as flags planted in newly discovered territory). All this is the 'side of chance', and until rightful possession—property—is agreed on, so that contractual relations can begin, there is nothing more rational in claims of ownership, than the children's way of settling disputes on the basis of 'who saw it first?'³

Within the family everyone has a status determined by 'character' (and one is a good or bad father, mother, sister, brother, servant, etc., according to the way one lives up to one's proper character). 'Character' is defined by the way the other complementary characters see the function that is to be defined. In universal social recognition, on the other hand, it is the free self-determining individual who is recognized.⁴ For this reason, the dialectic of the 'judgement' of property ('this is mine') involves the life-and-death struggle.

Hegel analyses the movement of the practical syllogism of

¹ *NKA*, viii. 215, 12–15.

² *NKA*, viii. 222, 12.

³ *Ibid.*, viii. 215, 19–218, 5.

⁴ *Ibid.*, viii. 218, 6–18.

ownership—for this is what the struggle now turns out to be—starting from the ‘middle’ represented by the family-possession. The outsider, who has no recognized status in the family, and hence no right to share in its goods, takes possession of some part of those goods. His right to do this arises from his name-giving capacity, or from Adam’s spiritual lordship over all things in virtue of his cunning—his insight into what they are ‘good for’.¹ That there exists a prior right which he has violated, the interloper does not know, for that right exists only in the knowledge of the family, and the outward signs of it are not decisive, they do not compel recognition. The family therefore attacks the intruder, and he defends himself as the injured party; he did not know he was attacking anyone. Both parties feel themselves injured, and neither sees itself as committing any injury as long as both are merely asserting their right to the thing. What is at issue on both sides is the recognition of the self that is posited in the thing; each side demands recognition of his will. What began on both sides as a concern to make use of the thing, changes into an activity with a different goal entirely—as when two children break a toy, which they both wanted to play with, but its breaking is irrelevant to the new question of whose will is to prevail, even though neither child can now achieve what he originally wanted. In a situation where property rights have not been authoritatively settled even for grown-ups, this familiar and elementary transformation of the goal involves a life-and-death struggle, because the recognition of one’s free self-determination is the condition of existence as a self, rather than as a ‘character’.²

The transformation of the determinate will to master the world, and the ethical will to play one’s part in the family, into a will to have one’s will recognized, is the first emergence of ‘free’ will. The conceptual resolution of the life-and-death struggle comes with the willing of intelligence itself, the

¹ *NKA*, viii. 215, 21–216, 9. (Nothing explicit is said about cunning here, but it is only through cunning that man is ‘the might against all things’, 216, 3.)

² *NKA*, viii. 218, 19–221, 4. We should note that Antigone and Creon are not yet involved in the ‘struggle for recognition’. Each sees the other as overstepping the proper bounds of character and him/herself as defending the ethical order by which ‘character’ is defined. It is only between opponents who are ethical *outsiders* for one another, that the struggle can arise as a simple clash of wills.

comprehension that free will must be not just self-will, but *autonomy*. The rational will has to be a general will that is valid for all who have wills of their own. The self must recognize that in willing recognition for itself as a self, it is actually willing recognition for free selves generally. Thus the logical outcome of the struggle is mutual respect. Death in the struggle is not wasted; but it would be, if it did not teach the surviving contestants what the struggle was now really about, and make them see that the only way in which those who are really committed to the new goal can achieve it is through common agreement. Acceptance of a stand-off leaves the problem in abeyance, but this result is logically irrelevant, since it makes no difference whether the syllogism is completed now or later. Submission—the path that belongs to ‘critical logic’, or ‘phenomenology’—is an ambiguous result. Outwardly it is an extension of the immediate existence of the concept as *Liebe*; the pain of free individuality is rejected, and consciousness turns back to the defined status of a ‘character’. But slavery by institution, rather than by birth and custom, is not a form of *Liebe*. Master and slave have the outsider’s consciousness of one another. They *do* recognize one another as free wills. So the movement of the practical syllogism *is* in progress, and the transition to Actual Spirit will eventually take place. Thus the *Phenomenology* shows how the conceptual necessity of the transition that Hegel makes here in his ‘Real Philosophy’ actually ‘manifests itself in its opposite’—or how freedom is implicit in slavery as a recognized status.¹

3. *Legal status*

In communal recognition or general will, spirit becomes, for the first time *wirklich*; it has manifest ‘existence’ (*Daseyn*) in the family community united by love. But the will that maintains that community of immediate recognition is involved in the contradiction of willing death universally when it seeks to maintain life in particulars. It must be balanced by a general will that maintains life universally in order that there

¹ I assume that the marginal note ‘Coercion (*Gewalt*), Lordship and Service’ (NKA, viii. 221, 23) was added when Hegel had worked out the phenomenology of the transition to ‘actual spirit’.

may be freedom in particulars, freedom for the single person who represents the family. The family is hidden, from now on, behind the mask of its personal spokesman. It exists publicly only in the potential form of the property needed for its maintenance. It must be there as that real potential, however, since the 'person' has recognition as a property-holder; and inheritance is all that can make that 'holding' permanent (or *wirklich*).¹

Hegel does not use *Anerkanntseyn* as a heading for the first phase of 'Actual Spirit', though it is clear enough from his underlinings in the text, and from subsequent references back to this discussion that 'Recognized Status' is the proper name of this phase. When we consider that he did not give any subheading for the opening section of his discussion of the third main chapter of his argument—'Constitution'—either, it begins to look quite likely that this was a methodical decision. The general *concept* (indicated by the chapter heading) must develop the antithesis involved in its own *judgement* before it has any proper subheadings at all. Thus 'Recognized Status' is just a label without its proper significance by contrast, until we reach 'b. Law having Coercive Authority' (*das Gewalt habende Gesetz*).² There is no harm in making the section divisions more explicit by inserting a bracketed heading and subheading (as our editors have done) but if we understand Hegel's failure to supply initial headings here in this way then we must regard the bracketed heading 'Intelligence' supplied by the editors in the lacuna at the

¹ This summing up is based on the text from *NKA*, viii. 221, 22–223, 9 and the marginal explanations (viii. 222, 22–6). But I have also taken into account the more phenomenological analysis of the struggle for recognition given in the lectures of 1803/4 (*NKA*, vi. 307–15; Harris and Knox, pp. 235–42).

² We should notice that Hegel marks the first subdivision of the unheaded section with an 'a' (which looks forward to 'b. Vertrag' and 'c./ Verbrechen und Straffe'). He then indicates the subheading which he is explicitly refusing to use by underlining *anerkanntseyn* and *unmittelbare* in his opening sentence. That his policy about headings is deliberate is strongly indicated by the fact that the marginal notes added later contain many mnemonic indicators and place-finders for himself regarding what is discussed in the text. If *all* the seeming anomalies of his heading pattern were mere anomalies in fact, it is amazing that *none* of them were unambiguously put right in the margin. Since Hegel went over this MS, and since he definitely needed markers for what was in it when he was using it for the second (or some subsequent) time, it is wiser to assume that there is a method in his madness, and that we are not here faced

beginning of the first chapter as being similarly clarificatory, and not as a hypothesis about what Hegel himself wrote.¹

Actual Spirit makes its effectiveness known first positively, in the making and keeping of contracts, then negatively in the punishment of rights. But the inward essence that is revealed in this actuality is the formal recognition of natural desires and needs. In place of the family situation, where the kin-group meets every need as it arises, the communal recognition system shares out functions, so that whole families specialize in meeting one general need. The whole community attacks the general problem of need, and the result is an enormous increase in *efficiency*.² This rationalization of labour, makes the satisfaction of general needs into a mechanical process; every specialized function is like a cog in a machine; and the more cog-like the labour-contribution is, the easier it becomes to find a natural mechanism which will supply the physical force for it.³ The conceptual perspective of 1805 allows no room for a consideration of what this mechanization does to labour as an aspect of conscious life. We are, however, given an answer by implication, to the problem of the phenomenal dialectic of wage-slavery which was left unresolved in 1803/4.⁴ The conceptual approach shows us that it is properly *things* that have 'worth', and should be bought and sold. Labour creates property, and property has worth. But labour-power does not have worth; it should be pooled, but not bought and sold. The preservation of the principle of free proprietorship—which is what the struggle for recognition was about—requires that as production is mechanized, craft-guilds must be replaced by co-operatively owned factor-

with the free vegetable growth of outward structures that is evident in so many of his MSS. (Once we make this assumption the methodic principle is not hard to discover.)

¹ In other words the status of the subhead: (*Intelligenz*) is quite different from that of the chapter heading: (*Der Geist nach seinem Begriffe*) because the latter is a guess at something that Hegel must *certainly* have written. (The importance of this problematic point will be more apparent when we have to articulate Hegel's discussion of 'Constitution'.)

² The meaning of *wirklicher* in the expression 'Wirklicher Geist' is made explicit when Hegel adds a marginal note referring to his earlier use of Adam Smith's pin-factory example (*NKA*, vi. 323; Harris and Knox, p. 248) to illustrate the claim that 'it is the concept, the truth of *Begierde*, that here exists' (*NKA*, viii. 224, 18 and 23-6).

³ *NKA*, viii. 225, 4-15.

⁴ Cf. *NKA*, vi. 323, 8-9 (Harris and Knox, p. 248).

ies. Hegel's economic theory is a co-operative or syndicalist one. The bourgeois form of wage-slavery is like the aristocratic serfdom that went before it. The retreat to the level of 'character' (the employer/worker relationship) is a pouring of new wine into old bottles; the wine is still working and the bottles must break. There is tremendous revolutionary potential concealed in the innocent-looking statement that 'the *abstract* thing displays in exchange what it is.'¹ The *Ding* is abstractly a 'value'; but labour is not a *Ding*, and many pages of the *Phenomenology* will be devoted to the complex display that it makes of what it abstractly is. Hegel has already moved a long way from the bourgeois-Platonic position that the desirous part of man is simply a wild beast that must be muzzled and tamed, and from the related faith that government policy can prevent those who own nothing but their labour-power from sinking into revolutionary poverty.² Allowing *Begierde* to emerge as a spiritual *right*, as soon as the struggle for recognition has validated the principle of equal right is an implicit admission (which can scarcely be unconscious) that equal recognition of human natural needs is a fundamental presupposition of social stability.

Through labour and exchange I can obtain any use-value that is equal to what I produce for the general market. Exchange makes the abstract concept of value explicit. *Contract* reverses that process by making exchange itself invisible and ideal. Here the theoretical consciousness that we create in our name-giving becomes *wirklich*. A man's word becomes his bond. Words however, are essentially evanescent. Once I have finished saying something, I am free to say something else, and in the same way I can say I will do something, and then not do it. So the making of contracts presupposes an agency capable of enforcing their fulfilment. To break a promise is not, in itself, immoral, for there is nothing rational about being true to one's (former) self. To be a self is to be capable of self-definition, and refusing to change could easily be a betrayal of self in that deeper sense. The obligation to keep one's promise springs rather from its public

¹ *NKA*, viii. 226, 1.

² This is his apparent position in the *System of Ethical Life, Schriften* (1913), p. 496; Harris and Knox, p. 171.

status, or from the fact that others have accepted the word for the deed. Others compel me to be not a free self but a person, the thing defined by my own words.

This principle of personality, and of honour, the commitment of the whole self in the particular moment of uttering the promise, is something quite beyond the range of contract itself. Contracts are always about determinate performances. I cannot make a contract to be honourable, to keep my word, to be a person, just as I cannot make one to be a slave, I cannot bind myself in honour to be a non-person, to give my life itself into the possession of another. Thus there is no 'original contract', no voluntary self-alienation into the keeping of the general will. The enforcement of contracts is not a subject of contract, just as recognition is not the immediate object of anyone's will. Crime dishonours the person against whom it is committed, like the attack on the family's earned possessions by a stranger. But now the forms of possible trespass are immensely various, and even verbal insult and slander can be crimes against the person. Hegel not only insists that all crime is conceptually crime against the person (which carries the implication that any inadequacy in the system of recognition is logically a crime); he also classifies crimes in terms of their conceptual 'vileness' (*Niederträchtigkeit*). Some crimes which involve greater real injury are less serious with respect to their injury to human dignity. An openly murderous attack involves the supreme injury, but has nothing vile about it. Defamation of character, on the other hand—even dismissing someone as a rascal, instead of detailing his precise transgression—involves a failure of respect for his conscience and responsibility as a subject; and stealthy or cunning crime, in which concealment is of the essence, is the extreme of vileness. The importance of human dignity in this classification, is the most significant thing about it. By insisting that all crime should be classified in terms of how it violates human personality, and of whether it involves material or formal injury (or both) Hegel has provided a yardstick by which whole systems of criminal justice can be evaluated.¹

Punishment, in his view, should always be the attempt to

¹ *NKA*, viii. 233, 11–235, 2.

make the criminal live up to the standard of human dignity as respect for conscience (where this means acting in the open, and doing as one would be done by). The retributive aspect of punishment is essential to it, because the criminal must comprehend the material wrong that he has done, but no amount of cunning on his part would justify the use of cunning in his punishment. Neither making an example of him, for the edification of others, nor disciplining him for his own good (except so far as the discipline shows him what he himself did), can properly be called punishment according to this concept of it.¹

4. *Law*

In punishment as the enforcement of personal right, the universal concept reveals itself as the force that maintains the manifold existence of personality as actual. Law is the 'substance' of personality. Persons are 'accidents' in that they can do and suffer injustice; but in the process of criminal justice the law is maintained as the concept that defines personality. Thus no person is accidental to the law as a person; and the object of criminal justice is to make the criminal be the person that the law says he *is*. The person that he is in law, is the one who receives universal recognition, and communal recognition is the medium in which personality exists. Thus, as a spiritual being, I am first of all, what the law says that my community recognizes me to be. This is what punishment is meant to teach me. With respect to my contractual obligations, my own will enters into the definition; the law merely compels me to keep my word. But there are other aspects of the definition of my personality, in which my expressed will does not enter. That I am the heir to an estate is determined by the will of another, or by the legal recognition of natural kinship.² And finally, the law guarantees my security as a person, at times and in circumstances

¹ NKA, viii. 235, 11–236, 15.

² The distinction between voluntary and involuntary aspects is made in a marginal note (NKA, viii. 237, 20–5). But the marginal notes only clarify what the text originally said. Marriage is treated in law like a contract, and hence Hegel has to mention it with contracts here. But it is not a contract and we shall have occasion to consider it further on. So, for the moment, I am leaving it aside.

where I am not able to speak or act for myself—even when I am not a person for myself, but a babe unborn or the dead victim of accident or crime. The *Bildung* of the individual as a person is the formation in his consciousness of the concept of personality that the law expresses. (This *Bildung* is the middle between the legal definition, and the freedom of the concrete individual to define his own personal commitments in family and contractual relations.)

The legal recognition of marriage is a special case because marriage is a total or infinite commitment, which goes beyond the bounds of what can be secured by contract.¹ The family is a pre-legal, pre-contractual institution, the needs and purposes of which give rise to contractual relations; hence it has to receive recognition along with contract. Marriage as an institution is the public acknowledgement by the parties that they are bonded. Within the context of legally defined personality it is the declaration of two recognized persons that they will to be *one*. They assume their natural character toward one another. It is a corollary of Hegel's conception of 'character' that the taboo against incest is likewise a matter of natural feeling. But the boundaries of this feeling are vague, so that the incest-bar has to be defined by law. The family is the immediate form of recognition; thus the recognition of character is the cradle of the spirit in nature. But the complementarity of the sexes in reproduction is the only form of 'character-recognition' that is naturally necessary, and it is the only form of regression to the level of immediate recognition that Hegel's concept of personality legitimates. Even then, he analyses it as a regression, so that the real possibility of issuing out of it and resuming personal independence is preserved. Marriage is made by consent, and can be dissolved likewise by consent, or on grounds which the community deems sufficient.² Hegel clearly lays it down that to make the religious ideal of absolute union into a positive law

¹ The criticism of Kant's contractual theory is taken over unchanged from the lectures of earlier years (cf. *NKA*, viii. 239, 1–5 with vi. 302–303; Harris and Knox, pp. 127–8).

² Hegel speaks as if the specific consent of both parties is always involved (*NKA*, viii. 240, 17–18). But where one party violates the union through adultery, desertion, etc., consent to the dissolution of the marriage is a logical presumption, as in the case of the criminal's logical consent to his punishment.

is a rigid extreme that must give way to communal sensibility regarding whether the living spirit has gone from the union. But exactly what the legitimate grounds of divorce should be is a matter of social circumstances not of conceptual necessity.

The ideal of marriage transcends the range of law altogether, and becomes a religious sacrament, because the marriage union is a reconciliation of nature and spirit, whereas law is the foundation of spirit in its opposition to nature. Thus it is precisely because the religious sacrament is above the law, that the law must contain provisions for the dissolution of the civil union.¹

Inheritance similarly comes under social control. The aristocratic principle of natural succession gives place to the proving of a valid will. As in the matter of divorce, Hegel takes a firm position in favour of bourgeois freedom here. The will of a testator is to be respected as far as possible. The same bias is evident in what he says about the authority of parents over children. It is only in the provision of care for orphans that the State authority enters constructively, rather than as a limit-setter.²

The State authority defines the family; but then protects it as the cradle of personal freedom. It emerges first as the protector of property. Property is produced by labour. Hegel again sums up the dialectic of wealth and poverty produced by the rational division of labour (more briefly than in the lectures of 1803/4 but in the same terms).³ But it is noteworthy that, although he explicitly refers to class hatred 'the extremest shattering [*höchste Zerrissenheit*] of the will—inward outrage and hatred' he says nothing about the 'strict domin-

¹ For the same reason the law can take no account of vows of constancy to a dead spouse, or of the nun's marriage to a heavenly bridegroom. Hegel points out the legal absurdity involved (*NKA*, viii. 241, 16–17) but says nothing of the religious aspect of these unions. (This is because he regards the religious consciousness involved in these institutions as immature too.)

² In view of his 'Greek ideal' it is interesting to find Hegel so passive about education (see esp. the marginal note, *NKA*, viii. 242, 25–6). It might be argued that this is because he sees the folly of trying to be 'better than the time'. But I think it is rather because he recognized the 'Protestant principle' of the time as 'better' than the totalitarian principle of Plato. (His own education gave him some conception of what compulsory education on the Platonic model would be like in a modern nation; educational pluralism based on respect for parental choice, offered a sounder foundation for the essential freedom of Absolute Spirit.)

³ Cf. *NKA*, viii. 243, 5–245, 5 with vi. 321, 1–326.

ance and taming [of the economy] like a wild beast'.¹ Whether this is because he sees it as politically uncontrollable, because the concept of personality is itself still in motion and must come to its own logically necessary conclusion, cannot be definitely decided. The policies of governmental control that he mentions are all such as would need to be continued in a syndicalist economy (the search for new markets, and for new employment for those thrown out of work by developments in technology, for example). It is clear that he is still wrestling with the lessons of the French Revolution, and that the focal importance of personality in his legal theory represents his formulation of the 'rights of man and citizen'. But whether he actually looked forward to a world in which labour-power itself would no longer be marketed is uncertain. I shall try to show, in a moment, that he probably did; but it is not important that we should come to agreement on this historical question. It is important that we should see the conceptual analogy between wage-slavery and the unequal recognition involved in lordship and bondage.

It is clear, at least, that Hegel does not look forward to a centralized socialist economy, since he says that government interference—even the taxation system—should be as slight as possible.² The economic sphere is one in which personal freedom and initiative must be allowed to display itself. The commonwealth should not own property, but be supported by taxes—because (however insignificant it manages to make them) its expenses must be accounted for.

The protection of property and securing of contracts is the primary function of State authority in the judicial system—which Hegel regards as an extension of its economic functions. The State-authority advances to the problem of general social health, and from that to the task of securing what Aristotle called distributive justice. The punitive activity, through which it first emerged, is an aspect of this, but Hegel now acknowledges the difficulties of interpreting

¹ NKA, vi. 324 (Harris and Knox, p. 249); cf. viii. 244, 21-2.

² NKA, viii. 244, 27-245, 1; and 245, 12-13. We should remember that Fichte's socialist economy was a model of the 'machine-state' for Hegel. The success that modern governments have achieved in finding out what their citizens are doing every minute of the day would appal him—cf. *Difference*, NKA, iv. 56, 4-23 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 146-7).

contracts and applying laws, the endlessness of occasions for dispute and of distinctions in judgement. Also the larger the body of applied law grows, the more difficult it is for anyone except a specialist to acquire the requisite knowledge of it. For this reason the spirit loses its 'presence'.¹

Both the fate of the *ancien régime* and the decadence of the German Empire come to mind here. Whether Hegel regards this 'ageing' of the State constitution as inevitable is not quite clear. But perhaps the right answer is no, since he goes on at once to say that the *procedure* of justice is 'almost more essential than the law itself'. Here, the revolutionary dialectic of rich and poor recurs, since the more complex the law becomes, the more expensive it is to go to law. So there comes to be one law for the rich and another for the poor, simply because the rich have access to legal remedies while the poor, whose need is greater, have not. It is difficult now, not to believe that *Hegel's criticism of the acquisitive society rests on a concept of human economic independence that he consciously possesses*. In other words, Hegel is expecting a social revolution, and his economic and judicial 'syllogisms' require a conclusion which he knows how to write, but which must be enacted by the world-spirit first.²

Apart from being somewhat repetitious, Hegel's summary of his theory of punitive justice in this second (judicial) section of his theory of law turns out to be premature. Nothing demonstrates the crucial importance of crime and punishment in his mind so well as the fact that he cannot let it alone, not only at the transition points where (as the middle term) it properly belongs, but in between as well.³ The power of life and death over the citizens is the conceptual kernel, the logical germ of sovereign authority; at the other extreme the

¹ NKA, viii. 248, 8–16. This is the first point in the discussion of the judicial system that is new. Criminal justice has already been discussed in this MS itself; and the bad infinity of civil law is a point made in the *System of Ethical Life, Schriften* (1913), p. 500; Harris and Knox, p. 174.

² NKA, viii. 248, 17–249, 7. (In this connection the explicit presence of a revolutionary hope in the *Phenomenology* deserves to be remembered.)

³ It seems to have crept into the discussion of the essential ambiguity of theoretical interpretation and practical application—which is the proper topic of the middle section—because the death penalty is a standard of the unambiguous (NKA, viii. 247, 6–19) just as murder by open assault was a standard of crime without dishonour (viii. 234, 16–18).

freedom of sovereignty is expressed in the right to pardon any offence. The power of forgiveness is the 'mastery' that 'pure life' has over 'evil' says Hegel, echoing the language and thought of his Frankfurt manuscripts.¹ This is the essential sovereignty of the 'living people' (*das lebendige Volk*). Thus far, everything in the argument has been within the compass of the understanding; the right of pardoning offences, and especially of commuting capital sentences is where living Reason first appears. The lineal descent of Hegel's concept of *Vernunft* from the Frankfurt theory of fate and reconciliation could hardly be plainer.

Law is the conceptual negation of the individual's freedom and spontaneity. Once we enter the realm of recognized status, our feelings and impulses become criminal rebellion against the declared commitments of the person which the law and our own declared choices define us to be. The verdict of the law is that all of that spontaneity must be put to death. Now Reason as the negation of that negation, raises freedom and spontaneity to life at a new level of existence incorporating the ideal of intelligence and moral responsibility that the legal recognition of personality establishes. As the will of the *Volk*, the law itself is alive, it is 'perfected, living, self-conscious life'.² As such, it has three abstract moments or distinguishable *Gewalten*.³ It is, in the first place the *Commonwealth* (here Hegel's summary makes it vividly obvious that the dialectic of economic acquisition and impoverishment threatens it with death).⁴ This economic reality is its natural body (or 'relationship of being'). Secondly it is the Court of

¹ *NKA*, viii. 249, 12; cf. Nohl, pp. 280-3, 287-92 (Knox and Kroner, pp. 228-32, 237-42).

² *NKA*, viii. 250, 1.

³ *Ibid.*, 253, 9. If we compare the 'separation of powers' in the *System of Ethical Life*, we can see that the *third* 'system of Government' has now been reduced to its conceptual minimum. The *maximum* defined in the earlier MS is still recognizable, however, in the exposition which this minimum here receives as 'Constitution' (see *Schriften* (1913), pp. 501-2; Harris and Knox, pp. 166-76).

⁴ The mention of 'aristocrats, who pay no taxes' (*NKA*, viii. 252, 8) is a transparent reference to the *ancien régime*. It is here apparent that Hegel intends in the section on 'Actual Spirit' to portray the living tensions that bring a society to the point of death. Thus the 'Constitution' that he goes on to develop is a blueprint for the work of Napoleon. But Napoleon's work is not just significant for France; and while Hegel's economic analysis focuses on the case of France, his judicial analysis is directed rather at the decadence of Germany.

Justice. This is its thought-essence (or 'relationship of thinking'). (In this connection Hegel does not draw the explicit moral of his dialectical critique, perhaps because it strikes too close to home, and the legal fiction of the *Reich*, though moribund, has not yet been struck down by the forces of revolution.) Finally it is the *sovereign power* which can decide to pardon what the law condemns. The 'evil' which it pardons in its 'mastery' is the self-will of the natural man who delivers himself wholly into its keeping, and must trust absolutely in its mercy.¹

Hegel developed this thesis—which is not even made fully explicit in his first draft—in a series of lengthy marginal additions. The single living being becomes in a court of law the bearer of rights. The court respects his particular will, but it is itself the guardian and keeper of his pure will. As a 'pure person' having a will of his own distinct from the purely moral will, he is 'evil'. In a civil suit any conflict between his particular and his moral will is potential only. He argues his case, but if he loses he obeys the court. Thus civil suits may discover fault (*culpa*) which must be made good, but not fraud (*dolus*) which must be punished.²

In criminal cases on the other hand, the question is whether the defendant has already been in conflict with the right. The convicted criminal is at the mercy of the court because he has surrendered his supposed (*gemeyntes*) natural right in return for legal recognition. In this context the law is actual as punishment, and all crime is fraudulent because it claims a right that the agent does not have. But to decide where simple fault ends and fraud begins is very difficult, whereas the simple violence of the pre-contractual state of nature is easy to identify. Even open murder is a much more ambiguous crime, than Hegel initially declared it to be, because of the problem

¹ The theological reference of 'das reine Böse' to the Fall of Man is shown first by the identification of the 'living law' as the 'divine Spirit' (NKA, viii. 253, 5–7) and then by the marginal glossing of 'reine Person' as '*daseyende Böse ABSICHT*' (viii. 253, 15 and 22). My own surmise is that this marginal gloss is the germ of the full exposition that Hegel proceeded to write in the margin of the preceding pages—since it is virtually superfluous once the doctrine has been stated at length.

² The editors have separated this note (NKA, viii. 249, 18–26) from the following one. So I assume they are fairly clearly distinct in the MS. But I think nevertheless, that the two can be read as one continuous whole.

of proving that death was actually intended. Only a murder freely confessed has the model character that Hegel was originally seeking.¹ The 'night' of man's inner heart is the ultimate fastness into which our 'supposed right' or our evil will retreats. This is the darkness in which the light of the Spirit must shine; and if it can shine there then, like Jesus, it can forgive. The prerogative of pardon is a *rational* complement of Hegel's concept of punishment, because the object of punishment is always self-knowledge, free self-recognition on the part of the criminal.

K.W.G. Kastner wrote to Schelling at the end of March 1806 that he had heard tell that Hegel's System was to appear at Easter in four volumes at one time.² This marginal revision, which puts Hegel's theory of criminal justice and punishment into its proper place, and leads up to the sovereign prerogative of pardon logically, is to my mind evidence that the rumour, though premature and exaggerated, was not false with respect to Hegel's intentions. Our manuscript was clearly written as a basis for his lectures. But in his marginal revision of it (Spring, 1806?) he already had publication in mind (as the last two of the four volumes that Kastner had heard about).

5. *The Constitution*

The articulation of the last main section of Hegel's manuscript looks very erratic and incomplete when judged by the normal indexical canons of a 'table of contents'. But in point of fact it is a perfect model of the logical evolution from concept, through judgement to syllogism. Once we realize this, we can recognize the articulation of Actual Spirit as an illustration of the dialectic of judgement. This makes it virtually certain that the first part of the 'Philosophy of Spirit' had only a main heading, and the one subheading 'b. Willen' to mark the point where the motion of the *Begriff* brought it to its *Gegensatz*.

¹ The point about coercive violence (*Gewalt*) is made earlier (NKA, viii. 250, 6–8) before Hegel begins to discuss the mingling of violence and fraud in most crime (viii. 250, 27–252, 20). We should notice that a definite decision to incorporate this revision into his text here would have necessitated considerable revision of his introductory discussion of crime and punishment as a pure concept. But detail of this kind belongs to the end rather than the beginning of the development (cf. viii. 234, 7–235, 2).

² Nicolin, report 93.

In the complete pattern of the third part, even this turning-point in the evolution of the *Begriff* is not outwardly marked. The heading 'III: Constitution' names the concept in its simplicity. This simplicity is left undisturbed until the exposition of the concept as concept is complete. Then the 'Spirit Articulating Itself' is presented to us as the *Gegensatz* of the particular and the universal terms in judgement. Here Hegel uses the Roman numerals (I, II) to mark the minimally necessary subheadings for 'the lower estates' and 'the estate of universality'. (Like the anticipatory antithetic articulation of the concept, the syllogistic articulation of judgement is eliminated.) Finally we reach the fully syllogistic articulation of Absolute Spirit as 'C. Art, Religion and Philosophy'. The 'C' refers back to an 'A' and a 'B' which (like the 'a' to which 'b. the Law having coercive power' is counterposed in 'Actual Spirit') have remained only implicit until now. But this time there is an added reason for not indicating the 'A' and 'B' immediately: the 'C' here is ambiguous—*there are two, indeed three, implicit articulations into which it logically fits*. In the first place, looking only at the explicit triad that is given in the heading, we can see in it the third moment of '[A: Constitution as Concept]' and '[B.] The Estates; or the Nature of the Self-articulating Spirit'. Secondly, considering the triad in its unity as 'Absolute Spirit' the implicit complements of the 'C' are '[A: The Concept of Spirit]' and '[B.] Actual Spirit'. In this perspective the discussion of the Constitution and the social structure must be seen as the proper fulfilment of 'Actual Spirit' (which is only completed in principle, or as a set of 'abstract moments', at the end of the section that bears that title). Finally, the occurrence of the word 'nature' in the immediately preceding heading ('the *nature* of the self-articulating Spirit') directs us to a third perspective—the one which was basic for Hegel until the end of 1803. In this perspective only 'Absolute Spirit' is Spirit proper, and 'Logic or Transcendental Philosophy' was co-ordinate with 'Philosophy of Nature, including the natural embodiment of Spirit'. In this perspective 'C. Art, Religion and Philosophy' is complemented by 'A. Logic and 'B. Real Philosophy'. The very fact that Hegel is continuing to speak of 'Real Philosophy' and to expound it as a unity shows that this

perspective has not lost its significance for him. (We shall see at the end how significant it still is.)

Like every stage of 'actuality' the evolution of the concept of 'Constitution' begins from the moment of 'thinghood'. The *res publica* is first of all (the common) *wealth* (*Reichthum*). The Law as State Power is the Commonwealth; and correspondingly the living spirit of the *Volk* is in the first instance their absolute *Macht* (we are surely meant to think first of 'armed might').¹ This concept has its actuality—what Hegel called in 1803/4 the *Werk* of the *Volk*—in the living organization of community life, and its final fulfilment in the 'perfect freedom and independence of the singulars'. The spirit of the people is the (ethical) 'nature' of the individuals, their (ethical) 'substance'. They are conscious of the general will as their own particular wills; and in their equal consciousness of alienation from it, they are aware of being alienated from their own (higher) selves. The general will is not an alien 'Lord', but themselves as universal or in the form of pure knowledge. It is their own final cause or purpose² (just as their 'perfect freedom and independence' is *its* final cause—the resolution of this apparent paradox is the task of 'Absolute Spirit').

Thus, as a person with 'recognized status' I have a mass of commitments, socially imposed or voluntarily assumed. *That everyone must meet his social commitments* is the general understanding of what it means to be a member of the community. This, together with my awareness of what *my* rights and commitments are, is my 'positive self' or my 'recognized status as intelligence'. The consciousness that I deserve to be subjected to the compulsion that will surely be applied, where I fall short or fail to do what I can do, is what makes the alien negative might of society, my negative self. My own 'utterance' (*Entäusserung*) is the might that stands against me demanding satisfaction. I am necessarily bound to

¹ *NKA*, viii. 253, 18–254, 10 should be compared with the spontaneously joyful or aesthetically playful approach to the life of the *Völk* as a communal *work* (of art) in the MS of 1803/4 (*NKA*, vi. 315, 2–316, 22, Harris and Knox, pp. 242–3). If I am on the right track, this contrast reflects Hegel's desire to interject the moment of 'Absolute Freedom and Terror' here, the moment in which the General Will as a negative might individuated for intuition (like a barbarian horde) sweeps the social slate clean for a fresh start.

² *NKA*, viii. 254, 11–255, 8.

have an ambivalent attitude toward this power: to trust and rely on it as the protector of my rights and to fear it as the power that exacts my obedience.¹

One can take either aspect (freedom or necessity) as primitive in developing the concept of the *Volk*. In the *System of Ethical Life*, where *Sittlichkeit* is viewed as the fulfilment and completion of Nature, Hegel presents the *Volk* first in its free, spontaneous, aspect; that 'life in the *Volk*' presupposes a long and hard discipline, and a heroic self-commitment, is never for a moment disguised. But everyone—including those who shirk the everyday discipline, and the great mass from whom heroism may never be demanded—is presented first in their *enjoyment* of the communal life.²

But here, where spirit is to be seen from the first moment in its conceptual *independence* of nature, it is the negative moment that must be predominant at the beginning. Ethical nature, like the subhuman natural order, must manifest itself to spirit as its 'other'. But since its destiny, unlike subhuman nature, is not to remain other but to reveal itself as the substance that supplies the energy of our subjectivity, our freedom, we must look for a neutral way to express its essence, a concept that does not disguise the all-controlling might of physical necessity that belongs to it as 'nature' but does not conceal the potential of freedom, of being owned as the medium of self-expression either. For us the word 'energy' is probably the most suitable label for this neutral concept. Hegel uses 'strength' (*Stärke*). The expression came to him naturally (from Plato) even when he was systematically presenting finite spirit as the highest phase in the order of nature. For, of course, the perspective of opposition between Nature and Spirit was just as logically necessary then; and it appeared then too, as the opposition between 'law' and 'life'. But then 'the marvellously strong nature' of the *Πόλις* appeared as the harmony of natural law and life.³ Now both life and law are being treated as spiritual moments, and the 'state of nature' has been set aside altogether.

This strength against which I am powerless is the strength

¹ *NKA*, viii. 255, 9–256, 10.

² *Schriften* (1913), pp. 468–9; Harris and Knox, pp. 146–7.

³ See *Natural Law*, *NKA*, iv. 460, 17–18 (Knox and Acton, p. 106).

of myself and my recognized fellows.¹ It depends upon its own process of formation in me and them. This process of formation is the negative social discipline that goes as far as cheerful subjection and willing support in all but a few of us most of the time, and as far as heroic sacrifice in emergencies. The representation of what is involved here as an 'original contract' made by agents who mutually recognize each other as free agents, and who all consent to surrender that freedom of action to the majority view of what their communal commitments are, is contradictory. For even as a moral ideal it contains the presupposition that those who dissent from the general decision may secede, and seek to found a community with others more nearly in harmony with them.² Nothing but anarchy could come into existence on this basis unless it is conceded that the moral ideal itself contains the logical assumption that a human plurality is implicitly one will. (In nature, the vegetable organism is implicitly many; in spirit a multitude of consciousness is implicitly one.) Once we admit that, we can recognize the necessary function of tyrannical authority in the founding of a political community. No one can become a tyrant without a considerable mass of popular support, which he does not get by physical intimidation. Often this support is a conscious recognition of 'lordship', i.e. it is the recognition of a directly felt authority that overrides one's own conscious will and preference. The focus of this superhuman authority may be revered afterwards as a hero, or lost to sight in the universal experience of revolutionary Terror.³ This truly spiritual authority is what Machiavelli understood and analysed in *The Prince*. The 'Prince' must secure his own power by all the violent means that ordinarily count as crime; but what raises him from the status of despot

¹ NKA, viii. 256, 11–257, 1. (We should notice that *this* is the point where the *implicit* articulation of the section begins, Hegel wrote 'Concept of the Constitution—its universal essence' in the margin, viii. 256, 24.)

² NKA, viii. 257, 6–24. (We are certainly meant to remember that Rousseau was a citizen of Calvin's Geneva; and equally we should remember the extremely authoritarian character of that Protestant society as we read on.)

³ NKA, viii. 12–13. These are the extremes of 'tyranny' necessary to the evolution of 'constitution' as concept. Theseus discovers the Πόλις positively, as part of the order of nature. He is, as Aristotle put it, the 'greatest of benefactors'—*Politics*, I. 2.15 (1253 a 30). Robespierre and the 'law of the suspect' create 'Nothing'; the Terror wipes the slate of 'nature' clean for a self-consciously spiritual beginning.

to that of tyrant is his vision of the sovereignty and independence of the *Volk*, which cannot exist unless lesser local authorities are destroyed, and the place of which will be filled by foreign domination if the *Volk* does not keep up with its neighbours. When the tyrant's work is done, he appears automatically as a despot. Then, it is the tyrant-slayers who are heroes.¹

State-power must always contain a tyrannical element, and those who exercise it must know when to display their tyrannical authority fearlessly. The subject must learn to be obedient. But the habit of obedience is the habit of reasoning—the will of the prince must be given the force of law, it must be given a universal interpretation; and once the habit of thinking legally is established, the personal will of the tyrant is superfluous. The spirit is 'sure of itself' in the law; the *Volk* stand ready to defend their law—and the tyrant is overthrown unless he has already become a constitutional monarch.² *Tyranny*, in any case, has become the word for the arbitrary will of a ruler who does not recognize the law—a sense which it does not properly have in the *Oedipus Tyrannus* of Sophocles. Original tyranny is the *Gegensatz* which the concept of 'Constitution' directly and necessarily contains in itself.³

The 'sovereignty of law' is the resolution of this *Gegensatz*. This is the developed concept of 'Constitution'. Every free individual is now conscious of himself as a *bourgeois* (in his

¹ *NKA*, viii. 259, 1–11. We might take the marginal reference to Peisistratus as offering a paradigm of despotism as distinct from tyranny. But the whole context suggests rather that the 'slaying of the tyrants' by Harmodius and Aristogeiton is in Hegel's mind. Tyranny must have two opposite manifestations in political history. It must be both nobly heroic, and diabolically degenerate. Coming after Solon, the work of Peisistratus must have the degenerate reading imposed on it. (In view of the fact that Frederick the Great's *Antimachiavel* is certainly in Hegel's mind when he speaks of the German 'abhorrence' for Machiavelli's teachings, it is perhaps legitimate to suspect Hegel of projecting a Peisistratid reputation for Frederick, when he echoes Frederick's language in speaking of the ultimate consequences of 'Gleichgültigkeit der Unterthanen gegen ihre Fürsten'.)

² The fate of the tyrant in the order of nature is to be assassinated or to become a constitutional king. But at the other end of the cycle, Robespierre goes to judicial execution through the operation of the constitutional structures of popular sovereignty that he has created (*NKA*, viii. 260, 4–13).

³ The point of the transition is marked by the underlining of '*sondern Tyranny*' at *NKA*, viii. 258, 14.

private, particular, legally classified capacity) and as a *citizen* (in his public, universal capacity). It is only in the context of a sovereign will that has already asserted itself and become law, that Rousseau's theory of the General Will can become a conscious moral ideal for the definition of the law's sovereignty. This 'protestant' self-assertion of rational consciousness, claiming the right of private judgement in the interpretation of law, and even the right to declare some laws unjust, some authorities despotic, is 'the higher principle of the modern time, which the ancients, which Plato knew not'.¹ For this is the meaning of the transformation of tyranny into constitutional monarchy. The 'prerogative' of the monarch, the aspect in which he is above the law *represents* the sovereignty of the people as the rational autonomy of every subject.²

The recognition of the 'protestant' character of the modern theory of popular sovereignty, the recognition that the safeguarding of a right of individual protest, and even of secession, is essential to the theory of the General Will itself, marks Hegel's decisive farewell to the 'Greek ideal' of his youth. From now on, that ideal is recognized as a merely aesthetic one, sub-rational precisely because it is impersonal. As an ideal of beauty, of natural harmony, it retains all the validity that it always had, and Hegel is as guilty as any disciple of Goethe, Schiller, and Winckelmann, of idealizing Greek culture aesthetically. But the 'tyranny' of that ideal is now finally diagnosed and broken. There is no right of critical protest in the recognized ethics of the *Πόλις*; Plato's *Republic* expresses the ideal of the time and the society that put Socrates to death. According to that ideal, the individual has no private life, his bourgeois existence, must be completely absorbed in his existence as a citizen.³ In that aspect he is immediately one with the City—in the way that the hereditary monarch is immediately one with the kingdom. That natural pole of the communal identity must be distinguished from the

¹ NKA, 263, 16–17.

² Hegel's comments about the uselessness of constitutional committees, etc., immediately after proclaiming the principle of hereditary monarchy, seem to me to show that he had Napoleon's proclamation of the Empire (1804) in mind as the final resolution of all the constitutional experimentation that had gone on since 1789.

³ Cf. NKA, viii. 262, 3–11; 263, 15–23; 263, 24–6 and 264, 17–19.

opposite extreme of bourgeois republican independence. The *Volk* as a free conceptual development is the middle between these two.¹

The monarch represents the natural extreme of the one civic family which Plato seeks to make absolute. But what is spiritually primary is the multiplicity of recognized bourgeois families, alienated from the feudal hierarchy of feelings and loyalties, and relying on their legal rights. A new purely spiritual sense of communal identity has to be generated in this atomic plurality; and the prince, as the repository of the values and achievements of natural societies must accept the place that the new communal will defines for him. He is essential to the social whole—or rather the natural values of love and loyalty that he embodies and represents are essential to it²—but not more essential than the polar opposite of free self-determination which those values generate in their natural embodiment (the family).

The structures of society and government must mediate between these poles in such a way as to maintain both of them. Hegel's articulation of these structures is modelled directly on his analysis of the structure of the living organism.³ First we view them as a system of interacting parts (the outer organism). Then we study the self-maintaining life-principle of each of them. Finally we study the inner life, the

¹ NKA, viii. 262, 11–263, 15. It is worth noting that—as Hegel's doctrine of divorce shows—this theory of the 'free universal' as the 'point of individuality' implicitly accords *citizen* status to women as well as men. But Hegel was not willing to commit himself 'beyond his time' in this respect, as Plato did. (We can see this by the way that he criticizes Plato's abolition of the family in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, TW-A, xix. 127–30. If we did not attend carefully to his theory of divorce, we might be tempted to think that the subjection of women was essential to Hegel's theory of 'protestant individuality'—as it apparently was to Rousseau's.)

² It is not at all necessary for the 'natural pole' to have any concrete links with the past. In fact, the situation of spiritual recognition involves behaving as if there are no naturally authoritative ties. But the monarchy must express the ties of blood, tradition, and above all 'brotherhood' that are actually recognized and felt. Thus the execution of Louis XVI was necessary because of his identification with the long *Bildung* of feudalism that was now ended. But Napoleon had finally got the new society started on the right base.

³ In actual fact it is a moot point how far the influence really went the other way. The social organism is far easier to observe, and the Heraclitean doctrine of a 'balanced conflict' is more directly suggested and supported by historical study than by anatomy and physiology. All that is certainly true is that there is a feed-back relation here.

consciousness, of the whole. (This last is the realm of Absolute Spirit.)

6. *The Social Classes and the Government*

The 'judgement' that expresses the Protestant concept of 'Constitution' that Hegel has expounded is the famous dictum of Louis XIV: 'I am the State.' Hegel's theory of class and government is an account of what that judgement means for every free citizen and civil servant (including the monarch). 'True Spirit'—which we have now reached, in contradistinction to the 'formal' *Dasein* of spirit at the level of 'recognized legal status', always designates in Hegel the sense of an immediate identity of the self with the social whole. This identity is essential to his theory because it is only in this way that the social whole can have an inner existence, a developed *self-consciousness*, at all. Human personal consciousness is the stuff, the raw material of the spirit as a self-conscious organism.¹ The human mind is the medium of the spirit's existence; any physical embodiment that spirit has, arises from the interpretation that a community of human minds have come to ascribe to the physical and social facts.

By this criterion the peasants are the class that has *no* self-consciousness. A peasant belongs to the *Volk*. But for him it is a community of blood, tradition, and faith, a natural entity. He *feels* his membership in it, but he has no concept of it. Everything ought to go on in his world as it always has done; and it is up to those whom God has charged with the governmental responsibility to see that it does so. The peasant's individuality is his sense of identity with his land. (Whatever inadequacies and oversimplifications there may be in Hegel's conception of peasant consciousness, we can recognize here the empirical basis of his theory of the 'struggle for recognition'.) In peacetime the peasant turns the soil, and in wartime he makes the cannon fodder. His knowledge of life is all proverbs.²

This is a caricature, and Hegel surely knew that. But I think

¹ Hegel noted this explicitly in the margin against his first mention of the spirit as an 'existing organism' (NKA, viii. 266, 19).

² NKA, viii. 267, 2-268, 14. The picture is more detailed than that given in the *System of Ethical Life, Schriften* (1913) pp. 473, 480; Harris and Knox, pp. 150, 156.

he would claim in his own defence that his scholar's image of the peasant has the right kind of 'distance', and that all the omitted details are irrelevant because the fixed conditions and requirements of agricultural life will always prevent the nascent signs of a more advanced form of consciousness from developing beyond the embryonic stage. What is important here is not the fact that he was wrong, so much as the clear evidence that in his view the material conditions of life determine the development of consciousness. He believes that there is a critical threshold at which a cyclic (or feed-back) relationship of life and thought is set up, and that peasant life has not passed, and cannot pass, that threshold.

The bourgeois class, on the other hand, is the one in which that dialectical cycle has taken over. Hegel presents the solid world of the comfortable worthies of the city guilds and of commerce, as if their system of recognized status were as stable as it takes itself to be when it walks abroad 'outside the City Gate' of Goethe's Frankfurt on the Sabbath.¹ But behind this stable façade is not the soil of the country and the cycle of the seasons, but the labile fluidity of money, and the changes and chances of business. A city worthy is worth just what he owns. We find out what that is in the market, where the commercial class forms the middle between the two great categories of primary producers, the peasants and the artisans of the guilds.

We should take careful note that there is no mention of mere labourers, or of mere financiers, in Hegel's class system. From his discussion of 'recognized status', we know that his bourgeois society is a mechanized and factory-based one. The rationalization of labour, culminating in the arrival of machines marks the end of feudal industry for Hegel. So the class structure he describes: peasants, burghers, and merchants, everyone being by implication an independent proprietor, contains in each case its own internal antithesis. In the case of the peasant proprietors, the antithesis of serfdom is clearly on its way out. In the other classes the antithesis—the urban proletariat—is waxing rather than waning. But the

¹ Cf. *NKA*, viii. 268, 15–269, 10 with *Faust*, Part I, 808–1010. (There can hardly be a direct influence here, unless it came through Goethe's conversation, since the scene did not form part of *Faust*, *Ein Fragment*.)

implicit destiny is surely the same. For what the work of the 'middle' class brings to light, is that the object of all this life and work is to make money. The 'disposition' of commerce is not to be as comfortable and self-satisfied as peasants and guildsmen alike, but to be 'just' with the grasping honesty of Ebenezer Scrooge. So the 'disposition' of the factory worker, upon whose misery (*Elend*) the most advanced aspect of the system of production rests, needs no elaboration. Logically the factory worker belongs to the bourgeois class. But Hegel delays all mention of him until we come to the monetary product of the whole process, and the feed-back reaction that the market economy has on the *Gesinnung* of everyone involved.¹ The conclusion seems to be obvious. The political revolution that is already in progress is the necessary prelude to a socio-economic one by which the marketing of labour will be halted. Hegel's confidence of this rested on his conviction that the drive toward family independence was part of the order of nature itself. That this order itself could be distorted by the rational mechanisms of law and economics he did not foresee. But then, he did not foresee the retreat from Moscow or the Battle of Waterloo either.²

Money is the 'blood' of social life. The first task of government is to supervise its circulation. This is the main task of judiciary and police force. But the control of the flow through taxation is where the *wisdom* of government is displayed. This wisdom shows also in the way justice is administered. Each class is to be dealt with differently, according to its 'disposition'. For instance, the marriage laws should be different for each.³ I have suggested that the sexual revolution is implicitly prepared for in Hegel's theory of divorce. But, just as I believe it is plain that he expected an economic revolution, so it is likewise plain that he did not expect, or have the smallest care about, equal opportunity for women. For him the boundaries of woman's existence were as firmly and permanently settled by nature as the limits of peasant life.

¹ NKA, viii. 269, 22–270, 13 (esp. viii. 270, 8–9).

² Not that his social ideals changed at all when these events occurred—only he was made aware how unfathomable and dark the future was.

³ NKA, viii. 271, 22. (No details of the sort of difference involved are given.)

The recognition of customary patterns and values in the administration of justice must at some points militate against social mobility, and the ideal of 'the career open to the talents'. But Hegel's evident desire for freedom in the sense of the self-definition of each functional subgroup in the society causes him to ignore this problem.¹ It is clear that he sees legislation, interpretation, and administration of regulations all proceeding in the context of continual consultation with those for whom the policing and juridical work is done. All the same, the 'disposition' that he ascribes to civil servants is that of a piece of clockwork. They should have a Kantian, or perhaps I ought to say Fichtean, 'formal' consciousness of duty performed.² But the good civil servant or 'man of affairs' is already something of a 'scholar'. He has to know the world of civil affairs and understand his place in it—hardly more so than a merchant certainly, but in a different, objective, *theoretical* way, since he is morally debarred from making a personal profit out of his knowledge.

This purely theoretical concern is the mark of scholarship proper; and with it absolute freedom begins, but only as intelligence, not yet as a concrete form of spirit. For the moment we are concerned with the social function of education, as the production and maintenance of the theoretical training and skills that society needs for its maintenance. This class mans the schoolroom all the week, and mounts the pulpit on Sundays. But it is an evident fact of Protestant experience that religious inspiration and philosophical insight do not always originate within this class or these activities—not to speak of artistic creativity.³

¹ Thus the principle that attention should be paid to the social significance of criminal conviction and sentence (*NKA*, viii. 272, 3–11) seems to create no problem. But it is a different matter with the marginal note in which a class institution like duelling is accepted (viii. 272, 22–6).

² The description of the civil servant's work as 'Maschinenarbeit' (*NKA*, viii. 273, 5) echoes the attack on Fichte's 'machine-state'. It does not imply that the work itself is dehumanizing or boring (like machine-minding); only, perhaps, that the person who does it is a bore. Hegel's father was a major civil servant, we should remember; he, himself, had graduated to the next class, the *Gelehrten*.

³ It is evident from the marginal note that this is at least part of what is meant by the comment that scholarship is 'an activity which deals with the *thought* as such—which utters (*entaussert*) its own self as intelligence, not as absolute *actual self*' (*NKA*, viii. 274, 5–7). The note is clearly meant to explain the 'absolute *actual*

What the theoretical approach of scholarship lacks is the self-commitment of the soldier. Here 'the whole is individuality', for it is *this* people that goes to war to exact recognition of its autonomous selfhood from the other that is its enemy. Peoples really are in a state of nature. They make 'contracts', but 'international relations' is quite different from the market justice maintained by police and courts, because the *Volk* is its own judge, and the only court of appeal is the judgement of God on the battlefield. Kant's contract for 'perpetual peace' could come about only in the way that the nation itself has come about; through the imperial tyranny of one nation over all, developing gradually into a universal constitutional monarchy. (It is significant that this possibility—which was realized by Rome and the *pax Romana* in the 'natural' world of the *gentes*—is mentioned without any hint of irony here. After 1815, Hegel's philosophy of history contains only the negative or divine 'court of judgement'.)¹

The soldier actually puts his life at risk, on the battlefield. This is where the megalomania of the criminal is justified and the truth of the Protestant principle demonstrated; and in modern warfare even the struggle for recognition is rationalized, because everyone faces the anonymous power of death, and not a particular adversary against whom natural strength or cultivated bodily skills might be decisive.²

The peril of death is the shaking of all the foundations, the abolition of all the artificial utterances of selfhood in labour, property, and legal personality. The survival of the whole way of life now depends on the identification of one's own natural life with it. It is the morale of the community that is tested in war; so Hegel brings his discussion of the class system to a close with a few lines about how the *general* 'disposition' of the

self: 'War, the government in the inner man (*nach innen*), singular *Volk*—Art, Religion, *Philosophy*' (viii. 274, 22–3).

¹ Hegel speaks (*NKA*, viii. 275, 4–6) of the 'dominion of one *Volk*' or 'universal monarchy'. But his discussion of the necessary evolutionary pattern of 'constitution' has shown that, so far as they are distinguishable, the first is the pathway to the second; and the model case of Rome's achievement in the world of natural politics is the evident empirical confirmation. ('Eternal peace' and 'the Golden Age' are condemned as 'empty dreaming' in the margin, viii. 275, 24.)

² *NKA*, viii. 275, 9–21 and 28. (According to Rosenkranz, Hegel first made the point about gunpowder in a lost fragment of the *German Constitution* essay—see *Hegels Leben*, p. 237; *Toward the Sunlight*, p. 458.)

people is created and maintained. The wisdom of the government lies first in letting the organic subgroups run their own affairs, and secondly in being flexible in general administration, knowing how to make the right exceptions and compromises. Doing the right thing is ultimately acting spontaneously, not in the sense of 'doing what comes naturally' but of letting the spirit blow where it will, once every effort to achieve an intelligent grasp of the situation has been made. This (I think) is what Hegel means by 'rest in the immediate present'.¹

7. *Absolute Spirit*

The three *governing* classes—civil servants, scholars, soldiers—are 'spirit certain of itself', because they are consciously working for the good of the community. It is interesting that we hear nothing about the 'absoluteness' or 'nobility' of any of them. In the order of natural ethics the officer class and the priesthood are 'noble';² and Napoleon was creating a new military nobility. But Hegel's spiritual world is marked by the sense of brotherhood, even though it is not abstractly democratic. Gunpowder has had a democratic, levelling effect on warfare; and Absolute Spirit is essentially democratic, even in the natural world of freemen and slaves.³ Art and Religion are for everyone; anyone, no matter what his place in society can give himself up completely to expressing the communal self-consciousness in art (if he can get the training for it); and everyone can dedicate their lives to God as completely as the soldier does in battle.⁴ Hegel's insistence that philosophy is for everyone, and that a mature culture will express its philosophical speculation in the ordinary language

¹ This phrase is the culmination of a marginal note which seems to be summing up *Sittlichkeit* as perceived by the soldier under fire (NKA, viii. 277, 21). But its universal applicability is evident, and the universal *Gegenwart* is the concern of Absolute Spirit to which we now pass.

² Cf. *System of Ethical Life, Schriften* (1913), pp. 475–6, 482–4; Harris and Knox, pp. 152, 157–9.

³ Cf. *Jedes Volk hat ihm eigene Gegenstände*, TW-A, i. 199 (Knox and Kroner, pp. 147–8).

⁴ This dedication will not appear *outwardly* as the soldier's dedication does. But nothing at this level appears outwardly except the work of the artist. Priest and philosopher belong outwardly to the scholars.

of every day, is a reflection of the difference between the spiritual and the natural order (in which the philosopher belongs properly to the military élite).¹ The military consciousness is still (as Plato thought) the prerequisite for entry to this world, in the sense that an absolute dedication like that of the battlefield is what distinguishes 'Absolute Spirit' from mere scholarship. But it is the militancy of Christian charity, not that of aggressive patriotism that is involved.

Beauty is the *natural* key to entry into the realm of Absolute Spirit because it is only in *beauty* that it can appear at all. But even here it appears sensibly as *love*. The aestheticism that reverences the art *object* as an object belongs to the spirit of scholarship, not to Absolute Spirit. Art is the vehicle of Absolute Spirit only when what it mediates is the awareness of something lovable in and for itself, so that the reverence involved is dedication, i.e. it is as much practical as theoretical. Art is, for Hegel—as it was for Schiller—the sphere of *Platonic* love, i.e. of active aspiration toward the divine; artistic *ἐρώς* is transformed in religious consciousness into perfect faith; and that faith is given its *present reality*, so that it becomes knowledge, in philosophy. But each stage contains its predecessors completely, though in a sublimated form.

We can scarcely recognize even the project of Hegel's mature *Aesthetics* in the extremely telegraphic notes on the forms of art that he put down here; the emphasis here is very different because there are many contradictory tensions that still await their dialectical resolution. Because of the absolute importance of the *message*, the linguistic arts are bound to rank higher than the plastic ones; and because the meaning is ultimately the inward meaning of life itself, the concept of self-consciousness, poetry falls into the destructive self-contradiction of allegory. But the God of art, in the natural perspective, is Dionysus rather than Apollo—a Hegelian anticipation of Nietzsche's antinomy which broke into public print in the celebrated comparison of philosophical truth to the Bacchanalian revel. When the fullness of the content is taken as the primary criterion, it is the dance (rather than

¹ The evident aristocratic bias of the fragment which Rosenkranz (pp. 132–3) treats as the conclusion of the *System of Ethical Life* (Harris and Knox, p. 178) is what finally convinces me that he is right at least about the period that it belongs to.

sculpture) in which the form and content are in perfect harmony. But the dance expresses life in its immediacy, and sinks almost out of consciousness into natural feeling; it is *anschauungslos*.¹ Beauty is only a veil with which truth is decked, rather than the displaying of truth itself. Its highest achievement is to create the illusion of absolute vitality in a non-living medium. The antithesis of form and matter is really essential to it; and it is in this perspective that Apollo emerges as the god of Art (though Hegel does not mention him).

'In its truth Art is rather Religion.'² The treatment of Greek art merely as a phase of Religion in the *Phenomenology* is a reflection of this dictum, and provides the clue to its meaning. That we should 'play for the Gods' (as Plato would put it), or make human life into a thing of beauty for thoughtful contemplation, is the highest message of Greek culture as the perfection of natural consciousness. Art gives all nature a spiritual meaning (even though it does so only by creating illusions). The religion of art reveals the deeper truth of that 'illusion', the truth that outer natural reality exists as a means for the expression of the inward Spirit, which can express itself only as the meaning conveyed by outward signs.

But the religion of art is aristocratic in essence. Art is for everyone, the whole *Volk* must recognize itself in the work of art and its message. Otherwise it cannot count as a mode of Absolute Spirit. But it is only the privileged self of the artist (dancer, athlete, soldier) that actively expresses and experiences the incarnation of the Absolute Spirit in its activity; and even to the extent that the experience is universal, because everyone is an artist making public life more beautiful in some way, recognition belongs to him for his natural gifts or his specialized skill, not for his humanity as such.

¹ *NKA*, viii. 278, 20. (Hegel—who was a very clumsy dancer himself—does not consider the dance as a *spectacle*, presumably because the absoluteness of the experience is then lost. The claim that art 'is the Indian Bacchus' is at viii. 279, 12–13.)

² *NKA*, viii. 280, 7. This perspective seems more appropriate for the *Phenomenology*. Hegel distinguishes the standpoint of art as such from that of the 'religion of art' not only in the *Phenomenology* (see *NKA*, ix. 402, 17–33; Miller, sect. 753) but even in the lectures of 1803 reported by Rosenkranz (p. 181; Harris and Knox, pp. 255–6). So the survival of the perspective of Nature in the *system* itself is a clear indication of his determination to recover and preserve everything valid in his own quadripartite Philosophy of Identity—but see further p. 517 n. 1 below.

In absolute religion, all nature is hallowed—not just human nature—including those parts of the subhuman order that man can transform into signs for his self-expression or instruments for his purpose. 'The heavens declare the glory of God' not just as the dead medium in which God's artistic power is expressed, but through what they are in themselves, or through the recognized divinity of the living energy that their motion expresses. Otherwise, it would be blasphemy to name 'the starry heavens' in the same breath with 'the moral law' as proper objects of religious reverence. But to say this is already to say that, just as 'art in its truth is rather religion', so religion in its truth is rather philosophy. For it is only a true philosophy of nature that can recognize the divinity in natural forces, without thereby degrading religious consciousness below the level that it has already achieved in 'the religion of art'. For the religious consciousness that has gone beyond the aesthetic level it is indeed blasphemy to say what Kant said—a creative blasphemy that drives spirit on toward the proper reconciliation with nature that will finally remove it. The message of absolute religion as faith is that God is spirit, and hence that every spiritual consciousness is one with him—that the very babe in the manger is one with God, before he has become even the minimal artist of linguistic expression that we all are, man, woman, child, slave, or free.

This is the 'depth' that engulfs the Greek gods. Hegel had run through the 'phenomenology' of this Absolute Spirit in its relation to nature in his earlier four-part system. But now that is out of place. Just as Art can come before us in the new system, only as the perfected concept which is the fulfilment of natural consciousness—the humanized 'religion of nature'—so Religion must be presented in its perfection, the moment of perfect balance before it tumbles over toward philosophy.

This moment of perfect equilibrium is the religion of the successful Protestant reformers. For them, even for the greatest humanists among them, Greek religion is a childish thing, without depth or seriousness, because it does not recognize the absolute significance, the eternal status of every single human soul. Every one of us must do his duty in this life, in the station God has given him; but each of us must

define it for himself, in the inwardness of his own conscience, where he is alone with God, spirit face to face with spirit. Thus this spirit is 'reconciled with its own world',¹ but not yet with the world of nature, for which the Greeks found the humanizing key. Properly speaking, there is strict opposition between the aesthetic reconciliation of inner and outer, and the pure religion of the inward spirit. The Protestant is rightly an iconoclast.

Hegel does not say this here, but he does insist on the absolute contrast between the outward, weekday hierarchy of stations, and the inward, Sabbath consciousness of equality in the sight of God. The spirit must be reconciled with its world, its embodiment here, precisely in order to rise beyond it. Doing the duties of my station is the condition of my entry into God's kingdom. But that kingdom is within; it cannot be uttered. My Sabbath experience is only a symbol of it. It has no presence here and now. It exists in my thought, and I *yearn* for it. I picture it, but I know that all the pictures are false. Thus my religion is indeed 'the truth of art'.

This negation is just the *thought* that what is actual is the noumenal, that not the expression but the thinking activity which produces it, and gives it its meaning is what is truly real. God is in man, but only as 'risen', no longer here. The flesh itself, and all that belongs to it is evil. Religion is the offering up of this life, just as the picture shows us the divine man, God's Son, sacrificing his natural life. But just as the outward representation of this for faithful contemplation is artificial, allegorical, so every active expression of it in life is hopelessly inadequate.

This fanaticism for the inward truth must recognize the truth where it is. The Church has its truth, not in the Kingdom of Heaven, but in the kingdom of this world—in the State which is its opposite. If they remain unreconciled it is because they are both still imperfect.² The *Volk* is the outward existence (*Dasein*) of human immortality, and the State is the actuality of the Kingdom of Heaven. Not only our

¹ NKA, viii. 281, 5.

² NKA, viii. 284, 22–3. It is important to notice this concession, because only the philosophical interpretation that reconciles them in principle can determine what is

task but our reward is to be found here, in present experience. The Church is the inward security of the State; it is in the Church, not the State that conscience is to be respected. (The State cannot respect consciences, because by definition it enforces respect for public law upon all alike. But it must preserve the Church as its own inward antithesis.)

Thus the relation of Church and State is a curious one. The Church has no 'actuality', in the sense of self-enforcing power, at all. It cannot have any authority, for all authority resides in the State by definition. The Church must respect all consciences (including those of its enemies). But the recognition of individual conscience is the recognition of something beyond all authority. Martyrdom is the weapon of conscience, and one does not need to know a lot of history to be aware that it is a mighty one. Hegel is right to focus attention on the death penalty as he continually does, not least because the dialectic of authority and fanaticism can never cease while the death penalty is a normal part of the jurisprudence of 'treason'.

What gives the religion of inwardness the insight to recognize its ideal in its own opposite—and even the lesser insight to recognize that its own principle of the sacredness of the inward conscience involves the renunciation of the outward authority which only the State can employ¹—is philosophy. Hegel's brief notes on it are a summing up of his system, and especially of the 'real philosophy' as he has developed it here. The connection of Philosophy with Art and Religion is made through the dogma of the Trinity and the theory of the Ego as consciousness (productive imagination developing into pure self-concept). The content which Christian theology expresses in the dogmas of the Trinity,² the

the other-worldly *fanaticism* of the Church, and what the incomplete dialectic of actuality in the State.

¹ Hegel never actually says that the Church *must* respect all consciences. He only says that the State need not. But the inference is simple, and the translation of the ideal of perfect charity is surely safe enough. (All Hegel's notes on Absolute Spirit are telegraphic, so one *must* read the implications and hints as thoroughly as possible. The schematic brevity of the treatment may be the reason why Art is dealt with only in its natural perfection, and Religion only in its perfection as pure thought. But the strict antithesis also has the practical value of making the 'need for philosophy'—and for the new philosophical religion—clearer.)

² As the reader will see from the quotation below, the Trinity is not explicitly referred to, but all the indications of the religious form of the content are fugitive; and

utterance of the Logos, the Fall, and the Redemption, philosophical insight translates into the twin sciences of speculative philosophy and philosophy of nature. The insight that does this is itself the subject of the highest science, the science of spirit. But it is only the fact that Hegel speaks of the second science as 'philosophy of nature' not as 'real philosophy' simply, that indicates the independence of the science of spirit. The boundary between these two sciences is not clearly defined, and does not unambiguously agree with the structure of the manuscript that is here summed up; and it seems that the ambiguity is deliberate, and that it is rooted in the final triad of the lost Logic (and probably in the way that the category of Relation was developed in that part of the system).¹ In effect, Hegel has combined his earliest triadic conception of philosophy with his latest one (which is actually quadripartite because the introductory phenomenology of spirit needs to be distinguished as a distinct part of 'speculative philosophy'); and by doing this, he has preserved the basic structure of the Identity Philosophy which was threatened by his revolutionary move to the transcendental standpoint of 'cognition' in the Summer of 1803.

Thus the explicit articulation that he offers us is dyadic. The third moment of the triad is very clearly implied, but it is not named, and it cannot be *unambiguously* named, because it is defined in the discussion in two conflicting ways. The dyad we are offered is:

α) speculative philosophy, absolute *being* that [becomes] other to itself (becomes *Relation*) life and cognition—and [self]-knowing knowledge, spirit, the spirit's knowing of itself— β) nature philosophy—expression of the Idea in the shapes of immediate being—it is the going into self, *evil*, coming to be spirit; [coming] to the *concept existing* as concept; but this pure intelligence is just as much the opposite, the universal, and indeed that which offers itself up, and thereby comes to the actual—and it is universal actuality, the *Volk*, the manufactured (*hergestellte*) nature, the reconciled essence

once we pick up the parallel of 'nature-philosophy' with the story of man's Fall and Redemption, the theological counterpart of 'speculative philosophy' is obvious.

¹ The vital importance of the parallel between the 'relationship of being' and the 'relationship of thought' which I shall demonstrate in the following analysis, strongly suggests that the Logic of 1805 preserved some aspects of the conceptual structure of the Logic of 1804 which are no longer visible in the Logic of 1808.

in which each assumes his being for self through his own uttering and offering up [of himself].¹

The description of 'nature-philosophy' here corresponds not to what is called 'Naturphilosophie' in the manuscript itself, but to the whole 'Realphilosophie' which is the topic of the course—except for 'C. Art, Religion and Philosophy', which thus becomes the implicit *gamma*, the Absolute Spirit at which nature arrives through its redemption, or the 'kingdom of heaven on earth'.

On the other hand, the description of philosophy in its reconciled totality which follows is a description of the *whole* philosophy of spirit as presented in our manuscript. The principle of philosophical cognition is the Ego, 'this inseparable knotting of the singular and the universal', the *Verknüpfung* of the singularity universally present in nature, and the universality of all essences, all thought. 'The *immediacy* of the Spirit is the spirit of the *Volk*.' But the ego is the *restored* immediacy through its passage from immediate sense-consciousness to the absolute *Wissen* of philosophy.²

The key to the riddle is the reference to *Verhältnis* in the summing up of 'speculative philosophy'. 'Life, cognition, and absolute *Wissen*' are the final triad of the Logic (of 1808, and surely of 1805, too). If we consider the evolution of this triad in terms of the category of Relation, it is clear that *Leben* is the totality achieved in the 'relation of being', while *Erkennen* is perfected in the 'relation of thought'. As 'relations' these two evolve in parallel. Thus the evolution of finite spirit involves both the self-making of the social organism (the *Volk* which is our 'second' or *hergestellte Natur*) and the evolution of its self-cognition. The highest level of the order of nature, overlaps and runs in harness with the phenomenological evolution of spirit. Both are historical processes (as well as being logical ones); and the boundary between Nature and Spirit becomes ambiguous because of this overlap. There is not a line between them at all but rather a large area of common territory.

If we turn back to the extremely telegraphic summing-up of

¹ NKA, viii. 286, 7–15. (I have kept as close as I can to the actual form of what Hegel wrote.)

² Ibid., 286, 19–287, 1.

'speculative philosophy' with this in mind, we can now see that the injection of the parenthesis '(*Verhältniss* wird)' gives that an ambiguous character likewise. *Leben*, *Erkennen*, and *Wissen* form the ultimate triad of speculative Logic; and as such they are the focal concerns of 'Real Philosophy'. *Leben* is the topic of the philosophy of nature; *Erkennen* of the philosophy of spirit; and *wissendes Wissen* of 'C: Art, Religion and Science'. On the other hand, if we consider *Leben* and *Erkennen* as internal relationships which come finally to *wissendes Wissen* when their *mutual* relationship of mirror images works itself out into recognized identity, then they are not the topics of speculative logic (or of real philosophy) at all, but rather of the new critical logic, i.e. of the phenomenology of spirit. The phenomenology of spirit is the introduction to speculative logic; but it is also the first part of real philosophy; for in its treatment of the relation of nature and spirit as a 'relation of being' it provides that part of the theory of reality without which, the system itself would not be intelligible, and absolute knowledge would not be real—*Wissen* would not be *wissendes*.

This is the significance of the fact that the overlap between Nature and Spirit is a *historical* process. The relation of Nature and Spirit is not simply a logical transition but a real one. Nature transcends itself, its highest achievement breaks down and dies without reproduction, as Spirit appears. The 'phenomenology of spirit' is not the simple rebirth of the natural social order, but its resurrection into the eternal life (of *Wissenschaft*); in other words it is not just the logical appreciation of the way things have been and always must be, but a radical transformation of the way they are and always will be from henceforth. Thus it is the logical analysis of a unique *historical moment*; the comprehension of the great transition in human life and human cognition that began with the advent of Alexander as destroyer of the political order of nature, and ended (in principle) with Napoleon's proclamation as Emperor in 1804.¹

¹ That the rationalization of human society in terms of the 'rights of man and citizen' is not yet quite complete in historical fact only became a real problem for Hegel when the dialectic of the revolution was visibly brought to a standstill in 1815. Even then his theoretical position did not change in the slightest. He only ceased to

The system of philosophy then is quadripartite, and it presents two distinct triadic perspectives: a theoretical one in which the *Phenomenology* is philosophical preparation for the triadic system of Logic, Nature, and Spirit; and a practical one in which the *Phenomenology* is a real grounding for the triad of Speculative Philosophy, Real Philosophy, and Absolute Knowledge.

This latter triadic perspective (first formulated in the *Difference* essay)¹ is the one that dominates in the account of *Wissenschaft* at the end of our manuscript; and it does so because the speculative significance of Art as a 'concept' is thereby made plain. The completion of Real Philosophy requires that the whole order of natural existence—world-history as well as the stable equilibrium of nature proper—shall be comprehended as a 'work of art'.² To make this '*ruhendes Kunstwerk*' out of world-history is the practical task of the *Phenomenology*; and this 'art of the pure concept' is Hegel's final formulation of the requirement laid down in the 'Earliest System-programme' that 'the philosopher must possess just as much aesthetic power as the poet'.³ History must be comprehended as the completion of the natural order. Time, the real lived time of human existence, must be comprehended in the 'thought of time'. Otherwise the spirit cannot be absolute as knowledge, it cannot know itself perfectly and it cannot reach the unmoving standpoint from which the bad infinity of both space and time can be comprehended truly.

Thus in posing the problem of the *Phenomenology* Hegel closes two circles. The Real Philosophy closes upon itself, for the bad infinity of the concept of space-and-time was where it began; and the system of philosophy closes upon itself as a

present the dialectic of society as involving a clear hope for the future. The grounds of the clear hope had perished, and the future had become enigmatic. Had he lived to be seventy-five, Marx and Engels might have converted him once more to a definite reading of where the social dialectic was going. But since he did not budge from his theoretical position in 1815, it is safe to say that nothing would ever have budged him from the ideals of constitutional society and respect for individual conscience which the *Gegensatz* of State and Church represented for him already in 1805; or from his conception of what the 'Resurrection' and the 'Kingdom of Heaven' were as a *Gegenwart*.

¹ NKA, iv. 74, 10–77, 26 (Harris and Cerf, pp. 169–74).

² NKA, viii. 287, 1–2.

³ *eine Ethik, Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft, 9, p. 264, 36–7; *Toward the Sunlight*, p. 511.

whole, for the ultimate problem of philosophy as the *Aufhebung* of religion—the reconciliation of Spirit with Nature absolutely—is the same as the first problem of philosophy as a science: the proper establishment of man's possession of the standpoint of logical necessity (or 'eternal validity') apart from which no cognition can be validated as absolute knowledge. Because of the identity of these two problems, the *Phenomenology* cannot just be an introductory 'Phenomenology of Reason'; it must also be a real *Phenomenology of Spirit*, moving from the 'ethical Substance' to the Protestant 'State and Church'. Nature and Spirit must be understood as one single essence. Otherwise our logical certainty that empirical interpretation must itself be eternally corrigible will remain unintelligible. This is an abstract logical way of saying that we must understand how historical freedom is naturally *possible* (i.e. what its 'nature' is) given that the order of nature is logically *necessary* for the realization of freedom in history. This conceptual problem is what the 'reconciliation' of Spirit and Nature (and all the theological talk of a God who created the world 'in the beginning') is all about. For this is the problem of the *logical* beginning of the rational interpretation of life, and of our cognitive consciousness of it. In more theological-sounding language this problem and the solving of it is 'the *eternal* creation, i.e. the creation of the *concept* of Spirit'.¹ But it is transparently obvious in the *Phenomenology* that this eternal creation is the self-examination of ordinary human conscious experience that aims to be scientific about itself. Human rationality as communal consciousness—that and nothing else—is the *Gegenwart* that philosophy of its charity, gives to the faith and hope of religion.

¹ NKA, viii. 287, 18–19.

APPENDIX

Hegel's diagram of Spirit as Organism

The diagram in the margin of Hegel's discussion of the organism seems to have human life and human cognitive experience as its subject-matter. The following attempt at a detailed interpretation begins from this assumption; and although every detail in it is conjectural, I think that the consistency of the whole must at least be held to validate the initial assumption. Other interpretations could no doubt be proposed for every element, and at every stage. Certainty or finality is scarcely thinkable in the interpretation of what was surely never intended as more than a blackboard diagram for a retrospective summary in a lecture (and perhaps not even for that). But I think it will be generally conceded that the grounds for the interpretation here proposed are the obviously relevant ones; and hence that the true interpretation *must* fall within the conceptual range of the basic assumption made here.

1. *The Evidence*

The evidence that I take to be directly relevant to the interpretation of the big diagram is (a) some comments of Hegel about the embodiment of the Solar System in organic life; (b) the diagrammatic syllogisms, using what I take to be sun and planet signs, along with the interpretive statements that Hegel makes about them. I shall therefore give these in the order of their occurrence (the diagrams reproduced exactly, the statements translated as faithfully as I can manage). Then I give my proposed rationalization of the large diagram as circles and ellipses.

(a) (NKA, vi. 186, 10–189, 6)

'If we reflect *upon this cyclic course* [Kraislauff] of the

organic [i.e. the cycle of sexual reproduction], we see that the organic *is* the unity of *two processes, which form [bilden] a single cycle*; the one is the cyclic course in which the independent elements become ideal elements, and from these become just as absolutely independent, in that their ideality [or] negative universality is immediately positive universality too, the cyclic course of self-maintenance; [or] of the being-positing of the elemental process in the organic [*new page*] the other [is] the cyclic course of the Kind; the realized Idea. The organic which has thus sublated its difference on the external side, [or] as against the process of the elements, in that it posits the process within itself, [and] posits the elements within its own self, disintegrates internally [*zerfällt in sich*] into differentiated [*differente*] organic individuals, it comes to be the sexes; and it sublates this difference likewise, and returns back to the first one. The organic intuitively its otherness [*Andersseyn*] [for] itself there [i.e. in that first difference] as the totality of the inorganic process, unaware that it is this same totality; this otherness comes to be for it in such a way that this other becomes itself, or that its own otherness is the same organic essence, and this difference inverts itself again into the first one. Both interlock directly with one another [*greiffen unmittelbar in einander*]. The becoming sublated of the difference as against the inorganic process, becomes a difference of the sexes, and the becoming sublated of this [becomes] that first difference.


We see from this that organic individuality is hereby the absolute unity of the doubled motion; <the motion> within itself [self-maintenance], and that which relates itself to another [sexual congress]; and the essence of the Earth is completely realized within it; or within it the Earth comes to itself and brings itself to birth as this absolute unity of the doubled motion. The two movements are, as has been shown, one absolutely indistinguishable cyclic course, the Idea, the *Kind*, is the *Sun* of the individual, around which the self-maintaining motion, the motion relating to the individual, is dragged; and this *motion* of the individual around the Kind, while it is connected on one side with the Idea, is connected on the other side with an inorganic nature. It is the middle, the infinity of external-being [*ausser-sichseyn*] is in itself

external to itself in two respects [*nach 2 Seiten*]; it is the Earth which moves around the Sun; likewise a moon moves round it, and in their being it holds off Sun and Moon from itself (but in such a way that it gets the force which, *qua* active, it uses against the Moon, only from the Sun); in this way the organic, [which] maintains itself against the might of the Kind which makes it go under, just as it does against the might of inorganic nature, and spins [*sich bewegt*] upon its axis on its own account, is within itself [and] maintains itself. But this motion of the organic individual within itself is the consuming of the inorganic nature, and [so] that it may have the Kind within it, [or] be conformable to it; and thus the Universal is the absolute Middle, which moves itself within itself, around which the Individuality is moved, which being, on the periphery, for ever changes its position [*immer andres werdende*]. But the maintenance-process of the individual as its spinning upon [*Bewegung um*] itself only gets its force from the Kind, the Idea, and in the maintenance-process the Kind exists as living organism [*Organisches*] in the organic individual; and *the Individual* [exists] as the *absolute Middle* and *unity* between the totality as inorganic nature, and the organic Idea, in such a way that this its shape, is its own activity; but, the Idea posits itself equally absolutely as active against the individual. It is inorganic nature which comes to be as Kind in sex and bears away the victory therefrom over the individual.' [*Bewegung* is translated indifferently as 'motion' or 'movement'; where axial rotation is clearly meant 'spinning' is used, but the German expression is given.]

(b) 1. In his discussion of the galvanic process Hegel wrote: 'This tension advances *through water substance subsistence* or the neutral body into existence (*Daseyn*).' In the margin against this he wrote: 'Second syllogism* and indeed divided—each posits itself through the middle (through the other differentiated [*different*]) the other is the ground; thereby each exists (*ist da*) as differentiated; there is negation posited in its *being*.— α It is *in itself*, universal; β Unity of itself† and of the opposed individuality. γ) differentiated connecting itself to another as to an alien—syllogism of Winterl type.

In this syllogism each posits itself and the other differentiated—chemical difference.'

*Above
'second
syllogism' he
wrote:



†Beside
'Unity of itself'
he drew this:

(NKA, viii. 106, 11-12 and 17-24).

2. The large diagram which we are seeking to interpret, was drawn in the margin (without any written comment) beside the following passage:


Paragraph I (before the diagram) reads as follows: 'I. The organic is immediately unity of Singularity and Universality, organic Kind; it is exclusive One, it excludes the universal from itself,—the Kind abandoned by the might of negativity, [i.e.] by life—or the organic posits [for] itself its own inorganic—the Kind is the absolutely universal, which sets the abstract universal over against itself; precisely thereby it has also let the moment of Singularity go free, the moment which is the negative relating [*Verhalten*] against the inorga-

nic. In the syllogism of the merely organic living [being] the Kind, the Universal, does not come forth as free actuality of its own.'


Paragraph II (with the diagram beside it) reads: 'II. The Kind stands here at the side of the organic—The syllogistic conclusion is that the Kind gets united immediately with the inorganic.—The individual consumes itself; the non-excluding diremption; connection of the organic to itself; it sublates its own inorganicity, nourishes itself from itself, articulates itself within itself dirempts *its own* universality into its distinctions. The course [*Verlauff*] of the process within itself.'

Paragraph III (after the diagram) continues: 'III. The syllogistic conclusion is connection of both of the sides which are the whole organic—Or diremption of this whole into opposites, independent sexes, sublation of the single [being], and the having come into being of the Kind, but as singular actual [being] which begins the cyclic course [*Kreislauff*] again.' (NKA, viii. 121, 3–122, 6).

The diagram (which seems to have been drawn as an articulation of the same process at the higher level of spirit) appears thus:



(The interpretation here proposed relies on the rationalization shown in Figure 1.)

Figure A.1 *The proposed rationalization of Hegel's diagram*

3. The first of the small syllogistic diagrams occurs in the context of Hegel's development of this summary of organic process. It seems to refer to the establishment of organic independence through the digestion of the organic matter which an animal consumes. In this digestive power the actuality of the Kind is manifested. The text reads: 'This immediate transition [a supposed ability of all parts of the organic body to assimilate other organic matter introduced into it] is likewise the developed process—that previous one [i.e. normal digestion] is the self-introreflection of the inorganic [*here the drawing and note stand in the margin*] its process of coming to the organic itself in general. But this universal has to actualize itself with respect to the organic itself. It gives itself its *self-feeling* [*here another summary of*


the argument begins in the margin]—precisely *through* [its] *movement*—[its] *coming to be for itself*.' The drawing in the margin has its own note thus:



'the immediate Kind in itself enters into the *process*—it has *come to be actual*' (NKA, viii. 126, 9–12 and 15–16.)

(The figure deserves study because either the lower connection to the ellipse is a C sign or there is a third intermediary line reaching for connection without attaining it—and *both* of these interpretations may be correct simultaneously.)

4. The clearest syllogistic drawing occurs in the discussion of plant growth. The main text reads as follows: 'The first relation comprehends the dichotomy into organic and inorganic, and the mechanical—immediate ('mechanical' *has here the significance of* 'that which has being *in itself*' [des *ansich seyenden*]) return into the organic unity.' In the margin we find:



'this syllogism exists [*ist da*] —shaping [*das Gestalten*] is its coming into being, [its] bringing forth through itself a) [Here Hegel made his first abortive drawing] *Root, stem and leaf*—leaf is b singularity as process. c) is *living wood*.' (NKA, viii. 132, 7–9 and 20–5).

Conclusion: From all of this data taken together we can securely infer that the *organic* syllogism deals with the transition from the abiding order of inorganic nature (represented by the spinning Sun, both for its resting symmetry and as the fount of the life-force) and the organic Kind (represented by the planetary ellipse of the Earth). In this transition the individual organism is an absolutely essential, but absolutely transient *middle*. It is really the Earth which organizes itself (and 'bears away the victory') in the process of the Kind. The large diagram, however, seems to be concerned with the analogous transition from organic nature to the actuality of the Spirit. Here the syllogistic result is very different.

2. *The elements*

Once we have surveyed the evidence of the other diagrams, we know that the problem of what formal elements in the large

drawing have a representative or symbolic function can to some extent be separated from the problem of what is actually represented or symbolized. For, although the identification of some of the elements was originally made in the very process of constructing a hypothesis about their interpretation, the attempt at interpretation began from the recognition of certain elements which Hegel employs in the 'syllogistic' drawings for which his text itself provides an interpretation. The full interpretation of these formal elements is different according to the context in which they occur. But these securely interpreted uses enable us to be certain that those same elements do have a symbolic function here, and even enable us to conjecture with some plausibility what some of Hegel's special conventions for interpretation were. Thus two closed geometric shapes are clearly distinguishable here: the circle and the ellipse. That this distinction is intended and has a meaning is certified by its occurrence in the 'syllogistic' diagrams (where the circle represents the pure Concept or Universal, and the ellipse the realized Concept or Universal Individual). Finally, of course, one principal element is instantly recognizable as a conventionalized drawing of the human figure. And although Hegel's other uses suggest a specialized conventional meaning for this—it stands for the living organism as the Concept in motion—in one present case (at least) it has its immediate or natural significance—for the trio at the lower left-hand corner of the drawing is plainly a portrayal of the minimal family (two parents and their child).

In this diagram both circle and ellipse appear sometimes as the 'bodies' of embodied Reason; and there are some places where we cannot be intuitively certain which shape is actually intended. There is also one open form (the incomplete circle or 'C' shape) which *must* be significant, at least in the one instance where it occurs in isolation, but for which we have no external evidence to aid us in the task of interpretation.

Apart from these 'shapes' there are single and double connecting lines. In his syllogistic drawings Hegel connects the three terms with double lines (only in the embryonic syllogism of 'chemical process' do we find connection by single lines). The doubling of the connections can give rise to ambiguity about what is a 'connection' and what is a 'shape',

since the effect of the syllogistic double connection is generally to create a shape (approximating to an ellipse) within which the term-shapes are themselves contained. Thus, if we did not have the one clearly drawn syllogism (with Hegel's own written explanation) we could not be at all sure how to analyse the other one—which is very badly drawn—into the proper elements that have significant functions. But in the larger drawing the shape-generating power of the double connection is quite probably significant in itself, so where it gives rise to ambiguity this may be quite intentional. Where alternative analyses of the elements are possible we must keep in mind the possibility of taking them both ways (as lines *and* shapes) instead of trying to choose one alternative as the right one.

If connection by two lines indicates a 'syllogistic' relation it is plausible to suppose that linkage by a single line is 'simple connection' (in the logic of understanding); that is to say, it indicates a direct identity or simple continuity (especially temporal sequence).

The single line that embraces the whole seems to represent a 'relation of being' where it is curved (or at any rate wavy, not straight) and a 'relation of thought' where it is straight. But all interpretation of this line is highly conjectural (including the interpretation of the 'shape' that it generates). Only the relative solidity and coherence of the argument as a whole can confer a measure of plausibility upon any thesis about this line (or its segments).

Finally, spatial position on the vertical axis of the drawing is here interpreted as a representative element. According to our hypothesis there is here an 'underworld' of nature (at the bottom), a 'real world' of practical spiritual activity, or self-realization (across the middle), and an 'overworld' of purely theoretical contemplation (at the top). Like the interpretation of the circumference line this is a conjecture which cannot be supported by any external evidence, and which must depend for its acceptance upon the acceptability of the interpretation as a whole.

3. *The interpretation*

The figure as a whole is a closed one, and should be regarded as approximating to a circle. A more detailed account of the

approximation will be proposed later, but for the present the rough circularity of the whole is emphasized because the logical starting-point for the interpretation of any Hegelian 'circle' must obviously be the centre. We cannot actually begin there because the motions that go from the centre to circumference are perhaps the most enigmatic phases of the whole process. But we can take note, at least, that there are *two* motions from the centre. First, there is a complex motion with a double connection within an ellipse. This horizontal figure we shall leave aside for the moment, because there is nowhere to go from this complex process, except to the point that can be reached more directly by the single radial line running from the centre to the bottom right. This line connects the enigmatic centre directly with the only terms in the diagram which have an obvious *natural* interpretation. So we shall follow that line first.

That line leads from a human figure (head, circular body, and legs, the head being common also to a legless ellipse which we probably ought to think of as a 'C' shape completed by a straight line of thoughtful self-comprehension) to a family group. The bodies of this group are not determinately either circular or elliptical, but in our rationalization they all appear as circles because it is only the circular body at the centre which has legs. (And just as the living individual can generate a satellite through the might of the Kind present in it, so the conscious individual can only 'move' to comprehend his world and its history through the might of the *logical* Concept in him.)

In this group the mother and child are on the circumference, while father is on the radial line. Mother steps toward father (and probably they are all looking towards one another); but the parents are connected only through the child (to whom both are linked by single lines). The most natural hypothesis, therefore, is that the single lines here stand for the 'recognition' through which each sex is the whole genus. Each parent directly perceives the other as an other (hence there is no line of identification between them). But each perceives him/herself in the child (hence the line) and thus they perceive their mutual or joint identity (as Kind) in him.

With this in mind we can offer an initial hypothesis about the figure at the centre which gets its primitive or natural

display (*Darstellung*) in the family. The circle within an unclosed (incomplete) ellipse sharing the same head—signifies the unity of the universal (the closed circle) of rational life with the temporal finitude (or determinacy) of existence as an historic individual (or singular organism). The unclosed ellipse represents the finite journey of the historic individual toward the goal of realized—or embodied—rational freedom (the ellipse achieved in thought). The little circle on its own legs will traverse the whole cycle described by the diagram and comprehend everything within it. But in doing so it must still remain within the broken ellipse which represents its *naturally allotted span* of time. Hence the broken ellipse provides the same head with a fixed body, one that cannot move from its place at the centre, but must move inexorably from birth to death in the world in which it naturally finds itself. The recognized identity of the parents in the child, the recognition of the unity of the human Kind (or *homo sapiens*) is the natural display of this antithesis, and of how it is sublated in the course of nature, through the genesis of natural consciousness as 'love'. It is the spirit itself that comes to birth in the little figure, evidently a child, who appears on the circumference at the bottom right.

If we follow the line of simple connection—or real identity—clockwise around to the top of the diagram, it leads us to the same small human figure at top centre. This figure is simply connected on the left side with an ellipse—a vertical ellipse which itself constitutes the left end of a larger horizontal ellipse which embraces the small figure at its inner or right end. The small ellipse at the left is marked by the letter 'g'. To the right the small human figure is syllogistically connected with an ellipse marked by the capital letter 'U' which floats above it at the circumference.

The interpretation of this capital 'U' as *Unendlichkeit* (Infinity) appears to me to be relatively obvious, and hence uncontroversial. The syllogistic comprehension of the Infinite is the task of philosophy, and of the rational individual as philosopher. Thus, if we go that way, we shall reach the terminus of our journey in a precipitate and uninformative manner. At this point we need to look in that direction only because the highly plausible interpretation of the letter 'U',

and the consequent identification of the terminus of our journey on that side, helps to make the more conjectural interpretation of the two ellipses and the small 'g' on the other side more persuasive. The letter 'g' stands, according to my hypothesis, for 'gestalten' (or, since Hegel's capitalization of substantives is demonstrably erratic, it may stand for *Gestaltung*, or even for *Gestalt*).

The whole complex at the top therefore represents *theoretical education*. The parents present their world to the child, as something already thoughtfully digested or developed into a 'real concept' (the small vertical ellipse). That ellipse is the same real world in which he is himself embraced (the large horizontal ellipse); and his task as pupil is to identify with that concept as his own spiritual nature—the second nature of communal customs and goals, and achieved knowledge and skills, which must take the place of his naturally given desires and activities if he is to be a fit person to take his father's place.¹ There is nothing philosophical in this domestic *Bildung* of the spirit as a *Gestalt*. The pupil must 'understand' the world within which he is comprehended, and he must 'identify' with the place that is already defined for him within it. We shall find the full process of philosophical *Bildung* (self-definition) elsewhere in the diagram, with a double line of syllogistic connection and a middle term. What is presented first here is the single life *finding* its place in the 'ethical substance'.

The simple conceptual intuition of this acculturation develops practically into the full syllogistic display of 'life in the Volk' in the circle below. Here the great ellipse of *Anerkanntseyn* (which the single line shows to be identical with the vertical ellipse of *Gestaltung* above) is endowed with a head (its self-consciousness, or the 'authoritative law') but no legs. Ideally, this ellipse is completely stable—once it has developed fully, it does not go anywhere except round and round like the 'city in the heavens'.

This ellipse bears a sign which I read as a capital 'L'. I interpret this to mean *Leben*, but there are other

¹ This part of the conceptual motion applies just as much to girls as to boys, but I am leaving girls out for a reason which will emerge when we get back round the circumference to the mother figure, and can comprehend why she is placed on it.

possibilities—for instance, *Leib*—which are only slightly less plausible. In the context of the *Geistesphilosophie* of 1805 an 'A' (for *Anerkanntseyn*) is what we might expect; but we should remember that Hegel did not use this term as an explicit heading.¹ It is quite likely—especially in the context of an analogy with his theory of the living organism—that he thought of the *Gegensatz* which develops to reconciliation in the 'Constitution' as beginning with the self-maintenance of 'Life'. The society of *Anerkanntseyn* is that in which personal life is the object of absolute respect, as is the right of property through which the life of the family maintains itself stably from generation to generation. The single rational individual now emerges as the middle between this ellipse and the ellipse of the free Spiritual Community (which has *legs* to indicate its freedom of movement as well as a head to show its possession of rational self-consciousness). The single individual embraced within his historical life-sign, is the middle between the stable world of natural life, and the world of free culture. That is to say, he now begins as an adult to generate the world in which he enjoys the freedom of self-definition. The life-sign is here, I think, as an index that this freedom is only achieved through the *sacrifice* of natural life and its finite goods. 'Resurrection' or 'life in the *Volk*' belongs not just to the hero who literally dies in his defence of the community, but to everyone who hears the gospel of the spirit, and spends his life in the realization of consciously spiritual values, rather than the pursuit of material 'happiness'. We should notice that both ellipses are contained within one circle (the Concept of Reason); and since this circle, which embraces both of the ellipses and their middle, has a head and legs (indicating both theoretical self-consciousness and practical freedom of action) we can securely identify it as the 'Constitution' or sovereign state. The free ellipse (with legs) which this circle contains is therefore the Church—where all are equal in the sight of God, and each obeys only God's voice as manifested in his personal conscience. In the legless ellipse of the

¹ My interpretation is influenced by looking forward to the *Logic* of 1808 (see *TW-A*, iv. 30–2) rather than backward to 1801–2. *Anerkanntseyn* may well be the name of the *formal* world of recognition represented by the *horizontal* ellipse within

community's natural life, on the other hand, everyone has a definite status, which involves enforceable responsibilities, even though the ideal of 'the career open to the talents' means that he can aim to fill any place within the system, and is not effectively bound, by 'natural law' (or a divinely appointed caste system) to remain in the social position he inherits from father or mother.

That the sphere of free existence, and true self-definition, is the 'Church'—and so far as it realizes the ideal of universal equality and brotherhood in the pursuit, expression, and appreciative recognition of spiritual values, the 'Kingdom of Heaven on Earth'—is confirmed by the double connection between this ellipse and the 'Infinite' ellipse on the circumference. In the free *Volk* everyone is conscious that he 'lives, moves and has his being' in God. Thus this ellipse of free spirit is conscious of its *own* infinity. It sees itself directly mirrored in its God. But the mirroring is not a personal one. The higher Absolute in which the *Volk* recognizes itself is 'real' (hence elliptical) but it has no legs (it is a theoretical reality without practical needs or duties), and it is not self-conscious (hence it is headless). The fullness of *self*-recognition is achieved for the Absolute only through the mediation of philosophy. For the religious consciousness of the *Volk*, God remains essentially an Other; his identity with us is recognized and asserted, but not rationally mediated. The mediating term is present only as a picture—the man who made himself an outcast rejecting all status and status-responsibilities, who lived only to express the ideal of the perfect brotherhood, and voluntarily accepted death upon the Cross.¹ What his life meant must be comprehended and expressed by one who speaks rationally for all, and intelligibly to all.

This one is the philosopher. Once we recognize that the immediate concept of *Gestaltung* (in the ellipse on the left of our paradigm individual) is what is developed and displayed in the great circle of practical Reason which is 'simply'

which the process of *Gestaltung* goes on (which I call *Zucht*). *Leben* is the 'real life' in which we are no longer apprentices but journeymen.

¹ It may not be an accident that one of the connections between the earthly and the heavenly infinite is broken (and looks rather like an arm stretched forth in 'yearning'?.) But there are, admittedly, other breaks in the lines which can only be the accidental contributions of Hegel's quill (and I would not want to be guilty of 'deducing' that!).

connected with it below, we can see why (as a purely theoretical process) it must also appear above this whole sphere. Just as the free practical individual consciousness which is generated and sustained by the living totality of the free community is the middle between the spirit's natural 'existence in bonds' and its culturally creative existence in freedom, so the free theoretical consciousness of the philosopher is the product (or 'conclusion') of this whole practical syllogism and the middle between practical self-realization and absolute theoretical self-cognition. The developed process of the 'Constitution' is the missing middle in the 'simply connected' ellipse of theoretical *Gestaltung*. By achieving consciousness of his 'freedom in the Volk' the rational individual raises his own *Gestaltung* from the level of Understanding to that of Reason. Otherwise he could not be—as he evidently is in the diagram—a syllogistic middle between the two ellipses of social reality. Through his performance of this function he also emerges as the missing middle of absolute cognition or speculation, which is only 'pictured' in religion. The syllogistic connection between him and the Infinite shows this, for it is only when it is read as identical with the latter (upper) half of the syllogistic connection between the free *Volk* and its infinite God, that either of these double connections can be interpreted as a proper 'syllogism' (with a real and present middle term) at all.¹ Absolute Religion comprehends only the death of God; philosophy comprehends God's death and resurrection in man. Only in the self-consciousness of the philosopher (i.e. of every man as capable of philosophic awareness) does the headless Infinite achieve the dignity of self-consciousness. That self-consciousness is neither properly in this world (inside the circumference) nor properly in the other (outside the circumference). It is in between. God is dead; and he is only resurrected in and as the voice of some man. He rises when Socrates, or Spinoza, or Hegel, (or Moses, or Michel-

¹ The linkage between the 'g' ellipse and the 'U' ellipse in the upper level of the diagram is a regular 'syllogistic' diagram except that it connects two ellipses. But the ellipse on the left is *identified* (by the single connecting line) with the circle of the Constitution below. (The recognition of this syllogism in its proper form increases the probability that the break in the religious connection—see preceding note—is not accidental.)

angelo) speaks. But these dead voices really *speak* only when there are living ears that can truly hear them—not, for example, when Reinhold or Schulze read Plato etc., or even when Kant and Fichte do. These two last can perfectly express the 'unhappy' religious consciousness of God as an Other 'in whose sight shall no man *living* be justified' (for each man's head and legs must be chopped off first, and only the objective body of all that he thought and did has the status of eternal truth).¹ But for God to appear as something other than the angel of death, or Mephistopheles, or the 'Moral Law' through which we recognize the 'radical evil' in our nature, there must be living, embodied, philosophical awareness that is capable of recognizing the 'one eternal Reason' in Plato, Spinoza, Moses, Michelangelo, etc. When this condition is fulfilled, God rises from his death too, as the 'Spirit in the midst'. But this need for a 'philosophical' head on the elliptical world body of spirit's free existence (as the Church) does not entail any coercive authority of Reason (as was the case with the judicial head on the legless ellipse). Every free man must be his own philosopher, as best he can. To obtain a proper 'syllogism' from *Leben* to *Geist* we must *convert* the identity-connection between the *Gestaltung* ellipse and the whole circle of our spiritual Sun, the *Volk*.² What this implies with respect to the authority of the monarch, whose head appears on that whole circle of the self-conscious 'Constitution', I must leave the reader to work out for himself. I will only remark that that circle has legs of its own too; and that my exposition of Hegel's doctrine of constitutional monarchy and popular sovereignty, which was worked out from the actual text, without any reference to, or even any conscious thought of, this diagram, seems to me to be in perfect accord with the natural interpretation of this resemblance between the Church and the whole State that embraces it.

¹ Because of the motionless objectivity of the eternal vision, the will of God can appear as the 'immutable commandment of Reason' in the ellipse of free spiritual existence, just as it can appear as the 'law of nature' or as the positive ordinance of a transcendent Lawgiver—even, for instance, as an inviolable system of social castes—in the ellipse of spirit's natural 'existence in bonds'.

² Cf. p. 538 n, above. This conversion (or *return* to the level of theoretical *Bildung*) is symbolized within the circle of the *Volk* by the simple connection between the head of the individual mediating term and the circumference of the circle itself.

This identification of a properly formed 'syllogism' within the diagram is the climax of our interpretation. It is time now to return to the centre of our great circle and consider the horizontal ellipse that connects it to the circumference. We can now see at once that this is identical in form with the upper left horizontal ellipse (the comprehensive world of *Gestaltung*), except that the internal connection is now a doubled syllogistic one, and there is, accordingly, a proper middle term constituted by the symbol for a finite life-cycle. Thus we are presented here not with the simple 'display' of the antithesis of the real genus, and its immediate sublation in feeling, but with the conscious advance of the rational individual toward full actuality as the embodied Reason which knows itself to be identical in essence with all reality. In other words, this is the 'phenomenology', not of individual consciousness, which we have already followed along its single track of 'simple connections' or 'identities' but of Spirit itself (as Reason). What is portrayed now is not the 'experience of consciousness' as a simple cycle, but the self-conscious 'Science of the Experience of Consciousness'. In Hegel's diagram we can see that the syllogistic lines from subject to middle term have quite different destinies beyond the 'C' sign. The top one becomes identical with the top side of the enclosing ellipse; and that top line itself becomes at the circumference the point of origin for the whole circle. Thus this line is the radius of simple connection as well as being one half of a syllogistic comprehension. The lower line descends from the central figure's head (completing the ellipse of his body in its course) and strains toward—without quite reaching—the bottom end of the 'C' sign. This end itself emerges from an arrowhead sign, which, we may surmise, represents birth (from the union of the two parents? or the birth of consciousness from the womb of Mother Earth?). The 'C' sign itself is quite directly and perfectly connected with the vertical ellipse. And the fact that that ellipse represents the achievement of absolute cognition by the finite historical consciousness is indicated by the straight line of conceptual identity which links it to the ellipse which represents the infinite self-consciousness of the social process. On this view the top end of the 'C' is natural death. Notice that the line of

the individual's self-comprehension (the 'C') coincides with the all-comprehending line of the spiritual organism before the actual point of death. But the syllogistic line for the phenomenal achievement of rational freedom passes through the moment of death itself.

The syllogistic connection of finite life with the ellipse of realized rationality certainly represents the phenomenology of natural consciousness as such; and, for this reason, it appears as a logically necessary phase in the Philosophy of Spirit of 1805, and in every subsequent theory of subjective spirit that Hegel penned. But we must distinguish sharply between this natural phenomenology of universal consciousness, and the *Gestaltung* of the singular natural consciousness in society. The ellipse of embodied Reason in which natural phenomenology terminates is the Greek *polis*. The parents down in the natural underworld of the diagram must have completed the *Gestaltung* of natural ethics, and be citizens of a *polis* in order to transmit their ethical consciousness to the child in his process of *Gestaltung*. But the stark, face to face encounter with one's own mortality, which Hegel presents in all his philosophies of spirit as the essential means for the sublation of our given nature, in favour of the second nature created by the spirit as its substance, is at once much more, and much less, than is contained in the normal social process of *Gestaltung* as Hegel pictures it. The individual at the bottom of the diagram becomes part of a Protestant *Volk* not of the *polis*. The story we have unfolded for that child is a path of bourgeois salvation; he must no doubt be disciplined with the rod, if he is eventually going to become the free consciousness which passes over from the 'pursuit of happiness' to 'seek ye *first* the Kingdom of God and all these things shall be added unto you.' This transition is the point where he must recognize and accept the inevitability of *natural* death; for it is here that we find the concrete universal embraced with the sign representing his mortal time-span. (In this respect the regular circle of the Constitution or of 'life in the *Volk*' mirrors the rough and ready circle of the whole story.) But this natural death comes in the fulness of time, when religious experience has prepared us for it, and ideally when the philosophical comprehension of why it is necessary has reconciled us with it

rationally. The warding off of *violent* death, on the other hand, is a primordial object of our civil society; mortality encountered as an external 'fate' does not enter into the normal pattern (except as a sanction for those natural consciousnesses whose social *Gestaltung* fails radically). Instead, an immense range of theoretical knowledge and practical life-experience enters into our normal effort to come to terms with our natural mortality; and the direct encounter with death as an external threat is no adequate substitute for all of that.

It is in the natural *Gestaltung* of Spirit as an 'ethical substance' (i.e. in the social transition of the human community from undeveloped barbarism to the natural spiritual maturity of the *polis*) that the life-and-death struggle for recognition is vital. In order that a society of free men may exist, everyone must go through the battle-test which establishes that he is free, teaches him what freedom involves, and enables him to recognize it in his peers. Thus the encounter with death is the middle for the establishment of the *polis*. The *polis* appears not as a result of human ordinance but as an expression of divine Reason. It is not Solon but Athena who establishes the Areopagus. But the 'tragedy of the ethical' sublated in that divine ordinance, breaks out again, and destroys the *polis* in the great encounter (*without* recognition) between the male principle of thinking autonomy and the female principle of felt identity with the life of Nature (which is God's own embodied form). Thus the story-circle as a whole really begins with the radial line that goes round the political ellipse to generate the circumference, and thus directly connects the human Kind at the centre with the woman and child on the circumference. This connection in turn represents the ultimate failure of the Greek *polis* to absorb and sublate the personal individuality of conscious Reason. Creon and Antigone exhibit for us the inward conceptual necessity of what was beginning in the historic world at the very time that Sophocles' play was produced: the Peloponnesian War. And with this breakdown of the 'ethical substance', and the birth of the spirit as rational subjectivity, the spirit breaks the bonds of its natural existence, and appears in its conscious freedom. This is shown by the way the figure of the child moves across a *gap* here. He steps *out of*

the smaller closed triangle of life in the natural society (Plato's 'Polity') to begin his own career in the more complex modern world of the Gospel message. This world evolves through the two great antithetic forms of Catholic *Gestaltung* (the left-hand side of the mediating figure at the top) and Protestant 'infinite yearning' (the right-hand side) to the reconciliation of the antithesis in Hegel's philosophical 'Constitution'.

Hegel's spiritual circle, unlike Plato's natural triangle, is unbreakable because the historical shape of the identity of the Universal and the Particular in the Individual is clearly recognized and conserved, not nullified as in the total sublation represented by the Platonic triangle. The real career of the individual is again represented overall as a 'C' shape. The actual circle of the spirit is completed, partly by the historical (or 'real') phenomenology of Spirit—the external side of the curvilinear triangle of life in the *polis*; partly by the line that indicates the speculative identification of that earthly Paradise which the Greeks really achieved with the heavenly Paradise beyond the circumference where the lines both of 'infinite yearning' and of philosophical conception terminate; and partly by the upper line of philosophical conception itself. This Paradise of philosophy, finally, is also within the circumference; and the lines that lead back from it to the Hegelian Church community in the centre become lines of 'recognition', or of fulfilled yearning, in virtue of the fact that the community itself becomes (through its philosophers) consciously infinite. The *identity* of the singular consciousness with this spiritual whole (a circle not an ellipse) is shown by the single line joining the head of the mortal middle term in Hegel's 'constitution' with the corresponding point of the circumference of that smaller circle. Every free individual must have the 'feeling' of living and moving and having his eternal being in this real infinite; but he need not speculatively comprehend it. For the spiritual community on the other hand, the double lines of the philosophic comprehension of the elliptical 'actuality of the rational' are essential if the constitution is to remain healthy. I said that Hegel's spiritual circle is 'unbreakable'. But this is a logical proposition, not an existential one. If the lines of cultured comprehension break—if there are no philosophers (at the highest level

within the circle) who have both a clear comprehension of the Infinite, and secure access to the ear of the public, then social breakdown, and a fall into barbarities far more terrible than those of the Hobbesian 'State of Nature' can occur. But then, the diagram claims, there will be nothing to do but rebuild the whole circle again, as a complex entity of experience and thought. It is in this sense that the circle of spiritual organism—or of the 'open society'—is unbreakable. Plato's ideal of the 'closed society', on the other hand, is only the first phase or segment in its genesis.

RECESSIONAL VOLUNTARY

Fugue of the 'Olympian in Shepherd Guise'

1. *Theme: the Muse of self-conscious meaning*

In his courteous response to Hegel's letter of May 1805, Heinrich Voss, the well-established and widely respected classical scholar, himself an 'Olympian' of German culture and academic life in his time, drew an analogy which strongly suggests that he was sympathetically conversant with Hegel's highest hopes and ambitions. Hegel himself had compared the Voss translation of Homer with Luther's Bible; and had indicated that he wanted to add the philosophical coping-stone to these two supreme expressions of the people's self-possession in art and religion. Voss may only have been returning the compliment in an appropriate way, when he prayed, in his turn, that 'the genius of Germany may bless your resolve to lead philosophy down again out of the clouds into friendly intercourse with the fair-speaking children of men. . . . An Olympian in shepherd-guise might do greater miracles thus than through his superhuman manifestations.'¹ We cannot assume that Voss really believed that Hegel was indeed Apollo come again to guard the steading of a human princeling, as in the days of Admetus and Alcestis. But it seems likely that he

¹ Letter 56 (Voss to Hegel, 24. VIII. 1805), *Briefe*, i. 102. I have tried to bring out the Homeric echo in 'Wohlredenden Menschenkindern'. The reader should also be mindful of the implicit reference to Socrates, who is credited by Cicero with having 'first called philosophy down from the sky, set it in the cities and even introduced it into homes, and compelled it to consider life and morals, good and evil' (*Tusc.* 5.4.10—cf. Hegel's comment at the beginning of the *Dissertation, Erste Druckschriften*, p. 348: 'Philosophy is only worthy of the lives and homes of men if, once having come down from heaven, every effort is then made to raise it back from whence it came'). To my ear the reply of Voss, taken as a whole, breathes a spirit of perfect sincerity behind all the courtesies. (Most of it is translated in Kaufmann, *Anchor edn.*, p. 317.)

had seen Hegel's little poem 'Entschluss', or had heard Hegel speak of his aims in some similar vein.¹ If he had not, then either his luck or his intuition was quite extraordinary; for it is precisely correct to say that between 1801 and 1805 Hegel's ideal of the philosophic vocation moved up from the heroic rank of the 'Son of the Gods' to that of God himself shepherding his people.

The persistence of Hegel's early vocation to be a great *Volkserzieher*, was what gave his commitment to the common cause of the Identity Philosophy a distinctive focus and accent from the first. This was what made him concentrate initially on the problem of philosophical logic. Speculative philosophy itself is founded upon the Metaphysics of the 'absolute identity' of thought and being, or of reflective consciousness and real life, the identity of mind and nature, of man and world, of subject and object; the self-identity of the *Sache selbst*, the substance which knows itself as subject. The human capacity of secure cognition, the capacity to grasp eternal truth, and to know beyond question that we have grasped it, can be comprehended and critically validated only if cognitive consciousness itself is recognized as the final flowering of the life and energy of the Universe that is known in it, or as the true goal and hence the proper essence of what truly *is*. This is the only condition upon which scientific knowing can coherently comprehend all of its own necessary relations with the lower forms of being that are not self-comprehensive. But this self-comprehension of Reason morally

¹ A similar vein—in fact a direct echo of the *Entschluss*—is present in one passage from the *Wastebook* (passage 51, Rosenkranz, p. 550; *IJP*, iii. 1979, p. 4, no. 1): 'Everyone aims to be better than this world of his, and believes he is so. He who is better, only expresses this world of his better than others.' (Also in the very last excerpt, the Olympian image is applied with biting satire ('ein verdammt kleines Merckürchen') to certain minor figures of the *Aufklärung* who were so far from being 'better than the time' as to count as a mild disease of it (but also perhaps as an inoculation against something much worse, since the disease is the cow pox—Salzmann and Campe are called *Kuhpocken zeitalterchen*.) See Rosenkranz, p. 555; *IJP*, iii. 1979, p. 5, no. 7. It was apparently Mercury (Hermes), the messenger of Zeus who brings his gifts and commands to men, acts as his companion when he wanders on earth himself, and also guides the souls of the dead to the Underworld, whom Hegel himself thought of as the Olympian image of the philosopher. This image highlights the philosopher's role as a mediator. The reader will see, however, that my shift to Apollo (in his relation to Socrates and Plato) enables us to comprehend the fate of Olympus itself within the image.

dictates communication as the goal of the rational metaphysician. 'Reason' is, of its essence, a gospel that demands to be preached to all nations, and first of all to one's own. The *Volk* must possess philosophy, because only as a possession of the *Volk* can it exist properly at all. The individual thinker is an event rather than a substance, a causal impulse rather than a real agent; at least, that is what he is from the empirical standpoint. Only the *Volk* whose institutions form his consciousness, and whose traditions provide its content, is an abiding substantial reality, capable of having and holding the truth as knowledge.

Real individuality, it is true, is something higher than this universal spiritual substance with its multifarious flicker of finite modes. But this spiritual empiricism, this concern with the relation between the social substance, and its singular organs or modes, provides the essentially *practical* context for Hegel's initially 'critical' conception of logic. The System, beginning from the 'intuition' of absolute Identity, and teaching us finally to know ourselves (along with everything else) *in God* will give us quite a different perspective upon the moment of our historic existence—characterized accurately enough by the Psalmist as 'threescore years and ten or at most fourscore'. But first we must learn to think objectively, i.e. we must be brought to understand how 'understanding' ever comes to be possible at all, and *imprimis* how it is not merely possible but necessary for us to have the project of understanding that. Locke 'thought that the first step towards satisfying several inquiries the mind of man was very apt to run into, was, to take a survey of our own understandings, examine our own powers, and see to what things they were adapted.'¹ But first, where did his absolute confidence that his mind was 'adapted' to take the survey, make the examination, define the range of suitable objects, come from, and on what can it be based?

The theory of what truly is, as an 'Absolute Identity' (of thought and being)—i.e. the conception of true science as a *self-cognition* of the real in which our finite cognition

¹ *Essay concerning Humane Understanding*, Book I, Ch. 1, sect. 7 (ed. Yolton, London, Everyman, 1961, Vol. i. 8). Hegel begins his critique of Kant in *Faith and Knowledge* from this point (*NKA*, iv. 326, 11-14; Cerf and Harris, p. 68).

participates in determinate degrees which can be definitely ordered—emerged historically from the progressive elaboration of the Kantian theory of experience. To those who participated in its genesis, this attempt to make human Reason self-sufficient, and its self-critical capacity self-explanatory, possessed an intuitive certainty, which made Fichte call his version of it 'sunclear'. But the very fact that others could claim to go beyond Fichte, showed that the truth was after all *not* intuitively obvious or sun-clear at all. And everywhere, there were those who agreed with Goethe that the philosophy students were people who thought they could walk on their heads, or laughed with Jean Paul over the poor fellow who had to be put in an asylum because he took his studies too seriously.¹ Surely something could be done about this? If human reason really *is* self-sufficient, then there must be some rational *method* by which men can be shown how to do this speculative walking, and by which we can decide who is rationally intuitive, and who is simply crazy.

Hegel took this problem for his own. He was as good a panentheist as anyone among them, so the basic thesis of the Identity Philosophy was as soundly intuitive for him as for Schelling. For years he had laboured for a renewal of religious consciousness as the only adequate embodiment for the human values and goals proclaimed in 1789. Philosophy was for him the critical *tool* that would lead the community to the secure consciousness of God and of the true religion. Schelling's 'breakthrough', his proclamation of the 'Absolute Identity', made a new kind of theorizing possible, a pure speculation that was wisdom itself, not just the quest for it. But it also implied that the older dialectical inquiry, the questing for

¹ Goethe's satire of German cultural life (including the philosophers walking on their heads) published in *Faust*, Part I as 'Walpurgis Night's Dream' was originally composed about 1797. The story of the student who went mad is in Jean Paul's *Titan* (Jubilee 33-5, Brooks, ii. 438-88). If Hegel is referring to this last in *Faith and Knowledge* (NKA, iv. 390, 29-31; Cerf and Harris, p. 157) then he heard of it by word of mouth, since the final volume of *Titan* was published only in 1803. I take his concession in the preface of the *Phenomenology*, that the natural consciousness is required to walk on its head, to indicate his familiarity either with Goethe's unpublished satire, or with the witty talk of the Jena tea-tables which that satire reflected. See *Faust*, Part I, 4369-70; cf. NKA, ix. 23, 15-19 (Miller, § 26). There is a fairly plain reference to the lunacy accusation in 'Walpurgis Night's Dream' also—see *Faust* I, lines 4347-50.

wisdom, could now be brought to a triumphant conclusion, and the journey could be mapped, from its finite starting-point to its absolute (or 'infinite') destination.

Because the new speculative standpoint had emerged through the logical criticism of the critical epistemology, and the categorical ethics of Kant, it was natural for Hegel to assume, initially, that the making of the map was essentially a 'logical' task. The assumptions of ordinary thought simply have to be made to reveal their true metaphysical ground.

If we study the programme of Hegel's first course in logic, in this 'pedagogical' perspective, we can easily see that the critically progressive form of dialectic that we shall find in the *Phenomenology* was systematically deployed for the first time here.¹ The forms of finite cognition are to be constructively linked into an 'imitation of Reason'. But this imitation is to be used as a pointer toward the *Urbild* which it is *not*. Logic thus provides a *negative cognition* of Reason, because Reason is the new object that emerges from the determinate negation, the *Aufhebung*, of the best effort that logic itself can produce.²

But the solving of this problem of leading the audience from the standpoint of 'subjective' reflection to that of rational or 'absolute' reflection, only opens up a much larger one. For the proper appreciation of the true Metaphysics when we reach it,

¹ The method was certainly ascribed to 'philosophy' in the *Systemfragment* (TW-A, i. 422-3; Knox and Kroner, p. 313); and from Hegel's description of his efforts in the letter of 2 Nov. 1800 as the 'transformation of the ideal of my youth into reflective form' (Letter 29, to Schelling, *Briefe*, i. 59-60) we can plausibly infer that Hegel employed the method in that lost MS. Certainly his conception of 'system' as the 'reflective form' of a religious ideal, enables us to understand why he was so ready with a critical theory of logic to go with the new 'constructive' metaphysics of the Identity Philosophy. My discussion of the *Systemfragment* in *Toward the Sunlight* (pp. 388-90) fails to take adequate account of Hegel's view that reflection can achieve systematic completeness, even though the 'system' must refer beyond itself to the 'true infinite' of religious experience, which it merely reflects. Thus I was right in my criticism of Kroner's note about the *bad* infinite aspect of philosophic reflection; but I was myself influenced by the mistranslation 'philosophy must stop short of religion' ('mit der Religion aufhören' means 'come to its climax with religion') so that I failed to grasp the 'true infinite' aspect of philosophy as *system*. This primitive form of the conception of philosophy as 'absolute reflection' could fairly be called the crucial mediation between 'understanding and life' (and hence 'the fountainhead of Hegel's dialectic'). So Kroner's principal error in this respect consists in placing his footnote one paragraph too early.

² See for the present Rosenkranz, pp. 190-1; Cerf and Harris, pp. 9-10. The original text of the fragment will be printed in *NKA*, v.

requires that we should grasp why the community *needs* the speculative knowledge (of which it is the only secure possessor). The Identity Philosophy can only show that it is not just a form of academic insanity by exhibiting itself as 'the restoration of the oldest of old things'.¹ The *Volk* has always needed philosophy; and men have been producing it steadily, ever since man first 'constructed' himself properly as a rational community (i.e. a social *substance*) in the Ionian cities. The *Volk* needs philosophy because the strains and stresses of private life break down the ethical bond of the community. Then 'the might of union vanishes from the life of men and the antitheses lose their living connection and reciprocity and gain independence.'² The philosophy that is now needed to restore men's originally aesthetic feeling of unity, is the work of a singular mind which makes the transition from logical organization to metaphysical vision; and the only proof that the vision is 'metaphysical' is its perennial character. Thus the philosopher must establish his bona fides by comprehending, and showing his audience how to comprehend, all his genuine predecessors. Displaying the genuineness of the singular philosophical vocation, establishing the philosopher's ability to prove his historic right to the name, is the nerve of Hegel's philosophical development throughout the Jena period. This is the problem that he brings to the Identity Philosophy from his long meditations upon those singular visionaries who founded religions; and this is the dynamite that eventually overturns it. For the Identity Philosophy has no room for this historical concern of Hegel's first 'Metaphysics'; and unlike his first 'logic', no part of his Metaphysics can be simply consigned to an antechamber. So the theme of philosophic *Bildung* eventually brings not just philosophy, but the God of philosophy, 'down again out of the clouds, into friendly intercourse with the fair speaking children of men'. The twin concerns of the first Logic and Metaphysics—conceptual criticism and historical comprehension—eventually coalesce in the *Phenomenology*; and the *Phenomenology* is a *critical*

¹ Rosenkranz, p. 192; Cerf and Harris, p. 11. The most natural referent for the 'oldest of old things' in its first infancy is the *ἐν διαερόμενον ἐαυτῷ* of Heraclitus, D.K. 22B 50 and 51. But see further Ch. I, pp. 57–8 n. 4.

² *Difference, etc.*, NKA, iv. 14; Harris and Cerf, p. 91.

introduction to systematic philosophy. But it is an introduction that transforms its subject matter ('the actual cognition of what truly is');¹ the thinker who began by exhibiting Jesus as the model of purely *human* rationality, ends by finding in his own self-concept 'the intuition of God's eternal human Incarnation, the begetting of the Word from the beginning'.²

2. *Fauxbourdon: The Ground-bass of Nature*

The essentially metaphorical character of Hegel's initial interpretation of this 'rational myth' taken over from the revealed theology of Christianity, can be seen from the way he employs it in the 'Introduction to Philosophy' of October 1801. Here he speaks of the Idea 'coming down to Earth' (from its first realization in celestial mechanics) for its embodiment in the mortal organism, and 'rising again' out of physical nature as the *Sittlichkeit* of the free *Volk*; from here it finally 'returns to itself' as the 'intuition of Spirit'.³ Hegel does not speak of this 'return' as an 'ascension', although he designates it as the 'fourth part' of philosophy.

This is interesting and instructive, for although the whole pattern of the Incarnation story is employed metaphorically for the *real Lebenslauf* of the Idea, it is clear enough that the properly 'heavenly' existence of the Idea is not its embodiment in the *physical* heaven, but its conceptual being in 'Logic or the Science of the Idea as such'.⁴ This logical 'science of the Idea' had two sides, critical logic which was only introductory, and speculative Metaphysics which was the first part of the system proper. The eternity of the metaphysical Idea, the 'one

¹ *Phenomenology*, NKA, ix, 53, 2 (Miller, sect. 73).

² *Difference, etc.*, NKA, iv, 75 (Harris and Cerf, p. 171). What is called by this name here in 1801 is called 'the night in which all cows are black' in the *Phenomenology*; and what is called the *inessential* 'preponderance that consciousness has in speculation' here is identified as 'the chalice of this realm of spirits' in the *Phenomenology*. That is what I mean by saying that the Identity Philosophy is 'overturned'.

³ *Die Idee des absoluten Wesens*, 1b-2a (in NKA, v, 263-4).

⁴ Rosenkranz analysed the four parts of the 'system' quite correctly from this same fragment—see *Hegels Leben*, p. 179 (Harris and Knox, p. 6). As can be seen from the critical apparatus of NKA, v, 263—*Die Idee des absoluten Wesens*, 1b-2a—Rosenkranz depended on Hegel's initial (cancelled) version. But he was right to do so, because—as I have tried to show in Ch. I, above—this primitive schema lies at the base of all of Hegel's 'system-outlines' for 1801 and 1802.

eternal Reason', reflectively imaged in the genuine speculation of any and all ages and cultures, has its *real* correlate in the 'moving image of eternity' provided by the Solar System.¹ Hegel's commitment to the doctrine of the 'absolute Identity' causes him to regard the initial opposition and separation between Logic and Nature, (or more narrowly between the true Metaphysics and the true Physics) as a reflective duplication, which speculation must overcome. Thus there can be absolute freedom for discursive conceptual development in the 'heaven' of Logic, as opposed to absolute fixity in the Heaven of Nature. But this logical free play must move towards the absolute fixity of a final vision in which thinking and being, reflection and reality, concept and intuition coincide in the Idea (not 'as such' in the formal sense of 'for us', but 'as such' in the final sense of 'in and for itself'). Thus 'ascension' (back to the Heaven of pure thinking) would be an inappropriate metaphor; the 'resurrection' of the Idea is a 'resurrection of the body'; it cannot leave its reality as 'Nature' behind. Spirit has its 'body' in the free *Volk*; and absolute Spirit is the intuition of the real 'Universe' which was always the object of 'Science' from the moment when the analogy between logical eternity and the perpetuity of the celestial motions was first recognized. 'The begetting of the Word from the beginning' must be mapped on to the objective ground of natural existence completely, because that is what the 'intellectual intuition' of the 'absolute Identity' requires for its validation. The comprehension of nature by spirit must be identical with the perfect embracing (or *realization*) of Spirit

¹ Thus Plato's *Timaeus* and *Phaedrus* together provide the most obvious and probable link between Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy as 'speculation' and his own 'speculative physics'. Cf. *Difference* (NKA, iv. 11, 30-12, 7 and 31, 20-32, 13; Harris and Cerf, pp. 88, 114-15) and 'Essence of Philosophical Criticism' (NKA, iv. 117, 13-118, 9; *JYP*, iii. 1979, 38) with the *Dissertation* (*Erste Druckschriften*, pp. 348, 398) and the *Natural Law* essay (NKA, iv. 462, 23-37; Knox and Acton, p. 109). See also pp. 67 n. 2 and 92 n. 1, above. This constellation of Platonic influences is an argument for the dating of the 'Holy Triangle of Triangles' (see the appendix to Ch. IV herein) no later than the end of 1802. It will be evident that my discussion of the 'first' and 'fourth' parts of the four-part 'system of absolute identity' fits the 'Triangle' fragment as well as it does any of the definitely datable 'system-outlines' of this period. I am making no appeal to it as *evidence* here, because the dating of that fragment is a problem which all the definitely datable evidence about the 'four-part' system helps us to settle, once we understand Hegel's use of Trinitarian and Incarnation imagery properly.

itself within Nature. The climax of all *begreifen* is the recognition of a perfectly reciprocal *übergreifen* between Spirit and Nature, the universe of thought, and the universe of being.

The fullest and clearest expression of this ideal of speculation in our texts is at the ends of the two instalments of the *Natural Law* essay.¹ In the earlier passage Hegel insists that Spirit is higher than Nature, because Nature is 'absolute self-intuition' while Spirit is 'intuition of itself as its own self'. But this should not be allowed to obscure the Spinozist parallel of Nature as *Anschauung* and Spirit as *Erkennen*: 'The Absolute is such that it intuits itself, and moreover *as* itself, and the former absolute intuition and the latter self-cognition, the infinite expansion and the infinite recovery of the same into itself, is simply one.' Thus Spirit is higher only because it fulfils Nature, it is the achievement of the *goal* which Nature itself means or is. The 'recovery of the infinite expansion' (of physical nature) in absolute cognition is identical with the 'recovery of the Universe into itself'; and Spirit is only higher because *in* that recovery of the Universe, Spirit is the perfection of Nature, *as well as* its annihilation in thought.

At the end of the essay as a whole, what is emphasized is that because of this ultimate identity, philosophy must culminate in the same intellectual intuition of the whole from which it starts:

[Philosophy] must [re]cognize also the most beautiful shape for the high Idea of absolute *Sittlichkeit*; and since the absolute Idea is in itself absolute intuition, the purest and freest individuality is immediately determined with its construction, too, in which the Spirit intuits itself completely objectively in its own shape, and [re]cognizes the intuition itself as a whole, without returning to itself out of the intuition, but immediately as its own self, and precisely thereby is absolute Spirit, and perfectly complete *Sittlichkeit*.

What is claimed here is that philosophy can achieve a perfect intuition of the ideal social order (as the crown and perfection of

¹ *NKA*, iv. 464, 20–31 (Knox and Acton, pp. 111–12); and *NKA*, iv. 484, 18–485, 5 (Knox and Acton, pp. 132–3). Trede tries to use these passages to argue that the 'system' outlined in the *Natural Law* essay is distinct from 'Schelling's System' as outlined in *Difference* (*Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 9, pp. 171–6). I hope that my argument here establishes that he is mistaken (just as Rosenkranz was surely mistaken in finding in the first of them the crucial parting of the ways between Hegel and Schelling—see *Hegels Leben*, p. 177).

the order of finite nature as a whole) together with its religious consciousness, through which finite life is exalted to infinite life; and that it does so in an immediate (i.e. aesthetic or sensibly shaped) mode of intuition. Thus philosophy, religion, and art all coincide perfectly, the order of finite nature as a whole becomes 'the Universe of God',¹ and speculation 'rids itself of the preponderance that consciousness has in it'.²

This apotheosis of man in nature is plainly a fulfilment of the programme sketched in the 'earliest System-Programme'.³ The essentially practical concept of 'Nature' as a living ideal, an *aesthetic* harmony of all the 'drives' of humanity from the lowest material needs, to the highest moral imperatives, in the spontaneity that Hegel calls 'self-enjoyment' comes from Schiller's *Aesthetic Letters*.⁴ Hegel and Hölderlin developed it together during the Frankfurt years; and it seems idle to speculate about which of them was the prime mover in this development. Probably they did not know themselves; and certainly they would have laughed ironically at anyone who sought to allocate credit for it between them. What is more feasible—and more valuable for the understanding of Hegel's development—is to examine the difference made by Schelling's 'breakthrough' to the 'intellectual intuition' of 'absolute identity'.

When we consider that art and speculation are both declared to be forms of 'divine service' in the *Difference* essay, and that Spirit 'cognizes the intuition itself immediately as its

¹ This tag comes from the 'Triangle' fragment, (*Hegel-Studien*, x, 1975, 135—see pp. 187–8, above). But I do not need it as evidence of how the philosophy of sub-human nature is integrated into the final vision (the copious analogies from astronomy and biology in the *Natural Law* essay provide that). Rather, I am giving the reader another nudge toward acceptance of the hypothesis that the 'Triangle' fragment belongs together with the *Difference* essay, the *Natural Law* essay, and the *System of Ethical Life*.

² *Difference*, etc., NKA, iv, 76, 5–6; Harris and Cerf, p. 172.

³ The whole 'programme' (*Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 9, pp. 263–5; *Toward the Sunlight*, pp. 510–12) (Nature, *Menschenwerk*, and religion) should be examined in this light. The remarkable resemblance at the level of 'religion' has been exhaustively discussed by Trede (in *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 9, 167–210); and I have tried to exhibit the continuous evolution of Hegel's concept of 'Religion as the Mythology of Reason' from 1793 to 1807 in *Thought*, lvi, 1981, 301–15.

⁴ Cf. *Toward the Sunlight*, p. 253; see also the introduction and notes to my translation of *Der immer sich vergrößernde Widerspruch* in *Clio*, x, 1980/81, no. 4 (in press).

own self, without returning to itself out of the intuition' at the end of the *Natural Law* essay, we might be tempted to think that there is *no* real difference, and that only a few terminological shifts have occurred since Hegel wrote that 'truth and goodness only become sisters in beauty' ('Earliest System-Programme', 1796 or perhaps early 1797) or that 'philosophy must cease with religion because it is a thinking [process], and hence has an antithesis in one way with non-thinking [life-processes] and in another between the thinker and what is thought' ('Systemfragment', mid-1800). But, in fact, there are at least two shifts that are more than merely decisions to call certain experiences by new names.

First, the view that natural philosophy of a *theoretical* kind is at best 'not life [proper] but a life fixated by reflection, though treated in the worthiest possible manner' is given up.¹ Critical logic can now lead us out of the bad infinite labyrinths of reflection into the heaven of metaphysics; and the heaven and earth of physics have become a *Bild* for which natural philosophy securely possesses the *Urbild*. This is no mean thing in practice, either, as the continual appeals to the theoretical level of natural philosophy in the *Nature Law* essay suffice to show. The philosopher of nature can now deal with nature like a Greek poet. Just as the myth-maker could make us recognize dryad and naiad (in one of the fragments of 1797) so the philosopher can 'make the manifold of nature pass before him as a series of living [shapes], and he recognizes in bush, in air, and in water his own brothers' in 1803.² At that stage, Hegel has already moved beyond the conception of Nature as the 'body' of Spirit. But when 'Nature' becomes the 'other-being' of Spirit, it does not fall back into the status of 'finite reflection'. The 'poetic intuition of Nature as an absolute living whole' is still the moment of 'absolute reflection' through which the transition to speculative (or truly systematic) philosophy first became possible in 1801.³

¹ This assertion is made in the *Systemfragment* (TW-A, i. 420; Knox, p. 311) about our experience of nature as a 'bad infinite' rather than about Schelling's speculative philosophy of nature. The philosophical target is almost certainly Kant's *Critique of Judgement* (see Ch. II, pp. 80-82, above).

² Rosenkranz, p. 187; Harris and Knox, p. 261. (The original MS fragment will be published in NKA, v.)

³ But since this capacity for 'poetic intuition' is ascribed to the philosopher already

Secondly, the view that philosophy is essentially an instrument for changing the world, the commitment to a Fichtean primacy of practical Reason, is abandoned. Speculation becomes sufficient unto itself in its free range over the whole realm of Absolute Spirit. Thus even philosophical understanding which has an obviously practical import—as in the case of the final draft of the *Verfassungsschrift*—is insistently declared to be self-sufficient, and to have no end beyond itself. Hegel may very well be disingenuous in claiming that ‘The thoughts, which this essay contains, *cannot* by their public utterance have any other aim or effect, than to promote the understanding of what is.’¹ But he is using ‘cannot’ in the precise sense required by his new claim to the status of a speculative thinker. He is disingenuous, because the living author of the essay is still the patriotic soul, ‘unwilling to bid farewell to its hope of seeing the German State raised up from its utter insignificance’ who first projected a pamphlet on the topic three years earlier.² His practical expectations have changed, but his patriotic concern is unabated. As a philosopher, however, he must be ‘dead to the world’; and he writes accordingly. The contrast with the religious enthusiast who looks forward to the establishment of the new ‘mythology of Reason’ in 1796 as the ‘last, greatest, work of mankind’; and with the political activist of early 1800 who writes with abhorrence of the ‘perpetual death’ of a self-contained vision of the Idea; and even with the philosophical letter-writer of late 1800, who asks himself ‘while I am still occupied with this [the transformation of the ideal of my youth into reflective form, into a system], how I am to find a way back to intervention in the life of men’—is quite stark.³

in the ‘System-Programme’ of 1796; and since Hegel there speaks already of ‘giving wings to physics’, it may be that he is already developing his theory of ‘absolute reflection’ in the ‘system’ of 1800. In that case, only the second difference (here following) really exists between the system of 1800 and ‘Schelling’s System’ in 1801. That that difference validly exists is guaranteed not only by the contrast between *Der immer sich vergrößernde Widerspruch* and the final draft of the *Verfassungsschrift*, but by the language of the letter to Schelling of 2 Nov. 1800.

¹ *Deutschland ist kein Staat mehr* (1802–3), TW-A, i. 463; Knox and Pelczynski, p. 145.

² *Sollte das Resultat* (1798–9), TW-A, i. 452, n. 2; (compare *Toward the Sunlight*, pp. 436–40).

³ See *eine Ethik* (Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 9, p. 265); *Der immer sich vergrößernde Widerspruch* (TW-A, i. 457; *Clio*, x. 1980/81, no. 4 (in press); and Letter 29, *Briefe*, i. 49–50.

Even the philosopher is still not sufficient unto himself. Philosophy belongs essentially to the whole community, not just to the fortunate 'son of the Gods'. But the communication of speculative truth suffices to realize it, to give it the embodied shape that is its fulfilment; it does not subserve any practical purpose beyond that. Hegel certainly still dreamed of practical influence at Jena—of being Aristotle for the Empire of the new French Alexander; but he was always keenly aware that all such hopes must equally come to the Calvary of the 'infinite grief'.¹ His Socratic pursuit of death was different because it gave him membership in a resurrected world.

The 'universal freedom and equality of spirits' that reigns in this sphere of Absolute Spirit—discovered and proclaimed first in the 'System-Programme'—brought doom upon the philosophical vision of a perfectly intuitive identity, the vision of Nature as a perfectly self-reconciling whole. Already in the 'System-programme' Hegel was promising to lay down 'the principles for a *history of mankind*'. Wrestling with the problem of the 'infinite grief' (which is historically the problem of the submission of the Hellenistic world to Roman law, and of Greek imaginative religion to positive Christianity), Hegel was forced to recognize that the doctrine of a Spinozist parallel, a simple subject-object or mind-body relation between Spirit and Nature was inadequate. Philosophy itself has a history, *the eternal Incarnation of God is a history*, and hence 'the history of the one eternal Reason' is not—as the critical essays of 1801 maintain—a perpetual return to the *same* intuitive vision.² The 'intuition' of Nature as a reconciled whole of theoretical and practical 'self-construction' was the distinctively Greek achievement. The smashing of that achievement, and the long and painful genesis of the concept of a single human family, a comity of *nations* in a world of *universal* enlightenment—all this cannot

¹ If Rosenzweig's hypothesis about the 'new Theseus' of the *Verfassungsschrift* is correct—as I think (see *Toward the Sunlight*, p. 476)—Hegel only focused his hopes on the man of destiny from Corsica at about the time that he proclaimed himself Emperor—i.e. after his Austrian hope had come to grief. See further O. Pöggeler's essay 'Hegels Option für Österreich', *Hegel-Studien*, xii. 1977, 83–128.

² See the passages cited in p. 552 n. 1. Also cf. Rosenkranz, p. 134 (Harris and Knox, pp. 179–80) with p. 192 (Cerf and Harris, pp. 10–11—Hegel's own text for this last passage will appear in *NKA*, v. 274).

be conceptualized within the frame of the Greek experience, with its fundamentally aristocratic structure, and its supposedly natural antitheses of Greek and barbarian, slave and freeman. The *Bildung* of the philosopher is something quite distinct from the *Bildung* of the free citizen, because it must comprehend the history of religion (not just the function of religion in ethical life) in order to overcome these aristocratic biases. The Identity Philosophy, with its Schillerian-Hellenic ideals is not entitled to set Kant aside after simply giving a demonstration of the logical inadequacies of his 'subjective reflection' upon the world, and showing how they can be overcome. It must also comprehend the essentially Kantian individuality of the philosopher who performs this intellectual feat.

All the time he was under the spell of Schiller's Hellenic ideal—and particularly from mid-1796 until mid-1803 when he was consistently antipathetic to Kant in the interest of the 'harmony of nature' and of an aesthetic-religious 'intuition' which finally laid claim to full 'intellectual' status—Hegel knew, as surely as Schiller did, that the Kantian Categorical Imperative was a decisive advance over the ethics of 'natural slavery'. His own political commitment to the ideals of 1789 was the driving energy of the 'System-programme', and of all his efforts to carry it out. Thus the sunset of the 'Greek ideal' in 1803 is only a conceptual *Aufhebung* brought about by its own inward dialectical tension. The goal of 'absolute freedom of all spirits, who bear the intellectual world in themselves, and cannot seek either God or immortality outside themselves' remains unchanged. But the faithful pursuit of the Kingdom of God *within* the self has now brought us to the point where we can recognize that the 'preponderance of consciousness' in speculation as an individual activity is not a free (but also dispensable) descant over the *cantus firmus* of the natural and the free social order. Nor is it an extemporized middle part as in true fauxbourdon—the serious reader of the *System of Ethical Life* will (I hope) agree with me that true fauxbourdon is an appropriate musical analogue for the effort that is demanded of us as we strive for 'cognition of the Idea of absolute Sittlichkeit' with its continuous counterpoint of Greek answers and modern questions.¹

¹ *eine Ethik, Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 9, 264; Toward the Sunlight, p. 511.*

No. The philosopher is the true and necessary middle between the 'Universe' of Nature (including finite spirit) and Absolute Spirit. He must break out of nature, alienate himself from it altogether. Indeed all mankind must be called to follow Jesus in his flight from it, in order that a properly philosophic consciousness, one that 'bears the intellectual world in itself' may come to birth. That philosophic consciousness can then summon us all to recognize in the order of Nature (including finite or objective spirit) the 'other-being' of Spirit, the abiding ground-bass which is, indeed, the foundation of all harmony, but not a canonic image of the spiritual existence for which it is ground.

3. Ricericare a tre voci: *the Spiritual substance*

Thus subjectivity, the villain of the piece in 1801 and 1802, becomes the hero by the summer of 1803. In its first appearance in the starring role it is—if we are right about the dating of the relevant report in Rosenkranz¹—outwardly still a tragic hero. But the appearance is belying. Performing the 'absolute labour' (of death) by rising into the aether of 'speculation as the absolute cognition of truth' is not now the Good Friday story, but the story of Easter Day. The doctrine of this Rosenkranz fragment is still that of the *Natural Law* essay. But the word 'cognition' has replaced 'intuition': and that means that the realm of Absolute Spirit is accorded its full independence. 'Death' is itself the symbol of this, the symbol of triumph, of resurrection into a higher life. Not the tragedy of political *Sittlichkeit* (Orestes) but the comedy of Everyman (Dante, Bunyan's Christian) is now the theme of speculation. The *system* of philosophy goes from the 'aether of the simple Idea' to 'the spirit of the natural and ethical universe'; and it is a story of 'spirit' all the way. The philosopher surrenders the 'determinacy of his individual, independent, life' from the first. By making the surrender to 'simple [i.e. purely logical] consciousness' he becomes the conscious spirit of the com-

¹ Pp. 132-3; Harris and Knox, p. 178. Even if my hypothesis about the dating is wrong, the *language* is that of 1804, except for the use of the term *Universum*; so the sceptical reader should regard my exposition as a bird's eye view of the 'system of speculative philosophy' in that year, and should consider what I say in the light of whatever evidence he accepts as undoubtedly belonging to that period.

munity of humanity (for no lesser community could be 'the simple Idea of absolute cognition' or could become 'Spirit of the *natural and ethical universe*'). So this history of the Spirit is the story of 'consciousness', i.e. of subjectivity which has purified itself into the purely theoretical function of observing and recognizing logical necessity. At the level of Metaphysics, it is best to say that this consciousness is self-consciously impersonal; at the level of Philosophy of Spirit it has become self-consciously communal (or *inter-personal*). In between, at the level of natural philosophy, it is 'objective' (i.e. it is 'scientific' in the ordinary English sense). But it is always and everywhere founded on, and grounded in, the self-transcending power of an individual consciousness which differs from animal awareness in being able to put aside its own personal concerns (feelings, urges, needs, or drives of the natural organism). The *Aufhebung* of nature (and the self-creation of spirit) is essentially this 'putting-aside' of just that concern with self-preservation which is fundamental to animate life as a natural phenomenon—it is the ability to establish a theoretical point of view.

'In the beginning' this impersonal standpoint appears to *create* its world of possibility, actuality, and necessity 'out of nothing'. But when it reaches the level where it can examine itself (Philosophy of Spirit) it finds that this 'creation' is a self-*begetting*. The beginning student of 'critical logic', whose conceptual world is made to overturn itself before his eyes, came to have the personal rationality without which he would not be allowed into the first lecture, because of a social discipline, a system of practical *askesis* which involves real sacrifice of self, not just a theoretical standing aside which can be revoked at any time at will, or which revokes itself automatically when the drive of *Bedürfnis* becomes *Not*. This system of social discipline is the real creative power, the 'Father'; and the generative process (*Bildung*) of the social order involves and requires absolute self-sacrifice on the part of its members, i.e. a capacity to set aside *Bedürfnis* absolutely, so that it can never become *Not*. Without that, the world of academic calm with its sublime values, and its oh, so petty snobberies and vices, could never have come into existence at all. That is why it is vital to identify the primitive

origin of this capacity, the self-will that will give in to no opponent, not even death itself, but which is not naturally attached to any object (as the homologous animal capacity is attached to self-preservation, or the protection of the young). From this root springs the *military valour* that maintains the inviolability of the community's constitution and laws. Constitution and mores are the 'substance' of spiritual existence, its real foundation as distinct from its formal foundation in the educated rational consciousness of the logic student. When he understands that, the metaphysician knows why his own function must be schematized as the 'ideal complement of war'. Social discipline turns obstinate self-will into absolute self-sacrifice. Philosophical *Bildung* must turn neutral indifference and impersonal observation into perfect charity. To turn the logical recognition of necessity into love of any kind is paradoxical, though the paradox is familiar enough in the Stoics and Spinoza. The philosophy of Absolute Spirit mediates the paradox right out of existence—and this is where we can recognize Hegel's debt to Schiller—by making art the fundamental expression of rational freedom. The 'pure' artist is as self-willed in his commitment as any noble consciousness asserting whatever it has chosen to make into a 'point of honour'. But no one could ever have defined this ideal of immediate self-expression as his personal vocation, if the community had not already recognized such expressions as the communication of absolute value.¹ Thus, just as the natural valour of the free barbarian points forward toward the inverse chivalry of the soldier dying for *his* altars and hearths (the plural is as crucial as the possessive), so the free expression of the romantic artist points back toward the 'divine service' out of which it has historically erupted; and the love of God, which first released the artistic impulse, achieves the absolute cognition of God's presence only in the human *community*.

This is the point at which we can finally comprehend the peculiarly 'subjective' terminology of Hegel's philosophy of nature in this phase. The *presence* of God is to be recognized

¹ The absolute value of a given artist's work need be no greater than the human significance of a noble 'point of honour'. A value, or anything else, needs only to be *complete in and for itself* in order to be *absolute*; it need not be great, indeed it may be nearly null.

discursively in the natural and the social order. Our parents lead us—roughly or gently but always very personally—to the recognition of objective necessity, natural and social. This is the spiritual substance. Then in our philosophical education, we come back from that alienated consciousness of social authority to the ‘service that is perfect freedom’. Now we know that all the impersonal logic of possible, actual, and necessary connections is not the structure of our singular consciousness but of the communal experience; that the laws and customs of the community are the framework of our freedom; and that the rational community is the highest possible object of our love and loyalty. It is easy now to see that natural necessity, the ‘law of nature’, must be thought of as the frame of this social rationality. Nature, conceived transcendently, or as existing not in itself but ‘for us’, is the essential objective structure of our theoretical cognition (just as the social order is the enabling ground of our free-ranging self-expression. Just as all the values of natural existence, are inverted in social life, so all the truths of natural consciousness must be inverted in natural science. For the conceptual framework, within which all the data of natural consciousness (already ‘sublated’ into the theoretical ‘ideas’ of empiricist philosophy before they can count as data at all) receive their scientific interpretation, is our historic achievement as a community. Hence, just as the ideal evolution of Absolute Spirit is the direct model for the moral ordering of the world of objective spirit, so too, at a further remove, it is the inverse pattern for its ‘absolute reflection’ in the theoretical order of our natural science. The philosophy of nature provides the order for our scientific cognition of the world we live (and die) in. Our science gets its absolutely theoretical character from its being the ‘absolute reflection’ of the spiritual self-contemplation which is our highest goal. Hegel’s philosophy of nature continued to be an effort to organize all his scientific knowledge so that it could be seen as ordered to this end, even after he stopped speaking so strangely of the Earth as ‘absolute cognition’ (again the contrast with the earlier doctrine of nature as ‘self-intuition’ is what matters here!) and adopted a neutral (logical) pattern and method in place of this obviously subjective (psychological) structure.

This transformation can be seen to be inevitable in its turn, when we re-examine the improperly practical, pragmatic, *empirical* account that has been given above, of what the scientific spirit discovers when it studies its own genesis in the philosophy of spirit. The rational subject who embarks upon the study of critical logic is indeed the product of a process of social discipline. but his situation is not that of a natural herd-member whose behaviour has been modified and adjusted. The truth is rather that he has come into mature possession of the reasoning power that is *his* distinctive essence. He is only susceptible to *Bildung* at all, because he is a thinking being, capable of taking a 'theoretical' attitude and enjoying it so that he never gives it up (as other young mammals give up playing for the serious work of species-maintenance). The medium for his primitively aesthetic experience of this enjoyment is language: and language is the medium in which the social authority of law and custom presents itself to him. Thus, properly speaking, the 'Lord' who is 'Father' of all of us, the giver of all our talents, to whose service we must in justice devote them (as our rational religion tells us) is the *Logos*. Logic is what orders both the world out there, and our thoughts (including our projects of rebellion). 'In the beginning was the Word.'

The logic of verbal comprehension can be presented in more than one way. If we adopt the standpoint of the finite rational subject, it is natural to begin with the nominalist concept of 'the world' as *one* great order of *singular* things. Hegel's logic always goes in the opposite direction because everything in his organization of experience is ordered to spiritual existence as the *end*. 'Spirit' is the *concept* in which the logical moments of universal, particular, and singular are united concretely (as the 'individual'). The lesson of critical logic is that the singular consciousness must sacrificially transform itself into universal logical cognition, the 'aether' of the rational community, before it can regain itself as the *concrete* universal, the *self-consciousness* of Absolute Spirit. But this lesson is not a 'logical' one so far as the self-regaining is concerned. The lesson of *critical* logic is 'logical', because without it 'knowledge' itself cannot be defined as an achievable goal. But nothing except the designation of *self-knowledge* as

the goal of existence dictates the necessary progress from the 'abstract' to the 'concrete' universal. Nothing logical determines that a nominalist science is either better or worse than an instrumentalist one (one which takes its stand upon the *particular* concept, the middle term, as fundamental); or that either of them must bow before the idealist science that insists on starting from the universal in order to find it again incarnate in the rational individual. All parties alike can absorb and repeat the philosophical lessons of the idealist logic. One is only obliged to accept that logic as one's ontology, when one agrees that 'first philosophy' is the science of *ends*, and that one can and must ask 'what is scientific knowledge *for*?' If one does that, and further refuses to be put off with any kind of instrumentalist (circular) answer which asks us to recognize the 'means-ends continuum' (and be satisfied with a 'bad infinite') then I think the Hegelian concept of 'spirit' imposes itself. For then the *end* of knowledge can only be the *self*-realization of the knower, and the goal of philosophical inquiry becomes the complete comprehension of human cognitive effort throughout history as related to this end. (Since much of it was consciously nominalist or instrumental in its assumptions and aims, 'comprehending' it in the idealist perspective, often gives it an extremely unfamiliar look.)

I have ventured upon this seeming digression about the philosophy of logic because in the final transformation of Hegel's theory of philosophical method the thinking subject gives way to the *logical* patterns of Concept, Judgement, and Syllogism; and the logic of the concept is presented as a motion from abstract to concrete—i.e. we go from universal to particular to singular accumulatively, first specifying, then individuating the concept we start from. The *Bildung* of the individual thinker no longer occupies the centre of the stage, but the concrete individuation of the Logos, the transformation of Reason from Universal to Individual logically, and from substance to subject really, is still the essential theme. Again, the transformation is one that the logic of this goal of rational individuality requires. The logical organization of the system in terms of a self-transformation of the individual consciousness that satisfies its 'need of philosophy'—i.e. of

'absolute knowledge'—is essentially a pragmatic or instrumental one. It takes its stand upon the middle, the moving force, not yet upon the prime mover that remains unmoved, the universal Logos. But when we do move finally to this unmoving centre, we must never lose sight of the fact that it is we, the moving force, who thus move to the point of eternal rest. None of the pretensions of the idealist logic make any sense at all, and it deserves all the sarcasms that have been so lavishly bestowed upon it, unless we recognize it as the one self-consistent positive formulation of *human* experience in response to the Delphic command: 'Know *thyself*.' The concept of 'Spirit' makes it possible to obey this command in quite another way than the humbling reflection which the God (or his mouthpiece among the Seven Sages) intended. I *can* indeed 'know myself, that I am a mortal, not an immortal like Apollo'; but *that means that I can know what knowing is*. The quest for that 'absolute knowledge' will lead me first to the point where I recognize the rational community as the only self that can properly be said to have knowledge, and thence to the point where I recognize that it is Apollo himself who is the mortal after all, for he is only a moment in the motion of my rational community toward conscious self-possession. It is I, the mortal who receives the oracle, who is the true ground of immortality, and my self-knowledge is the *telos* of the great spiritual motion which first sets up Apollo and then sets him aside. But only the God's authority is mortal in this way, for as a Hegel-inspired poet said: 'Jove dies, and the poet's hymn remains.'¹ It is as a creation of human thought that the God survives immortally—like everything else in the spiritual realm.

4. *The fugue of thought and of life*

Thus, when subjectivity became the conscious theme of Hegel's philosophy, there were bound to be radical consequences for his logic and Metaphysics; and these consequences must in the end have a determining force with respect to the structure and method of systematic philosophy as a whole. To begin with, Hegel conceived of transcendental

¹ Carducci, 'Dante' (*Rime nuove*) 14: 'Muor Giove, e l'inno del poeta resta.'

philosophy as essentially neutral with respect to the subject/object antithesis. Logic proper (and he always preferred to call the 'Science of the Idea as such' Logic simply) is equally the structure of mind and world, of substance and self. 'Critical' logic was a necessary preamble to speculative thought (Metaphysics) because we have to sacrifice our subjectivity. The whole of Hegel's philosophy, indeed, was originally critical in this sense, for its last phase, like the first, has this sacrifice as its theme. What is absolute is neither subject nor object, self nor world, but their coincidence, their identity. Subjectivity is a 'higher' phase than objectivity in the progressive realization of this identity, because substance is self-cognitive. But in the final elevation of finite to infinite life, the metaphysical subject as 'Spirit' must repeat the pattern of finite subjectivity. In the Philosophy of Identity sacrifice is the fate or structure of rational subjectivity generally. To put it another way, as between subject and object, soul and body, spirit and nature, the first is 'higher'. But as between subject and substance, thinking and truth, knowing and living, it is the latter that is fundamental or absolute. In the expression 'thinking substance', thinking is adjectival because it refers to the process of appearing which achieves true being when it completes its cycle of revolution and returns to the moment of 'intuition' from which it began.

When subjectivity is recognized as the true mode of *being*, when spirit as a self-knowing *process* is taken as fundamental, the first result, as we might expect, is an over-reaction against the metaphysical primacy of substance. The process of self-manifestation is what matters now, and 'cognition' not 'intuition' is the key-word. Yet the fact remains that what is truly known in absolute knowledge, is what substantially, i.e. eternally, *is*. This logical requirement of the concept of truth must be honoured, even if we have discovered that *what absolutely is for knowing, can only be its own process of coming to self-awareness*.

But if 'what is' is this process, then the assumption that any phase of the process is only a critical preamble to philosophy as the self-display of Reason is a mistake. Rather, every phase of conscious cognitive existence is part of the experience of that process as a process, part of its 'reality' or its phenomenal existence.

Thus Hegel's attempt to structure his system as a whole in

terms of the logical evolution of cognition as a 'concrete universal' led him to the discovery of the 'phenomenology of Spirit' as an all-comprehensive display of the 'life of Reason', and to the recognition that since the sacrifice of finitude is the necessary preamble to any elevation to the infinite, the whole of this phenomenal display must be experienced as a logical progression before the truth can be comprehended as it is in and for itself, or eternally.

What this means is that instead of critical logic being the overcoming of 'subjective reflection' that is required for the comprehension of the 'absolute Identity', it is rather the whole Identity Philosophy as a critical theory of experience that is the required preamble for the comprehension of the true theory of subjective reflection. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* is the record of what Hegel finally learned from the Identity Philosophy, and hence a record of his debt to Schelling even in the very overturning of 'Schelling's System'. It is true, of course, that the intuition of the absolute Identity is regarded only from its negative side: 'the dark night in which all the cows are black' is 'the night in which the substance was betrayed'.¹ But this is somewhat deceptive because the *Phenomenology* is not only the introduction to the 'System of Science', it is also the first part of it. Absolute Knowledge is not an 'intuition' when we reach it; it is a concept, a cognitive process which having finally come to be 'for itself' can now display itself as it is 'in and for itself' in its eternal rest. Thus the 'System of Science' contains two logics: the logic of experience or of cognition as it is 'for us', a logic which goes from the singular consciousness to the universal self-consciousness, i.e. from the concrete (but unconscious) universal to the abstract (but self-conscious) Logos; and the logic of truth, or of absolute Cognition as it is in itself. The theory of *Wissenschaft* being thus completed in two parts, the real philosophy then raises Cognition first to the status of being *for*

¹ The two comments occur in widely separate contexts, and the betrayal refers to the 'ethical substance' of Greek *Sittlichkeit*, *NKA*, ix. 17, 27-9; 377, 36-7 (Miller, sects. 16, 703). But it is exactly that substance which is presented as the 'absolute Identity' *intuiting itself as its own self* at the climax of the *Natural Law* essay. The obvious echo of Gethsemane in the 'betrayal' passage marks the transition to the higher concept of Spirit (as what rises from the abandonment of this perfection of 'nature').

itself as other than itself (the Philosophy of Nature); and then to that of being *in and for itself* (i.e. for itself as itself—the Philosophy of Spirit). But this last is once again its being ‘for us’, except that now we can comprehend every phase of the *Phenomenology* positively, we know that the ‘highway of despair’ is more than a trail of lost illusions (for to lose an illusion properly is to gain the truth in its place). Only in this second time round can we properly understand the standpoint which Hegel *calls* ‘ours’ in the *Phenomenology*. For this is the standpoint of Spirit, ‘the *I* that is *we*, and the *we* that is *I*’, appearing to itself. We must go right round the circle in order to fix its centre. But the circle can only be drawn from that centre; and *what is*, is neither the circle nor the centre, but the cyclic motion which describes the circle. The two parts of the ‘System of Science’, the ‘science of the experience of consciousness’ and ‘the science of Logic’ belong together, because it is only when we can see the Logic in the appearing of the Logos that we really know what it is. In order to do that, of course, we need the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit. But it is the *positive* comprehension of the ‘science of the experience of consciousness’ that is the real goal. For to add this comprehension to the instrumental ‘comprehension of the time’ (which is the *content* of the science as a discipline through which we become philosophers by raising ourselves to the standpoint of the world-spirit, the real transcendental subject of experience, while raising *it* from the status of substance to subject at the same time) to add this positive comprehension, is to comprehend philosophy as the meaning of life, and so to ‘learn from philosophy how to live’.

In thus seeming to overturn the principal lesson which Hegel drew from the Identity Philosophy (the lesson of Olympian calm and indifference, illustrated above in the final draft of the introduction for the *Verfassungsschrift*) I may seem to have contradicted my claim about the significance of the final ‘logical’ revolution in Hegel’s development. But this is only a deceptive appearance. For ‘learning how to live’ is not the same as ‘learning what to do’. Philosophy does not teach us that (except in the absolute and abstract sense that it sets up self-knowledge as the goal of existence). But in order to be the ‘mediator between itself and life’ the Concept must

show us *how* we can regard every aspect of experience as a moment of our self-knowledge. The *Phenomenology* does this; and in this way, too, it fulfils the teaching of the Identity philosophy, with its emphasis on 'intuition' and on 'art as the organon of philosophy'.

The perceived *presence* of the Absolute is the focal requirement of these Jena years which leads to the eventual emphasis on consciousness (as the logical mode of 'presence'). This emphasis is what Voss has caught when he echoes Cicero's praise of Socrates for 'leading philosophy down again out of the clouds'. It is because intuitive awareness is not enough, and the presence of the Absolute as cognition is necessary that the people must possess philosophy in their own tongue, and as a meditation upon the most ordinary, everyday, words 'in that tongue. The fundamental transition in Hegel's philosophy is not the transition from 'phenomenology' to 'logic' or from 'logic' to 'nature' or from 'nature' to 'spirit'. It is rather the transition from finite spirit to absolute Spirit. This is obvious enough in the initial four-part system where it is sharply distinguished as the final 'resumption of the whole into one.' But it is just as emphatically marked in the peculiar (because seemingly incomplete) articulation of the Real Philosophy of 1805; and when we consider that *this* transition is the main topic of the *Phenomenology* we must recognize that the triadic division of the *Encyclopaedia* can easily mislead us. Hegel's philosophy is a *four*-part fugue, because the three parts of the 'system' lead back to what is outwardly presented as the 'prelude'. It does this because its goal is to bring the kingdom of the spirit down to earth, to bring philosophy down out of the clouds, and raise the quest itself into wisdom, by making it terminate in knowledge (Spirit's knowledge of itself) rather than in faith.

I have called this final retrospective survey a 'voluntary' to indicate that it is a free quasi-improvisatory piece. Thomas Morley wrote that 'To make two parts upon a plainesong is more hard than to make three parts into voluntary.' One can view Hegel's Jena manuscripts in many lights. In the body of this work I have tried to treat them 'in and for themselves', to

elucidate what the concept and aim of each of them in fact was. But there has always been in my mind the consciousness that *my* real aim is to elucidate the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which Hegel finally wrote and published at the end of the period. This project cannot be completed (or even begun) in the present volume. But it seems necessary and proper to acknowledge that it was there. So I have tried here, consciously, to relate the phases of my inquiry to it. Because it is improvised freely, according to my own impressions and feelings and without further reference to the texts—or even to my own text, except to check the accuracy of the quotations and references that came to mind spontaneously—it will serve, I hope, as a reliable indicator of the biases that must be watched for in my more deliberate attempt at objective interpretation.

Of course, there are other ways, too, in which the title recommended itself. A voluntary is an organ piece playable at any convenient point, but typically at the conclusion, of 'divine service'. Since the *Difference* essay says that speculation is a form of 'divine service', a 'recessional voluntary' seems appropriate. But since I agree with Voss that Hegel ends by becoming an Olympian God in disguise, to speak of a 'voluntary' is also an ironic reminder of the human wilfulness of all divine service. But the 'son of the Gods' was subjected to hard service; and the Olympian shepherd, though eventually he was recognized, has never been understood.

His fate resembles that of a closely contemporary volunteer for divine service who also became a divine shepherd—William Blake. Blake and Hegel knew nothing of one another; indeed Blake seems—unlike Coleridge—to have known nothing of Kant's 'Copernican revolution' and its speculative aftermath. Yet the affinity between Blake and Hegel has long been recognized although its significance has never been adequately understood. One of the incidental benefits of a clear grasp of how Hegel turned the speculative tradition of Christian panentheism into a properly critical philosophy—i.e. one in which 'God' has *no* transcendent status whatever, being only the *Gestalt* in which the transcendental structure of experience appears as a *whole*—is the acquisition of a conceptual foundation that makes possible a comparatively

rigorous (i.e. internally consistent, and systematically coherent) interpretation of Blake's 'prophetic books'. For Blake, like Hegel, thought of 'man' always as the actual community of mankind; and he laid down categorically that 'God only Acts and Is in existing beings or Men.'¹ Thus the community of all 'existing beings or Men' is a unitary *Zoa*, and this *total collection of living things* is God's manifestation in history (where he Acts) and nature (where he Is). By a simple grammatical operation the four Beasts of the Apocalypse were in this way transformed into four modes of the 'absolute Identity' of God and Man;² and Blake's 'Four Zoas' (with all their offspring) emerge finally as phases and aspects of the same 'Lebenslauf Gottes' in human consciousness that Hegel was trying to conceptualize. The marvellous dialectical ambiguity of the epigraph from the opening lines of the poem, which I have chosen for this book, would have delighted Hegel: 'Four Mighty Ones are in every Man a Perfect Unity' (logical thesis); yet 'A Perfect Unity cannot Exist' (because there are the Four Mighty Ones differently arrayed in each of us—empirical antithesis); and finally 'A Perfect Unity cannot exist, but from the Universal Brotherhood of Eden' (speculative synthesis returning us to the logical beginning).

Blake's vision is related to the 'Night Thoughts' of Edward Young (which he 'illuminated' literally) in just the way that Hegel's thought is related to the symbolic mysteries of Protestant 'faith' (which he illuminated conceptually); and the logical relation between Blake and Coleridge is not unlike the historical relation between Hegel and Schelling. That Blake in his rebellion against Locke and Newton, could create a proto-Hegelian vision with only the conceptual armoury provided by English Neoplatonism and Boehme, *before* Coleridge nostrified the aesthetic and natural philosophy of Schelling, is the true index of his intellectual greatness. More

¹ *Marriage of Heaven and Hell*, Plate 16, *The Illuminated Blake*, London, 1975, p. 113. (The capitalization of the verbs, is meant—I think—to indicate that Blake is using them as Platonic Ideas, i.e. as eternal or logical concepts.)

² In view of his study of the Authorized Version, Blake could not help knowing that the word ζῶα (in Revelation 4: 6 ff.) was *already* a Greek neuter plural. So when he added the English plural ending he meant to generate a *plurality of groups or collections*. (I expect that he also knew, at least, that a Greek neuter plural takes a singular verb. This helps to legitimate his procedure.)

clearly than that of anyone else in his time (except perhaps Goethe) Blake's work shows that Hegel was wrong to believe that the poet's vision could have only a *negative* significance in the modern revolutionary period. Certainly, Blake's high aristocratic pose as a prophet, and his ever increasing attachment to esoteric and mysterious modes of speech, was in part a defence (as successful as it was necessary) against the fate of being his own first victim, which Hegel prophesied for the revolutionary poet. But we can fairly hold that Hegel as a philosopher must have encountered the same fate if the project of 'making philosophy speak German' had not entailed an equally high and arduous journey for its intended audience. The truth seems to be (as Hegel saw about the end of 1796 when he began, more or less consciously to *become* a philosopher) that the visionary poet and the systematic thinker must still always depend on one another, and go hand in hand; and further, that both require to be viewed in the distanced perspective of the historic past, before their achievement can be interpreted, appreciated, and evaluated with anything approaching adequacy or justice.

If this last conclusion is valid, then the 'volunteers' for the crossing of the Jordan (or the Acheron) of Absolute Spirit, must always find that their service is almost unwanted and largely unwelcome in the real order of their own time. No doubt even my voluntary (played at the comfortable distance of a century and a half after Hegel's earthly funeral) is still quite unwanted by many and unwelcome to some. But I trust that it is not—like the *Phenomenology* itself—being played for a congregation that is totally tone-deaf. I am well assured, at least, that such listeners as I may have are not—as far too many of Hegel's audience were—still intent upon their prayers. And the true freedom of the spiritual realm shows itself, above all, in this: that there is never any need to be impatient.¹

¹ There is one final coincidence which came to my notice only after the last revisions of my MS had been completed. The first whole chapter of Hume's *Treatise* to appear in German was the last chapter of Book I. This was translated by Hamann, and published in the *Königsberger Zeitung* in July 1771 under the title 'Night Thoughts of a Sceptic'. In a paper delivered at the Tenth Congress of the Hume Society (Trinity College, Dublin, August 1981) but otherwise still unpublished, Manfred Kuehn argues (very plausibly in my opinion) that Kant's reading of this

translation was the immediate occasion for his 'awakening from dogmatic slumber'. This gives the title of my own work a fitness, and a providential significance of which I knew nothing when I chose it. For my fundamental contention is that the long process of gestation that culminates in the writing of the *Phenomenology* should be seen as a continuing effort to bring to fruition 'the revolution to be expected from the completion of Kant's philosophy' (Hegel to Schelling, Letter 11, April 1795, *Briefe*, i. 23). Hegel's poetic 'Resolution' of [1 Jan.] 1801—with which the present book begins—was, in my view, a conscious comment upon Kant's declared hope that the new critical philosophy could be completed 'before the end of the present century'. His fulfilment of Kant's hope was six years late.

The coincidence gives my title a *providential* significance, because it illustrates how the 'cunning of Reason' works. Hamann was surely influenced in his choice of a title—as Kant was too, in the choice of titles like 'Dreams of a Spirit-Seer'—by the contemporary celebrity of Dr Young's 'Night Thoughts'; while I, on the other hand, would never have attended to Young at all, had it not been for the far greater work, and truly lasting fame of William Blake—of whom they were probably altogether ignorant.

A CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX TO HEGEL'S EARLY WRITINGS AS CITED IN THIS BOOK

Note: This index overlaps with, and continues, the Chronological Index in *Toward the Sunlight*. All items are identified (as far as possible) by the title used by Hegel himself, or by the opening words of the text as it now survives. But even texts which do not survive are listed here, if we have incontrovertible evidence of their existence. The first section of this index is repeated from *Toward the Sunlight* (with any necessary amendments and qualifications). The numbering is discontinuous because it is taken from that earlier list. The continuation of that list begins with Section II (item 151). The chronological terminus of the list is March 1807.

SECTION I: THEOLOGICAL-POLITICAL WRITINGS OF 1793-1802

46. *Religion ist eine* [the 'Tubingen fragment'] <July-Aug. 1793?>; *TW-A*, i. 9-44 (*Toward the Sunlight*, pp. 481-507): 404
67. *Die reine aller Schranken* [the 'Life of Jesus'], 9 May-24 July 1795; Nohl, pp. 75-136: 174
70. *Ein positiver Glauben* [draft] <between Dec. 1795 and March 1796>, *TW-A*, i. 190-6: 73 n., 134 n.
71. *Der gute Mensch* [excerpt] (Apr. 1796?), Nohl, p. 367: 186
74. *Der Grundfehler, der bei dem ganzen System* [conclusion added to 'Positivity' essay], 29 Apr. 1796, (*TW-A*, i. 187-90; Knox, pp. 143-5): 147 n., 404
75. *Jedes Volk hat ihm eigene Gegenstände* [draft] <May-June 1796?> (*TW-A*, i. 196-215; Knox, pp. 145-67): 512 n.
76. *eine Ethik* ['the earliest system-programme'] <June or July 1796?> (*Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 9, 261-6; *Toward the Sunlight*, pp. 510-12 or Morgan and Guterman, pp. xi-xiii): see Analytical Index (System Programme)
78. *Eleusis* [poem], Aug. 1796 (*TW-A*, i. 230-3; Mueller, 1968, pp. 60-2): 195 n.
80. *Joseph. jüd. Alterth.* [notes] <early 1797> (Hamacher, pp. 346-8): 146 n.
83. 84. *Positiv wird ein Glauben genannt* [outline] <mid-1797; before July> (*TW-A*, i. 239-43; *Clio*, viii, 1979, 258-61): 5, 72, 76 n., 211 n., 555

85. *so wie sie mehrere Gattungen* [fragment of outline] <July–Aug. 1797> (TW-A, i. 243–4; *Clio*, viii, 1979, 261–3): 7 n., 10 n., 163
86. and 100. *welchem Zwecke denn alles Übrige dient* [fragment of draft] <Nov. 1797; revised late 1798 or early 1799> (TW-A, i. 244–50—cancelled passages of 86 are only partially printed in the footnotes; translation of 100, Knox, pp. 302–8): 123 n., 324 n., 482 n., 485
87. *Zu Abrahams Zeiten* [draft] <early 1798> (Hamacher, pp. 529–31): 146 n.
89. *Glauben ist die Art* [draft] <early 1798> (TW-A, i. 250–4; *Toward the Sunlight*, pp. 512–15): 11–12, 16 n.
92. Notes on Kant's *Metaphysik der Sitten*, <begun 10 Aug. 1798> (quoted by Rosenkranz, pp. 87–8; see also TW-A, i. 43–4): 7–8 n.
94. *Die schönen, ihrer Natur nach* [outline] <autumn 1798?> (Hamacher, pp. 376–7): 146 n.
99. and 107. *leben* *digen Modifikation* and *Jesus trat nicht lange* [complex of drafts, 'The Spirit of Christianity'] <late 1798–early 1799; revised summer 1799–early 1800> (TW-A, i. 317–418, cancelled passages of 99 only partially given in footnotes; 107 translated in Knox, pp. 205–301): see Analytical Index (*Spirit of Christianity*)
107. (j). *Reines Leben zu denken* (TW-A, i. 370–80; Knox, pp. 254–64): 5, 287 n., 455 n.
104. and 116. *Sollte das Resultat* and *Sollte das politische Resultat* [draft] <Dec. 1798–Jan. 1799, revised Feb.–March 1801> (*Dok.*, pp. 282–8 with 104 in the footnotes; 116 only in TW-A, i. 451–6): 556
105. Commentary on Steuart's *Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy*, 19 Feb.–16 March 1799 (described by Rosenkranz, p. 86): 126 n.
108. *Der immer sich vergrößernde Widerspruch* [unfinished essay] <early 1800?> (TW-A, i. 457–460; *Clio*, x, 1980–1, 399–406: 6 n., 10–11 n., 193 n., 556 n.
110. (a) *absolute Entgegensetzung gilt* [fragment of treatise] <before Sept. 1800> (TW-A, i. 419–23; Knox and Kroner, pp. 309–13).
(b) *ein objektiven Mittelpunkt* [conclusion of treatise] 14 Sept. 1800 (TW-A, i. 423–7; Knox and Kroner, pp. 313–19): see Analytical Index (Systemfragment)
115. *Macch. richtet sich an Laurent*. [excerpt in French] <after Jan. 1801> (TW-A, i. 553–4; Knox and Pelczynski, pp. 219–20): xxv, 1
120. *Ich § (a) Menschenliebe, Freundschaft* [outline] <late 1800? certainly before Apr. 1801> (TW-A, i. 444–5 n; *Clio*, x, 1980–1, 403–4: 6 n.
121. (a) and (b) *Kaiserliches KommissionsDekret* [excerpts] <Apr. 1801> (NKA, v): xxv
122. *Schreiben der Reichsstände* [excerpts] <May 1801> (NKA v): xxv
[Here the writing of the *Difference* essay intervenes.]
123. *Diese Form des deutschen Staatsrechts* [draft] <July 1801> (TW-A, i. 465–72; Knox and Pelczynski, pp. 146–53): xxv, 1, 76 n.
124. (a) and (b). *Der Nahme für die Staatsverfassung* [fragments of a draft] <July 1801> (NKA, v): xxv, 1, 76 n.
125. *Deutschland kein Staat mehr* [essay-plan] <July 1801> (TW-A, i. 603): xxv, 76 n.

126. *Die Fortpflanzung des kriegerischen Talents* [fragments of draft treatise] <July 1801> (TW-A i. 485-7, 585-92, 595-6, 512-81; first and last sections in Knox and Pelczynski, pp. 164-6, 187-242): see Analytical Index (*German Constitution*)
127. *Gustav hatte kaum die Schlacht* [excerpts] <July 1801> (NKA, v): xxv, 1, 76 n.
[Here the *Dissertation* and lecturing intervenes.]
128. *Sitzung 14ten Sept.* 1802 (excerpts), Sept. 1802 (NKA, v): 1 n.
129. (a) and (b). *Nouvelles de Paris 2 Nov.* [excerpts], Nov. 1802 (NKA, v): 1 n.
130. *Botschaft der Regierung* [excerpt] <Dec. 1802> (NKA, v): 1 n.
131. *Deutschland ist kein Staat mehr* [fragments of fair copy based on 126] <Dec. 1802 or early 1803> (TW-A, i. 461-5, 472-85, 487-512; Knox and Pelczynski, pp. 143-6, 153-64, 166-88): see Analytical Index (*German Constitution*)
144. *Der Streit über die Möglichkeit* [fragment of essay-complex 99 or 107?] <Frankfurt, 1799 or 1800?> (Rosenkranz, pp. 510-12): 7 n.
146. Fragments of historical studies <Berne, 1796?-Frankfurt, 1800?> (TW-A, i. 428-42, 446-8; *Clio*, vii, 1977, 113-34): 4 n., 217 n.

SECTION II: PHILOSOPHICAL TEXTS OF THE JENA PERIOD

151. *Entschluss* [poem] <1 Jan.?> 1801 (*Dok.*, p. 388): xix, 26 n., 546, 573 n.
[Items 114-27 in the preceding section properly follow here.]
152. *Differenz* u.s.w., Jena, Seidler, 1801 <May?>-July 1801; NKA, iv. 3-92 (trans. Harris and Cerf, Albany, N.Y., 1977): see Analytical Index (*Difference* essay)
153. Review of Bouterwek, *Anfangsgründe der spekulativen Philosophie* <Aug. 1801>, NKA, iv. 95-104: xxviii n., xlv n.
154. *Dissertationi philosophicae . . . praemissae Theses* [printed leaflet] <Aug. 1801>; *Hegels Leben*, pp. 156-9, or *Erste Druckschriften*, p. 404: xxx, 18 n., 48 n., 49, 87, 88-9, 125-6, 157, 158-9, 393
155. *ad Respond. In publico* [Latin notes for the Disputation] <Aug. 1801>; *Dok.*, 312-14: xxx n.
156. German version of *Dissertatio* (see 157) with calculations [all lost] <Frankfurt, mid-1800?> mentioned by Rosenkranz to K. Hegel in letter of May 1840: xxxvi n., 75, 76 n., 80 n., 88 n.
157. *Dissertatio philosophica De Orbitis Planetarum*, Jena, Präger, 1801 <Aug.>-Oct. 1801; *Erste Druckschriften*, pp. 347-401: see Analytical Index (*Dissertation*)
158. *Introductio in philosophiam* <Oct. 1801> [a]: *Diese Vorlesungen* . . . [two fragments of lecture draft]; NKA, v. 259-61: x, xxx, lii n., 74, 75, 102, 192, 411
[b]: *Die Idee des absoluten Wesens* . . . [fragment of lecture draft]; NKA v. 262-5: x, 18 n., 19, 34 n., 39, 62-9, 74, 75, 87 n., 98 n., 102, 174 n., 179 n., 201, 231 n., 232 n.
159. *Logica et Metaphysica: Dass die Philosophie* . . . [fragment of lecture

- draft] <Oct. 1801>; *NKA*, v. 267-75: (quoted in *Hegels Leben*, pp. 189-91, trans. Harris and Knox, pp. 263-4 and Cerf and Harris, pp. 9-11): x, xxx-xxxiii, 18 n., 53 n., 57 n., 62, 92 n., 93 n., 102-6, 191 n., 193, 201-2, 231-2 n., 363 n., 381 n., 405 n., 413, 414 n., 550 n., 557 n.
160. *Verständlicher für den Begriff Gottes* . . . [the 'Triangle-fragment'] <before Nov. 1801?>; *Hegel-Studien* x, 1975, 133-35 (trans. on pp. 186-8, above): see Analytical Index (Holy Triangle)
161. *Ueber das Wesen der philosophischen Kritik* u.s.w. [essay co-authored with Schelling] <Nov. 1801 or earlier>; *KNA*, iv. 117-28 (trans. in *Independent Journal of Philosophy*, iii. 1979, 37-45): xxxviii-xli, 9, 34 n., 57 n., 59 n., 405 n., 406 n., 552 n., 557
162. *Wie der gemeine Menschenverstand* u.s.w. [review of W.T. Krug] <Nov. 1801 or earlier>; *NKA*, iv. 174-87: xxxviii n., xxxix n., xl n., 18 n.
163. *Besonderer Zweck des Blattes* [critical note, authorship uncertain, perhaps by or with Schelling] <late Nov. 1801>; *NKA*, iv. 188-90: xli-xlii
164. *Ein Brief von Zettel an Squenz* [critical note, authorship uncertain, see 163] <late Nov. 1801>; *NKA*, iv. 190-4: xlv
165. Announcement of the *Critical Journal* [authorship uncertain, see 163] <Dec. 1801>; *NKA*, iv. 503-4: xxxix
166. *Verhältniss des Scepticismus zur Philosophie*, u.s.w. [review of Schulze] <before mid-Feb. 1802>; *NKA*, iv. 197-238: xlvi, 57, 62
167. *Ruckert und Weiss*, u.s.w. [review, probably by Schelling] <before mid-Feb. 1802>; *NKA*, iv. 239-55: xlv
168. *Neue Entdeckung über die Fichtes' che Philosophie* [critical note, authorship uncertain, see 162] <before mid-Feb. 1802>; *NKA*, iv. 256-7: xliii-xlv
169. *Bayern. (a) Beforderung . . . (b) Ausbruch der Volksfreude*, u.s.w. [critical notes, authorship uncertain, see 163] <before mid-Feb. 1802>; *NKA*, iv. 256-61: xliii-xlv
170. *(a) Aufnahme . . . (b) Ansicht des Idealismus selbst* [critical notes, authorship uncertain, see 163] <before mid-Feb. 1802>; *NKA*, iv. 261-2.
171. Critical notice of two pamphlets by J. F. C. Werneburg <before 26 March 1802>; *NKA*, iv. 105-6: xlii-xlv
172. Review of K. F. W. Gerstäcker's *Deduktion des Rechtsbegriffs* <before 26 March 1802>; *NKA*, iv. 107-11.
173. Critical notice of W. T. Krug, *Organon* <before 26 March 1802>; *NKA*, iv. 112.
174. Review of G. C. F. Fischhaber, *Princip und Haupt-Probleme des Fichteschen Systems* [never published; MS lost] <before 26 March 1802>; see *NKA*, iv. 517-18, 554-5.
175. Review of J. G. Herder, *Gott* [never published; MS lost] <April? 1802>; see *NKA*, iv. pp. 517, 554.
176. *Glauben und Wissen* [critical essay] <before June 1802>; *NKA*, iv. 315-414 (trans. by Cerf and Harris, Albany, N.Y., 1977): see Analytical Index (*Faith and Knowledge*)

177. *Ueber das Verhältniss der Naturphilosophie* u.s.w. [essay by Schelling—with revisions by Hegel?] <July–Aug.? 1802>; *NKA*, iv. 265–76: xliii, 173 n.
178. *B. Göttingen* [three critical notes, authorship uncertain, see 162] <July–Aug. 1802?, the third note is a bit later>; *NKA*, iv. 309–11: xliii–xliv
179. Lecture notes for 'Natural Law' courses, <Summer 1802 and/or later>; reported in *Hegels Leben*, pp. 133–41 (trans. in Harris and Knox, Albany, N.Y., 1979, pp. 179–86): xxxiv n., xlix, li n., 66, 68–9 nn., 89 n., 102, 140, 143 n., 144–9, 153–5, 158 n., 179–80, 183, 187 n., 191 n., 193, 213, 222 n., 514 n., 557 n.
(Item 128 follows here chronologically—Sept. 1802.)
180. *Logik und Metaphysik* [Systema reflexionis et rationis lectures and textbook] <Jan.–Oct. 1802>; all lost, see lecture announcements for 1802 Summer and Winter terms: xxxiv, xlix, 58 n., 102–5, 201, 203 n., 232–3
181. Notes for the *Naturrecht* essay [lost] <before Nov. 1802>; mentioned by Rosenkranz to Karl Hegel in letter of 15 July 1840.
182. *Ueber . . . Naturrechts* [critical essay] <before Nov. 1802>; *NKA*, iv. 417–85 (trans. Knox, Philadelphia, 1975): see Analytical Index (*Natural Law*)
183. *Anhang zu No. II* [critical notes appended to Schelling's Dante-essay, authorship uncertain, see 163] <before Nov. 1802>; *NKA*, iv. 497–500: xliv–xlv
(Items 129–131 follow here chronologically. 131 is probably later than 184 following.)
184. *Um die Idee der absoluten Sittlichkeit* ['System of Ethical Life'] <end of 1802>; *Schriften* (1913), pp. 417–503 (trans. in Harris and Knox, pp. 99–177): see Analytical Index (*System of Ethical Life*)
185. *Ad pag. 156 editionis nostrae* [notes for Paulus edition of Spinoza] <before March 1803>; Spinoza, *Opera* (ed. H. E. G. Paulus, Jena, 1803) Vol. II, xxxvi–xxxix.
186. *I: Intelligenz α) Anschauung* [plan for lecture-drafting?] <Summer 1803 or earlier>; *NKA* vi. 329.
187. *Encyklopädie der Philosophie* [*Delineatio* lectures and lost compendium of which 184 was Part III] <Dec. 1802–Aug. 1803>; see lecture announcement for Summer term 1803: see Analytical Index (*Delineatio*)
188. *ist auf das Allgemeine . . .* [fragment of *Delineatio* opening lecture] <April 1803>; *NKA*, v. 365–9: 191, 200–8, 227, 229, 334 n.
189. *Das Wesen des Geistes . . .* [lecture fragment] <Summer 1803>; *NKA*, v. 370–3 [quoted in *Hegels Leben*, p. 187, trans. in Harris and Knox, p. 261]: 207–13, 226 n., 234 n., 555
190. *seine Form* [lecture fragment] <Summer 1803>; *NKA*, v. 374–7 [quoted in *Hegels Leben*, pp. 180–1, trans. in Harris and Knox, pp. 254–6]: 24 n., 145 n., 178 n., 213–16, 217 n., 218, 219–20 n., 317 n., 334–5
191. *Das absolute Bewusstseyn* [lecture fragment] <Summer 1803?>;

- Hegels Leben*, p. 133 (trans. in Harris and Knox, p. 178): 134 n., 194 n., 223-5, 513 n., 559-61
192. *C. Dieser starren Gestalt* [lecture fragment] <Summer 1803?> *NKA*, vi. 31-3: 254 n., 433 n.
193. *bezieht sich auf* [lecture fragment] <Summer 1803?> *NKA*, vi. 19-30: 250-1 nn., 253 nn.
194. *auf diesem Gesetze* [lecture fragment] <Summer 1803?> *NKA* vi. 3-5, 10-18: 249, 250-1 nn.
195. *Nemlich die himmlischen Bewegung* [lecture fragment] <Summer 1803?> *NKA*, vi. 6-9.
196. *auf das ganze System* [lecture fragment] <Summer 1803?, for revision see 199> *NKA*, vi. 34-57 (1st draft below the line): 254 nn., 257 n.
197. *Es erhellt aus der Bestimmtheit* [lecture fragment] <Summer 1803?, for revision see 200> *NKA*, vi. 58-107, 111-218, 223-40, 245-6, 248-66, 269-72, 277-8, 282-326 (first draft below the line): 263-4 nn., 266 n., 268-71 nn., 274-8 nn., 279, 281-2 nn., 283-301, 304-13, 316-34, 337, 445, 453-6 nn., 458-60 nn., 462-3 nn., 466 n., 472, 476 n., 478-9, 481, 483, 488 n., 489, 493 n., 494, 495 n., 501
198. *System der spekulativen Philosophie* [lecture MS] <Sept. 1803-March 1804>; main text of *NKA*, vi (above the line); [Part I lost; Part III trans. in Harris and Knox, pp. 205-53]: see Analytical Index (*System of Speculative Philosophy*)
199. *b) die Erde hat auf diese Weise* [fragment of revised lecture draft] <Autumn-Winter 1803> *NKA*, vi. 34-57 (main text): 254 nn., 257 n.
200. *d) endlich muss noch bemerkt werden* [fragments of revised lecture-draft] <Winter 1803-Spring 1804> *NKA*, vi. 58-107, 110-218, 223-40, 245-67, 269-79, 282-326 (main text partially trans. in Harris and Knox, pp. 206-50): 257 n., 261 n., 263-4 nn., 266 n., 268-71 nn., 274-8 nn., 279, 281-2 nn., 283-301, 304-13, 316-34, 337, 445, 453-6 nn., 458-60 nn., 462-3, 466-7 nn., 472, 476 n., 478-9, 481, 483, 488 n., 489, 493 n., 494, 495 n., 501, 523-5
201. *<allege> meine Infektion* [fragment of lecture draft] <Winter 1803> *NKA*, vi. 108-9: 268 n.
202. *θ. Das Gestalten des animalischen* [fragment of lecture draft] <Winter 1803> *NKA*, vi. 219-22: 290 n.
203. *der ideale Process* [fragment of lecture draft] <Winter 1803> *NKA*, vi. 241-4: 293-4, 463 n.
204. *III. Philosophie des Geistes* [two insertions for 200] <early 1804?> *NKA*, vi. 268 and 270 (lines 3-12), trans. in Harris and Knox, pp. 205-6: 269 n., 299-300
205. *Die erste Form der Existenz des Geistes* [fragment of lecture draft] <early 1804> *NKA* vi. 280-1 (trans. in Harris and Knox, pp. 210-11): 314-16, 326-7
206. *ist nur die Form* [fragment of lecture draft] <early 1804> *NKA*, vi. 330-1 (trans. in Harris and Knox, pp. 251-3): 152 n., 154 n., 156 n., 216-22, 225, 299 n., 337-8, 402 n.
207. *Wastebook* [reflections and excerpts] <1804-6>; *TW-A*, ii. 540-67

- (selections trans. in *Independent Journal of Philosophy*, iii, 1979, 1–6): see Analytical Index (*Wastebook*)
208. *Das die absolute Totalität* [outline for lecture or logic-text] <Summer 1804>; *NKA*, vii. 348–9: 227, 229–31
209. *Metaphysik, Die Idee* [plan for lectures or text] <Summer 1804 or earlier>; *NKA*, vii, 341–2: 227–8, 229, 230, 234 n., 388 n.
210. *Anm./I. Die Philosophie* [footnotes for a logic text] <Summer 1804?> *NKA*, vii. 343–7: 227, 231–7, 413 n.
211. *seyende sind. Das eine* [draft for 'compendium'] <late Summer 1804–early 1805>; *NKA*, vii. 3–338: ix–x, lv–lvi, lix n., 175 n., 178 n., 201, 202, 220 n., 239–79, 281 n., 303–4 nn., 308 n., 340–93, 397 n., 401 n., 406 n., 407, 410, 411 n., 412–14, 416–17, 419, 420, 421 n., 429–31, 432 n., 433, 447, 451 n., 458 n., 518 n.
212. Introduction for course on *Die ganze Wissenschaft der Philosophie* <Oct. 1804>; report with quotations, *Hegels Leben*, pp. 181–5 (trans. in Harris and Knox, pp. 256–9): 242 n., 397–402
213. *Logik* [lost lecture MS] <Summer 1805>; see *Hegel-Studien*, iv, 62: lvi, lvii, 397 n., 405, 410, 411, 518–19
214. *Das absolute Wissen* and a) *göttliches Recht* [fragments of draft 'Phenomenology'] <May 1805 or earlier>; *NKA*, ix. 437: lvi n., 415
215. *der Bestimmungen dieser Einheit* [fragmentary outline for *Realphilosophie* course] <Autumn 1805>; *NKA*, viii. 294–308: 441–2
216. *I. Mechanik./Die Idee* [draft for lectures (and textbook?)] <Autumn–Winter 1805; revised Spring–Summer 1806>; *NKA*, viii. 3–287: 250 n., 255 n., 283 n., 286 n., 287, 289–95 nn., 296, 339 n., 397 n., 408 n., 410, 415–16, 418–544, 569
217. *Der Organismus ist Einheit* [fragment of draft for textbook?] <Spring–Summer 1806?>; *NKA*, viii. 291–3.
218. *Geschichte der Philosophie* [lecture MS, lost] <Autumn 1805–early 1806>; report and quotation in *Hegels Leben*, pp. 201–2: xlvii n.
219. Review of J. Salat, *Geist der Verbesserung* u.s.w. [?never published, MS lost] <before mid-May 1806>; see *NKA*, iv. 518, 555–7.
220. Introductory lecture for *Philosophie der Natur und des Geistes* [lost] <April 1806>; quoted in *Hegels Leben*, pp. 192–3 (trans. in Harris and Knox, pp. 264–5): 58 n., 158 n., 175, 178–9 n., 188, 420
221. *Spekulative Philosophie oder Logik* [lost lecture MS], ended, 18. ix. 1806; report and quotation in *Hegels Leben*, pp. 212–15: 415–16
222. *C./Die Wissenschaft . . .* [fragment of draft for 'Phenomenology'—i.e. Logic lectures], <Summer 1806?—See *Hegels Leben*, p. 214>; *NKA*, ix. 438–43: 416 n.
223. *System der Wissenschaft/I Theil, die Phänomenologie des Geistes* [originally 'Science of the Experience of Consciousness'] <first drafts early 1805, see 214;> printing began Feb. 1806; MS of Preface went to press Jan. 1807; *NKA*, ix. 1–434: see Analytical Index (*Phenomenology of Spirit*)
224. *Maximen des Journals* u.s.w. [plan for a journal] <Feb.–March 1807>; *NKA*, iv. 509–14: lxii n., lxix

SECTION III: UNDATABLE TEXTS

- 225. Introductory lecture cited by Rosenkranz, <Introduction to Philosophy, Winter 1801? (see 158) or Logic, Summer 1805? (see 213); *Hegels Leben*, pp. 188-9 (trans. in Harris and Knox, pp. 262-3): 28-9, 411
- 226. Introductory lecture cited by Rosenkranz, <after Summer 1803, perhaps identical with 212, Oct. 1804>; *Hegels Leben*, pp. 185-6 (trans. in Harris and Knox, pp. 259-60): 402-3, 406 n.
- 227. *Aristot. de Anima* III . . . (trans.) <perhaps late 1805 in connection with 216 but this is by no means certain>; *Hegel-Studien*, i. 1961, 49-88.
- 228. Triangle Diagram with symbols <date of origin and even authorship quite uncertain>; see *Hegel-Studien*, viii, 1973, 55-77: 157 n.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX

Note: What follows is an index for the sources and references in this book, not an exhaustive survey of the literature—or even of the works that I have myself used and consulted. Everything that is explicitly referred to in the text or the notes (except classical authors and post-Hegelian literary works) is here listed by author in alphabetical order. This means that some works used by Hegel (rather than by me) are included. I have identified these as clearly and fully as I can, and have indicated the cases where Hegel's actual sources are doubtful (cf. for instance, Boehme, Machiavelli). Translations are normally listed together with the texts translated. In cases where an editor's or translator's name has been used to identify a work in the footnotes the necessary cross references are here supplied. Periodicals and reference works are listed by titles. (For a key to Abbreviations the reader should consult the note on pp. xvi–xvii.)

- Allgemeine deutsche Biographie*, (Leipzig, 1875); repr., Duncker and Humblot, Berlin, 1967–71.
- Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung*, ed. C. G. Schutz, Jena and Leipzig (from 1804, *Jenaische Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung*, under new editor).
- Annalen der Physik*, ed. (1799–1823) by L. W. Gilbert, Leipzig, 1799 ff. (still continuing).
- ARISTOTLE, *Politics*, translated with introduction and notes by Ernest Barker, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1946 (paper, 1962).
- Athenäum*, ed. Friedrich and A. W. Schlegel, Berlin, 1798–1800.
- AVINERI, SHLOMO, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State*, C.U.P., Cambridge, 1972.
- BAADER, FRANZ VON, *Ueber das pythagoraische Quadrat in der Natur oder die vier Weltgegenden* (Cotta, Tübingen?), 1798. (Rosenkranz says Tübingen, but the copy used by Schneider was 'ohne Ort'.)
- BAILLIE, SIR JAMES BLACK, *The Origin and Significance of Hegel's Logic*, Macmillan, London, 1901.
- BARDILI, CHRISTOPH GOTTFRIED, *Grundriss der Ersten Logik*, Löfflund, Stuttgart, 1800.
- BAUM, MANFRED, 'Zur Methode der Logik und Metaphysik beim Jenaer Hegel', *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 20, 1980, 119–38.
- BAUM, MANFRED AND MEIST, KURT, 'Durch Philosophie leben lernen. Hegels Konzeption der Philosophie nach den neu aufgefundenen Jenaer Manuskripten', *Hegel-Studien*, xii. 1977, 43–81.

- BERGMAN, TORBERN, *Opuscula physica et chemica*, 3 vols., Uppsala, 1779–83; completed in 6 vols. (last 3 posthumous, ed. Hegenstreet), Müller, Leipzig, 1786–92; German trans. H. Tabor, 6 vols., Frankfurt, 1782–90.
- BERTHOLLET, C. L., *Essai de statique chimique*, 2 vols., Paris, 1803.
- 'Recherches sur les lois de l'affinité', *Memoires de l'Institut National des sciences et arts*, Vol. iii. Paris, an IX (1800–01), 1–96.
- BLAKE, WILLIAM, *The Illuminated Blake*, annotated by David Erdman, O.U.P., London, 1975.
- BOEHME, JAKOB, *Theosophia Revelata*, ed. J. W. Ueberfeld, 10 vols., Hamburg, 1730. (It is not clear what Boehme texts Hegel had access to during the Jena period, but this is the best collected edition. Possibly Hegel saw only the early editions of some isolated works. It is clear, for instance, that he read Boehme's earliest book, the *Aurora* (1612). He did not own any edition until July 1811, when van Ghert sent him the *Theosophia revelata*, ed. Glusing, 2 vols., Altona, 1715. The early English translations by J. Sparrow (1661–2) were edited by C. J. Barker, London, 1909 ff. For fuller details of these, and of the few modern versions see the bibliography in the work of Robert Brown cited below.)
- BONSIEPEN, WOLFGANG, 'Zur Datierung und Interpretation des Fragments "C. Die Wissenschaft"', *Hegel-Studien*, xii. 1977, 179–90.
- BOUTERWEK, FRIEDRICH, *Anfangsgründe der spekulativen Philosophie*, Dieterich, Göttingen, 1800.
- *Geschichte der Poesie und Beredsamkeit seit dem Ende des dreyzehnten Jahrhunderts*, Vol. i. Göttingen, 1801.
- BRADLEY, FRANCES HERBERT, *Appearance and Reality*, Swann Sonnenschein, London, 1893; 2nd edn., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1955.
- *Ethical Studies*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1878 (2nd edn., 1927, paper, 1962).
- *Principles of Logic*, 2nd edn., 2 vols., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1922.
- BROWN, MARSHALL, *The Shape of German Romanticism*, Cornell Univ. Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1979.
- BROWN, ROBERT F., *The Later Philosophy of Schelling*, Bucknell University Press, Lewisburg, Pa., 1977 (subtitled 'The Influence of Boehme on the Works of 1809–15'; provides a valuable survey of Boehme's Theosophy).
- BUBNER, RUDIGER (ed.), *Das älteste Systemprogramm* (Studien zur Frühgeschichte des deutschen Idealismus), Bouvier, Bonn, 1973 (*Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 9).
- BUCHNER, HARTMUT, 'Hegel und das Kritische Journal der Philosophie', *Hegel-Studien* iii. 1965, 95–156.
- Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain*, ed. Z. A. Pelczynski, Oxford, 1980 ff.
- CAIN, PAUL E., *Widerspruch und Subjektivität*, Bouvier, Bonn, 1978.
- CAVENDISH HENRY, 'Experiments on Air', *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society*, lxxiv. 1784.
- CERF, WALTER AND HARRIS, H. S.: See HEGEL, G. W. F., *Faith and Knowledge*.
- Chemische Annalen*, ed. L. F. F. von Crell, Helmstädt and Leipzig, 1784–1804 (40 vols., 2 vols. in each year).

- CULLEN, BERNARD, *Hegel's Social and Political Thought*, Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 1979.
- DANTE, *La Commedia*, ed. G. Petrocchi, Milan, Mondadori, (Edizione nazionale della Società Dantesca Italiana). (This is the text reprinted by C. Singleton with his translation and commentary, *The Divine Comedy*, 6 vols., Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J., 1970-5, which I have used. The first complete German translation of the *Commedia* appears to be that begun by August Bode (1803-5) and completed by Karl Ludwig Kannegiesser (1809, 1814-21). A. W. Schlegel published excerpts from the *Inferno* in Schiller's *Die Horen*, 1795—for which Hegel was a subscriber—and from the *Purgatorio* and *Paradiso* in other periodicals between 1795 and 1799. But Schelling made his own translations—see *Werke*, x. 441-6—and it seems not improbable that Hegel, too could read Italian. For full details of the German translations see T. Ostermann, *Dante in Deutschland*, Winter, Heidelberg, 1929 pp. 18-21.)
- D'HONDT, JACQUES, 'Première vue française sur Hegel et Schelling (1804)', *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 20, 1980, 45-57.
- DIELS, H. AND KRANZ, W., *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 7th edn., 3 vols., Wiedmannsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Berlin, 1954.
- DÜSING, KLAUS, *Das Problem der Subjektivität in Hegels Logik*, Bouvier, Bonn, 1976 (*Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 15).
- 'Spekulation und Reflexion. Zur Zusammenarbeit Schellings und Hegels in Jena', *Hegel-Studien* v. 1969, 95-128.
- 'Idealistische Substanz-metaphysik. Probleme der Systementwicklung bei Schelling und Hegel in Jena', *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 20, 1980, 25-44.
- Encyclopedia of Chemistry*, ed. G. L. Clark, 2nd edn., Van Nostrand Reinhold, New York, 1966.
- ERXLEBEN, J. C. P., *Anfangsgründe der Naturlehre*, 5th edn. with additions by G. C. Lichtenberg, Vienna, 1793.
- FICHTE, JOHANN GOTTLIEB, *Die Bestimmung des Menschen*, Vossische Buchhandlung, Berlin, 1800; repr. in *Werke*, ed. Lauth and Gliwitsky, Band i. 6; or in *Werke*, ed. I. H. Fichte, ii. 165-319. (*The Vocation of Man*, trans. William Smith and ed. R. M. Chisholm, Bobbs-Merrill, The Library of Liberal Arts, Indianapolis and New York, 1956.)
- *Briefwechsel*, ed. Hans Schulz, Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim, 1967 (orig. publ. 1930).
- *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre*, Gabler, Leipzig, 1794; repr. in *Werke*, ed. Lauth and Gliwitsky, Band i. 2; or in *Werke*, ed. I. H. Fichte, i. 83-328. (*Science of Knowledge*, trans. Peter Heath and John Lachs, Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1970.)
- *Grundlage des Naturrechts*, 2 vols., Gabler, Jena/Leipzig, 1796, 1797; repr. in *Werke*, ed. Lauth and Gliwitsky, Band i. 3 and Band i. 4; or in *Werke*, ed. I. H. Fichte, iii. 1-386. (*The Science of Rights*, trans. A. E. Kroeger, London, 1889; repr. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970.)
- *Sämtliche Werke* (Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften), ed. R. Lauth and H. Gliwitsky, Frommann, Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt, 1964- (in progress).

- *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. I. H. Fichte, 8 vols., Veit, Berlin, 1845–56.
- FISCHER, KUNO, *Hegels Leben, Werke, und Lehre*, 2nd edn., 2 vols., Carl Winter, Heidelberg, 1911 (photoreprinted, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1963).
- FUHRMANS, HORST: See SCHELLING, *Briefe*.
- GENTILE, GIOVANNI, *La riforma della dialettica hegeliana* (1913), 3rd edn., Sansoni, Florence, (1954). ('The Reform of the Hegelian Dialectic', trans. A. Mac C. Armstrong, *Idealistic Studies*, xi, 1981, 187–213). (The translation does not include the Spaventa fragment.)
- GIBBON, EDWARD, *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, London, 1776–88; Hegel probably used the 'new edition', Tournaisen, Basel, 1787; repr. in 6 vols., J. M. Dent, (Everyman Library), London, 1963.
- GLOCKNER, HERMANN, *Hegel I: Die Voraussetzungen der Hegelschen Philosophie* (1929), 4th edn., Fromann, Stuttgart, 1964.
- GOETHE, JOHANN WOLFGANG VON, 'Faust, ein Fragment', in *Schriften* Vol. vii. Götschen, Leipzig, 1790.
- *Das Märchen*, published in *Die Horen*, 1795; repr. in *Werke*, Vol. xii. Aufbau Verlag, Berlin, 1972, 372–406.
- *Faust: Der Tragödie, Erster Teil*, *Werke*, vii. Cotta, Tübingen, 1808.
- 'Beiträge zur Optik', *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung*, Jena, 1791, 1792; facsimile ed. J. Schuster (1928), repr. G. Olms, Hildesheim, 1964. (The critical edn. in Goethe, *Die Schriften zur Naturwissenschaft*, iii. (ed. R. Matthaei), H. Bohlaus Nachfolger, Weimar, 1951, gives a clear picture of the subsequent development of Goethe's views down to 1808, and hence of what Hegel *could* have learned through conversation.)
- *Metamorphosen der Pflanzen*, Ettinger, Gotha, 1790.
- HAERING, THEODOR LORENZ, *Hegel: sein Wollen und sein Werk*, 2 vols., Teubner, Leipzig, 1929, 1938; repr. Scientia Verlag, Aalen, 1963.
- HARRIS, H. S., 'Gentile's Reform of the Hegelian Dialectic', in *Il pensiero di Giovanni Gentile*, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, Rome, 1977.
- *Hegel's Development I: Toward the Sunlight (1770–1801)*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972.
- AND CERF, W.: See HEGEL, G. W. F., *Difference*, etc.
- AND KNOX, T. M.: See HEGEL, G. W. F., *System of Ethical Life*, etc.
- HARTKOPF, WERNER, *Kontinuität und Diskontinuität in Hegels Jenaer Anfängen*, Forum Academicum, Königstein, 1979.
- HAYM, RUDOLF, *Hegel und seine Zeit*, Gaertner, Berlin, 1857; repr. Hildesheim, 1962.
- HEATH, PETER: See SCHELLING, *System of Transcendental Idealism*.
- and LACHS, JOHN: See FICHTE, *Science of Knowledge*.
- HEGEL, G. W. F., *Aesthetics*, 2 vols., trans. T. M. Knox, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975.
- 'Aphorisms from the Waste-Book' trans. Susanne Klein, David L. Roochnik, and George Elliott Tucker, *JfP*, iii. 1979, 1–6. (See Chronological Index, item 207.)
- 'Fragment on the "Life-course" of God' (*Wastebook* excerpt 48), trans. M. H. Hoffheimer, *Clio*, xi. no. 4, 1982 (forthcoming).

- *Briefe von und an Hegel*, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister and Rolf Flechsig, 4 vols., F. Meiner, Hamburg, 1961.
- *Differenz des Fichte'schen und Schelling'schen Systems der Philosophie*, Seidler, Jena, 1801; repr. in *Gesammelte Werke*, iv. 1–92. (*Difference between the Systems of Fichte and Schelling*, trans. H. S. Harris and Walter Cerf, State U. of New York Press, Albany, 1977.)
- *Dissertatio philosophica de Orbitis planetarum*, Seidler, Jena, 1801; repr. in *Erste Druckschriften*, pp. 347–401.
- *Dokumente zu Hegels Entwicklung*, ed. J. Hoffmeister, Fromann, Stuttgart, 1936.
- *Erste Druckschriften*, ed. Georg Lasson, F. Meiner, Leipzig, 1928.
- 'Fragments of historical studies', trans. Clark Butler, with introduction and notes by H. S. Harris, *Clio*, vii. 1977, 113–34. (See Chronological Index item 146).
- *Der Geist des Christentums* (Schriften, 1796–1800), ed. W. Hamacher, Ullstein, Frankfurt, 1978.
- *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. Rheinisch-Westfaelischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, F. Meiner, Hamburg, 1968 ff.
- 'Glauben und Wissen', *Kritisches Journal der Philosophie*, Vol. ii. no. 1, Tübingen, 1802; repr. in *Gesammelte Werke*, iv. 313–414 (*Faith and Knowledge*, ed. and trans. W. Cerf and H. S. Harris, State U. of New York Press, Albany, 1977).
- *Jenaer Kritische Schriften, Gesammelte Werke*, Band 4, ed. Hartmut Buchner and Otto Pöggeler, F. Meiner, Hamburg, 1968.
- *Jenaer Realphilosophie*, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister, F. Meiner, Hamburg, 1967 (repr. without change from *Jenenser Realphilosophie* ii. Meiner, Leipzig, 1931).
- *Jenaer Schriften und Entwürfe*, ed. Manfred Baum and Kurt Meist, Meiner, Hamburg (in preparation). (*Gesammelte Werke*, Band 5.)
- *Jenaer Systementwürfe* i. ed. K. Düsing and H. Kimmerle, F. Meiner, Hamburg, 1975. (*Gesammelte Werke*, Band 6.)
- *Jenaer Systementwürfe* ii. ed. R.-P. Horstmann and J. H. Trede, F. Meiner, Hamburg, 1971. (*Gesammelte Werke*, Band 7.)
- *Jenaer Systementwürfe* iii. ed. R.-P. Horstmann and J. H. Trede, F. Meiner, Hamburg, 1976. (*Gesammelte Werke*, Band 8.)
- *Jenenser Realphilosophie* i. ed. J. Hoffmeister, F. Meiner, Leipzig, 1932.
- *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, trans. E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson, 3 vols., Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1892 (repr. 1955). (For the German text see *Theorie Werkausgabe*, Vols. xviii–xx.)
- *Logic*, trans. from *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* by William Wallace, 2nd edn., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1892 (repr. 1974).
- (and Schelling), 'On the Essence of Philosophical Criticism', (the Introduction for the *Critical Journal* with introduction and notes by H. S. Harris), *Independent Journal of Philosophy*, iii. 1979, 37–45.
- *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, ed. W. Bonsiepen and R. Heede, Meiner, Hamburg, 1980. (*Gesammelte Werke*, Band 9.) (*Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller with Introduction and analysis by J. N. Findlay, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977.)

- *The Philosophy of Hegel*, ed. C. J. Friedrich, Random House, New York, 1953.
- *Philosophy of Nature*, trans. M. J. Petry, 3 vols., Allen and Unwin, London, 1970. (Petry includes K. L. Michelet's Introduction, and the use of different typefaces enables the reader to distinguish those parts of the text that are derived from the 'Naturphilosophie' of 1805/6.)
- *Philosophy of Nature*, trans. from *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1830) by A. V. Miller, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1970.
- *Philosophy of Right*, trans. with notes by T. M. Knox, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1942.
- *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*, ed. and trans. with Introduction and notes by M. J. Petry, 3 vols., D. Reidel, Dordrecht and Boston, 1978.
- *Schriften zur Politik und Rechtsphilosophie*, ed. G. Lasson, Meiner, Leipzig, 1913; 2nd edn., 1923. (*Hegel's Political Writings*, trans. T. M. Knox with introductory essay by Z. A. Pelczynski, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1964). (The 1st edn. is preferable to the 2nd—see the note on p. 102 above.)
- *System der Sittlichkeit*, ed. G. Lasson (repr. from *Schriften zur Politik und Rechtsphilosophie* 1923), Meiner, Hamburg, 1967. (*System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of Spirit*, ed. and trans. H. S. Harris and T. M. Knox, State U. New York Press, Albany, 1979.) (See the note to the preceding entry.)
- *System der Wissenschaft: Erster Teil, die Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Goebhardt, Bamberg, and Würzburg, 1807. (For the critical edn. see *Phänomenologie des Geistes*.)
- *Theologische Jugendschriften*, ed. Hermann Nohl, Mohr, Tübingen, 1907 (repr. 1968). (*Early Theological Writings*, trans. T. M. Knox with Introduction and fragments trans. Richard Kroner, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1948; repr. U. Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1971.)
- 'Two Fragments on Love', trans. C. Hamlin and H. S. Harris, *Clio*, viii. 1978/9, 257–65. (See Chronological Index, items 83–5.)
- 'Two fragments on the ideal of social life', trans. with introduction and notes by H. S. Harris, *Clio*, x. 1980/81, 399–406. (See Chronological Index items 108 and 120.)
- 'Ueber die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts', in *Kritisches Journal*, Band 2; Stuck 2–3, Cotta, Tübingen, 1802–3; repr. in *Gesammelte Werke*, Band 4, 415–85. (*Natural Law*, trans. T. M. Knox with Introduction by H. B. Acton, U. Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1975.)
- *Werke*, ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, 20 vols., Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt, 1970/1 (Theorie Werkausgabe).
- *Wissenschaft der Logik*, 2 vols., Schrag, Nuremberg, 1812, 1816; ed. F. Hogemann and W. Jaeschke, Meiner, Hamburg, 1978–81 (*Gesammelte Werke*, Bände 11–12. The translations are from the rev. edn. of 1832 as follows: *Science of Logic*, trans. R. A. Johnston and L. G. Struthers with Introductory Preface by Viscount Haldane of Cloan,

- Allen and Unwin, London, 1929; *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller, Allen and Unwin, London, 1970.
- Hegel-Studien, ed. F. Nicolini and O. Pöggeler, Bouvier, Bonn, 1961 ff.
- HENRICH, DIETER, 'Absoluter Geist und Logik des Endlichen', *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 20, 1980, 103-18.
- and DÜSING, K. (eds.), *Hegel in Jena*, Bouvier, Bonn, 1980 (*Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 20).
- HERDER, JOHANN GOTTFRIED, *Gott: Einige Gespräche*, 1st edn., 1787; 2nd edn. revised, Gotha, 1800; both editions collated in *God: Some Conversations*, trans. F. H. Burkhardt, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1940.
- HOFFHEIMER, Michael H., *The Development of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature*, Dissertation (Ph.D), University of Chicago, 1981.
- HÖLDERLIN, J. C. F., *Hyperion*, 2 vols., Cotta, Tübingen, 1797, 1799 (repr. in *Sämtliche Werke*, Band 3). Trans. W. R. Trask. New American Library, New York, 1965.
- *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. F. Beissner and A. Beck (Grosse Stuttgarter Ausgabe to be completed in 8 vols.), Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1943-.
- HORSTMANN, ROLF-PETER, 'Jenaer Systemkonzeptionen', in *Hegel* (ed. O. Pöggeler) Freiburg-Munich, pp. 43-58.
- 'Probleme der Wandlung in Hegels Jenaer Systemkonzeption', *Philosophischer Rundschau* xix. 1972, 87-118.
- 'Über das Verhältnis von Metaphysik der Subjektivität und Philosophie der Subjektivität in Hegels Jenaer Schriften', *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 20, 1980, 181-95.
- HÖYER, B. C. H., *Abhandlung über die philosophische Construction*, Perthes, Hamburg, 1801 (reviewed by Schelling in the *Critical Journal*. See *NKA*, iv. 277-93).
- HUME, DAVID, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Noon, London, 1739; ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1888 (1951). ('Nachtgedanken eines Zweiflers' (*Treatise*, I, iv, 7) trans. J. G. Hammann, *Beylage zur Königsberg'schen Zeitung*, 5 and 12 July, 1771. See note on pp. 572-3.)
- *Untersuchung über den menschlichen Verstand* (nebst einer Abhandlung über den philosophischen Skeptizismus von Herrn Professor Reinhold) übersetzt von W. G. Tennemann, Jena, 1793. (Hölderlin owned this translation of the *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, London, 1748, new edn. 1777; see note on p. 7.)
- HYPOLITE, JEAN, *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology*, trans. S. Cherniak and J. Heckman, Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, Ill., 1974.
- ILTING, KARL-HEINZ, 'Hegels Auseinandersetzung mit der aristotelischen Politik', *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, lxxi. 1963/4, 38-58.
- Independent Journal of Philosophy*, ed. G. E. Tucker.
- JACOBI, FRIEDRICH HEINRICH, *Werke*, 6 vols., Fleischer, Leipzig, 1812-25; repr. Wissenschaftlich Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1968.
- Jahrbuch der Medicin als Wissenschaft*, ed. F. W. J. Schelling, Perthes, Hamburg, 1805-7.
- JEAN PAUL: See RICHTER, J. P. F.
- KANT, IMMANUEL, *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels*,

- Königsberg and Leipzig, 1755; repr. in *Werke*, i. 215–368. (Abridged trans. by W. Hastie, U. of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1969.)
- *Critik der reinen Vernunft*, Hartknoch, Riga, 1781 [=A]; 2nd edn. improved throughout, 1787 (=B). Hegel used B. The two editions were collated by R. Schmidt, Meiner, Hamburg, 1930, and trans. by N. Kemp Smith, Macmillan, London, 1933. (The pagination of both A and B is indicated in the margin.)
- *Critik der praktischen Vernunft*, Hartknoch, Riga, 1788 (repr. in *Gesammelte Schriften*, v. 1–164); trans. L. W. Beck, U. of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1949 (paper, Library of Liberal Arts, New York, 1956). (The pagination of *Gesammelte Schriften* is indicated in the margin.)
- *Critik der Urteilskraft*, Lagarde and Friederich, Berlin and Libau, 1790; 2nd edn., 1793 (repr. in *Gesammelte Schriften*, v. 165–486). Trans. J. C. Meredith as *Critique of Aesthetic Judgement*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1911; and *Critique of Teleological Judgement*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1928. (The pagination of *Gesammelte Schriften*, v. is indicated in the margin throughout.)
- *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences, 24 vols., Reimer, Berlin, 1910–66. (Photo-reprint of Vols. i–ix. De Gruyter, Berlin, 1968.)
- *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaften*, Königsberg, 1786; repr. in *Werke*, iv. 456–566. Trans. James Ellington, Bobbs-Merrill (Library of Liberal Arts), New York, 1970.
- *Zum ewigen Frieden* (1795) in *Gesammelte Schriften*, viii. 341–86; trans. L. W. Beck in *Kant, On History*, Liberal Arts Press, New York, 1963.
- KAUFMANN, WALTER ARNOLD, *Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary*, Doubleday, Garden City, 1965 (paper, 2 vols., Anchor Books, 1966).
- KIMMERLE, HEINZ, *Das Problem der Abgeschlossenheit des Denkens*, Bouvier, Bonn, 1970 (*Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 8).
- 'Dokumente zu Hegels Jenaer Dozententätigkeit (1801–1807)', *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 1967, 21–100.
- 'Zur Chronologie von Hegels Jenaer Schriften', *Hegel-Studien*, iv. 1967, 125–76.
- 'Hegels Naturphilosophie in Jena', *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 20, 1980, 207–15.
- 'Ideologiekritik der systematischen Philosophie', *Hegel-Jahrbuch*, 1973 (Cologne, 1974), 85–101.
- 'Die von Rosenkranz überlieferten Texte Hegels aus der Jenaer Zeit. Eine Untersuchung ihres Quellenwerts', *Hegel-Studien*, v. 1969, 83–94.
- 'Zum Hegel-Buch von Rudolf Haym', *Hegel-Studien*, v. 1969, 259–63.
- KOJÈVE, ALEXANDRE, *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel*, ed. R. Queneau, Gallimard, Paris, 1947. (*Introduction to Hegel*, abridged edn. A. Bloom, trans. J. H. Nichols, Basic Books, New York, 1969; paper, Cornell, Ithaca, N.Y., 1980.)
- KLOPSTOCK, F. G., *Der Messias* (1748–73), Eckhardt, Altona, 1780. (This

was the final edn. prepared by Klopstock himself; but Hölderlin owned the reprint of Fleischhauer, Reutlingen, 1782, the same may well have been true in Hegel's case.)

KNOX, T. M. AND ACTON, H. B.: See HEGEL, *Natural Law*.

— (and KRONER, R.): See HEGEL, *Early Theological Writings*.

— and PELCZYNSKI, Z. A.: See HEGEL, *Political Writings*.

Kritisches Journal der Philosophie, ed. F. W. J. Schelling and G. W. F. Hegel, 2 vols., Cotta, Tübingen, 1802-3. (Repr. in Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke*, iv. 113-500.)

KOEPPEN, FRIEDRICH, *Schellings Lehre oder das Ganze der Philosophie des absoluten Nichts*, Hamburg, 1803.

KRAUSE, K. C. F., *Briefwechsel*, ed. P. Hohlfeld and A. Wünsche, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1907.

KUEHN, MANFRED, 'Kant's conception of "Hume's Problem"', Paper delivered at the Tenth Congress of the Hume Society (Trinity College, Dublin, August 1981), *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, xxi, 1983 (forthcoming).

LAUBE, HEINRICH, *Moderne Charakteristiken*, Mannheim, 1835.

LEIBNIZ, GOTTFRIED WILHELM, *Essais de Theodicée*, etc., new edn. by L. de Neufville, 2 vols., Amsterdam, 1734. (Hegel also owned a Latin edition, publ. Frankfurt in 1719.) (*Theodicy*, trans. E. M. Huggard, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1952; abridged edn. D. Allen, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1966.)

— *Opera Omnia*, ed. L. Dutens, Geneva, 1768. (This is the edition cited in *Gesammelte Werke*. The catalogue of Hegel's library lists *Oeuvres philosophiques*, ed. Raspe, Amsterdam and Leipzig, 1765. But Schelling used, and almost certainly owned, the Dutens edition. The largest selection in English translation is *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, 2 vols., trans. and ed. Leroy E. Loemker, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1956.)

LESSING, GOTTHOLD EPHRAIM, *Sämtliche Schriften*, ed. K. Lachmann, 3rd edn. rev. F. Muncker, 23 vols., De Gruyter, Berlin and Leipzig, 1886-1924 (reprint of 1968).

— *Laocoon, Nathan the Wise, Minna von Barnhelm*, trans. W. W. Steel and A. Dent, Dent (Everyman), London, 1930.

LINK, HEINRICH FRIEDRICH, *Grundlehren der Anatomie und Physiologie der Pflanzen*, Göttingen, 1807.

Literatur-Zeitung, ed. G. E. A. Mehmel, 7 vols., Erlangen, 1799-1802.

LOCKE, JOHN, *Essay Concerning Humane Understanding*, London, (1690), 5th edn. with large additions, 1706; ed. J. W. Yolton, Dent (Everyman), London and New York, 1961. (At Jena Hegel used the German translation of H. E. Poley, Altona, 1757; he owned an English reprint (London, 1721) at the time of his death.)

LUKÁCS, GYORGY, *The Young Hegel*, trans. R. Livingstone, Merlin Press, London, 1975.

LUGARINI, LEO, *Hegel dal mondo storico alla filosofia*, Armando, Rome, 1973.

MACHIAVELLI, NICOLÒ, *Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio*, Florence, Giunta, 1531; trans. Allan Gilbert in *The Chief Works and*

- Others*, 3 vols., Duke University Press, Durham, N.C., 1965 (Vol. i). (It is not clear that Hegel had any *direct* knowledge of the *Discourses*.)
- *Il Principe*, Florence, Giunta, 1532; trans. Allan Gilbert (see preceding entry). (Hegel definitely knew *The Prince* in a French translation, perhaps first in the Amsterdam edn. of 1696, which was available to him in his Berne years (1793–6).)
- MARQUARDT, Hertha, *Henry Crabb-Robinson und seine deutschen Freunde*, 2 vols., Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1964–7 (Palaestra 270).
- McTAGGART, J. M. E., *A Commentary on Hegel's Logic*, The University Press, Cambridge, 1910 (repr. 1931).
- MEIST, KURT R., 'Hegels Systemkonzeption in der frühen Jenaer Zeit', *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 20, 1980, 59–79.
- MORGAN, E. S. and GUTERMAN M.: See SCHELLING *Vorlesungen*.
- MUELLER, GUSTAV EMIL, Hegel: *Denkgeschichte eines Lebendigen*, A. Francke Verlag, Berne–Munich, 1959. (Abridged in Hegel: *The Man, his Vision and Work*, Pageant Press, New York, 1968.)
- NEWTON, SIR ISAAC, *Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica*, last (i.e. 2nd) edn. enlarged and improved, Amsterdam, 1714. (Hegel owned this edn.; Motte's trans. (1729) rev. Cajori, is from the *third* edn. (London, 1726); U. of California Press, Berkeley, 1934, (paper, 1962).)
- *Optice*, libri tres. Latine reddidit Samuel Clarke. 2nd edn. enlarged, London, 1719. (Hegel owned this edn.; the only readily available text is the 4th edn. of 1730, Dover, New York, 1952.)
- NICOLIN, FRIEDHELM, 'Aus Schellings und Hegels Disputatorium im Winter 1801/2', *Hegel-Studien*, ix. 1974, 43–8.
- NICOLIN, GÜNTHER (ed.), *Hegel in Berichten seiner Zeitgenossen*, Meiner, Hamburg, 1970.
- NOVALIS (Friedrich, Freiherr von Hardenburg), *Heinrich von Ofterdingen, Schriften* (ed. F. Schlegel and L. Tieck), Vol. i. Reimer, Berlin, 1802; repr. in *Schriften*, ed. P. Kluckhohn and R. Samuel, Band I, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1960; trans. Palmer Hilty, F. Ungar, New York, 1964.
- 'Die Lehrlinge zu Sais', *Schriften* (ed. Schlegel and Tieck), 1802, ii. 159–246; repr. in *Schriften* (ed. Kluckhohn and Samuel), Band i.
- 'Hymnen an die Nacht', *Athenäum*, iii. 2, Berlin, 1800; repr. in *Schriften* (ed. Kluckhohn and Samuel), Band i; trans. C. E. Passage, Library of Liberal Arts, New York, 1960.
- The Owl of Minerva*, (*Quarterly Journal of the Hegel Society of America*), ed. L. S. Stepelevich, Villanova University, Pa., 1969 ff.
- PARTINGTON, J. R., *History of Chemistry*, 4 vols., Macmillan, London, 1960–70.
- PELCZYNSKI, ZBIGNIEW A.: See HEGEL, *Political Writings*.
- Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London*, 177 vols., London, 1665–1886. (From 1665 to the year 1800, abridged by Charles Hutton *et. al.*, 18 vols., London, 1809.)
- PLANT, RAYMOND, *Hegel*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1973 (and U. of Indiana Press, Bloomington).
- PLITT, G. L. (ed.), *Aus Schellings Leben: In Briefen*, 3 vols., Hirzel, Leipzig, 1869–79.

- PLATO, *The Collected Dialogues*, ed. E. Hamilton and H. Cairns, Pantheon, New York, 1961 (Bollingen Series LXXV).
- PLUTARCH, *Opera Omnia*, ed. J. G. Hutten, 14 vols., Cotta, Tübingen, 1791-8.
- PÖGGELER, OTTO, 'Hegels praktische Philosophie in Frankfurt', *Hegel-Studien*, ix. 1974, 73-107.
- 'Philosophy in the wake of Hölderlin', *Man and World*, vii. 1974, 158-76.
- 'Hegels Option für Österreich. Die Konzeption korporativer Repräsentation', *Hegel-Studien*, xii. 1977, 83-128.
- 'Die Entstehung von Hegels Ästhetik in Jena', *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 20, 1980, 249-70.
- (ed.), *Hegel*, Karl Alber, Freiburg and Munich, 1977.
- PRIESTLEY, JOSEPH, *Versuche und Beobachtungen über verschiedene Gattungen der Luft*, 3 vols., Vienna and Leipzig, 1778-80. (Trans. of *Experiments and Observations on Different Kinds of Air*, 3 vols., London, 1774-7.)
- REINHOLD, KARL LEONHARD, *Beyträge zur leichtern Uebersicht des Zustandes der Philosophie*, 6 vols., Perthes, Hamburg, 1801-3.
- *Beyträge zur Berichtigung bisherige Missverständnisse der Philosophie*, Jena, 1790.
- *Fundament des philosophischen Wissens*, Jena, 1791.
- *Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens*, Widtmann and Mauke, Prague and Jena, 1789; repr. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1963.
- RICHTER, JEAN PAUL FRIEDRICH, *Titan*, 4 vols., 1800-3; trans. C. T. Brooks, 2 vols., Ticknor and Fields, Boston, and Trübner, London, 1862.
- RIEDEL, MANFRED, *Studien zu Hegels Rechts-philosophie*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1969.
- ROBINSON, HENRY CRABB, *Diary, Reminiscences and Correspondence*, ed. Thomas Sadler, 2 vols., Macmillan, London and New York, 1872 (photoreprinted, A.M.S. Press, New York, 1967).
- ROSENKRANZ, KARL, *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben*, Berlin, 1844; repr. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1963.
- 'Hegels ursprüngliches System 1798-1806. Aus Hegels Nachlass', *Literarhistorisches Taschenbuch* (ed. R. E. Prutz, Leipzig), ii; 1844 (actually Sept. 1843).
- ROSENZWEIG, FRANZ, *Hegel und der Staat*, 2 vols., Oldenbourg, Munich, and Berlin, 1920 (repr. in one vol., Scientia Verlag, Aalen, 1962).
- RUCKERT, JOSEPH, *Der Realismus, oder Grundzüge zu einer durchaus praktischen Philosophie*, Göschen, Leipzig, 1801.
- SCHELLING, F. W. J., *Briefe und Dokumente*, ed. Horst Fuhrmans, Bouvier, Bonn, 1962 ff. (2 vols. published to date).
- *Bruno, oder über das göttliche und natürliche Princip der Dinge*, Berlin, 1802; repr. in *Werke*, iv. 213-332.
- 'Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie', *Zeitschrift für spekulative Physik*, ii. Heft 2. Gabler, Jena and Leipzig, 1801, repr. in *Werke*, iv. 105-212.

- *Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur*, Breitkopf and Härtel, Leipzig, 1797. 2nd edn. (Landshut, 1803), repr. in *Werke*, ii. 1–343.
- *System des Transcendentalen Idealismus*, Cotta, Tübingen, 1800; repr. in *Werke*, iii. 329–634. (*System of Transcendental Idealism*, trans. Peter Heath with an introduction by Michael Vater, U. of Virginia Press, Charlottesville, 1978). (The pagination of the *Werke*, iii is indicated at the top of the page.)
- *Sämmtliche Werke*, ed. K. F. A. Schelling, 14 vols., Cotta, Stuttgart and Augsburg, 1856–61. (The pagination of this edn. is preserved in the photo-reprinted *Ausgewählte Werke*, 8 vols., Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1966–8.)
- 'Ueber das absolute Identitäts-System', *Kritisches Journal der Philosophie*, i. Heft 1, Tübingen, 1802. Repr. in Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke*, iv. 129–73.
- *Von der Weltseele*, Perthes, Hamburg, 1798. Repr. in *Werke*, ii. 345–583.
- *Vorlesungen über die Methode des academischen Studium(s)*, Cotta, Tübingen, 1803; repr. in *Werke*, v. 207–352. (*On University Studies*, trans. E. S. Morgan with introduction by Norbert Guterman, Ohio U. Press, Athens, 1966.)
- SCHILLER, J. C. F. VON, *Die Räuber, ein Trauerspiel*, Mannheim, 1782; repr. in *Sämmtliche Schriften* (ed. Goedeke), Vol. ii.
- *Sämmtliche Schriften* (Historisch-kritische Ausgabe) ed. by K. Goedeke, Stuttgart, 1867–76.
- 'Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen', *Die Horen*, i. Jan.–June 1795; rev. in *Kleine prosaische Schriften*, iii. 1801. (Hegel owned *Die Horen*; this version is reprinted in *Sämmtliche Schriften*, Vol. x. 274–384.) The English translations are based on the text of 1801: *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*, the text with trans. by E. M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1967; trans. by R. Snell, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1954.
- SCHLEIERMACHER, F. E. D., *Ueber die Religion: Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern*, Berlin, 1799. (Abridged trans., *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers*, ed. John Oman, Ungar, New York, 1955.)
- SCHNEIDER, HELMUT, 'Zur Dreiecks-Symbolik bei Hegel', *Hegel-Studien*, viii. 1973, 55–77.
- 'Anfänge der Systementwicklung Hegels in Jena', *Hegel-Studien*, x. 1975, 133–71.
- SCHULZ, HANS: See FICHTE, *Briefwechsel*.
- SCHULZE, G. E., *Kritik der theoretischen Philosophie*, 2 vols., Bohn, Hamburg, 1801.
- SIEBERT, RUDOLF J., *Hegel's Concept of Marriage and Family*, University Press of America, Washington, 1979; also (abridged) in D. P. Verene (ed.), *Hegel's Social and Political Thought*, Humanities Press, New Jersey, 1980, 177–209.
- SIEP, LUDWIG, 'Der Kampf um Anerkennung. Zu Hegels Auseinandersetzung mit Hobbes in den Jenaer Schriften', *Hegel-Studien*, ix. 155–207.
- 'Praktische Philosophie und Geschichte beim Jenaer Hegel', in *Der Idealismus und sein Gegenwart*, Meiner, Hamburg, 1979, pp. 388–411.

- 'Zum Freiheitsbegriff der praktischen Philosophie Hegels in Jena', *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 20, 1980, 217–28.
- SMITH, ADAM, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776), Basel, 1791. (*Untersuchung über die Natur und die Ursachen des Nationalreichthums*, aus dem Englischen der vierten Ausgabe neu übersetzt von Chr. Garve, Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1796. This translation was apparently *not* used by Hegel, who owned the Basel edn.)
- SPAVENTA, BERTRANDO, 'Frammento inedito', in Gentile, *Riforma della dialettica* (q.v.), 40–65.
- SPINOZA, BENEDICT DE, *Opera Omnia*, ed. H. E. G. Paulus, 2 vols., Akademische Buchhandlung, Jena, 1802–3.
- STEFFENS, HENRIK, *Grundzüge der philosophischen Naturwissenschaft*, Berlin, 1806.
- *Beiträge zur innern Naturgeschichte der Erde*, Erster Teil, Freyberg, 1801.
- STEUART, SIR JAMES DENHAM, *Untersuchung der Grundsätze der Staats-Wissenschaft*, übers. J. von Pauli, Verlag der typographischen Gesellschaft, Hamburg, 1769–70. (Hegel owned this translation of *An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy*, 2 vols., Millar and Cadell, London, 1767; abridged edn. by A. S. Skinner, 2 vols., Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1966.)
- STIRLING, JAMES HUTCHISON, *The Secret of Hegel*, Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1865 (2nd edn., 1898 repr., Brown Reprints, Dubuque, Iowa, n.d.).
- TAYLOR, ALFRED EDWARD, *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1928.
- TAYLOR, CHARLES, *Hegel*, The University Press, Cambridge, 1975.
- TILLIETTE, XAVIER, *Schelling: Une philosophie en devenir*, 2 vols., Vrin, Paris, 1970.
- TREDE, JOHANN HEINRICH, 'Hegels frühe Logik (1801–1803/4). Versuch einer systematischen Rekonstruktion', *Hegel-Studien*, vii, 1972, 123–68.
- 'Mythologie und Idee. Die systematische Stellung der "Volksreligion" in Hegels Jenaer Philosophie der Sittlichkeit (1801–03)', *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 9, 1973, 167–210.
- VIEILLARD-BARON, JEAN-LOUIS, 'La notion de matière et le matérialisme vrai selon Hegel et Schelling à l'époque d'Iéna', *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 20, 1980, 197–206.
- WOLFF, CHRISTIAN, *Der Anfangs-Gründe aller mathematischen Wissenschaften*, Halle, 1750.
- WOLF, F. A., *Prolegomena ad Homerum*, Halle, 1795.
- YOUNG, EDWARD, *The Complaint and the Consolation; or Night Thoughts on Life, Death and Immortality* (1742–3), Part I (with 43 engravings by William Blake), Edwards, London, 1797. (Only this first part was published, but Blake completed 537 water-colour designs.)
- Zeitschrift für spekulative Physik*, ed. F. W. J. Schelling, 2 vols., Gabler, Jena and Leipzig, 1800–1.
- ZIMMERLI, WALTER C., 'Inwiefern wirkt Kritik systemkonstituierend?', *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 20, 1980, 81–102.
- *Die Frage nach der Philosophie*, Bouvier, Bonn, 1974 (*Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 12).

ANALYTICAL INDEX

- abbild*: of Idea, 105. *See Urbild*
- ABEKEN, Bernhard Rudolf (1780-1854):
 memories, xxxi-xxxii, 52, 73
- ABRAHAM: religion of, 5, 13, 81; God of, 303
- Absolute, the: Concept, 118 (*see absolute concept*); as humanity, 308, 338-9, 411; Infinity, 77 n. (*see infinite, infinity*); negative, 40 (*see negative Absolute*); as night, 194-5; object of Metaphysics, 35-7; parallel sciences of, 31-2, 67-8, 76, 177-8, 181-2, 552; philosophical intuition of, 87 (*see intuition*); pure, 94; realized, 537; referred to, 9 n., 146; religious intuition of, 80 (*see intuition*); as substance, 54-5 (*see substance*)
- absolute cognition (*Erkennen*): Earth as, 266-9; 1802 theory of, 65-7, 166-9, 175, 183; in 1804 logic, 364-5, 389-93; in Metaphysics, 35-6, 50; in Spinoza, 60; philosophy as, 226-37, 518-20, 547-8, 566-8; self-cognition of God, 186-7, 224, 305, 538, 561; syllogism of, 538
- absolute concept: and absolute movement, 117-18, 305-6; consciousness as, 304, 305-6, 390; history of, 147 (*see God, biography of*); and Idea, 107; and image, 77 n., 244-5, 435; intelligence as, 72, 86 n., 120 n., 125, 131, 229 n., 230, 314, 518; mediates with life, 398-9, 403, 406; as negative, 46, 86 n., 125; in organism, 290; as Relationship, 365-6, 368; of Reason, 481; of religion, 69; Spirit as, 186
- absolute consciousness: as aether, 206; as the Beyond, 219-20; as cognition, 384, 390-2; communal, 308; defined, 309; goal of development, 64, 234, 269 n., 309; harmony of, 2-5; historic evolution, 409-10; impersonal and suprapersonal, 207-8, 338-9, 359-60; inadequately expounded, 299 n., 337; resumption of whole, 154-5, 172, 182, 207; singularized, 335-8; as speculative science, 223-5 (*see speculation*); transition to, 330-1
- absolute contradiction: as antinomy, 54, 56, 232; as bad infinite, 386 (*see bad infinite*); in calculus, 359, 362; as *Gegensatz* of consciousness, 309, 364-5 (*see antithesis*); infinity as, 46, 357, 364; in the middle term, 379; in monad, 374; substance as, 367
- absolute freedom: concept of, 204; as goal, 307-8, 558; Idea of, 72, 78-9; of scholarship, 510; of Spirit, 64-6, 150, 337-8
- absolute Identity: of God and Nature, 5, 81, 164, 167, 210; of night and noon, 195-7; of one and many, 72-3, 364-5; speculative principle, 18-19, 33, 38, 53-4, 57, 546-8; two sides of, 58-9, 85, 222, 400, 551-4
- absolute matter: aether as, 240-3, 302-3 315 n., 393, 420, 421 n.; memory as 314-15
- absolute reflection: cognition as, 228; in Holy Triangle, 174; logic of, 345, 364, 383-4; natural science as, 562; and simple reflection, 16-22, 54-5, 111, 402, 549; and Relation, 409; and speculation, 16-18, 20-2, 67-8, 85-6, 98, 555, 556 n.
- Absolute Spirit: eternity of, 180; evolution of concept, xlix-1, 64-7, 69; as freedom, 64, 72-3; as God, 162-3 (*see God*); as life, 5-14; in philosophy, 223 (*see philosophy*); place in 1805 system, 500-1; practical Ego as, 392-3; as Providence, 172, 174-8, 194; in religion, 144-56, 213-22; 1805 theory, 512-22
- Abyss: God as, 165; origin of term, 165 n., philosophy as, 52
- Achilles: *see HOMER*
- acid(s): dubious elements, 257 n.; liquid and gas, 439; materialized fire, 277, 438-9; process of, 256
- ACKERMANN, Jakob Fidelis (1765-1815), liii n., liv n., lxvi

- actuality: in logic of 1808, 444; and possibility, 367; and reality, 469-70; of self, 501-2, 510 n.; of spirit, 487-92
- Adam: naming of animals, 320, 472-6, 486; sin of, 149, 221 n., 435
- Admetus: *see* EURIPIDES
- AESCHYLUS (525-456 B.C.): *Oresteia*, 129, 130 n., 150-1, 216, 219, 482 559; personality of, 336; *Prometheus Vinc-tus*, 260
- Aesthetics*: and 1805 MS, 513
- aether: absolute matter, 240-3, 302-3, 315 n., 393, 420, 421 n.; category, 77 n., 79, 315 n. 318; of cognition, 206, 207, 224-5, 301-5, 307-8, 311, 315 n., 320, 559; divine life, 76-7, 240-1, 338; life-force, 283, 286; and light, 248; not metaphor, 191 n.; negative absolute, 360, 361 n.; physical, 86 n., 268 n.; physical and cognitive, 64, 76-7, 89 n., 110 n., 297-300, 392-3; Schelling's concept, 244 n., 248 n.; 1805 theory, 419-20, 421 n., 425-6 n.
- affinity: chemical, 63, 99, 278, 279
- Agamemnon: *see* AESCHYLUS, *Oresteia*
- aging: theory of, 295, 465-6
- air: cycle of, 262-5, 270; element, 258; fluidity of, 427, 431-2; in organism, 460-1; tensions of, 188, 267, 268 n., 270, 272; types of, 256, 258, 262-3, 271, 429 n.
- Alcestis: *see* EURIPIDES
- alchemy: H's debt to, 274, 278-9, 438-9; not superstition, 399-400
- ALEXANDER of Macedon (356-323 BC): and Aristotle, 122 n., 193, 223, 557; historic moment of, 215, 520; and Napoleon, 557
- alienation (*Entfremdung*): of consciousness, 205-6, 310-12; from nature, 208-11
- allegiance: and service, 121-2, 143
- AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS (c.330-90), 127 n.
- Animal*: H's use, 288
- animal (*Thier*): concept of, 100, 177, 185, 284-5, 287-98; as intuition, 115; process, 295 n., 442, 446-67. *See also*, brute, organism
- Anschaung*: *see* intuition
- antinomy: Being/Nothing, 41, 364, 419, 420; belief/being, 11-13, 16; coercion/freedom, 139; day/night, 195, 242, 435; finite/infinite, xl, 12, 36, 41, 73, 192-3, 214; freedom/necessity, 6, 25-6, 67 n., 205, 210-11, 230-1; mathematical, 47 n.; matter/spirit, 242-3; speculative, 54, 56, 57-8 n.; subject/object, 5-6 (*see* object); sublation of, 106; union/non-union, 6, 10. *See also* absolute contradiction, antithesis
- antithesis (*Gegensatz*): absolute, 228, 406; active/passive, 228, 300, 311; air/water, 188; bad infinity of 41; being/thought, 57, 181, 384, 391, 393, 546-7, 552; body/soul, 79; body/spirit, 63, 551-2; concept/intuition, 86 (*see* concept); of cognition, 229-30; of consciousness, 311, 317-18, 327, 384, 388, 391, 393; in Constitution, 504; content/form, 36, 214; cultural, 550; dogmatic/transcendental, 59-60; environment/organism, 446; faith/Reason, 60, 398; formal/real, 46 n.; history/nature, 172-3; Here/Yonder, 183; ideal/real, 11, 85-6, 154, 191-2, 320; idealism/materialism, 406; idealism/realism, 59, 61; inner/outer, 63, 149, 192, 205, 444; is/ought, 192, 208; Kind/organism, 446; matter/spirit, 303; method of, 67-8; in natural ethics, 558; nature/spirit, 208-11, 536; as non-union, 6-8, 10; noumenon/phenomenon, 380 n., 400, 444; one/many, 72, 251, 364-5; other/self, 310; particular/universal, 85-6, 122-3, 377-9, 443-4; Quality/Quantity, 363; Reason/sensibility, 35 n., 79; Reason/understanding, 44, 192-3; singular/universal, 446, 451, 534; in social classes, 508-9; subject/object, 35 n. (*see* object); subject/substance, 415; sublation of, 192, 406; in syllogistic method, 499-500; theory/practice, 11, 85-6, 173, 391-2
- Apollo: and Dionysus, 513-14; on Earth, 545; fate of, 546 n., 565; as Reason, 133, 151, 480-1
- aristocracy: concept of, 136, 140-2; ethics of, 121, 128-9, 138-40, 194, 494, 510 n., 512-13, 542; intellectual, 403; weakness of, 142-3, 497 n.
- ARISTOGEITON (d. 514 BC), 504 n.
- ARISTOPHANES (c.448-c.388 BC), 123
- ARISTOTLE (384-22 BC): and Alexander, 122 n., 193, 223, 557; on barbarians,

- 126, 128; celestial physics, 252 n.; constitutional theory, 139-40; *De Anima*, 206 n.; embryology, 285, 289; eternal world, 282, 424 n.; *Ethics*, 139, 325 n.; on family, 325; friendship in, 325; and H, 199; intellect and imagination, 206; justice, 495; logic of, 379 n.; meteorology, 434; metaphysics, 55, 305; moral virtue, 134; natural slavery, 121, 126, 128; *Parts of Animals*, 466 n.; *Politics*, 112, 126 n., 219, 325 n., 503 n.; practical science in, 33, 34; prime matter, 242, 420
- ARIUS (c.260-336), 218
- army: ancient and modern, 132 n., 141
- art: in absolute triad, xlix, 65-6, 155, 500, 515, 517 n., 521, 554; aristocracy of, 514; concept of, 513-14, 515, 521; democracy of, 510, 512; organon of philosophy, 15-16, 49-50, 403; and philosophy, 8-14, 24-6, 186, 212-13, 337; philosophy of, 64-9, 513-15; and religion, 9, 64-9, 145, 150-6, 213-22, 334-5, 514-15, 565; social function of, 8-11, 13, 24-5, 561; and speculation, 9, 65-6, 145, 155, 177
- artisan: place in society, 332, 508; artist as, 335
- Ascension: eliminated, 67, 551-2
- astronomy: Hegel's interest in, 78 n.; of Solar System, 82-97 (see Solar System)
- ATHANASIUS (c. 296-373): triangulated, 160, 162
- Atheismusstreit*, xxi
- Athena: and Areopagus, 133, 151, 542; birth of, 375, 389; intuition of *Volk*, 144-5, 220, 317
- atom(s): conceptual, 272-3; false constructs, 304-5, 353 n., 354; 1801/2 mechanics, 86 n.; 1803 mechanics, 250, 251 n.; 1804 mechanics, 251, 253 n., 255
- ATTILA (c.406-453), 127 n.
- AUGUSTINE (353-430), 477
- AUGUSTUS (63 BC-AD 14), 206, 318
- authority: of Church, 218, 219, 404-5, 517; domestic, 7, 122, 312-13, 326, 328, of philosophy, 9, 403, 405, 408; of Reason, 403-5; social, 71, 131-3, 334, 487, 490-1, 497, 501-3; of State, 141, 494 (see State)
- AVINERI, Shlomo, ix
- BAADER, Franz von (1765-1841): *On the Pythagorean Square*, 184, 185 n.
- bad infinite: Absolute as, 40, 42-3 (see negative Absolute); of causes, 43, 359; of conceiving, 377; of consciousness, 359-60 n., 362-3; of desire, 481; first occurrence, 235 n.; of inquiry, 373; of judgement, 379, 380, 386; of Kind, 297; mathematical, 346-7, 358-62, 374, 421; as progress, 23, 149 (see FICHTE); in plant-life, 287; qualitative, 348; of space and time, 23, 39-40, 245, 249 n.; of subjectivity, 24, 26; of temperature, 356-7
- Bamberg: Hegel's interest in, xxi, xxv; move to, lx, lxi-lxiii, lxvii, lxix-lxx
- barbarism: of Boehme, 158 n. (see BOEHME); and chivalry, 561; and ethical nature, 542; of Germany, 409-10; Greeks and, 147-8, 558; of Holy Triangle, 185; as indomitable, 126-8; religion of, 214; and understanding, 126, 127 n., 419 n.
- BARDILI, Christoph Gottfried (1761-1808): in *Difference* essay, 18, 27, 28, 30 n.; Identity in, 53 n.; and reflective logic, 37 n., 47, 54 n.; and Reinhold, xxxv, xxxvi, xlv
- battle: and murder, 130 n.
- BAUM, Manfred: on dialectic, 70 n., 358 n.; on 1801 and 1803 fragments, 43 n., 206 n.; on scepticism, 61 n.; on *Timaeus Locrus*, 93 n.
- beauty: appearance of Absolute, 513-14; pursuit of, 214; regulative ideal, 8, 404. See also art
- becoming (*Werden*): in 1805 logic, 420; spirit as, 300
- Begierde*: see desire
- Begriff*: see concept
- Being (*Sein*): chain of, 374, 375, 382; and concept, 72; and simple connection, 412-13; determinate and indeterminate, 41 (see *Daseyn*); *Ding an sich*, 17, 38, 391, 474-5; enduring, 39, 469-70; Frankfurt concept, 4 n., 5, 11-13; and Nothing, 364, 419-20; as Quality, 366; and reflection, 20 (see reflection); Relation of, (see Relation); and thought, 42, 55, 57, 181, 373, 381, 384, 391, 393, 546-8, 552-3
- belief: see faith
- BENEDICT (c.480-c.547), 218

- BENTHAM, Jeremy (1748-1832), 135
- BERGMAN, Torbern (1735-84); H's debt to, 278
- BERKELEY, George (1685-1753), 59, 243
- BERTHOLLET, Claude Louis (1748-1822): *Chemical Statics*, 278; 'Recherches, etc', 278 n.
- Bible: Galileo and, 305-7; Luther's, 409-10, 545
- Bildung*: bourgeois, 140, 541-2; Catholic, 152, 217-22, 543; classical, 131-3, 144-5, 541; concept, 114-16, 374-5, 389-90, 476-9, 493, 528; domestic, 115, 309-15, 327-8, 535; equality of, 450; of human race, 139, 147, 172-3, 214-22, 478-9, 540-4; of nobles, 130-3, 140-3, 512-13; of peasants, 136, 507-8; of philosopher, 222-3, 535, 537-8, 550, 560-2, 564; social, 140, 398-402, 535-7; and *Zucht*, 140, 528, 536-7 n., 560-1. *See also* education
- biology: and geography, 269 (*see* organism)
- BLAKE, William (1757-1827): *Four Zoas*, 571; and H, 570-3; *Marriage of Heaven and Hell*, 571 n.
- blood: theory of, 200-1, 460-1
- BODE, Johann E. (1747-1826), 96
- body: dynamic equilibrium, 251-2, ideal, 86, 88, 94, 181, 246-7; living, 88, 100 (*see* organism); real, 86, 88, 246-50. *See also* matter
- BOEHME, Jakob (1575-1624): attacked (1804), 219 n., 242 n., 336 n., 397-9, 402, 406, 407-10; barbarism of, 158 n., 175 n., 336 n., 408 n., 409; influence (1801-2), 84-5 n., 161, 165, 184-5, 407; (1805), 408 n., 432, 433 n.; myth, 161 n., 167 n., 179-80 n., 219 n., 363 n., 407-8; Ternary of, 184-5; Virgin earth in, 274, 278, 399, 438 n.
- BOETTIGER, Karl August (1760-1835): attack and response, xxii-xxiii, xlii n., xlv
- BOHN, Johanna Sophia (c.1768-1834), lxviii
- bond of analogy, 92 n., 160-2, 184
- bone: theory of, 289-90, 459
- BONSIEPEN, Wolfgang, 416 n.
- boredom of the world, 147, 203 n.
- botany: H's interest in, lxi, 100, *see* plant
- bourgeois(ie): and citizen, 504-6; class, 70, 135, 136, 508; ethics, 121, 128-9, 132, 134-6, 140, 143, 152-3, 508-9, 541-2; family, 494, 506
- BOUTERWEK, Friedrich (1766-1828): criticism of, xxxviii n., xli n. xlvii n., xlvii n., on Dante, xlv-xlv; and logic, 37 n.
- BOYLE, Robert (1627-91), 278 n.
- BRADLEY, Francis Herbert (1846-1924): *Appearance and Reality*, 341; *Ethical Studies*, 341 n.; and H, 53 n., 54 n., 341, 353; and Hume, 376 n.; *Principles of Logic*, 353 n.
- brain: theory of, 292, 462
- BREYER, Karl W. F. (1771-1818), xxvii n.
- BRINKMANN, Karl G. von, xxiii
- BROWN, John (c.1735-1788): medical theory, 286 n., 296
- BROWN, Marshall: *Shape of German Romanticism*, 85 n.
- BROWN, Robert F.: *Later Philosophy of Schelling*, 165 n.
- brute (*Thier*): awareness of, 101, 288, 293, 294-5, 310, 459, 473; and consciousness, 296-7, 299-302, 310-12, 449-51, 463, 467; herd-instinct of, 101, 294; making of, 323-4, 449-50, 457, 462; self-feeling of, 296-7, 450, 461; voice of, 101, 292-3, 294, 462
- BUCHNER, Hartmut: on *Critical Journal*, xxxiv n., xxxvi n., xxxvii, 103 n.
- BULLA, Sophie (1783-1842), lxiv
- BUNYAN, John (1628-88): *Pilgrim's Progress*, 559
- BURKHARDT, Johanna: H's relation with, lxvii-lxx, 324 n.
- CAIN, Paul E., 239 n.
- calculus: theory of, 359-61
- CALDERON de la Barca, Pedro (1600-81), xlv
- CALIGULA, Gaius (12-41), 484
- CALVIN, John (1509-64), 218, 503 n.
- CAMPE, Joachim H. (1746-1818), 546 n.
- carbon: chemical element, 264 n.; as diamond, 432; earth element, 257
- carbon dioxide: chemical element, 256, 258, 429 n.; in finite chemism, 271; in infinite chemism, 262-5, 432
- CARDUCCI, Giosu  (1835-1907), 565 n.

- CARROLL, Lewis: *Alice in Wonderland*, 315-6 n., 389, 476
- CARY, Joyce: *The Horse's Mouth*, 322 n.
- categorical imperative: and *Begierde*, 479-80; historical application, 173. *See* KANT
- categories: aether as, 77, 79, 315 n., 318; deduction of, xxxiii, 26, 383, 386-7; logic and spirit, 42-3, 345; in *Phenomenology*, 29 n., 387, 417; of Relation, 42, 366 (*see* Relation); of simple connection, 42, 345; theory of, 35-43, 345-93, 472-6, 479; as world-structure, 23, 25, 36. *See also* KANT
- Catholicism: art in, 153, 215-16; beauty of, 148, 222; discipline of, 148, 187 n., 217-22, 543; divine comedy of, 151-2, 219, 220-2, 559; heroes of, 217 n., 218, 338; in rational mythology, 156, 216-17
- causality: bad infinite of, 43, 359; concept of, 368-73; and judgement, 378-9, 385; reflective category, 42-3
- CAVENDISH, Henry (1731-1810): forms of air, 257 n., 258; H's debt to, 257, 263, 264, 271, 277 n., 432 n.
- CERF, Walter, ix
- certainty (*Gewissheit*): of knowledge, 314; rational, 470, 522; subjective, 223, 236
- character: in marriage, 493; and recognition, 485-7; worker as, 490
- chemism: chemical elements, 256-8, 431, 438; of digestion, 460; of Earth-process, 63, 64, 98-101, 111, 257-60, 265, 442; 1803-4 evolution of, 254-5, 259-61, 268 n.; finite, 256, 263 n., 274, 276-9, 438-40; infinite, 261-2, 266-7, 270-1, 280, 282, 432, 444, 445; in medical theory, 296; organic analogies barred, 266-7 n., 275, 446, 454, 463; physical, 441, sexual, 63, 64, 101; syllogism of, 525-6, 531; 1805 theory of, 424, 429-34
- chemistry: affinity, 63, 99, 356, 370, 440; chemical bond, 253 n.; chemical process, 256, 263 n., 274, 276-9, 438-40, 525-6, 531; compounds, 263; definition of, 277; and physics, 259-63, 265; reagents, 278; tables of elements, 257
- chivalry: ideal of, 217 n., 561; transitional, 482
- Christianity: and Greek religion, 147, 172, 216-20, 557; historic moment of, 205-6; and Judaism, 172-3, 398-9 n.; otherworldliness of, 192; Spirit in, 162-4, 185-8, 302; triangulated, 160-88. *See also*, Catholicism, Protestantism, religion
- Church: authority of 218-9, 405, 517; invisible, 411; and State, 10, 65 n., 338, 516-17, 522, 536-9, 543
- CICERO, M. Tullius (106-43 BC), 545 n., 569
- circle: of Absolute Spirit, 66, 149-50, 559; of aether, 224; God as, 242; Idea as, 64-5, 106 n.; of life and logic, 342-3; as logical symbol, 453, 523, 530-44; of philosophy, 56, 62, 69, 235, 532-3; of philosophy of nature, 466; of Real Philosophy, 466; of Science, 383, 568; of speculation, 56, 82; of the system, 224, 559-60; of true infinity, 108
- classes: social theory of, 132-6, 334 n., 507-13
- classification: logic of, 382
- climate: *see* meteorology
- Clytaemnestra: *see* AESCHYLUS, *Oresteia*
- coercion: identity with freedom, 139
- cognition (*Erkennen*): not animal function, 288, 294-5; continuum of, 436; as cunning, 481; of the Earth, 255, 451; finite and infinite, 35-6, 60 (*see* absolute cognition); and imagination, 450; and intuition, 175-6, 180, 222, 226, 229, 306-7, 407-8, 553, 566; in 1801-3 logic, 201-2, 207; in 1804 logic, 364-6, 380, 382-93; natural conditions of, 267-9, 272, 286, 546-7; possibility of, 166-9, 175-7; realized as spirit, 468; reflective, 35-8, 372; rends determinism, 374-5; sensory, 471; theory of, 50-2, 226-37; 1805 theory, 410, 412-15, 523-44
- cohesion: concept eliminated, 1804, 253, 255, 268 n.; earlier theory, 86-92, 254, 281; 1804 survivals, 268 n., 276 n.; 1805 theory, 255 n., 427
- COLERIDGE, Samuel Taylor (1772-1834), 570-1
- colour(s): concept and intuition of, 320-1; experiments on, lix; model of Quality, 366-7; in plants, 455-6; theory of, 195, 268 n., 271, 435, 437-8

- combustibles: category of, 274, 276, 277; sulphur as model, 438
- comedy: Greek, 151, 153; Christian, 151-2, 153, 219, 220-2, 559
- comets: higher analogues, 254, 267, 460; motion, 83-4; significance, 248, 424; and vintage, 252 n.
- common sense (*Menschenverstand*): critique of, xxxix, xl-xli, xlvii, 19; and speculation, 32, 195-9, 405-6
- commonwealth: state as, 497, 501
- Communism: Platonic and Soviet, 325-6
- community: art and religion in, 8-12 (see art, religion); as authority, 310; bearer of spirit, 324; cognitive, 382, 475; Idea of, 131-43, 308; membership in, 6, 72, 133, 501-2; self-conscious, 507, 565
- comprehension (*Begreifen*): beginning of, 435-6, 522; and cognition, 266, 563-8; historical, 521, 550; of life, 398, 457-8, 468-70, 474-5; logical, 383-4; social necessity of, 543-4; of one's time, 568
- concept (*Begriff*): abstract, 106, 382; animal as, 100, 458; atomic, 272-3; consciousness as, 304, 305-6, 311, 390; as contradiction, 53, 386; determinate, 315, 320-1, 323, 328, 375-9; embodied, 307-8; and empirical data, 96 n.; evolution of, 481; and experience, 330 n.; fixed, 125; of force, 369-70; formal, 117-18, 147; individuation of, 287; and intuition, 71-2, 74, 100, 107, 132, 147, 228, 390; intuitive, 50-1; living, 446; logical motion of, 351, 563; motion and rest of, 107, 120-1, 132-3, 244, 259-60, 263, 306; paralysed, 264; plant, 457; pure, 46, 521, 531; real, 90, 147, 258, 531, 535, 536; realization of, 467, 469; sensory, 376; of space-time, 420-3; and species, 381; in syllogistic method, 499-500; in synthesis, 49, 78
- concrete universal: abstract and, 563-5; cognition as, 566-7; form of, 384; organism, as, 451; rational community as, 382, 565; universal individual, 531, 543
- conscience: freedom and, 479; respect for, 139, 517; as self-definition, 515-16
- consciousness: birth of, 101, 463; in brutes, 301-2, 312 n.; and cognition, 227-8; communal, 307-8, 560, 563 (see absolute consciousness); concept of, 207-8, 300, 301-8, 364; contracts and expands, 90; determined and free, 230, 234; experience of, 191 n., 477-9, 568; of life, 6; mortal, 88, 374-5; moving principle, 144; as need of philosophy, 223-5 (see need of philosophy); night-bounded, 195, 197-8; preponderance of, 73, 197-8, 225, 336, 551 n., 558-9; not quantum of force, 359-60, 362-4; rational, 296-7, 367 n., 372-5, 382-3, 390; reflected in nature, 251 n., 255, 259 n., 260-1, 273; reflective, 11-14, 20-2; as Relation, 365, 409; self-cognition of Earth, 266, 269-70; self-deceptive, 203-5; sensory, 291-5, 297, 301; sinful state of, 206, 219-20, 499; standpoint accepted, 207-8, 225, 237, 239; 1801-2 theory of, 37-8, 50, 52, 63; 1803-5 theory, 207-8, 308-34, 414-21; transcendental, 25-6, 29, 166-7, 269-70 n.; as whole and parts, 359-60 n.
- consecration: of world, 148-9, 187, 515, 518-9 (see also Universe, of God)
- constitution: 1805 articulation of, 488, 489 n., 499-501, 503 n.; dialectic of, 495-6; elements of, 497-8; establishment of, 130, 503-4; free, 138-43, 213; mixed, 140; natural foundation, 136-7, 505-6; religion and, 65 n. (see religion); symbolized, 536, 537 n., 539, 541
- construction: cognition as, 173, 175-8; of the Earth, 250 n., 254; false and genuine, 348-9, 363; of ideal body, 87, 91, 247; logical, 202, 351, 352-3, 382; of matter, 249-52, 254; method of, 246 n. (see method); and reconstruction, 146-7, 178, 222
- continuum: of communication, 310-12, 314-15; determined and free, 374-5; of family and society, 326-7
- contract: concept of, 119; dialectic of, 495-6; international, 511; of marriage, 122-4, 493; critique of original, 491, 503; for service, 121-2; theory of, 489, 490-1
- contraction: and expansion, 90, 161 n., 165 n., 177, 553

- contradiction: formal, 380; law of, 53-4, 59; resolution of 380 n., 386
- COPERNICUS, Nicolaus (1473-1543), 196
- COTTA, Johann F. (1764-1832): xxxiv-xxxvi, xxxix
- creation: concept, 78, 79, 472-6, 522, 560, 565; image, 168, 169-70, 188, 472-6
- CRELL, Lorenz F. F. von (1744-1816), 258 n.
- Creon: *see* SOPHOCLES, *Antigone*
- crime: fraudulent, 498-9; egoism of, 490, 499, 511; personal violation, 491-2; as transgression, 125, 127, 206, 498
- critical: application of term, 344; meaning, 105-6, 340-2
- Critical Journal*: authorship questions, xxxviii, xli-xlviii; 'Einleitung', xxxviii-xli, 9 n., 34 n., 35 n., 59 n.; 'Hegel's journal', xliii n., xlv; last issues, xlv-xlvii, li, 103-4 n.; and H's *Metaphysics*, 57; 'Notizenblätter', xli-xlv; planning of, xxxiv-xxxviii; polemics in, xxiv n., xxxix, xl, xlv n., xlvii, 405; *Potenz* theory in, 75; 'Schelling's journal', xxiii-xxiv, xxxiv, xlv, xlvii. *See also* *Faith and Knowledge*, *Natural Law*
- 'Critical Journal of German Literature', lxii
- criticism: theory of, xxxviii-xli; theme of *Metaphysics*, 55-7
- crystal: diamond, 432-3; Earth as, 260, 433; process of, 255-6, 270, 432; self-shaping, 100, 428
- C shape: significance, 531, 534; use, 536, 540-1, 543
- cube: ratio, 91-5, 247; of Spinoza, 91
- CULLEN, Bernard, ix, 333 n.
- Culture: *see* *Bildung*
- cunning (*List*): criminal, 491-2; of Reason, 332-3, 480-2, 486, 573 n.
- cycle: aetheric, 297-8; of Earth-process, 283-4; organic, 284, 285, 294-5, 296-7, 456-8, 466, 523-5
- DALTON, John (1766-1844): atoms of, 272, 304-5
- dance: immediacy of, 513-14
- Daseyn*: of aether, 420, 421 n; of heat, 429; in 1808 *Logic*, 421 n., 422, 425; of love, 483, 487; of spirit, 507
- DANTE ALIGHIERI (1265-1321): Christian poet, 216, 219; *Comedy* of, 12, 151-2, 219-20, 559; in *Critical Journal*, xlv-xlvi; Earth's shadow, 196; *Hell*, xxxi, xl n., xlv, 52, 152, 220-1; Paradise, 12, 222 n.; Purgatory, xlv, 12, 220-1
- DARWIN, Charles Robert (1809-82), 88
- DAVOUST, Louis Nicolas (1770-1823), lxii
- death: absolute labour, 224, 559; conceptual necessity, 88, 101, 305, 374-5, 381, 458; and consciousness, 463, 467-70; education and, 124, 324, 541; of God, 150 (*see* God); indifference to, 126, 129; natural, 125, 195, 295-7, 465-6, 540-1; martyrdom, 148, 517; penalty, 130, 496, 517; pursuit of, 141, 193, 194, 224, 511, 513; recognition through, 134, 330-1, 487, 541-2; and sleep, 180; and resurrection 150-1
- deduction: example, 277 n., 279; meaning, 383-4
- definition (*Definition*): of Earth, 267-9, 281; logical example, 349-50; theory of, 380-3
- Delineatio*: beginning of, 200-2, 219 n., 228-9 n., 334 n.; chemism in, 254; conclusion of, 194 n., 223-5; discussed, 200-16, 223-5; first 'Encyclopaedia', xlix-l, lii, 104; 4-part system, 212, 226 n., 298 n.; putative fragments, 145 n., 224-5, 229, 251 n., 254 n., 268 n., 335; and *System of Ethical Life*, 104, 191, 207-14; turning point, 219 n., 225, 226 n., 233, 337
- democracy: of absolute Spirit, 512; in constitution, 140-1; and military service, 121, 132 n.; of philosophy, 68 n., 402 n., 403-6, 411
- DESCARTES, René (1596-1650); demon of, 39; dogmatism, 59-60, 411, 464; dualism of, xli, 59, 372-3; physics, 246; subjectivism of, 204 n., 233, 235
- desire (*Begierde*): of brutes, 288, 293, 461-3; idealization of, 316, 322; natural, 322, 479-81, 483; as relation, 64; recognized, 489-90; and satisfaction, 113-16, 180; sexual, 114, 123, 327
- despotism: and tyranny, 503-4
- determinacy (*Bestimmtheit*): of being and concept, 375-6; of Quality, 351,

- determinacy (*Bestimmtheit*) (*cont.*):
 352; as Quantum, 356-7, 360-1, 364;
 spatial, 421-2
- determinism: climatic, 99, 282 n., 283
 n.; logical, 373-4
- D'HONDT, Jacques, 156 n.
- diagrams: discussed, 523-44; spirit as
 organism, 449-50, 454 n., 527-8; syl-
 logistic, 450 n., 453, 454 n., 523, 525-
 6, 528-30
- dialectic: of common sense, 340-1; des-
 tructive method, 40, 70, 358-9, 549;
 of process, 443-4; phenomenological,
 549; theoretical and practical, 203-4
- Difference* essay: absolute reflection, 17-
 19, 85-6, 98-9; art in, 56, 150, 153 n.,
 177, 213; bias of, xxiii, xxvi n., xlii,
 28, 81 n.; climatic determinism in, 99,
 282 n., 283 n.; common sense in, xl
 n., divine service in, 9 n., 65-6, 149-
 50, 554, 570; enthusiasm attacked,
 403 n.; Fichte in, xxxvi-xxxvii, 27, 29
 n., 34, 56 n., 78, 205 n., 337 n., 349;
 4-part system in, 31-3, 521; Frankfurt
 ideal in, 14; and Holy Triangle, 157,
 159 n., 552 n., 554 n.; idealism in, 23,
 26; Identity in, 12 n., 52-4, 67-8, 76,
 174, 336, 338 n.; independence of,
 xxv-xxvi, 28; indifference point, 33
 n., 177-8; intellectual intuition, 16;
 light in, 63, 89 n.; logic in, 30, 31, 35
 n., 41, 42-4, 45-6 n., 359; Logos in,
 89 n., 198, 219 n., 551; machine state
 in, 495 n.; Metaphysics in, 42, 54, 56;
 method in, 61-2, 71, 107 n., 109, 110,
 112 n., 113, 176; natural philosophy
 in, 63, 98-101, 293 n.; need of phil-
 osophy in, 10 n., 191-2, 202, 550;
 Night in, 165 n., 194-5, 434; and
 Phenomenology, 44 n.; philosophy in,
 59; Plato in, 92 n., 161, 552 n.; Pre-
 face, xxxviii, 31, 345 n.; reactions to,
 xxii; 'Schelling's system' in, li, lii n.,
 31 n., 54, 61 n., 67-8, 75, 76 n., 85, 97,
 161 n., 165 n., 179, 225, 228 n., 553
 n., 556 n., 567; speculation in, 56-7,
 150, 154 n., 177, 197-8, 224-5, 232,
 336, 405 n., 551 n., 557 n.; and Sys-
 tem programme, 80, 82, 89 n.; trans-
 lation defective, 219 n.; Understanding
 in, 41, 43-4, 478 n.; writing of,
 xxv-xxvi, xxxiii, xxxv
- digestion: as self-articulation, 527; as
 intro-reflection, 528; theory of, 289-
 90, 295, 448-9, 460-1; total plant-
 process, 455-6, 458 n.
- dimensions: theory (1801), 87, 90, 94
 n.; (1804) 245-6
- Ding*: labour not, 490; and properties,
 376-7, 380; and *Sache*, 361, 368, 472;
 self as, 476-7, 479
- Ding an sich*: in Fichte, 17; mistake,
 38, 391; and *Sache selbst*, 475 (*see*
Sache selbst); uncreated, 474. *See also*
 KANT
- DIODEGENES LAERTIUS (*fl.* 2nd cent. AD),
 57 n.
- Dionysus: and Apollo, 513-14
- discipline (*Zucht*): of consciousness,
 309-13, 317-18, 326-7; in diagram,
 528, 536-7 n.; in education, 124, 476-
 9; military, 122 n.; social, 138, 140,
 503, 560-1
- disease: *see* medicine
- disposition (*Gesinnung*): of civil service,
 510; of eommerce, 509; of labourer,
 509
- Disputatorium* (1801-2): xxx-xxxi,
 xxxii, xxxiv n.
- Dissertation*: analysed, 82-97; compared
 with 1804 theory, 244 n., 246, 248,
 249, 250, 253 n.; and *Delineatio*, 254;
 and Holy Triangle, 157; language of,
 75; mechanism, 98; philosophy in,
 545 n., 557 n.; Plato in, 92 n., 161,
 552 n.; and 1805 *Realphilosophie*, 426;
 topic of, lii n.; writing of, xxv-xxvi,
 xxxi, xxxv, xxxviii, 75-6, 77-8, 80 n.,
 98-9
- Divine Triangle: *see* Holy Triangle
- divorce: legally rational, 493-4; theory
 of, 506 n., 509
- dominance (*Herrschaft*): of concept
 and intuition, 71, 114-16 (*see* sub-
 sumption); of nature, 283; of
 one and many, 72. *See also* lord-
 ship
- DOMINIC (c. 1170-1221), 218
- DRACO (*fl.* 7th cent. BC), 477
- drive (*Trieb*): ethical, 153, 285 n.; prac-
 tical, 479-80; sexual, 285
- DUESING, Klaus: on dialectic, 358 n.;
 editing points, 249-50 n., 257 n., 288-
 9 n.; on H's logic, 29-30 n., 37 n., 42
 n., 44; on Schelling, 27 n., 61 n.; on
 substance, 54 n.

- earth (element): carbon as, 257, cycle of, 262, 265, 267; types of, 274, 277, 439
- Earth, the: absolute cognition, 266, 562; construction, 250 n., 254; definition of, 251 n., 255, 267, 268-9, 281; description of, 266-7, 270; and earth-element, 265, 267; evil principle, 176, 187, 480; evolution of, 282, 445; fertility of, 267, 281-3, 434 n., 438, 452-3; finite complex, 272-4, 277, 281, 315 n., 320; Idea of, 259, 265-6; as Kind, 447-8, 452-3, 524, 530; life of, 99, 254, 258-9, 261, 264-5, 280-5, 381, 451-2; Mother, 252, 480 n., 481; mineral organism, 63, 275, 278-9, 280, 281, 283, 441-3; planet, 86, 248-9, 253; self, 269, 451; self-cognition of, 266, 269, 272-3, 285, 300, 306-8, 309; shape of, 254, 259-60, 265, 267, 279, 280, 282, 438; spirit, 152-3; stability of, 306-7, 469; substance, 269; universal individual, 68, 98-101, 283, 448. *See also* Earth-process
- Earth-process: in atmosphere, 99, 188, 262, 270, 431-2; chemism of, 63, 64, 98-101, 254, 257, 258-9, 262-5, 280, 282-3, 442; as cognition, 267-9; concept, 305-7, and consciousness, 293; and cunning, 481; heat and light in, 256-7, 282, 433-4, 438; infinity of, 252, 298-301; and Kind, 294; mechanism of, 98-9, 254, 257, 282, 442; meteorological, 68, 99-100, 264, 266-71, 280-5, 469; in the organism, 101, 290 n., 291, 460-1, 524, 530
- ECKHART, Johannes (c.1260-1327), 186
- ecology: H's theory, 99 n., 275, 281-3
- economy: theory of the, 138, 332-3, 489, 494-5, 497, 508-9
- Eden: historic, 145-6, 172-3, 211, 213-15, mythic, 211-12
- education: concept, 115, 140, 323-4, 483, 528; domestic, 129, 324-8, 329 n., 330, 389, 535, 562; social, 208-9, 389, 476-7, 493, 510, 560-2; Soviet, 326. *See also* Bildung, discipline
- Ego (*Ich*): actuality of, 501-2, 510 n.; brute lacks, 296-7; construction (1801), 43-5; in Fichte, 22-3 (*see* FICHTE); inner light, 433 n.; intuitive, 50-1, 53, 420-1; negative infinite, 43, 104, 362-3; practical, 25-6, 78-9, 388-93; self-defining, 490; spirit, 518-20; not substance, 52; substantial moment, 367-8; theoretical, 72, 388-93, 471-3; as 'thing', 476-7, 480; as understanding, 349-50. *See also*, cognition, consciousness, subject
- Eigensinn: practical, 321, 328, 329, 479, 498-9 560-1; theoretical, 321, 328
- Electra: *see* AESCHYLUS, *Oresteia*
- electricity: in Earth-process, 99, 254; 1804 elimination, 263 n., 276 n., 433, n.; lightning, 434; static, 279, 428-9; not substance, 370
- element(s): aetheric cycle of, 318 n.; chemical, 256-7 (*see* chemism); and colours, 437-8; Greek, 436; levels related, 258, 262, 280; physical, 258 (*see* physics); in plant process, 452-4; spiritual, 318 n., 482, 484-5; transmutation of, 99, 264
- ellipse: logical symbol, 453, 523, 530-43; planetary, 84-5 n., 89, 247-8
- embryology: theory of, 289, 459-60 n., 461, 466
- EMPEDOCLES (c.485-c.425 BC); 9 n., 216 n.
- Encyclopaedia: and *Dissertation*, 84 n., 92 n., 95 n., 96 n.; on Goethe, 455 n.; and 1803-4 natural philosophy, 264 n., 286 n.; Real Philosophy (1805) in, 429-30 (*see* PETRY); structure emerges, 411; structure misleading, 569
- energy: aether as, 246 n., 304-5, 361 n.
- ENGELS, Friedrich (1820-95), xl n., 283 n., 521 n.
- ἐν καὶ πᾶν: ideal of youth, 5; and natural philosophy, 79; origin, 57-8
- Enlightenment: as Fall of man, 204 n.; H's sympathy with, 402
- environment: Earth as, 284-5, 448; inorganic, 287, 446; internal, 448, 465, 526-7; as satellite of life, 525
- EPICURUS (c.341-270 BC); atoms of, 250, 251 n.-353-4 n.
- ERDMANN, Johann E. (1805-92); xxxii
- error: implicit in all knowledge, 314
- ERKLEBEN, Johann C. P. (1744-77): *Anfangsgründe der Naturlehre*, 279 n.
- essence (*Wesen*): and being, 443-4; concept, 245, 412-13; defining of, 380-1; determinate, 425; divine, 390-1, 392 n., 399; and substance, 375

- ethical life, ethical nature, ethics: see *Sittlichkeit*
- EUCLID (fl. 300 BC): 383 n.
- EURIPIDES (484-406 BC): *Alcestis*, 545; personality, 336
- Eve, 480
- evil: cunning as, 480-2; Earth as, 187, 407 n., 480; morality as, 153 n., 204 n.; nature as, 407, 518; problem of, 164, 166-7, 202, 363 n., 406-8; self-will as, 498-9
- evolution: natural, H's attitude, 275, 444
- EWING, A. C., 54 n.
- exchange: theory of, 118-20, 490
- excluded middle: law of, 379, 386
- expansion: of bodies, 430, 431; and self-recovery, 553 (see contraction)
- explanation: tautological, 368-9
- faith: and knowledge, 171, 179; philosophy and, 89 n., 200, 204 n., 515, 571; positive, 81; practical, 11-13, 16, 52, 81, 82; and Reason, 12, 60, 81, 89 n., 393, 398, 402 n.; as yearning, 16 (see *Sehnsucht*)
- Faith and Knowledge*: Abyss in, 165 n.; art in, 150; climax of, 61 n., 89 n., 149, 187 n., 338 n.; cognition in, 175-6, 207 n.; ethical nature, 63-4 n.; on eudaemonism, 149; Fichte in, 29 n., 68 n., 152 n., 222 n., 349 n.; Identity in, 73, 87 n.; Incarnation in, 67 n., 198, 202; infinite grief, 179-80 n.; intuition, 66 n., 175-6; Jacobi, xxxvi n., 153; and Jean Paul, 548 n.; Kant in, 43-9, 51, 206; Köppen's attack, xlvi; logic in, 30, 36 n., 42 n., 43-8, 62, 105; metaphysics in, 55 n., 56 n., 58-9, 341 n.; morality in, 152-3, 204-5 n.; natural philosophy, 86, 91 n., 156 n.; reactions to, xxiii, xxiv; religion in, 155 n., 192, 407; Schleiermacher in, 153; theme of, xxxix, xl n., li, 60, 205 n., 233 n., 398; writing of, xlii n., xlii, xlix n., 47 n.
- Fall: 84 (see mythology)
- family: as clan, 111-12, 122 n., 129-30; education in, 535 (see education); element of society, 111-12, 541; finite totality, 122, 124-5, 144, 203-4, 315-16; Idea of, 109; real individual, 133, 308; love exists as, 481, 483-8, 506, 534; one-in-many, 72; organism, 64; parent-child relation, 115, 124, 483, 494, 531, 533, 534; piety of, 129-31, 144, 151; spiritual primacy of, 506, 509; exists as property, 122, 315-16, 327, 328, 331, 333-4, 482-6; 1804 theory, 322-8; and *Volk*, 6
- fate: aether as, 302; Frankfurt concept survives, xxx, 6 n., 13, 126, 179-80; reverence for, 393; Fates, the, 480 n., 481
- feeling (*Gefühl*): concept of, 114; dichotomy of, 109, 113, 114; identity of, 156, 217 n.; marriage as, 123; primacy of, 109, 112-13, 326; of self, 448-52, 528-9; for truth, 404
- FERGUSON, Adam (1723-1816), 333 n.
- FERNOW, Karl Ludwig (1763-1808): lxvi
- fertility: see Earth
- feud: see vendetta
- FICHTE, Johann Gottlieb (1762-1814): *Anstoss*, 347, 348, 349 n.; *Appeal*, 43; and art, 68 n.; conscience, 479; construction in, 348-9; critical blindness of, 34, 56 n., 539; and *Critical Journal*, xxxv-xxxviii, xxxix, xlviii; and *Difference* essay, 81 n.; Ego, 12 n., 29, 39, 43, 51, 60, 78-9, 269, 347, 391-3; faith of, 60, 81; formalism of, 98 n., 117, 204 n., 205, 401, 510; infinite progress in, 40, 41 n., 220 n., 222, 363; intellectual intuition, 16 n., 17, 38-9, 51, 548; and Kant, 23, 26, 36 n., 62, 196; logic of, xxxiii, 27-9, 30 n., 38-9, 40, 345 n.; logical idealist, 60-1, machine State of, 495 n., 510 n.; morality of, 152 n., 153, 195 n.; *Naturrecht*, xxxii, xxxiii n., xxxiv, 103; personalism of, 204, 337, 339; postulation in, xxxi, 12, 16, 23, 41 n., 44, 61, 78; primacy of practical, 26, 39, 82, 556; Hegel's relation to, xxxiii, li, 6 n., 12 n., 41 n., 51, 78-9, 82, 98 n., 139, 156, 196, 225, 234, 391-3; relation to Schelling, xxi-xxiii, xxvi-xxviii, xlii, 17, 27, 28, 31, 32, 35 n.; *Science of Knowledge*, 29, 38-9, 60, 109 n., 411-2 n.; subjectivism of, 17, 29, 105, 225, 233, 234, 391-3; terminology borrowed, 107 n., 109; *Vocation of Man*, 29 n., 60 n.
- fire: of bile, 460-1; chemical, 276-9; cycle of, 262-4, 265; fluidity of, 427, 429-34; materialized, 277, 432, 438-

- 9; mechanics of, 438, 440; real concept, 270-1
- firearms: significance of, 134, 511 n., 512
- First Philosophy of Spint*: faults in, 314 n., 334 n., 338 n.
- FISCHER, Kuno (1824-1907), xlix, 26 n.
- FISCHER, Ludwig (1807-31): H's son, lxvii-lxx, 483
- fluidity: animal, 289-90, 295, 296, 464, 465-8; concept of, 252-3, 446; of consciousness, 299-300; theory of, 255-8, 427-9
- force: concept of, 79, 88-9, 345, 347, 349-50, 368-73, 425 n., 428; and consciousness, 359-60, 479; gravity as, 43, 86-7, 369-70, 426-8; heat as, 429-30; light as 425-6; and manifestation, 43; mechanical, 80, 83-5, 361; organic, 101; realization of, 467
- formalism: philosophical, 107-8, 397, 400-1, 409 n. *See also* FICHTE, KANT
- formell*: H's use, 69 n., 272, 388 n.
- fossils: theory of, 275, 428, 445-6
- FOURCROY, Antoine F. de (1755-1809), 263 n.
- FRANCESCA da Rimini (d. 1285), 221 n.
- FRANCIS of Assisi (1181/2-1226), 218
- fraud: and fault, 498-9
- FREDERICK II the Great (1712-86): 504 n.
- freedom: abstract concept, 245; and coercion, 139; of conscience, 139, 515-17; dream and striving, 191-3; formal concept, 203-4, 316; of imagination, 319, 471-2; and law, 139, 497, 501-2; and nature, 5, 124-31, 147-8, 210-12, 309-10, 542; and necessity, 203, 388-90, 501-2; negative, 70, 111, 125, 498, 501 n., 511; political, 111, 121, 138-9, 142, 149, 506, 510, 512; and possibility, 230; primacy of 38-9, 50, 522, 557-9; practical, 479; Protestant principle of, 149-50; and slavery, 121, 139, 491; of sovereignty, 496-7, 511; spirit as, 297-8, 307-8, 317, 332; not surd, 25-6
- free fall: concept of, 247, 249, 423-4, 426-7
- French Revolution: constitutional lessons, 137, 497 n., 501 n., 503-5 nn.; economic lessons, 138, 495, 497 n.; and speculative rebirth, xl-xli, 26, 153 n., 435-6, 548, 558
- FRIES, Jakob Friedrich (1773-1843), liv-lv
- FROMMANN, Friedrich Johannes (1797-1886): lxiv
- FROMMANN, Johanna (1765-1830): lx, lxiv, lxvii n.
- FROMMANN, Karl F. E. (1765-1837): xxxiv n., lix, lx, lxi, lxiv, lxvi, lxvii
- Furies, the, 151
- GABLER, Georg Andreas (1786-1853): memories of, xlvii n., lvi, lvii-lix, lxiii n., lxv n., lxviii, 158 n., 416 n., 418
- GALEN (c. 130-201), 296
- GALILEI, Galileo (1564-1642): free fall, 247 n., 249; and Joshua, 305-7
- galvanism: image of organism, 440; process, 525-6; theory, 276, 279, 440
- GANS, Eduard (1798-1839), lviii n.
- GARVE, Christian (1742-98), 126 n., 333
- gases: theory of, 256-9, 439
- Gattung*: biological, 285 n. (*see* Kind); logical, 285 n. (*see* Genus)
- Gegenwart*: of Absolute, 87, 338, 402, 569; and action, 512; of faith, 220, 513, 521 n., 522; of God, 338, 561-2; importance of term, 219-20 n.; of plant, 455; religion of, 222; of truth, 406
- Geist*: *see* spirit
- general will: not contract, 503; emergence of, 486-7; moral ideal, 505; sovereign, 501, 505
- GENGHIS KHAN (1162-1227), 127 n., 128 n.
- genius: aristocratic concept, 68 n., 514, 572; artistic, 8, 24-5, 68, 215, 335-6, 514, 573 n.; false, 403, 409-10; genuine, 409-10; of *Volk*, 9, 177, 215, 216 n., 219 n., 335-6
- GENTILE, Giovanni (1875-1944), 364 n.
- Genus: and Kind, 285 n., 389-90; Reason as, 390; and species, 378-84, 386
- geography: and biology, 269; compass points, 90, 254, 259; science of, 259, 282-3, 444
- geology: H's interest, liv, lx, 99-100; Neptunism and Vulcanism, 275 n.; 1804 theory, 273, 275, 282; 1805 theory, 428, 439-40, 444-6; translation, 445-6 n.

- German Constitution*: constitution in, 140-3; lacuna, 134 n., 511 n.; on Machiavelli, 153 n.; machine state in, 139; organic principle of, 234 n.; theoretical context, 8, 556, 568; writing of, xlix n., l-lii, 76 n.
- German Empire, 142-3, 145, 206
- GIBBON, Edward: influence of, 119 n., 126; *Decline and Fall*, 126-7 n.
- GLOCKNER, Hermann, l, li n.
- Gnostics: criticism of, 406 n., 407, 409; influence of, 186
- God: Abyss, 165; biography of, 89 n., 105-6, 144-5, 172, 178, 215-23, 408-9, 557; concept, 304-6; Creator, 85, 473-4; death of, 150, 153, 171, 241, 407, 538; Demiurge, 161; divine knowledge, 305; goodness of 241-2, 304, 407; grace of, 220; ground, 11-12, 165, 390-1; of all humanity, 148-56; Idea of, 187, 228, 240 n., 303, 304-6; Incarnation of, 150 (*see* Incarnation); judgement of, 511; kenosis, 238, 241; Kingdom of, 123, 516 (*see* Kingdom); light of, 196, 433 n.; living, 240-3 300-1, 303, 307-9; Logos, 55, 89 n., 162-6, 175, 177, 186-8, 243, 472-6, 517-18, 563; as Lord, 5, 13, 121, 146, 176, 303, 306-7; as love, 5, 10, 156, 163, 186, 217; monad of monads, 389; national, 214; as Night, 165, 196-7; and Nature, 5-6, 81-2, 164, 167, 171, 172-3, 176-7, 210, 226, 234, 433, 515; panentheism, 5-10, 57-8, 79, 195, 338, 537, 548, 570; postulate of, 52, 82; presence of, 220, 222, 241, 338, 522, 561-2; Providence, 170 n., 172-4; Resurrection of, 150, 179-80, 338, 538-9; and speculation, 37, 56-8, 69; as Spirit, 62 n., 162-3, 167-76, 178, 181, 186-8, 196, 204, 220, 242, 302, 472 n., 473-4; as Supreme Essence, 390-1, 392 n., 399; as Trinity, 89 n., 155 (*see* Trinity); of *Volk*, 9, 132, 144-5, 337-8
- GOEBHARDT, Josef A. (d. 1813): H's publisher, lviii, lxix
- GOETHE, Johann Wolfgang von (1749-1832): aids H, xxii, xxiv-xxv, liii, liv-lvi, lix, lxi, lxvi; colour theory, lix-lx, 83 n., 268 n., 271 n., 435, 438 n.; and *Critical Journal*, xxxvi, xxxvii; *Faust*, 118, 508, 548 n.; 'Faust-fragment', 152-3, 211 n., 216, 508 n.; first meets H, lxiv n.; Greek ideal of, 505; *Iphigenie*, 152; and Jena culture, xxi-xxii, lxiv-lxv; on leaf, 455; 'Das Märchen', 399n.; marriage of, lxviii; *Metamorphosen*, 455 n.; on philosophers, 548; philosophic poet, 572; 'Prometheus Ode', 206; 'Was wir bringen', lxiv; mentioned, xxxi
- Good Friday: and Easter, 559; historic, 149; speculative, 72, 149
- GOTTER, Julie (1783-1863), lxiv
- government: absolute, 136-7, 142, 151; theory of, 136-40, 506, 509-13; universal, 137
- gravity: 'cause' of, 373; and chemism, contrast, 259; concept of, 45 n., 76-7; as equilibrium, 111, 273; as force, 43, 86-7, 369, 370, 426-8; general and specific, 253; as negation of motion, 250-1; physical and spiritual, 131; substance, 64; theory of, 83-91, 94 n., 97, 347, 349-50, 423, 425-7, 434
- Greek drama, 177, 261
- Greek ideal: artistic totality, 215, 514; harmony of nature, 145-6, 151, 543, 557-8; heritage of, 172-3, 409-10; historic destruction, 205-6, 211-13, 214 n.; Hoelderlin's, 62 n.; limits of, 404, 558; persistence, 9, 13, 73 n., 122; and Protestant influence, 85 n.; reconstruction project, 146-7, 206, 318; sublation of, 241-2, 494 n., 505, 515-16, 557-8
- GREEN, Thomas Hill (1836-82), 376 n.
- grief (*Schmerz*): infinite, 134-5, 149-50, 179 n., 211, 220, 407, 557; of tragedy, 133-4, 150-1
- GRIES, Johann D. (1775-1842), lxiv, lxvi, lxvii
- ground (*Grund*): as first principle, 231-3, 234-5, 413; God as, 390-1; in logic, 42 n., 43 n., 386-8
- guilt: psychology of, 125-6, 129
- HAERING, Theodor L.: x, 346 n.
- HALLER, Albrecht von (1708-77), 363
- hallucination: significance of, 319, 321
- HAMANN, Johann Georg (1730-88): and Hume, 11 n., 572-3
- HARMODIUS (d. 514 BC). 504 n.
- harmony: pre-established, 205, 374. *See also*, Greek ideal, life, *Sittlichkeit*

- HARRIS, Henry S.: on *Delineatio*, 224 n.; on Hartkopf, 27 n.; in *IJP*, xxxviii n.; on logic fragments, 29–30 n., 36 n.; mistakes, 31 n., 37 n., 152 n., 211 n., 314 n., 334 n., 338 n.; new view, 122 n.; on 1804 philosophy of spirit, 299 n., 334 n., 338 n.; on 'Schelling's System', 31 n., 67 n.; on *System of Ethical Life*, 102 n., 107 n., 122 n., 142 n.; *Toward the Sunlight*, 4 n. (see *Toward the Sunlight*)
- HARTKOPF, Werner: on Hegel's logic, 27 n.
- HARVEY, William (1578–1657): influence, 296
- havoc: of concept, 147; dialectic of, 126–8
- HAYM, Rudolf (1821–1901): fragments, 152, 154, 163 n., 186 n.
- health: see medicine
- heat: chemical agency, 262; and light, 256–7; real concept, 258; theory of, 271–2, 354 n., 369–70, 429–31, 434
- Hector: see HOMER
- HEGEL, Christiane Luise (1773–1832, sister), xix, lvii n.
- HEGEL, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770–1831): career-choice, xix–xx; *curriculum vitae*, xx, xliii, xlvi; Disputation, xxx–xxxi; economic problems, lii, lv, lix, lxv, lxvi–lxx; his education, 476–7; his influence ambiguous, 341 n.; inheritance, xx; lecturing style, xxiv, liii; *Magister*, xxvi; nostrification of, xxvi–xxxi, liv; at Nuremberg, lii; professorship, liv–lv; *Stifter*, xix–xx unintelligible, xxiv–xxv; vocation, 546
- HEGEL, Georg Ludwig (1733–99, father), xix–xx
- HEGEL, Georg Ludwig (1776–1812, brother), lxvii
- HEGEL, Karl Friedrich Wilhelm von (1813–1901, son), xxvi n., lxviii n., 76 n.
- HENRICH, Christian Gottlieb (1748–1810), xxviii, xxxii
- HEINRICH, J.: *Logik der Phänomenologie*, 365 n.
- Hell: of Dante, xl, 152, 220–1; of Goethe, 152–3, of Klopstock, 152–3, 204 n.
- HENNING, Leopold D. von (1791–1866): xliii n.
- HENNINGS, Justus Christian (1731–1815): xxviii, xxix, xxx, xxxi n., xxxii n., xliii n., 27 n.
- HENRICH, Dieter: 209 n.
- Heracles, 482
- HERACLITUS (fl. 500 BC): balance of conflict, 253, 506 n.; fire-theory, 272, 429; Logos of, 57 n., 246 n., 433 n., 476; model of Quality-logic, 351–2; nature in, 464; 'the one' of, 57, 58 n., 550 n.
- Hermes: figure of philosopher, 546 n.
- HESIOD (8th cent. BC): Titans in, 145, 214, 334–5
- HIPPOCRATES (c. 460–377 BC), 466 n.
- HIPPOLYTUS (c. 165–c. 235), 57–8 n.
- history: of art, 215–16 (see art); as conceptual artwork, 521; and ethical nature, 172–3, 175, 177, 520, 522, 557–8; of God, 144–56 (see God); and immortality, 199–200, 375; and logic, 119; of mankind, 557; historical materialism, H's, 282–3, 315–6 n., 333, 508; Metaphysics and, 10 n., 34–5, 55–9; of philosophy, 204 (see philosophy); Providence in, 170, 172–4, 177; of religion, 144–56 (see God); as movement of spirit, 177, 187–8, 222–3, 318
- HOBBS, Thomas (1588–1679): fear and glory, 109, 112, 461; rationality, 131, 223; social theory of, 110–11; state of nature, 98 n., 128–30, 211, 214, 544
- HOELDERLIN, Johann Chr. Friedrich (1770–1843): and *Dissertation*, 77–8, 85 n.; *Empedocles*, 9 n., 216 n.; and Hume, 7 n.; *Hyperion*, 9 n., 58 n., 216; influence of, 11–12 n., 15–16, 554; in Jena, xxi; Nature-ideal, 62 n.; and Plutarch, 122 n.
- Holy Triangle: dating, 75, 80 n., 157, 179, 383 n., 552 n., 554 n.; and H's development, 177–8, 223; discussed, 157–83; evil in, 164, 166–7, 172, 186–7, 363 n., 406–7, 408 n., 432–3; Logos in, 162, 164, 165–7, 175, 186, 188, 239 n., 241, 243; natural philosophy in, 98, 99 n., 176–7, 188, 260 n., 264 n.; subjectivity in, 186–7, 202, 207 n.; topic of, 89 n.; translation, 184–8; Universe of God in, 170–1, 172, 181, 187–8, 198, 204 n., 216, 337

- HOMER: barbarism of, 221; Greek bible, 409-10; Homeric question, 335-6; *Iliad*, 134, 218, 331, 409; noble ethics in, 216 n., 219; Plato's attack, 405, 409; religion of, 213, 214, 334; as schoolbook, 309; voice of *Volk*, 220, 408, 411; Voss translation, 409-10, 545
- honour: concept of, 129; communal, 331; beyond contracts, 491; self-defining, 329-30; in Socrates, 132
- HORSTMANN, Rolf-P.: editing point, *lix n.*; on H's logic, 30 n.; on *Metaphysik* fragment, 229 n.
- HOYER, Benjamin (b.c. 1770), xxviii
- HUFELAND, Gottlieb (1760-1817), lxxv, lxxvi n.
- HUFNAGEL, Wilhelm F. (1754-1830), lii
- humanity: Adam as, 320, 475, brotherhood, 148-9, 172-3, 211, 217, 308, 338-9, 341 n., 404, 411, 559-60; dignity of, 491
- HUMBOLDT, Wilhelm von (1767-1835), lii-liii
- HUME, David (1711-76): brute fact, 39-40; on causality, 369-70; consciousness in, 21, 352, 376-7; *Enquiry*, 7 n.; force, 370-1; scepticism, 11 n., 54 n.; *Treatise*, 352 n., 572-3 n.
- HUS, John (c. 1369-1415), 218
- HUTTEN, Johann Georg (1755-1834): edited Plutarch, 122 n.
- hydrogen: atom of infinite, 432; chemical element, 256, 258; infinite chemism, 271; in fire and water process, 262-4; relation to phlogiston, 257-8 n.
- HYPPOLITE, Jean (1907-68): ix
- idea: *see Vorstellung*
- Idea: absolute triad of, xlix, 65-6, 155, 222, 521; body of, 39, 87 (*see Solar System*); of Earth, 259, 265-6; of God, 303-6 (*see God*); of freedom, 74 (*see freedom*); of God, 133-4; and Ideal, 4, 33, 404; Kind as, 524-5; of life, 6; Logical, 18, 54, 58, 65, 155, 156, 187, 201-2, 219 n., 230, 303, 551-2; of philosophy, xxxviii-xxxix, 9 n., 10 n., 33-4, 55-7, 105, 155, 178, 231-2, 235-6; realization of, 225, 551-3; of Reason, 16, 22-3, 79, 228-30, 233, 266, 404; self-cognitive, 65, 77 n., 303; twin sciences of, 31-2, 62-3, 67-74, 178, 181-2; of Spirit, 145, 188, 303, 552-3; as synthesis, 49; systems of, 35, 59-61; as totality, 22-3, 26, 86, 107; as *Vorstellung*, 78, 398-9
- Ideal: of Frankfurt period, 3-17, 26, 49-50, 123, 549 n.; Greek, 122 (*see Greek ideal*); and Idea, 33, 72-3 (*see Idea*)
- idealism: dogmatic, 59; logical, 18-19, 23, 26, 29-31, 33, 51, 60, 228 n., 229 n., 340-3, 563-5; transcendental, 60-2
- ideality: 'bad', 377; negative moment, 346, 348; and reality, 238-9 n., 437 n.
- ideell: and ideal, H's usage, 69 n., 331, 349
- identity: antinomic, 72, 109, 300, 303, 400, 546; of cause and effect, 372; of concept and substance, 371; conceptual, 378; of consciousness, 304, 310, 318; formal, 18, 44-5; logical principle, 12 n., 52-4, 232, 386-7; as relation, 72, 123; temporal, 422
- Identity Philosophy: articulation of, 57-69; and Critical philosophy, 55-7; Fichte and, xxvii; H's concept of, xlvii-xlix, 9 n., 546-59; Hölderlin's concept, 11-12 n., 554; logic of, 27-8, 33-5; method, 69-73, 76, 84; 1805 return toward, lvii, 518, 569; as Schelling's, xlvii-xlviii, 14-15, 182, 554-6; 1803 transformation of, l-li, 219-20 n., 233-7, 559-62, 565-7
- ILGEN, Karl D. (1763-1834), xxix, xxxi
- ILTING, Karl-Heinz, 112 n.
- imagination: freedom of, 319, 471-2; productive, 45, 48, 49, 50-1, 53, 206, 319-21, 349, 471-2
- immortality: of consciousness, 359-60 n.; of the Earth, 63; objective, 365, 392 n.; postulate of, 12, 23, 39, 52, 73; of *Volk*, 64, 516. *See also*, resurrection
- impressions: and ideas, 21, 352, 369, 370-1, 376-7
- Incarnation: Christian dogma interpreted, 62 n., 67-9, 81, 156-7, 392, 435, 472 n., 476; in Greek religion, 150-1, 317 n.; history as, 177-8, 557 (*see God, biography of*); as kenosis, 238-9; in single consciousness, 219 n., 308; as Universe of God, 186-8, 198, 551-2. *See also* Logos
- incest: law of, 493

- individual(ity): and community, 308-9; and death, 466; Earth as, 448 (*see* Earth); family as, 133, 308; logical, 380; organism as, 284-5, 287, 448-9, 451-2, 457, 524-5; as person, 120; rational, 288, 308, 547; real, 381-2; self-defining, 390, 398; and singularity, 448; supreme goal, 72-3, 408-10; *Volk* as, 6, 309, 444
- inertia: as equilibrium, 424; fictive, 246, 249; theory of, 250-2, 262
- infinite, infinity: arms of, 431-2; cognition, 385 (*see* absolute cognition); in consciousness, 304 (*see* absolute consciousness); in diagram, 534-5, 537-8; of Earth-process, 252, 298-301; ethical, 73, 104-6; and finite, xl (*see* antinomy); formal, 117-20, 146; Frankfurt Ideal, xxxiii n., 6, 11-12, 17; grief, 134-5 (*see* grief); Kind as, 292-3, 297; in logic, 35-6, 37 n., 42, 347, 362-6, 412-13, 419; in nature, 39, 68, 298; negative, 72, 91, 104; progress, 149 (*see* FICHTE); pure, 55 n., 57; realized, 384, 407, 543; Reason as, 29 n., 39-40; as subject, 54-5; as substance, 54-5; time as, 521; understanding and, 41. *See also* bad infinite, true infinite
- inheritance: aristocratic custom, 494; bourgeois law, 492, 494; significance of, 483
- insight: use of term, 180
- institutions: reality of consciousness, 316, 331. *See also* recognized status
- instrumentalism: logic of, 546-5
- intelligence: as absolute concept, 72, 86 n., 131, 230, 501; freedom of, 321; system of, 177-8; theory of, 374-5, 469-80
- intuition: absolute, xli, 65-7, 72-3, 80, 87, 175-6, 186-7, 197-8, 552-4, 566-9; aether as, 64, 76-7, 243; of artist, 9, 24-5, 49-50, 66, 68-9, 211, 554; categories of, 42, 228-9; certainty of, 464; and cognition, 175-6 (*see* cognition); and concept, 71 (*see* concept); of chemism, 99 n.; of Earth, 265-6; empirical, 26, 420-1; forms of, 40, 87, 471; of freedom, 26; intellectual, 9, 15-19, 22-6, 38, 51-2, 66-9, 107, 131-3, 552-3; of life, 13, 120 n.; of love, 122, 217; mathematical, 90-1; plant as, 100; as postulate, 16, 23; self-intuition, 64, 77, 89 n., 242-3, 553-5; of Solar System, 266; of Spirit, 65, 176; transcendental, 16-18, 25, 43; of *Volk*, 108 (*see* *Volk*)
- irritability: system of, 289
- Isaac: H's slip, 193 n.
- Italy: fate of, 143
- Jacob: and the angel, 193
- JACOBI, Friedrich Heinrich (1743-1819): and *Critical Journal*, xlviii n.; faith of, 11 n., 60, 408 n.; and *Faith and Knowledge*, xxiv, xxvi n., xlv n., xlvii n., 56 n., 60, 91 n., 231 n., 232; on fatalism, 205 n.; ground in, 231 n., 232; and Köppen, xxiii; and Lessing, 57 n., 205 n., 206 n.; novels of, 153; scepticism of, 80
- Jena: battle of, lviii, lx, lxvii, lxviii; cultural life, xxi-xxiii; xenophobia at, xxvii-xxx, lvii-lviii n.
- JESUS (c.4 BC-c.30 AD): and forgiveness, 499; as founder, 219; H's image of, 5, 6, 9 n., 13; historicity of, 173-4 n.; historic moment, 206, 318; and the Logos, 89 n., 551; other-worldliness of, 148, 558; Passion of, 89 n., 148, 435; on spirit, 163
- Job: and God, 13; H's admiration, 303
- JOHN (1st cent.): Logos doctrine of, 173-4 n., 473-5
- JOSHUA (14th cent. BC?): standpoint of, 305, 306-7
- Judaism: exception, 145; fate of, 398-9 n.; formal infinite in, 146; and Greeks, 13, 172-3, 174 n.; heritage of, 173 n.; Holy of Holies, 484
- judgement: categories of, 42-7; in Constitution, 507; faculty of, 48; of God, 511; of property, 485; of sense and sex, 461; in syllogistic method, 499; theory of, 377-9, 385; in understanding, 478-9
- judiciary: economic function, 509-11; and executive, 137-8; operation of, 139, 495-8
- justice: civil, 138-9, 498; criminal, 139-40, 496, 498; natural, 125-30; social, 133, 482, 509-10
- KALB, Charlotte von (1761-1843): xxi
- KANT, Immanuel (1724-1804): 'abyss'

KANT (*cont.*):

in, 165; antinomies, 40, 106, 205; a priori in 44, 474-7, 478 n.; categorical imperative, 108, 117-18, 173-4; categories, 42, 46-7, 228 n., 244 n., 347, 366; 'completion' of, 15, 62, 573 n.; conscience, 479; 'Copernican Revolution' of, 196, 387 n., 571; *Critique of Judgement*, 4 n., 24, 41 n., 48, 49 n., 81, 107, 286 n.; *Critique of Pure Reason*, 4-5 n., 47, 59, 165 n., 474; deduction, xxiii, 35; dialectic in, xl, 23, 41, 76 n., 106, 111, 204, 228 n., 266, 445; *Ding an sich*, 347 n., 350 n., 351-2, 372-3; dogmatism critique, 55-6; faith in, 12, 81; formalism in, 45, 48, 108, 117-18, 397, 400, 402, 510; forms of intuition, 360 n.; God of, 303; and Greeks, 403-4, 558; historic moment, 223; and Hume, 572-3 n.; Ideal in, 4-5, 10; Ideas in, 15-16, 22-3, 228-30, 233, 266, 404; legal theory, li, 105, 117-18; logic of, 17, 19, 22-3, 36 n., 37, 40, 43-52, 81, 106, 345 n., 373, 393; on marriage, 122-4, 493; mechanism in, 286, 464; morality, 123-4, 131, 147, 153, 195 n., 213, 318, 392; Ontological Argument, 58; 'Perpetual Peace', 6 n., 7, 150, 511; postulates, xxxi, 62; productive imagination, 45, 51, 206; psychology, 359-60 n.; religion, 10 n., 539; scepticism of, 49-50, 60-1; speculation discovered by, 60, 105, 548, 549; standpoint accepted, 225, 234, 236-7; sublime in, 220 n., 243, 363, 468, 515; terminology borrowed, 106, 108; unity of apperception, 45, 50-1; 'Universal History', 6 n.; *Universal Natural History*, 249; mentioned, 33

KARL AUGUST, Duke of Sachsen-Weimar (1757-1828), lv

KASTNER, Karl W. G. (1783-1857), liv n., lxii n., lxvi., lxix., 499

KAUFMANN, Walter A., xl, lxviii-lxix

KELVIN, Lord (1824-1907), 306

KEPLER, Johannes (1571-1630): excerpts from, 76 n.; H's debt to, 84, 85 n., 92, 424; planetary laws, 83, 91, 92, 94, 196, 246 n., 247; and regular solids, 95 n.

KIMMERLE, Heinz: on absolute intuition, 66 n.; chronology of MSS, lii n., 76

n., 216-17 n., 219 n., chronology of Rosenkranz reports, 58 n.; on the *Dissertation*, xxvi n., 76 n.; editing points, 249-50 n. (see DUESING); on 4-part system, 61 n.; on Frankfurt system, xxxiii n.; on H's lectures, xxiv n., xxxiii n., lviii n., lviii n., 28-9 n.; on Jena professorship, lv; on H's logic, 30 n.; on H's philosophy of nature, 110 n., 319 n.; on square of nature, 87 n., 90 n., 159 n.; on Triangle, 260 n.

Kind (*Gattung*): absolute, 463, 469, 533-4; concept, 111; cunning of, 481; dominance of, 114; as Idea, 284-5; in plants, 286-7, 447; process of, 287-8, 292-7, 446-50, 524-30; self-contained, 464-6; species as, 88, 444; syllogism of, 448; universal as, 376; use of term, 285 n., 389 n.

Kingdom: of the Father, 164-9, 186; of God, 123, 169, 516, 541; of Heaven, 167-9, 171, 175, 178, 400; of Heaven on Earth, 64, 150, 180, 222, 521 n., 537; of the Son, 164, 166-8, 171, 186; of the Spirit, 164, 168-70, 186; of the Universe, 164, 175, 187, 222

KLOPSTOCK, Friedrich Gottlieb (1724-1803): *Messias*, 152, 204 n.

KNEBEL, Karl Ludwig von (1744-1834), lix, lxiii-lxiv

Knechtschaft: of Spirit, 478-9; types of, 128 n. See also lordship

knowledge (*Wissen*): absolute, 66, 154-5, 417, 519-22, 565, 567; as cognition, 231, 236 (see absolute cognition); continuum of, 314; divine and human, 305, 415, 481; Fichte's science, 38-9 (see Fichte); general will as, 501; logic of, 38, 305; reflective, 19-22 (see reflection); self-comprehension, 470, 564

KNOX, Sir T. Malcolm (1900-80), x, 127 n.

KOEPPEN, Friedrich (1775-1858): and Jacobi, xxiii, xxvii; *Schelling's Doctrine*, xlvii-xlviii

KOJÉVÉ, Alexandre (1902-68), ix

KRAUSE, Karl C. F. (1781-1832): lviii-lviii n., 26 n.

KRONER, Richard (1884-1976): on dialectic, 549 n.; on *Difference* essay, 81 n.

KRUG, Wilhelm Traugott (1770-1842): xxxviii-xl n., xlii, 18 n.

- KUEHN, Manfred: Hume and Kant, 572-3 n.
- KUFFELAER, Abraham Johannes (late 17th cent.): lxx n.
- labour: absolute, 224, 337; of artisan, 322, 489, 508; of child-bearing, 114-15; concept of, 124-5; as conceptualization, 113, 315-16; not *Ding*, 489-90, 509; division of, 118, 332-3, 489, 494; in family, 122; rationalization of, 119, 138, 322-3, 489, 494, 508; of self-formation, 114, 476-7, 479-80; syllogistic forms, 114
- LAMARCK, Jean-B. P. A. de Monet, Chevalier de (1744-1829), 461 n.
- language and speech: absolute, 334-7; and animal cries, 101, 292-3, 462; *Bildung* medium, 116, 398-402; body-language, 116; determinate concept, 315-16, 319-21, 376 n.; divine, 175, 188, 243; of lion, 389-90; as Logos, 116, 563 (see Logos); naming theory, 320-1, 323, 472-6, 485-6, 490-1; self-realization in, 314-16, 317-18, 323; as spirit generally, 472, 515; of tiger lilies, 315-6 n., 390; of tribe and *Volk*, 332; and writing, 116-17
- LASSON, Georg (1862-1932): editing points, 102 n., 112 n., 142 n., 362 n.
- Latin: otherworldly, 399-400; universal, 404
- LATINI, Brunetto (c.1210-c.1295), 221 n.
- LAUBE, Heinrich R. C. (1806-84): *Moderne Charakteristiken*, xxvii-xxviii n., lxiii n.
- LAVOISIER, Antoine Laurent (1743-94): on heat, 354 n.; on water, 257 n., 264
- law: civil and criminal, 139-40, 498-9; codification of, 139, 495-6; and freedom, 139; and life, 76 n., 503; moral, 318, 539; and person, 492-5; sovereignty of, 139, 496-9, 501, 504-5, 535
- leaf: mediation of, 453, 454-5, 530
- Lectures on History of Philosophy*: Fichte in, 29 n.; Plato in, 92 n., 506 n.
- LEIBNIZ, Gottfried Wilhelm von (1646-1716): *Monadology*, 205, 373-5, 388-92; *Theodicy*, xli; understanding in, 477
- LESSING, Gotthold Ephraim (1729-81): *Nathan*, 404; Spinozism of, 57 n., 206 n.
- LEUTWEIN, Christian Philipp (1768-1838), xx
- lever: principle of, 89, 251-2, 254, 271-2
- liberty: natural, 124-31. See also freedom
- life: and art, 513-14; and cognition, 523-44; concept of, 283, 286, 381, 446, 519; and death, 195, 214, 295-7, 465-6; in diagram, 535-6, 538-9; of Earth, 63 (see Earth); examination of, 341-2; goal of philosophy, 192, 342, 398, 400, 402, 568-9; of God, 303-4 (see God); harmony of, 5-14; human and natural, 241-2, 296-8, 301-2; infinite, 6, 17, 179, 195, 198, 214, 300-1; intuition of, 108-13, 147; and light, 63, 89 n., 426-7, 433 n., 473-5; and logic, 342, 353; of organism, 294 (see organism); pure, 5, 147; sacrifice of, 325-6; science of, 80-1; self-interpreting, 236; singular, 120 n.; spontaneous generation, 445-8; as tension, 447
- Life of Jesus*: Logos in, 174
- light: as aether, 248, 425-6; as centre of force, 89, 97, 248, 425-6; and darkness, 434-7; and heat, 262, 430; inner, 63, 89 n., 187, 268 n., 427, 433 n., 435-6, 474, 499; and life, 63 (see life); physical constant, 247 n., 426; in plant process, 452-5; theory of, 77, 83 n., 256-7, 425-6, 428-9, 433-7
- Limit: comprehended, 385; concept of, 347-59; consciousness as, 362; of force, 368; ideal and real, 422; mathematical, 360; physical, 361; present as, 244, 422
- liver, the: theory of, 291 n., 460-1
- LOCKE, John (1632-1704): *Essay*, 321, 547; state of nature, 128, 211; subjective reflection, 60, 547, 571
- logic: 1801 critical, xlviii-xlix, 28, 35-52, 61, 546-9; 1804 critical, 340-84, 560-7; 1801 and 1804 compared, 344, 363; definition of (1801-2), 31-3; and ethics (1802), 104-5; and fact, 39-40, 166-70; as idealism, 18 (see idealism); lacunae (1804), 345, 347, 354, 355; and Metaphysics, 34, 52-5, 178, 200-2, 207, 414, 551, 555; and nature,

logic (*cont.*):

303-4; objective, 12 n., 18, 24, 29, 197-8, 560, 562-3; and *Phenomenology*, 339 n., 518-22, 567-8; primacy of, 164; reflective, 36-7, 41; revolution of 1803-4, 226-37, 269 n.; speculative, lvi-lviii, 27, 29, 385, 387, 410-20; speculative, (1808), 411, 418-20, 421 n., 431-3 nn., 444 n., 451 n., 477, 519-20, 536 n.; and spirit, 207-8; transcendental, xl, 233, 240 n., 380 n., 383; use of term, 19 n.

Logic and Metaphysics (courses and texts): 1801-2, xxxiii, 26-55, 231, 546-9, 555; 1802 and 1802/3, xxxii, xlix, 58 n., 102-5, 201, 203 n., 232-3; 1803 and 1803/4, lii, 226-37; 1804-5, lvi, 340-93; 1805 Logic, lvi-lvii, 397 n., 405, 410, 411; 1806, 415-16, 518-19; courses by others, 27 n.; textbook plans, xxxiv

Logos: as Creator, 472-6, 563; Christian, 89 n., 163-8, 175, 186-8, 517-18; eternal and temporal, 417, 551-2, 564-5, 567-8; and Fall, 406-7, 435-6; God as, 162-4 (*see* God); of Heracleitus, 57, 246 n., 433 n., 476; Idea as, 55; in Nature, 167, 239 n., 243; speech as, 116, 472-6

lordship (*Herrschaft*): and bondage, 121, 128, 130, 146, 147-8, 487; conceptual, 125, 316; domestic, 122-3; educational, 124, 478-9; of God, 146 (*see* God); and obedience, 121-2, 135, 503-4; of philosophy, 408; and service, 120-1

LOUIS XIV (1638-1715), 507

LOUIS XVI (1754-93), 506 n.

love: aesthetic, 513; concept of, 481-3; in family, 122, 326, 483, 487; God as, 186 (*see* God); and life, 10, 109, 534; as miracle, 7 n., 163-4; philosophical, 406, 561; religious, 10, 123, 147

Lucifer, diamond as, 432-3; fall of, 85 n., 161 n., 167 n., 175 n., 407-8

LUKÁCS, Gyorgy (1885-1971): ix-x

lungs: theory of, 291 n., 460

LUTHER, Martin (1483-1546): Bible translation, 285 n., 409-10, 545; historic moment, 204 n., 218, 318, hymn of, 156 n.

lymph: theory of, 289-91, 459-61, 466

MACHIAVELLI, Nicolo (1469-1527): morality of, 153; *Prince*, 503-4; on war, 130 n.

machine: effect of, 118, 332-3, 489, 508; machine State, 139 (*see* State)

McTAGGART, John McT. E. (1866-1925), 360 n.

magnetism: animal, 63, 101; in chemistry, 99; and celestial cohesion, 88-9; 1804 downgrading, 261 n., 265 n., 276 n., 282, 433 n.; terrestrial, 254-5; theory of, 370, 428

magnitude: continuous/discrete, 355-8; extensive/intensive, 354-8

MANI (c.215-276), 218

mankind: *see* humanity

manifestation: *see* force

MARCUS AURELIUS (121-80), 141

MARIE-ANTOINETTE (1755-93), 211

MARK (1st cent.), 485

marriage: concept, 122-4, 323-5; in law, 493-4, 509; sacrament, 323, 493-4

MARX, Karl (1818-83); anticipated, 333, 521 n.; mistaken, 283 n.

MARY, Virgin (c.25 BC-c.AD 63): identity-symbol, 155-6, 217

mass: theory of, 250, 423-4. *See also* body

master(y): *see* dominance, lordship

materialism: of H, 240-3, 303; historical, 282-3 (*see* history)

mathematics: calculus, 359-61; intuition in, 87; lectures on, lvii, lviii; and physics, 82-97; ratio, 161-2, 360-1

mating: *see* brute, marriage

matter: absolute, 240-3 (*see* aether); fluidity of, 252-3, 255-6; ideal process of, 253, 255-6; materialization, 429-30, 432; real process of, 256; as substrate, 373; theory of, 76-7, 85-6, 89-90, 244-52, 419-27, 434-40

meaning: and being, 373; continuum of, 310-12, 314-15; creation of, 236, 328, 472-7

mechanics: finite (earthly), 63-4, 97-9, 249-52, 262, 426-7; infinite (celestial), 63-4, 86, 78-9, 81-4, 97-9, 261-2, 282, 419-26, 442-4; and physics, 98, 434, 438, 440-1; and shaping, 259, 265, 432-4; social, 333, 489, 509; subjective, 477-80

mediation: of philosophy and life, 198,

- 341-2, 398-9, 403, 406, 444, 568-9; triangular, 185-6, 188
- medicine: theory of, 101, 295-6, 460 n., 463-7
- MEHMEL, Gottlob E. A. (1761-1840), xlv-xlvi
- MEIST, Kurt R.: on 1801 and 1803 fragments, 43 n., 206 n.; on *System of Ethical Life*, 103 n.
- memory: absolute matter, 314-15; discipline of, 476; night of, 471-2; signs and names, 319-20; of *Volk*, 335-6
- MENDELSSOHN, Moses (1729-86): and Kant, 58, 359-60 n.
- merchants: social middle, 508-9
- MESMER, Franz Anton (1734-1815), 101
- metals: base and noble, 274 n., 277-8; as elements, 272-3; osmium etc., 439; theory of, 274, 276-8, 438-9
- Metaphysics: of 1801, 42, 52-61, 201, 228 n., 231-2, 546-53; of 1803, 200-7; of 1803-4, 227-37; of 1804-5, 365, 384-93, 419; absorbed in Logic, 178, 410, 412-14, 416; and logic, 414 (*see* logic); method of, 61-2, 71 n., 349; objective and subjective, 202, 229 n., 385, 387-93, 466, 560, 566; perennial, 34-5, 549-52; and theology, 106, 157-8; use of term, 19 n.
- meteorology: Aristotelian influence, 434; process of, 99 (*see* Earth-process)
- method: constructive, 87, 94 n., 107-8, 110, 348-51, 365, 383; critical, xlviii-xlix, 40-1, 46-7, 106, 340-2, 364-6, 414, 467, 549; deductive, 383-4; dialectical, 40, 70, 358-9, 549; of dichotomy, 61-2, 69-73; empirical, 109; experimental, 83-5; geometric, 84; instrumentalist, 564-5; logical, 352-3, 382, 414; of natural history, 282; nominalist, 563-4; phenomenological, 260-1, 280-1, 326, 365-6, 407 n., 431, 443, 456, 464, 467, 483, 515, 520-2, 549; postulational, 16, 23, 44 n., 78, 82, 108; scientific, 96-7; of subsumption, 106-7 (*see* subsumption); syllogistic, 410-11, 431, 442, 447 n., 451, 458, 464, 467-8, 483, 499-500, 515, 520-2, 564-5; transcendental, 1-li (*see* transcendental standpoint)
- MICHELANGELO Buonarroti (1475-1564), 538-9
- MICHELET, Karl Ludwig (1801-94): on *Critical Journal*, xliii; editing distortions, 427 n., 433 n., 445-6 n., 448-50 nn., 455 n., 458 n., 460 n.; excerpting of 1805 text, 424-8 nn., 430, 432-3 n., 435 n., 440 n., 444-6 nn., 454-6 nn., 463 n., 465 n.; interpolations, 438 n., 445 n., 450 n.; revisions, 455 n., 458 n., 459 n., 462 n., 463 n., 465 n.
- middle: absolute consciousness as, 309; divine light as, 187; family-holding as, 327; individual organism as, 294, 295 n., 525, 530; institutions as, 331; Kind as, 525, 530; leader as, 194; philosopher as, 559; single consciousness as, 536, 538; Spirit as, 188; subject as, 380; Universe of God as, 187-8
- MILL, John Stuart (1806-73), 54 n., 368, 372
- MILLER, Arnold V.: translation preferred, 429 n., 444 n., 449 n., 452 n., 455 n., 461 n.
- mind: *mens*, 90, 181; and nature, 38, 222, 234, 557; never disembodied, 307-8, 311; philosophy of, 31-3; as Spirit, 507; as universal complex, 477
- mineralogy: H's alchemical, 272, 274, 278-9; mineralogical organism, 63, 64, 99-100, 278-9, 280, 281, 283, 441-6
- Mnemosyne, 335-6
- modality: categories of, 45-6 n., 366-7, 562
- monad, 380 (*see* LEIBNIZ)
- monarchy: constitutional, 140-1, 505-6, 539; H's preference, 142-3; universal, 511
- money: bourgeois goal, 135 n., 508-9; concept at rest, 120
- monism: ethereal, 243
- MONTESQUIEU, Charles de Secondat, Baron de (1689-1755), 108
- moon: Earth-analogy, 254, 267, 280, 282; fixed shape, 262, 280, 282; organic analogy, 460, 525; as satellite, 86, 95, 248, 425, 525; tidal regency, 254 n., 425, 434 n.
- morality: immorality of, 123-4, 153, 177; and ethics, 81-2, 174, 177, 213. *See also* FICHTE, KANT, *Sittlichkeit*
- MORLEY, Thomas (1557-1603), 569
- MOSES (14th cent. BC?): creation myth,

MOSES (*cont.*):

473-3; God of, 81, 165, 171, 303; Ideal of, 9 n., 10 n., 13; and Kant, 10 n., 60; law of, 318; presence of, 538-9; religion of, 146

mother-tongue: importance of, 398-402

motion: of brutes, 458, 459 n., 471; of concept, 107 (*see* concept); free, 284; as mass, 423-4; of organism, 524-5; planetary, 83-9, 92-6, 246-9, 424 n., 524-5; as primary problem, 351; priority of, 246, 253 n., 361; real concept, 244, 253 n.; real gravity, 86-7; and rest, 87, 246; 1804 theory of, 244-52; 1805 theory, 423-5, 426-7; voluntary, 448-9, 456

MOZART, Wolfgang Amadeus (1756-91), lxiv

MUELLER, Gustav E., lxix

murder: ambiguity of, 498-9; and dignity, 491; justification of, 129-30

muscle: theory of, 289-90, 459

mysticism: Oriental and Western, 398-9

mythology: artistic-ethical, 8, 146, 150-3, 211-12, 317, 334-6, 337-8, 405, 514, 555; Christian, 12, 67, 148, 151-4, 186-7, 216-17, 219-22, 551; Creation, 67 n., 472-6; Fall, 84, 177, 211-12, 406-8, 415, 433, 482, 498 n., 518; Greek, 13, 67 n., 133, 145-7, 150-1, 161, 183, 212-7, 219-20, 317, 334-6, 337-8, 408-10, 545-6, 555; natural, 213-14, 317, 334; rational, 5-6, 9, 146-7, 155-88, 211-12, 213-17, 219-22, 252 n., 403, 405-9, 485-6, 545-6, 551, 555-6, 570

name, 320 (*see* language)

NAPOLEON I (1769-1821): and H's Constitution, 497 n., 505 n., 506 n., 512, 557 n.; ethical leader, 122 n.; historic moment, 223, 318, 520; at Jena, lxviii; and *Reich*, 143; warfare of, 134

natural law: courses, xxxiv, xlix, li n., lvii, 66, 140, 141, 213, 217 n.

Natural Law: absolute intuition, 66 n., 180 n., 187 n., 338 n., 557, 559; aether, 76-7 n., 240 n., 421 n., anonymity of, xlv; Atomists, 86 n.; bourgeois ethics, 121, 151-3, 204 n., 285 n.; climax of, 65 n., 67, 553-5; contraction and expansion, 161 n.; coercion and freedom, 139; critical

aim, 105; determinism, 99 n.; empirical and formal theories, 107-8, 117-18; ethical nature, 63, 64 n.; ethical tragedy, 129-30 n., 150-1, 559; Fichte in, xxxii n., li, 105, 117; geology, 100 n.; Greek ideal, 122, 126, 216 n.; history, 119, 140-1; light, 76-7, 97 n.; mechanics, 98 n.; medicine, 101; morality, 195 n.; nature and spirit, 242-3, 553; noble ethics in, 121; philosophy of nature, 110 n., 555; Plato in, 67 n., 502, 552 n.; Solar System, 100 n.; space, 91 n.; and *System of Ethical Life*, 103-4, 108, 110; and *Systemfragment*, 6 n.

nature: bondage of spirit, 208, 238-9, 242, 538; conquest of, 149, 327; contempt for, 210-11, 559; ethical and physical, 62, 63-4 n., 65, 70, 72, 74, 177-8, 225, 502, 519, 535, 559; ethics of, 102-31, 144-6, 174; God and, 81 (*see* God); harmony of, 145-6, 210-13, 553, 557-8; and history, 69, 172-5, 519-22, 542-3; idealization of, 315-16, 326-8; and logic, 552; not mechanism, 38-9; otherness of spirit, 208-11, 226, 234, 433, 502, 555; pendulum of, 84 n., 89-90; in religious intuition, 187-8, 514-15, 553; square of, 87, 94 n.; and true *Sittlichkeit*, 128-31, 136-7, 142; and spirit, 87 n., 88, 101, 110-11, 115, 123, 125-6, 147-8, 174, 177-8, 238-9, 241-3, 297-300, 324-8, 406-8, 409, 411, 433, 468, 519-22, 552-3, 557; state of, 109-11 (*see* State of nature); uncreated, 473; use of terms, 62 n.; utterance of Spirit, 175, 188, 226. *See also* philosophy of nature

necessity: actual, 367-8; and autonomy, 389; bad, 234; causal, 368-9; empirical, 117, 166-8, 203, 470; formal, 117; and freedom, 6, 203-4, 501-2; logical, 23-6, 166-8, 204; natural, 203-4, 325, 328 n.; and possibility, 389, 522; practical, 13, 117, 129-30; recognition of, 561; relative, 191, 203; tragic, 13, 129-30; transcendental, 325, 328 n., 352-3, 371-3

need (*Bedürfnis*): cycle of, 322; and *Not*, 560; origin of consciousness, 109; realm of, 64; practical and theoretical, 208; and satisfaction, 112-13; system of, 489

- need of philosophy: empirical aspect of, 25, 26 n.; individual, 205 n., 223-5, 231 n., 232, 336-7, 564-5; no phenomenology of, 34-5, 58; social, 10, 13-14, 17-18, 191, 200-6, 224-5, 231 n., 232, 336-7, 550
- negation: category of, 346, 347-8; determinate, 364, 379, 469; law as, 497; in natural ethics, 113, 117, 119, 125; of nature, 316, of negation, 421-2, 469-70; *Potenz* of, 125-31
- negative Absolute: God as, 165, 196-7; infinity of Reason, 46-7, 192-3; manifold of sense, 45, 54; sublates finite logic, 40-3, 71-2, 192-3, 359; tragedy as, 211; as true infinite, 70 n., 130, 149-50
- nervous system: theory of, 290, 291-2, 295 n., 462
- NEWTON, Isaac (1642-1727): apple of, 84; atomism of, 251 n., 272, 304-5; Blake and, 571; calculus of, 361; critique of, xxxi, xlix, 12 n., 78, 80, 82, 92, 253 n., 268 n., 271 n., 282, 424, 426; excerpts from, 76 n.; and Hobbes, 111; and Kant, 393, 400, 464, 475; mechanics of, 39, 83-5, 87, 286, 468; metaphysics of, 373; motion in, 246, 423 n.; optics, 435, 437; *Opticks*, 438 n.; planetary density, 249; *Principia*, 249 n., 375; reintegration of, 213; and Adam Smith, 126 n.; model of understanding, 40, 43, 347, 349
- NIETHAMMER, Friedrich Immanuel (1766-1848): and Bamberg post, lxi-lxii, lxix n.; at Jena, xxvii n., xxx, lxv; and *Phenomenology*, lviii, lix n., lx, lxi, lxvii
- NIETHAMMER, Rosine E. (1771-1832), lxiii, lxv
- NIETZSCHE, Friedrich (1844-1900), 513
- night: comprehension of, 196, 199-200, 436; and day, 90, 196, 435-6; in *Eleusis*, 195 n.; God as, 165, 196-7; of memory, 471-2; other mind as, 484 n., 499; Quality model, 348; of Self, 461
- nitrogen: chemical element, 256, 258; in finite chemism, 271; in fire process, 262-3; in infinite chemism, 432; in water process, 264
- nobility, *see* aristocracy
- nominalism, 563-4
- Nothing: and Being, 364, 419-20; creative, 166, 167-8, 363-4; negative absolute, 41, 354 n., 380, 468-9
- noumena: intuition of, 50; and phenomena, 372, 380 n., 400; rejected, 82, 393
- NOVALIS (Friedrich von Hardenburg, 1772-1801): *Heinrich von Offertdingen*, 216; orientalism, 399 n.
- number: bad infinite of, 346-7, 359; one or unit, 245, 352, 353, 359, 361; Pythagorean, 93-6; realized Quantum, 346, 355, 357-9, 361; Zero, 358, 360-1, 363-4
- nutrition, *see* digestion
- obedience: battle of, 140, 143; ethical, 121-2, 128 n., 129-30, 135, 194
- object(ivity): above subject, xxxix, 225, 566; below subject, 77, 225, 566; identical with subject, 5-6, 27-8, 33, 45-6 n., 77, 82, 230, 566; of logic, 25, 27, 40; metaphysics of, 385, 387-90; parallel with subject, xxxiii, 35 n., 85-6, 322, 566; of truth, 473-6
- Oedipus: fate of, 480, 482 n., 485
- Ontological Argument, 58, 222-3, 241
- opposition, 205 (*see* antithesis)
- Orestes: in Goethe, 152 (*see* AESCHYLUS)
- organism: animal, 63-4, 101, 110-11, 242, 300, 523-5; anticipation of, 248; not chemical, 261 n., 278; and Earth process, 68, 266; and environment, 248, 382; human, 68, 174 n., 300; ideal of freedom, 138-9, 142, 510, 512; inner and outer, 289, 290-1, 295 n., 297, 460-1; mineralogical, 63 (*see* mineralogy); nature as, 39; social, 6-7, 9, 506-7, 519; spirit as, 64-5, 313, 523, 527-8, 530-44; systematic trinity of, 288 n., 294-5, 297; 1804 theory, 283-98; 1805 theory, 441-68; vegetable, 64, 503
- 'Outline of Universal Philosophy': *see* *Delineatio*
- ownership: dialectic of, 330, 484-5; illusion of, 203-4; labour and, 113; syllogism of, 484-7. *See also* property
- oxygen: chemical element, 256, 258, 432; in fire-process, 262-3; and oxidation, 271, 439 n.; in water process, 264, 432

panentheism: *see* God

PAOLO (Malatesta, d. 1285), 221 n.

PARACELSUS (Theophrastus Bombastus von Hohenheim, 1493–1541): alchemy of, 274, 278–9, 399, 438 n.

pardon: sovereign prerogative, 497–9

particular: and singular, 378, 451; and universal, 85–6, 100–1, 123–4, 375–81, 442–4

PARTINGTON, James R. (b. 1886), 258 n., 263 n., 277 n., 278 n., 354 n.

PAUL (Apostle, d. c.65): church-founder, 218; conversion of, 172, 173–4 n.; on Resurrection, 338

peasant: disposition of, 135, 507–8; as soldier, 140

PEISISTRATUS (c.600–527 BC), 504 n.

PELCZYNSKI, Zbigniew A., ix

pendulum: motion of, 84 n., 251, 428 n.; of nature, 84 n., 89–90

person(ality): category, 334–9; concept, 120–2, 203; evil principle, 497–9; legal, 489–93, 495; loss of, 128; love and, 482; and property, 125; respect for, 536; as spirit, 507

PETER, (Apostle, d. c.67): church founder, 218

PETRY, Michael J.: editing points, 430 n., 444 n., 445–6 n., 452 n., 460 n., 461 n., 465 n.; 1805 excerpts translated, 424–40 nn., 444–66 nn.; Hegel-interpretations of, 426 n., 434 n., 438 n., 454 n., 466 n.; on Kepler, 91, 95 n.; on Newton, 84 n.; on translation points, 429 n., 430 n., 435 n., 444 n., 449 n., 452 n., 455 n.

phenomenology: crisis for H, lvi, 339 n., 343, 414–15; and logic, 384, 414–18, 420–1, 436, 566–8; method of, 260–1 (*see* method); in philosophy of spirit, 417, 478, 541; as science, 540–3

Phenomenology of Spirit: an sich für uns antithesis, 267; art in, 514; Boehme in, 161 n., 175 n.; crisis point, 184; and *Difference* essay, 44 n.; ethical action, 415, 482; Fichte in, 29 n.; force, 266, 345; formalism in, 401–2; freedom and slavery, 139, 478–9, 487; and Identity Philosophy, 567, 569; Infinite in, 353 n., 365 n.; and Jena battle, lviii, lix n.; labour, 490; life in, 374 n.; and logic, 385, 387, 416–18, 550–1; method in, 443, 549; night in,

551; noble consciousness, 140, 479; object of concern, 344 n., 570, 572, 573 n.; origins of, lvi–lviii, lix n., lxix, 35, 414–18; philosophers in, xl, 548; and philosophy of spirit, 478, 568; revolution in, 496 n.; and Schelling breach, lxx n.; sense-certainty, 362 n.; systematic place of, 417–18, 464, 520–2, 569; *Vorrede*, lxi, lxix n., 403 n., 548 n.; *Weltlauf* in, 204; writing of, lxix

philosophy: in absolute triad, xlix (*see* art); and art, 8–14 (*see* art); of art, 64–9, 513–15; authority of, 403–8, 435; critical, 31–3 (*see* logic); democratic, 68, 403, 510, 512–13, 545; divine service, 65–6, 69 n.; dogmatic, 55–6, 59–61; and drama, 177; esoteric, xl–xli; Greek, 34, 172–3, 177, 199, 212–13, 505, 543; as Hesperus and Phosphorus, 194–5, 199–200; history of, xxxi, xlvii, lvii, 52, 199, 204, 539; impersonal, 336–7, 338–9; inverted world of, xl, 548; Idea of, 33–4 (*see* Idea); language of, 397–404, 409–11, 569, 572; of life, 8–14; as mediation, 444; natural, 82–97 (*see* philosophy of nature); need of, 10 (*see* need of philosophy); perennial, 34, 58, 93 n., 105, 411, 539; phenomenology as, 416–18; popular, xl–xli; and prophecy, 182–3; pursuit of death, 72, 193, 224, 559–61; real, 415–16, 518; reflective, 3–5 (*see* reflection); and religion, 80 (*see* religion); of religion, 64–9, 155–88, 222, 317, 514–18; social function of, 3–9, 13–14, 192–200, 342, 556–7; speculative, 74–17 (*see* speculation); of spirit, 63–4 (*see* philosophy of spirit); transcendental, 31 n., 59–60, 317–18; as wisdom, 72–3, 194, 197–9, 223, 226, 403, 548–9, 568–9

philosophy of nature: of 1801–2, xlix, 74–101, 110 n., 555; of 1803, 226, 238–9; of 1803 and 1804, lii, 238–98, 422, 423 n.; of 1805–6, 419–69; 1805 articulation, 441–5; and chain of being, 374 n.; division from spirit, 300–1; H's early interest, xxvi n.; Fichte's, xxxii, li–lii, lvi n.; formal and speculative, 400–1; Goethe's interest, lix–lx; Greek discovery of, 212–13; in Identity Philosophy, xxv, 31 n., 54,

- 62-5; and logic, 352 n.; religious importance, 515, 518; 1803 revolution, 238-9, 255, 259-60; Schelling and, xxi, 29; transcendental status, 265-70, 381, 393, 561-2, 567-8; in Triangle MS, 176-7; unity of real philosophy, 288 n., 442-4; Universe theory, 62-4
- Philosophy of Right*, 323 n.
- philosophy of spirit: of 1803-4, 228, 229 n., 269 n., 299-339; of 1805-6, 467-544; as absolute spirit, 63-4, 217 n.; 1805 articulation, 444, 470-1, 488-9, 499-501, 519; autonomy of, 518; begins as 'religion', xx-xxi, 5-16; diagram of, 523-44; in *Delineatio*, 207-22; emergence, 31 n., 140; as ethical nature, 63-4, 102-43; and logic, 345, 364-5; nature excluded, 449; and phenomenology, 417-18, 568; 1803 revolution, 233-4; totality of organism, 442, 444
- phlogiston: H's concept, 257; dispensable, 439 n.; and hydrogen, 263, 264, 276-7; theory, 279
- physics: 1805 articulation, 441; atomist concept, 360 n.; 1804 concept, 255, 259, 261-79; dynamic concept, 85, 354-5, 360; elements, 432-3; evolution of concept, 268 n.; H's interest, 78 n.; and metaphysics, 552; phenomenological, 443; philosophy of, 82-97; in System programme, 78-9; in total process, 433-45; 1803 transition to, 280-1
- PIER delle VIGNE (d. 1249), 221 n.
- Pirithous, 482
- planets: anticipate organisms, 248-9, 250, 524-5; motion of, 83-4, 86, 88-9, 92-6, 246-9, 424 n., 524-5; orbits, 88-9, 247-8, 424-5
- plant: and animal, 381, 449, 455-6; concept of, 64, 100, 283-7, 442, 446-9, 451-7, 477, 503; consciousness imagined, 315-6 n., 390, 455; sex in, 286 n., 455-6; syllogism of, 453, 529-30; types of, 448, 452
- PLANT, Raymond, ix
- PLATO (427-347 BC): and Apollo, 546 n.; *Apology*, 133; City in heaven, 54, 79, 177; Cave, 183, 193, 215; communism, 325-6; *Crito*, 132 n.; on desire, 461 n., 490; Homer attack, 334; influence of, 85 n., 136 n., 138, 159, 199, 213; *Lawus*, 112, 514; logic of, 380, 382; love, 413; *Parmenides*, 57; perennial philosophy, 37, 199, 213, 539, 552 n.; *Phaedo*, 131-2, 353 n.; *Phaedrus*, 67 n., 79 n., 552 n.; and poets, 405; *Politicus*, 119 n., 126, 502; and Protestant principle, 494 n., 505-6; *Republic*, 113 n., 135, 178 n., 211, 505, 543-4; *Symposium*, 57, 58 n., 123, 132 n.; *Timaeus*, 67 n., 92 n., 93, 94 n., 95 n., 160-2, 176 n., 178, 179 n., 184, 249 n., 252 n., 382, 403, 552 n.; *Timaeus Locrus*, 93 n.; world-soul, 67
- PLUTARCH (c.46-c.120), 122 n.
- Pluto, 480 n.
- POEGGELER, Otto: on Dante reference, 221 n.; on 'historical fragments', 4 n., 399 n.; on Hölderlin, 9 n.; on H's politics, 143 n., 557 n.
- poet(ry): and philosophy, 11, 25-6, 408-10, 521, 555-6, 572; teacher of mankind, 24, 150-3, 215-16, 219-22, 335-6, 405. *See also* mythology
- police, 509-10, 511
- polis*: art in, 215; ethical norm, 112, 122, 125, 131-4; fall of, 211, 541-2; and family, 122, 150-1; freedom of, 205; and individuality, 505; and nation, 317, 541; religion of, 132-3, 144-6, 150-1, 174, 192, 205, 213-14, 220, 317, 334-5, 337-8, 514-16, 542, 557-8; 'strength' of, 126, 133, 502; totality of nature, 169, 177, 541, 543
- POPPER, Karl R., 283 n.
- possession: *see* ownership
- possibility: and necessity, 389, 522; real, 366-7. *See also* modality
- postulate(s): critique of, xxxi-xxxii, 16, 82; *Ding an sich* as, 38; forces as, 371; God, 52, 82; immortality, 12 (*see* immortality); intuition as, 16, 23; method of, 16 (*see* method)
- Potenz(en)*: concept of, 70 n., 71-2, 91 n., 92-3, 106-7, 130; of consciousness, 308-9, 319, 476 n.; of family, 122-4; of feeling, 109-17, 138; formal, 117-22, 124-5, 135, 138; in logic, 354-5; in metaphysics, 387; of nature, 74, 100-1, 257 n., 283-4, 287, 451 n.; negative, 125-31, 134; Schelling's term, 75, 76 n., 106; of *Sittlich-*

Potenz(en) (cont.):

keit, 131-42; systems of, 106-42, 319;
theory abandoned, 246 n., 355 n.

poverty: revolutionary, 490, 494-5, 496,
497, 509

presence: *see Gegenwart*

present: mediates past, future, 244-5;
past, future possessed in, 422-3

PRIESTLEY, Joseph (1733-1804): debt
to, 257 n., 258, 271; forms of air, 258,
263 n.

process: animal, 442, 458, 466, 473,
475-6; and reality, 443-4, 468; and
structure, 468-9, 470; total, 433-4,
441-3, 468; vegetable, 458, 466

projectile: motion, 424, 426

proof: circle of, 349, 382; of Meta-
physics, 392

property: of family, 122 (*see family*);
and freedom, 328 n.; legal protection,
494-5; limits of, 125; in natural
ethics, 117-21; and recognition, 331,
333-4; recognition of, 484-6, 488;
sovereignty as, 143; violation of, 127-
8

proportion: concept, 366, 381-6; as
Metaphysics, 412, 414; and Subjec-
tivity, 385

Protestantism: art of, 152-3, 215, 516;
Church and State, 522, 536-7; demo-
cracy of, 510; inwardness, 515-16;
principle, 218-22, 494 n., 505, 511;
Reformation, xli, 149, 515-16

PROUST, Marcel (1871-1922): *Remem-
brance* etc., 319-20

Providence: *see God*

psychology: empirical, 472 n.

punishment: theory of, 489, 491-2, 496-
7, 499, 510 n.

Purgatory, 12, 221-2

Pylades, 482

PYTHAGORAS (*fl.* c.530 BC): astronomy of
school, 95, 253; influence of, 80 n.,
92-3, 94 n., 213; theorem, 383 n.,
473; triangle, 161

Pythia, 480 n., 481

Quality: articulation hypothetical, 346
n., 347-8, 350 n., 420-1; 1801 cate-
gories of, 42; concept defined, 350-1,
376; dialectic of, 244; ego as, 362-4;
and Infinity, 385; in Metaphysics,
385-6; primary and secondary, 354

n.; as Simple Connection 366; and
Substance, 366, 368

Quantity: as Allness, 353-4, 355, 356;
articulated in 1804 text, 346 n.; 1801
categories, 42; continuous/discrete,
352; dialectic of, 250-1; ego as 362-4;
labour as, 118; One/Many, 351-2,
353, 355; space as, 420-1

Quantum: articulation hypothetical, 346
n.; of consciousness, 364, 373-4; as
Degree, 354-5, 356; dialectic of, 355,
358-62, 421 n.; intensive, 432 n.; as
Number, 346 (*see Number*)

RAMANN Bros, lxiv-lxv

real philosophy: of 1802, xlix, 62-4; of
1805, lvii-lviii, 195 n., 410-11, 415-
16, 419-544; 1805 articulation, 442,
444, 451, 467-8, 500-1, 569; and
Encyclopaedia, 411; goal of, 230, 231
n.; lacunae (1805), 465 n., 466, 470,
488-9; and logic, 340, 342-3; and
Metaphysics, 392-3; nature and spirit,
293 n., 444, 449-51, 467-8; 1806 re-
vision, 499

realism: dogmatic, 59; transcendental,
60

Reality: and actuality, 469; 'bad', 377;
category, 346, 347-8; in real philos-
ophy, 467-9

Reason (*Vernunft*): as antinomy, 54, 56;
authority of, 403-6; and bad infinite,
363; and *Bildung*, 389-91, 564; in
brutes, 294, 296-7; and categories, 37,
42; and cognition, 436; critical, 341-
2; cunning of, 480-2; embodiment of,
122 n., 341 n., 531, 539; faith and, 12
(*see faith*); as finite subject, 233; for-
mal concept, 204; Frankfurt origin,
497; goal of, 305, 546-7; Ideas of, 15
(*see Idea*); and imagination, 60, 92; as
intuitive intellect, 51, 68; mediation
of, 406; mythology of, 5 (*see mythol-
ogy*); and nature, 325-6, 328; as nega-
tive Absolute, 41, 46, 359; objectified,
322, 536; paralysed, 374, 375; in
Phenomenology, 29 n., 417; phenom-
enology of, 414-15, 417, 472; practical,
104-5, 118, 174, 391-3, 479; regulative
ideal, 139; religion of, 8, 10 n.; self-
constructive, 71, 548; and sensation,
307-8; and speech, 116 (*see Logos*); in
syllogism, 47-8; *systema rationis*, 58

- n., 201-2, 203 n., 232-3; as true infinite, 39-40, 42; and understanding, 36-7, 41, 44-9, 84, 192-3, 359, 360 n., 419 n., 538; unique, xxxviii-xxxix, 93 n., 411, 539, 551-2, 557
- Reciprocity (*Wechselwirkung*): free, 388-90; rational, 381, 384; reflective, 42-3; of substances, 372-5
- recognition (*Anerkennung*): brute demand, 101, 293 n., 294-7, 450; concept, 406, 484-5; critical, xxxix, xli; family, 123, 316 n., 323-5, 450, 485-7; of God, 561; as honour, 330-1; legal, 119-21 (*see* recognized status); loving, 123, 163-4; of nature, 555; personal, 121, 199; religious, 145, 151; self-recognition, 323-5 (*see* self-recognition); sexual, 316 n., 481, 483, 533; speculative, 34, 35 n., 56-7, 59, 199, 406; struggle for, 330-1 (*see* struggle)
- recognized status (*Anerkanntseyn*): actuality of spirit, 487-8, 501-3, 535-6; existence of spirit, 507, 508, 536-7; as law, 488, 490-9; as property-right, 119-21, 334, 488-90, 494-5; self-defined, 515-16; transition to, 330-1
- reconciliation (*Versöhnung*): in Catholicism, 148; with fate, 168, 170; philosophic, 338-9, 405-6, 518-19; Protestant, 516
- reell, real*: H's use, 46 n., 69 n., 349
- reflection: absolute, 16-22 (*see* absolute reflection); active/passive, 376; cognition as, 230; in logic, 35-7, 40-50, 201, 351-2, 414; in mathematics, 90; philosophy of, 3-9, 11-14, 16-24, 35-7, 40-50, 53, 55-6, 59-61, 80-2, 111, 201-2, 205 n., 233, 236, 363, 549; into self, 380; subjective, 59-60, 233, 549; *systema reflexionis*, 201, 203 n.
- Reformation: *see* Protestantism
- REID, Thomas (1710-98), 377
- REINHARDT, Karl Friedrich (1761-1837), xxvii n.
- REINHOLD, Karl Leonhard (1758-1823): *Beyträge*, xxxv; and *Critical Journal*, xxxv, xxxvi, xxxix n.; formalism of, 18-19, 27-8, 30 n., 32, 37 n., 43 n., 47, 53 n., 54 n., 400; on history of philosophy, 52, 204, 337, 539
- Relation: absolute reflection and, 409; of Being, 366-75, 377, 379, 383-4, 387, 532; categories of, 42-3; cognitive, 203, 230-1; Essence replaces, 412-13; ethics of, 64, 106, 111-31, 203, 366 n.; identity as, 123; Infinite as, 365-81; in Metaphysics, 385, 387; and structure of system, 518-20; of Thinking, 366, 375-81, 383-4, 387, 519, 532; totality of Connection, 344, 347, 356; Whole and Parts, 355-6
- religion: in absolute triad, xlix (*see* art); of art, 9 (*see* mythology); of Beyond, 16, 192, 222; biography of God, 105 (*see* God); ceremony, 132; and Church, 9-10 (*see* Church); democracy of, 153-4, 510, 512; founders of, 218, 338, 550; and law, 494; natural, 146, 174, 213-14, 317, 334-5; political, 132 (*see* polis); of Reason, 8, 10 n.; above reflection, 7-8, 80-2, 549 n., 555; resumption of whole, 64-9, 144-88, 198; Roman, 119 n.; above *Sittlichkeit*, 123; speculative, 9, 143, 153-6, 194-200, 222, 233-4, 302-4, 337-9, 398-400, 402, 404-10, 515-18, 522, 536-9, 553-5, 557-9
- representation: *see* *Vorstellung*
- reproduction: course of, 289, 295; Kind-process, 287-8, 291-2, 294-5; minimal animal process, 458 n., 459 n.; of plants, 455, 457; sexual, 450, 527
- republic: H's sympathies, 142 n., 143 n.; and monarchy, 504-5
- rest: and motion, 246-52
- Restoration: effect of, 509 n., 520-1 n.
- resumption of the whole: becomes absolute spirit, 207, 337, 569; and logic, 33; physical analogue, 87, 551; subjectivity of, 154-5, 198, 219 n., 337, 569; theory of, 64-9, 553-4; in Triangle MS, 158-88; not written, 103, 105
- Resurrection: in Greek religion, 150-1; speculative interpretation, 67, 89 n., 179-80, 516-20, 551-2; universal experience, 89 n., 198-200, 337-9, 536, 538-9, 557, 559
- revenge: *see* vendetta
- revolution: economic, 490 (*see* poverty); French, 26 (*see* French Revolution); poet in 215-17; Scientific, 153 n.; sexual, 509
- RICHTER, Jean Paul F. (1763-1825): philosopher in *Titan*, 548

- RIEDEL, Manfred, 112 n.
- right (*Recht*): and barbarian, 127; concept, 64, 119–21; condition of, 119 n., 203 n., 211, 212; and *Naturrecht*, li
- ROBESPIERRE, Maximilien M. I. de (1758–94): as tyrant, 503 n., 504 n.
- ROBINSON, Henry Crabb (1775–1867): memories, xxii n., xlix n., 103 n.
- romanticism: attack on, 402–3
- Rome: achievement of, 119, 128, 147–8, 557; Empire, 177, 206, 211–12, 511; fall of, 126
- ROSENKRANZ, J. Karl Friedrich (1805–79): accuracy, 58 n.; H's Catholic sympathy, 156; *Critical Journal*, xlv; death fragment, 134, 223–4, 225, 337 n., 513 n., 559–60; *Delineatio* fragments, 145 n., 191 n., 193 n., 211 n., 214 n., 234 n., 514 n.; *Dissertation*, xxvi n., 76 n., 88 n.; editing, 36–7 nn., 43 n., 66, 75 n., 202; H's move to Jena, xx; 1801 lectures, 551 n.; 1802 lectures, xxxiv; 1804 lectures, 242 n., 397–402, 1806 Summer lectures, lviii, 420; logic fragment, 28–9, 411, 412 n.; Metaphysics, 157–8; Natural Law reports, 102, 105, 140, 144–9, 153–5, 158 n., 179–80, 183, 213, 214 n., 217 n.; phenomenological crisis, lvi; *Phenomenology* MS, lviii; Romanticism attacked, 402–3, 406 n.; H and Schelling, 553 n.; H's scientific studies, liii n., liv, 76 n.; Triangle MS, 75 n., 157–61, 174 n., 175–7, 178–9 n., 181, 184–8; *Verfassungsschrift* reports, 134 n., 511 n.; *Waste-book*, 158 n., 336 n., 408 n., 435 n., 546 n.
- ROSENZWEIG, Franz (1886–1929): new Theuses, 557 n.
- rotation: and orbital motion, 248, 252 n., 253, 425, 524–5
- ROUSSEAU, Jean Jacques (1712–78): 'back to nature', 211–13; General Will, 505; Geneva, 503 n.; women, 506 n.
- Royal Society: *Transactions*, 257 n., 439 n.
- RUECKERT, Josef (1771–1813): Realismus, xlv–xlvi, xlvii n.
- RUMFORD, Benjamin Thompson, Count (1753–1814), 429
- RUSSELL, Bertrand A. W., third Earl (1872–1967), 360 n.
- Sache*: and *Ding*, 361 n., 368, 472; examples of, 361; and *Ursache*, 368
- Sache selbst*: consciousness as, 372, 546; and *Ding an sich*, 359, 361 n., 373 475; as Ground, 386, 388
- salt, 439 (see chemism, finite)
- SALZMANN, Friedrich R. (1749–1820), 546 n.
- satisfaction (*Genuss*): see desire
- Scepticism: of Critical Philosophy, 48–9; spectre of, 53 n., 59–61
- Scepticism essay*: Leibniz in, 205 n.; Parmenides in, 57; Schulze in, xlv
- SCHAD Johann B. (1758–1834), 27
- SCHELLING, Caroline (Schlegel, 1763–1809): on Böttiger, xlii n., xlv; disruptive, xxii, lxiii–lxv; marriage, li
- SCHELLING, Friedrich W. J. (1775–1854): 'Absolute Identity-System', xxxviii n., xlv, 75; Abyss in, 165 n.; aether, 244 n.; aristocratic emphasis, xl–xli; breach with, lxv n., 235, 240 n., 401–2; *Bruno*, 99 n., 240 n., 244 n.; cohesion, 88 n.; friendly collaborator, x, lxiii–lxv, 196; correspondence with, xx–xxi, 3, 142 n., 549 n., 556, 573 n.; and *Critical Journal*, xxxiv–xxxviii, xl n., xli–xlvi; critique of, 240 n., 244 n., 263 n., 266 n., 286; 'On Dante', xlv–xlv; 'Darstellung', 88 n., 427; H as disciple, xxii–xxv, xxx, xxxviii n., xliii n., 81 n.; *Disputatorium*, xxx, xxxi, xxxii n., xxxiv n., and Fichte, xxii–xxiii, xxxvi–xxxviii, 17, 31–2, 35 n.; not formalist, 400–2; Gnosticism of, 406–7, 409; H's influence on, 15; H's view of, 3–4; influence on H, xxxiii, 14–17, 29, 30 n., 59 n., 71, 76 n., 77, 82, 428 n., 548, 554–6, 567, 571; *Ideen*, 165 n.; *Jahrbücher*, xlvii n., lxi, 296 n.; Jena lectures, li n.; leaves Jena, li, lii, liii, 191, 225, 226 n.; and nature philosophy, xxi, li, 173 n., 235; organic triad in, 295 n.; Platonism of, 193 n., 199; polarity in, 286; *Potenz* terminology, 75, 106–7, 319 n.; 'Schelling's system', li (see *Difference* essay); his school attacked, 261 n., 274 n., 286, 296 n., 400–1; soul and body, 249 n.;

- Spinozism of, 158; *Transcendental Idealism*, xxxv, xxxvi, 15 n., 27 n., 29; at Tübingen, xxvii n.; *Weltseele*, 81, 97 n., 248 n., 286 n., 295 n.; *Zeitschrift*, xxxvi n., xlii; mentioned, liv n., 499
- SCHELLING, Karl (1783–1855), xxx, xxxi, 28 n.
- SCHELVER, Franz Josef (1778–1832): liv, lxi, lxii, lxvi, lxvii
- SCHILLER, Johann Christoph Friedrich von (1759–1805): *Aesthetic Letters*, 554; aids H, xxii, xxiv–xxv, lii–liii, lxvi; and *Critical Journal*, xxxvii; death of, xxii; and Greek ideal, 505, 513, 558; influence of, 16, 404, 561; *Robbers*, 206, 216
- SCHLEGEL, August Wilhelm von (1767–1845): *Athenäum*, xxi, xxxv; and *Critical Journal*, xxxvi–xxxvii; divorce, li; and H, xxiii, xlii n., xlvi; orientalism of, 399 n.
- SCHLEGEL, Friedrich von (1772–1829): *Athenäum*, xxi, xxxv–xxxvi; Catholic convert, 156; his disputation, xxix; on H, xxiv; orientalism, 399 n.
- SCHLEIERMACHER, Friedrich D. E. (1768–1834): and *Athenäum*, xxxv–xxxvi; on H, xxiii; H attacks, 180 n.; Protestant thinker, 153
- SCHLOSSER, Christian H. (1782–1829), xxxi
- SCHLOSSER, Johann F. H. (1780–1851), xxxi
- SCHNEIDER, Helmut: on Triangle diagram, 157 n.; on Triangle MS, 157 n., 159, 160 n., 184–5 nn.
- SCHNURRER, Christian F. (1742–1822), xix
- scholars: as class, 510–12
- SCHOLL, Johann E. H. (1761–1820), xix n.
- SCHUETZ, Christian G. (1747–1832), xxi, xxviii, xxix, xxxiii n.
- SCHUETZ, Friedrich K. J. (1779–1844), xxxiii n.
- SCHUELER von EINEM, Gisela, xvi
- SCHULZE, Gottlob E. (1761–1833): critique of, xlv; formalism of, 400; and history of philosophy, 204, 539
- SCHWABE, Johann F. H. (1779–1834), xxvii n., xxx
- SCHWARZOTT, Thomas (b. c. 1780), xxx
- SCHWEIGHAEUSER, Jean-Geoffroy (b. c. 1770), 156 n.
- science (*Wissenschaft*): experimental, lix, 96–7; feeling and, 398–9; of life, 80, 81, 199, 408, 546; logic as, 18, 25, 31, 62, 201; meaning of, 301; natural and transcendental, 31–2, 62, 68, 76, 85, 181–2, 518, 567–8; phenomenological, 407 n., 520, 567–8; philosophy as, xxxvii, xli, liv, 14–15, 97, 199, 223, 518–22, 567–8; as self-cognition, 547–8
- Science of Logic*: beginning of, 420; and 1804 logic, 344 n.; and *Phenomenology*, 464; *Schein* in, 427
- SEEBECK, Thomas J. (1770–1831), liv, lix–lxi
- Sehnsucht*: faith as, 16, 219–20, 515–16; moral will as, 149–50, 543
- self: *see* ego
- self-cognition: of aether, 307–8, 315 n.; of Earth, 266, 269, 272–3, 285, 300, 306–8, 309; science as, 547–8; of spirit, 519, 537
- self-consciousness: of Absolute Spirit, 538–9; of God, 186–7; in *Phenomenology*, 416–17
- self-definition: as cognition, 380, 382–3; community of, 536–7; as damnation, 152; as freedom, 388, 390
- self-recognition: of Absolute, 537; civic, 450–1; in family, 323–5, 450; philosophical, 57, 406, 450–1; and sexual homology, 462–3
- sensation: and cognition, 176, 294, 297, 301, 311–13, 376, 471; and consciousness, 295–7, 310, 311–14; and intuition, 319, 321, 322, 471; manifold of, 45, 50; and Reason, 307–8; theory of, 287–8, 290, 291–5, 459, 461–2
- senses: phenomenology of, 292, 436, 439, 443, 462
- service (*Knechtschaft*): *see* lordship
- sex: conceptual division, 100–1, 446; and death, 465–6; total desire, 114, 123, 327; homology of, 462–3; and Kind, 524–5, 527; in plants, 286 n., 455–6; and recognition, 316 n., 481, 483, 533; and self-preservation, 459, 461; theory of, 217 n., 284–5, 287, 292–3. *See also* reproduction
- SHAKESPEARE, William (1564–1616):

SHAKESPEARE (*cont.*):

Dream, xlv; *Hamlet*, 457 n.; *Macbeth*, 129; *Romeo*, 485

shape, shaping (*Gestalt[ung]*): death and, 463; in diagram, 534-5; of Earth, 254-5, 259-60, 265, 267, 279, 280, 282, 438; finite and infinite, 260; fire and, 438; organic process of, 288 n., 289-96, 467; physical mechanics, 441; of plant, 530; of *Sittlichkeit*, 105, 131, 183, 553; sphere of, 534-5, 537-43; syllogism of, 538-9; theory of, 255-6, 259-60, 425, 427-34. *See also Bildung*

SHELLEY, Percy Bysshe (1792-1822): *Prometheus Unbound*, 260

SIEBERT, R. J., 324 n.

SIEP, Ludwig: freedom, 234 n.; Hobbes and Hegel, 111 n., 112 n.

signs: ambiguity of, 116-17; conventional, 485; and meaning, 472

Simple Connection (*einfache Beziehung*): analysed, 345-63; becomes 'Being', 412-13; and Infinity, 344; and Metaphysics, 383-5, 392, 419; as Quality, 366; and Relation, 347, 365, 531-4; and Understanding, 345-7, 419

simplicity: of aether, 299-300; of consciousness, 300, 304, 309, 311; defined, 304-5; and infinity, 364

sin: and *Sehnsucht*, 219-20. *See also Adam*

SINCLAIR, Isaac von (1775-1815), xx n., lxi n., 216 n.

singular(ity) (*Einzelne* etc.): absolute significance, 151, 326; as conscious middle, 536, 538; and formal *Potenz*, 124-5; and individual, 44; numerical, 299-300; and particular, 378; totality of, 327-9; and universal, 377-9, 446, 449 nn., 455, 526, 534

Sisyphus, 152

Sittlichkeit: absolute, 65-9, 553-4; art and, 215; comedy of, 151-3; ethical nature, 63-4 n., 74, 172-3; as goal, 193; harmony of, 205; and logic, 105-6; and *Moralität*, 81-2, 152-3, 174, 177, 213; origin of concept, 80-2; and spirit, 506, 509, 513, 532, 534-5; system of, 70-1, 101 n., 104-43; tragedy of, 150-1 (*see* tragedy); transcendental concept, 316-7

skin: theory of, 289, 292, 459

slave(ry) (*Knechtschaft*): not contract, 491; cultural freedom in, 132 n., 512; destiny of, 121, 490; Greek, 404, 558; instituted, 121, 128, 148, 487; natural, 120-2, 126, 128, 147, 487; wage-slavery, 333 n., 489-90, 495

sleep: and desire, 112, 180, 461; function of, 450

SMITH, ADAM (1723-90): *Wealth of Nations*, 126, 138, 489 n.

SNOW, Sir Charles Percy, xi

social insects: ignored, 294 n.

socialism: implicit, 333 n., 495

SOCRATES: death of, 131-3, 148, 151, 218, 505; hot and cold, 353 n.; absolute intuition of, 121-3, 151; and philosophy, 538, 545 n., 546 n. 569; pursuit of death, 134, 136, 194, 557

Solar System: and aether, 77 n.; concept realized, 243-4, 246-9, 424; and consciousness, 305, 471-2; dynamic concept, 345, 349-50, 450; and Earth-process, 265, 266, 434; evolution of, 282; ideal body, 39, 63, 91, 94, 157, 273, 476-7, 551-2; infinite mechanism, 282; and organism, 77, 100 n., 285, 453 n., 460, 523-5, 530; substance, 54; theory of, 75, 79, 82-96; and tone, 253 n.; and understanding, 345-6, 419, 424; and *Volk*, 535, 539

soldier(s): class of, 511-12; ethics of, 65 (*see* aristocracy); maintenance, 136

solicitation: prismatic, 437; in Solar System, 266, 280, 282 n.

OLON (c.640-c.559 BC): constitution of, 504 n., 542; wisdom of, 193

SOPHOCLES (496-405 BC): *Antigone*, 133, 151, 415, 483-4 n., 486 n., 542; and Greek Ideal, 145-6; *Oedipus Rex*, 504; personality of, 336

soul: Idea of, 228-31, 234 n.; rational self, 387-92

sovereignty: elements of, 141, 496-8, 501; form indifferent, 140; of law, 139, 501-5; natural and political, 130; popular, 504-6, 536, 539; as property, 143; and religion, 136-7; and tyranny, 502-4

space and time: and aether, 77; comprehension of, 521; concept and realization, 427 n., 443, 467-8; dimensions deduced, 86-7, 94 n.; finite cognition

- in, 35, 319, 471; and imagination, 319, 471; bad infinite of, 39-40, 54; and intelligence, 90, 471; spirit and time, 521; 1804 theory, 244-6; 1805 theory, 419-24; unity of, 361
- SPAVENTA, Bertrando (1817-83): on H's logic, 364 n.
- species: *see* genus, Kind
- specific gravity: as cohesion, 255-6; as fluidity, 427-9; light and, 254 n.; and mechanical gravity, 253
- speculation: as absolute consciousness, 224; as absolute reflection, 17, 19; and art, 9, 177, 554-5; dogmatic forms, 59-61, 411; evolution of concept, 336-7, 549; goal of, 65 n., 553-4; and history, 10 n., 57-8, 405-6; intuitive, 22-3, 553-4; as logic, 29-30, 35-52, 344, 549; practical science, 81-2; propositions in, 54, 56; rebirth of, 56, 58, 60; and reflection, 14-22, 31-3, 44-5, 46-7, 69 n., 413; and religion, 65-6, 154-5, 554-5; as spirit, 155, 156; transcendental, 60-1, 411. *See also* philosophy
- speech, *see* language
- sphinx, 480
- SPINOZA, Benedict (1632-77): *Ethics*, 199, 375; extension and thought, 158, 391; God, 56, 390-1; in history, 34, 199, 538-9; and Identity philosophy, 38, 60, 62 n., 67, 84, 91, 232; intellectual love, 561; mind-nature union, 234, 553, 557; *natura naturans*, 91, 94 n., 158; *Spinozismustreit*, 205 n.; substance, 54, 363, 372
- spirit: body and, 63; in bonds, 208 (*see* spirit in bonds); concept of, 301-3, 469-70, 568-9; and contempt of nature, 208-11; Divine, 187-8 (*see* Absolute Spirit); emergence of, 296, 463, 467-8; ethical nature, 62-4 (*see* *Sittlichkeit*); as final cause, 563-4; as forgiveness, 499; fulfils nature, 552-4; human-absolute, 236; identity self-made, 209; immediate existence of, 219 n., 316; life as, 6, 9; medium of consciousness, 207-8; as middle, 175; and nature, 238-9 (*see* nature); phenomenology of, 415-18, 519-22; practical and theoretical, 532; primacy of, 162-4, 186; and Reason, 417; as social bond, 11-12; subjective, 43-52, 108-17, 202, 219 n.; true, 507; use of term, 62 n.
- spirit in bonds: concept of, 169, 182, 238-9, 242; defined, 301-2; and divine law, 539 n.; and free spirit, 317, 538
- Spirit of Christianity*: community in 123 n.; fate, 126; forgiveness, 497; life, 5; Logos, 174; love, 163 n.; tree metaphor, 100 n., 455 n.; virtue, 135 n.
- square: of *mens*, 159 n., 181; of nature, 87, 90-1, 157-8; Pythagorean, 186 n.; ratio, 91-4, 247; resting, 159 n., 160, 174 n., 179-83; unresting, 162, 180-1
- stars: and consciousness, 308; significance of, 243-4, 248, 425
- State: authority focus, 501-5, 507, 517; and Church, 10 (*see* Church); comprehensive community, 536, 539; as machine, 79, 139, 495 n., 510 n.; prerogative of, 497; and property, 494, 495; separated powers, 137-8, 497-8. *See also* Constitution, Sovereignty
- state of nature: ethics of, 111-31; international, 511; non-spiritual, 449, 484, 502; transition from, 109, 125-30, 449, 542
- STEFFENS, Heinrich (1773-1845): *Grundzüge*, lx
- STEUART, Sir James Denham (1712-80): *Principles*, 126 n.
- Stoics: and Alexander, 122 n.; love of fate, 561; spirit in, 302; suicide, 321; tone, 253
- STORR, Gottlob C. (1746-1805), 5, 15
- struggle for recognition: brute sexual, 293 n.; conceptual motion, 121; close of cycle, 130-1, 334; as *Eigensinn*, 321; family-contest, 329-30, 484-7; honour motive, 129, 329, 330-1; and modern war, 511; in philosophy of nature, 449, 450; and property right, 328 n., 489-90; systematic significance, 478-9, 542
- subject(ivity): activity of finite, 43-52, 120, 191-3, 203-4; body as 86; definition, 349; metaphysics of, 229 n., 385, 393; need primitive in, 202; and object, 225 (*see* object); of plant, 451, 454, 455; and predicate, 377; reflective philosophy of, 29, 35-7, 59-60, 81, 233, 236, 363; speculative philo-

- subject(ivity) (*cont.*):
 sophy of, 223-5, 233-6, 301-31, 336-7, 471-87, 559-65; and substance, 390-1. *See also* consciousness
- sublation (*Aufhebung*): concept, 252 n., 324-6, 513; of death, 134 n.; false and genuine, 362-3, 367; of Greek ideal, 558; logical, 355, 360-3, 367; metaphysical, 230, 234 n., 236, 388, 549; natural, 245, 250, 252, 254 n., 444, 524, 527; self-transcendence, 520; spiritual, 309, 327, 331, 337, 513, 522, 561; sublimation, 513; supersession, 327; suspension, 192; of time, 406; transitional, 293, 520, 534, 549, 560; of understanding, 51-2, 55-6
- substance: as Cause, 368-73; and determinate concept, 377, 378; Earth as, 266; logical, 380; Metaphysics of, 54-5, 225, 228, 385, 566; monadic, 374-5; and process, 273; as Relation, 42-3, 366-8, 384, 447-8; Solar System as, 54; soul as, 387-8; and subject, 390-1; *Volk* as, 65 (*see Volk*)
- subsumption: of concept by intuition, 118-19; of intuition by concept, 113-15, 119-20; in logic, 377, 379, 382; in nature, 248, 259-61, 279-81, 293; method, 71-2, 74, 100, 101 n., 106-8, 112, 176, 377 n.; in religion, 146-50. *See also* *Potenz*
- SUCKOW, Johann L. (1723-1801), xxvii-xxx
- sufficient Reason, 231 (*see* ground)
- sulphur, 274, 277, 278-9
- Sun: centre of motion, 86 (*see* Solar System); centre of light, 89, 97, 248, 425-6; force, 433; ideal body of, 248-9 and Kind, 524-5; man as, 196-7, 'mother' of Earth, 425; negative unity, 188; process of, 261-2; sunspots, 252 n.
- SUTHMEYER, Hermann (1784-1824): lvi, lvii
- sylogism: of animal process, 457; of cognition, 391; diagrams, 450 n., 453, 454, 523, 525-6, 528-30; of digestion, 528-9; of force, 467; formal, 45, 47-8, 379-81, 384, 413; of galvanism, 525-6; of Kind, 447-8, 524-7; method illustrated, 499-500 (*see* method); organic, 526-7, 530; of plant, 283 n., 453, 457, 529-30; practical, 484-7; and Relation, 447 n.; speculative, 18, 50-2, 157, 381, 391, 413, 444; of spirit, 467, 538-40; of understanding, 478-9
- syndicalism: implicit, 489-90, 495
- synthesis: of concept and intuition, 49, 71-2, 78-9; of freedom and necessity, 6, 39; Idea as, 49; and *Potenz*, 76 n.; of reflection, 9; of self and world, 51, 78; as union, 6-8, 10; use of term, 44, 107 n.
- system: Frankfurt reflective, xx, xxv, xxxiii n., xlix-l, 3, 4, 7-9; 3-part (1804), l-liv, liv, lv-lvi, 239-40 n., 337, 407-8, 468, 559-63; 4-part (1802), xlvi-lxix, 61-73, 317 n., 336-7, 407, 468, 515, 547-59; 3/4-part (1805), lvi-lviii, 410, 416, 468, 500-1, 514 n., 518-22, 564-9; *Phenomenology* and, lvii-lviii, 416-18, 567-9; publication of, xlix, liii, liv-lvi, lvii-lviii, 499; as transcendental argument, 303, 305, 306-8, 331, 343; transition (1803), l-l, 178, 207, 212, 222-3, 299 n., 337, 338 n.
- System of Ethical Life*: aether in, 77 n.; agriculture, 100, 312 n., 455 n.; analysed, 102-40, 142-3; *Bildung* in, 323, 326 n.; civil law, 496 n.; cognition, 227 n., 228-9, 558; conclusion (supposed), 194 n., 224, 513 n., 559-61; and *Delineatio*, 145, 191, 203 n., 205, 207, 214 n., 268 n.; ethical nature in, 63-4 n., 178, 193 n., 202-3, 233-4, 322, 328, 366 n., 450, 558; freedom in, 234 n.; government in, 497 n.; Greek ideal, 211-13; grief in, 179-80 n.; Homer, 213-14, 216 n.; Idea in, 209; Kind in, 294 n.; labour, 113-14, 332-3; and H's logic, 30 n.; marriage, 323-4 n.; method, 70-2, 74, 86, 100, 106-8, 112, 176, 377 n.; and natural philosophy, 74, 99, 260 n., 268 n.; nobility, 512 n.; peasants, 507 n.; philosophy and religion, 195 n., 217 n.; *Potenzen* in, 319; published texts, 102 n.; recognition in, 101, 293 n.; self-intuition in, 125, 241; signs, 116-17, 320 n.; and *System of Speculative Philosophy*, 309; and 'Systemfragment', 6 n.; textbook origin, xlix-l; and Triangle MS, 554 n.; *Volk* in, 194, 317 n., 331, 502

- System of Speculative Philosophy* (1803/4): aether in, 206, 240, 299-300; class list, liii; conclusion (hypothetical), 194 n., 224 n.; consciousness in, 207, 301-28, 364; fragmentary, 299-300, 308, 322-3, 329, 343; Logic and Metaphysics, 228-9, 269 n.; philosophy of nature, lii, 239-40, 257, 261-82 nn., 283-98, 445, 453-6 nn., 458-63 nn., 466 n., 523-5, 530; philosophy of spirit, 219-20, 269 n., 299-339, 467, 472, 476 n., 478-9, 481, 483, 488 n., 489, 493 n., 494, 495 n., 501; and 1804 textbook, 279-82; time-pressure, 299, 331
- System-fragment (1800): and *Difference*, 9 n.; mythology in, 155-6; nature in, 80-1; philosophy and religion, 555
- System Programme (1796): authorship, 15; and *Dissertation*, 78-80, 81-2; philosopher and poet, 405, 406, 521, 555-6; physics in, 98, 156, 405; project of, 5 n., 6 n., 23, 147, 554-8
- systema rationis* (1802): see Reason
- systema reflexionis* (1802): see reflection
- TAMERLANE (1336-1405), 127 n.
- TASSO, Torquato (1544-95), xlvii
- TAULER, Johann (1300-61), 186
- tautology: example, 378; formal, 386
- taxation, 138, 509
- TAYLOR, Alfred E. (1869-1945): *Commentary*, 93 n.
- TAYLOR, Charles, ix
- temperature: 'Allness' model, 353-4; expression of, 430, 431, 432 n.; and heat, 369, 430 n., 431 n.; Kelvin scale, 306; Quantum model, 355; and Tone, 256, 258
- tension: colour as, 437; concept of, 253; of Earth, 254; of elements, 180, 265; galvanic, 525; heat as, 429; organic, 295-6, 447
- TERESA (of Avila, 1515-82), 218
- theft: types of, 119, 128
- THEOCRITUS (c.310-250 BC), 211
- theology: dogmatic, 5, 8, 171, 185-6, 387 n.; rational, 4, 8, 55; speculative, 144-88, 387 n., 411
- theoretical standpoint, 313, 473, 560, 563
- theosophy: H and, 161 n., 184
- THESEUS (12th cent. BC?): charisma of, 122 n., 194; constitution of, 141, 503 n.; friend, 482; of Germany, 143, 557 n.
- THIBAUT, Anton F. J. (1772-1840), lxvi
- THOMAS AQUINAS (1225-74), 165
- thought: and being, 57 (see being); and extension, 158, 240, 391; Relation of, 375 (see Relation); religion of, 149, 516; thinking machines, 268 n.; 'utterance' of, 510 n.; as wisdom, 194
- TILLIETTE, Xavier: *Schelling*, 319 n.
- time: see space and time
- Titans: see HESIOD
- tone: as heat tension, 262; musical, 320-1; theory of 253, 255-6, 259, 427, 429, 437
- tool: product of Reason, 113, 114, 116, 322, 323, 480
- Toward the Sunlight*: clarification, 11 n.; H at Berne, 15-16, 26, 73 n., 134 n., 147, 174, 186 n., 405, 521, 558; at Frankfurt, xx, lxix n., 4 n., 6-7 n., 11, 76 n., 146 n., 156 n., 549 n., 558; new interpretations, 6-7 n., 76 n., 549 n.; H's political interests, xxv n., 10 n., 141, 511 n., 556 n., 557 n.; *System-fragment*, 6-7 n., 547 n.; translations in, 5 n., 11, 12 n., 16, 23, 521, 554 n.; H at Tübingen, 57 n., 404
- tragedy: ethical, 129-30, 133, 134-5, 150-1, 212, 542, 559
- transcendental: cognition and consciousness, 222-3, 300-39, 359-60, 362-4, 371-3, 390, 407-8, 468; deduction, 37 n., 383-4; definition, 381-3; ego, 27, 39; idealism, liii, 60, 233, 240 n., 300-6, 308-15, 319-22, 334-9, 400 n., 408, 472-6, 560-1, 565-9; intuition, 16-18, 25, 43; logic, xl, 38-9, 233, 240 n., 380 n., 383, 563-4; philosophy, li, 33, 59, 177, 222-3, 343, 410-11; psychology, 30; realism, 60, 238-9, 265-70, 304-8, 315-17, 322-34, 381, 393, 400 n., 408, 561-2
- transgression: see crime
- TREDE, Johann H.: editorial points, lix n., 346 n. (see HORSTMANN); Hegel's Identity-system, 553 n., 554 n.; H's logic, 30 n., 104, 227, 229 n., 231, 234-5: *System of Ethical Life*, 70 n.
- Triangle: diagram, 157 n.; of ethical

- Triangle (*cont.*):
 nature, 543; of spirit, 87, 157, 158-9;
 of triangles, 157, 159 (*see* Holy
 Triangle)
- Trinity: implicit reference, 517; in
 nature, 243; speculative interpreta-
 tion, 89 n., 155-88, 407
- TROMMSDORF, Johann B. (1770-1837),
 257 n.
- TROXLER, Ignaz P. V. (1780-1866): H's
 first class, xxxii, 28 n.; Jena memor-
 ies, xxviii, xxxi-xxxii, lxiii
- true infinite: of concepts, 371; ethical,
 54, 73, 105; logical, 42, 54-5, 344-5,
 347, 363-6, 379, 416-17; love as, 481;
 physical, 39, 54, 68, 94 n., 244, 361,
 425; religious, 6, 17, 179, 198, 214; of
 syllogism, 378; of understanding, 353
 n.
- trust: *see* virtue
- truth: correspondence theory, 45, 371;
 definition of, 383; logic of, 23-4, 38,
 40; reflective, 19-22; semantic theory,
 53
- 'Tübingen fragment', 404
- tyranny: in constitution-making, 503-4,
 511
- ULRICH, Johann A. (1746-1813), xxvi,
 xxviii, xxix, xxxii
- Understanding (*Verstand*): active
 intelligence, 125, 314, 321-2; and bad
 infinite, 23, 41, 359; as determinate
 concept, 315, 322; importance of, 202,
 419 n.; logic of, 345-63, 419, 532; as
 mastery, 125, 203-4; mimicks Reason,
 36, 37, 43-9; Reason as, 84, 192; self-
 made, 476-9, 535; sphere of, 421,
 422-4 nn., 426-7; sublation of, 51-2,
 55-6; transition to Reason, 51, 359,
 360 n., 538, 547-8; true infinite of,
 353 n.
- unhappy consciousness: of Boehme,
 398-9 n.; of Critical philosophy, 539;
 of Protestantism, 219-20; of *Weltgeist*,
 478-9
- union (*Vereinigung, Einsseyn*): body and
 soul, 105-6; with God, 197, 234, 515;
 marriage as, 493-4; might of, 6, 12 n.,
 13-14, 501-3, 550; of mind and
 nature, 234, 557; of simple and in-
 finite, 299-300, 304; of singular and
 universal, 311; *Volk* as, 6, 7, 331, 505
- unity (*Einheit*): dialectical, 367, 402,
 434, 525, 534; one/many, 72, 503;
 negative, 188, 352, 354, 358, 367;
 positive, 352, 354, 358, 382; pure,
 362; of will, 492, 501-6
- universal(s): abstract, 21, 563-4; in art,
 24; as categories, 37, 40, 42 n., 43; as
 community, 297; concrete, 382 (*see*
 concrete universal); empirical, 100-1,
 122-4; and individual, 68, 453, 524-5,
 531, 543; mind as, 477; natural and
 spiritual, 409-10; and particular, 375-
 81 (*see* particular); problem of, 19,
 563-4; singular and, 377-9 (*see*
 singular)
- Universe (*Universum*): blind fate, 203;
 cognitive reconstruction of, 175-8,
 222-4, 546, 553; creation of, 175, 188;
 ethical and natural, 208-9, 224-5,
 560; finite aspect, 70, 233; of God,
 170-2, 181, 187-8, 198, 204 n., 216,
 337, 554; Idea realized, 62-4, 65;
 objective Logos, 164, 188; realm of,
 187; as Son, 155-6; and Spirit, 208-9,
 552-4, 559; use of term, 63 n., 559 n.
- Unphilosophy: xxxix (*see* common
 sense)
- Urbild*: and *Abbild*, 37-8, 42, 55, 61, 93
 n., 105, 549, 555
- utterance (*Entäußerung*): of self, 501-
 2, 510 n., 519; of spirit, 226, 239
- value: concept, 188, 119-20; dialectic of,
 490; range of, 489
- VARNHAGEN von ENSE, Karl A. (1785-
 1858), xxxii n.
- vegetable: *see* plant
- velocity: of light, 361 n., 426; planetary,
 247
- vendetta: natural justice, 129-30, 151
- Verfassungsschrift*: *see* German Consti-
 tution
- Vernunft*: *see* Reason
- Verstand*: *see* understanding
- VIEILLARD-BARON, Jean-Louis: H's
 materialism, 240 n., 244 n.; Platonic
 influence, 252 n.
- VIRGIL (P. Vergilius Maro, 70-19 BC),
 56 n., 221 n.
- virtue(s): courage, 121, 129, 132, 134,
 141-2, 150, 194, 197, 215, 224, 330-1,
 482, 511, 512-13, 536, 542, 561;
 friendship, 325-6, 482; intuitive, 135

- n.; justice, 128-9, 133, 325-6, 482, 509, 511; moral, 135, 152-3, 541; political, 133-4; trust, 128-9, 135, 136, 143; unity of, 134; wisdom, 72-3, 107, 134, 135, 136, 138, 141-2, 182-3, 194, 197-9, 223, 226, 403, 509, 512, 545 n., 548-9, 565, 568-9
- VOIGT, Friedrich S. (1781-1850): lxi
- VOIGT, Johann H. (1751-1823): xxvi, xxvii, xxx
- volition: *see* will
- Volk*: as absolute consciousness, 224, 309, 317, 335-6, 403, 411, 514, 539; bond of, 143, 550; and climate, 99, 209-10; and constitution, 216; ethical substance, 54, 64, 65, 70 n., 249 n., 269 n., 316, 415, 453, 482, 501, 518-19, 550; happy, 10 n., 13; as Idea, 107; immortal, 64, 516; intuition of, 6, 9, 108, 131, 214-15, 220, 316-17; language of, 403, 409-10; life in, 67, 72-3, 108, 121, 132, 194, 197, 215, 331, 535, 536, 542; organism, 68, 111, 442, 444, 497; and philosophy, 197, 224, 409, 547, 550; real spirit, 208, 501, 519, 547, 552; religion of, 144-6, 182-3; sovereignty of, 501, 504-6, 511-12
- Vorstellung(en)*: authority of, 408, 435; and concept, 367-71, 376, 406, 408; free self as, 48; importance of, 485; inadequacy of, 398-9, 403; theory of, 48-9, 50, 64, 319-21, 471-2
- Voss, Johann Heinrich (1751-1826): H's letter, lvi n., lxii n., 409-10, 414-15; reply, 545-6, 569, 570
- WALDO, Peter (*fl.* 1175), 219
- war: national, 134, 511; natural, 129-30, and philosophy, 224, 561
- Wastebook*: Boehme in, 158 n., 161 n., 167 n., 179-80 n., 185 n., 219 n., 336 n., 363 n., 407-8; philosophy in, 199 n., 408, 409 n., 435 n.; time-spirit in, 546 n.; understanding in, 419 n.
- water: chemical composite, 257, 432; and crystallization, 432; cycle of, 262, 264; model fluid, 427; salt element, 268 n., 270, 272; and spirit, 215; tension of, 188; as whole and parts, 356
- Waterloo: battle, 509
- WATT, James (1736-1819), 263 n.
- weather: novelty of, 469 (*see* Earth-process)
- WEBER, Max (1864-1920), 119
- WEISS, Christian (1774-1853), xlvii
- Weltgeist*: *Bildung* of, 478-9, 568
- Werk*: product of labour, 479; of *Volk*, 220, 331, 335, 501
- Whole and Parts, 42 n., 355-7
- will: general, 486-7 (*see* general will); spontaneous, 309-10; theory of, 479-89; of *Volk*, 214, 497
- WINCKELMANN, Johann J. (1717-68), 505
- WINTERL, Jakob J. (1732-1809): syllogism of, 525
- wisdom: *see* virtue(s)
- Wissen*: *see* knowledge
- WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig J. J. (1889-1951), 390
- WOLF, Friedrich August (1759-1824): on Homer, 216 n., 335
- WOLFF, Christian (1679-1754), 95-6, 205 n., 360 n.
- World: 'course of', 204; Idea of, 228-31, 234 n.; monadic reciprocity, 388; soul of, 67, 93
- WYNDHAM, John: *Day of the Triffids*, 315-16 n.
- yearning: *see* *Sehnsucht*
- YOUNG, Edward (1683-1765): *Night Thoughts*, 571, 573 n.
- ZELLMANN, Christian G. (1785/6-1808): lvi, lvii n.
- ZENO (of Elea, *fl.* 450 BC): paradoxes, 40, 360, 380 n., 423; pure infinite, 57
- Zeus, 145, 146, 217, 260, 317
- ZIMMERLI, Walter C.: on *Difference*, 43-4 n.